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  Abstract  
    
Abstract 
 
This thesis deals with a history of the lie of innocence, its inception in biblical 
representation and its development in literary representations from the eighteenth 
century to contemporary times. The aim is to disclose the way the lie functioned 
across time both in Christian societies and in the secular ones in their wake. In 
identifying the place of ‘innocence’ in Christian dogma as an ideal unrealized state, 
this work will disclose not only the source of the lies that replaced the sublime 
archetype (after ‘The Fall’) but also how the lie has been sustained across time to 
service the law. In this thesis the law will be seen as a patriarchal state presented by 
writers in father figures. The lie in being exposed by the ‘sons’, who, in disowning the 
law of the father, become orphans and rebels and subsequently hold the potential to 
embody what Nietzsche, termed the ‘innocence of becoming’ and which Deleuze, 
incorporated into his concept of ‘becoming’.  
 
An analysis of the selected texts by William Blake, Herman Melville, William Faulkner, 
Graham Greene and Cormac McCarthy will trace the ways in which biblical 
stories/myths/parables/symbols survive in literary works for philosophical rather than 
religious reasons. It will show how ‘the lie of innocence’ was seen as a necessary 
trope both in societies where economic, political and religious forces were inextricably 
fused (particularly in protestant environments as analyzed by Max Weber) and in 
societies, that although secular, nevertheless give expression of the ‘affects’ of those 
old certainties in the process of losing validity, and how they harbored the ‘lie of 
innocence’. This thesis will argue that the plane of transcendence continues in the 
cypher of what Deleuze would refer to as the plane of immanence and that it is the 
nature of politics in its secular dealings to justify its expedient and duplicitous polemics 
by lies that were once but are no longer universally justifiable in terms of a 
transcendent order. 
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This thesis will argue that the origins of the concept of innocence – as represented in a 
selection of western literary texts by William Blake, Herman Melville, William Faulkner, 
Graham Greene and Cormac McCarthy – lay in the biblical legend of The Fall. This 
work will demonstrate the ambiguous nature of the concept itself. The biblical narrative 
that included the dominance of the ‘Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil’ over the 
‘Tree of Life’ in the ‘Garden of Eden’ will be identified as being prophetic of the ‘law’ 
upon which humanity has constructed its concept of innocence. Human beings’ 
fixation upon ‘law’ and its projections of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ has served to distract 
interpretations of the Bible that might have acknowledged the forgotten presence of 
the ‘Tree of Life’. The image of the ‘Tree of Life’ will be employed in this thesis as a 
symbol for a perception or vision of life that may be characterized by a freedom of 
imagination and a veracity that manifests in compassion and a determination to 
preserve life. Such a vision is represented in characters that assume orphan status 
and who create new values that replace older laws of patriarchy. What this thesis will 
argue is that there exists in the literature examined an emerging ‘knowledge of life’ 
(the Tree of Life) that was mostly subsumed and repressed in institutionalized religion 
prior to the 8th Century and the emergence of the period known as Romanticism. 
Accordingly, philosophies and literary texts reflected more in their discourse, symbolic 
structures and language questioning the rigidity of absolute values. This thesis will 
also examine later manifestations in selected modernist and postmodernist texts that 
increasingly created characters that represented in orphan form what Nietzsche 
referred to as the ‘innocence of becoming’ that was a consequence of this questioning. 
 
Symbols inherent in biblical legend are also a central concern of this thesis. The 
Genesis text, foundational to the Christian tradition and the source upon which its 
claims to authenticity rests is drawn on in this thesis in order to determine its 
understanding of the concept of innocence. The Genesis narrative of the ‘Garden of 
Eden’ juxtaposes two trees, the ‘Tree of Life’ and the ‘Tree of the Knowledge of Good 
and Evil’ from which man is prohibited from eating (Genesis 2:8-9;17).i Having tasted 
the fruit of this forbidden tree humanity is subsequently banished from the ‘Garden’ 
and hence alienated from the ‘Tree of Life’. Christian theology has identified Adam’s 
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trespass against this prohibition as a defining breach of moral law that ushered ‘sin’ 
into the world, concealing humanity’s potential to choose an authentic pathway. 
Although not overtly developed as a metaphor in the Bible, it will be argued that in the 
dominant Christian presentation of the Genesis narrative, the ‘Tree of life’ is subsumed 
by The Fall. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify in biblical stories a continuing vision 
of the ‘Tree of Life’, represented in those characters who despite the prohibitions of 
‘law’ and the threat of punishment, act with fidelity to others in order to preserve life.ii 
In this thesis I will argue that art specifically literary art, will demonstrate that there are 
always human beings who carry the seed from the ‘Tree of Life’; History will show that 
these characters are those who transgress the law subverting the will of the Father. I 
term these characters as ‘Orphans’. Literature may represent them, depending at what 
point they emerge, as tragic heroes/heroines/victims, rebels or outsiders.  
 
We believe that we know what ‘innocence’ means. There is a general consensus that 
it has particular meaning and that it has a moral value. However, when one tries to 
access the basis of a moral origin it becomes impossible to find. It does not exist. In 
seeking the genealogy of the history of the concept of innocence, I began my research 
with the biblical text in that it is a source that will become integral to the symbolic 
worlds of Western art, literary art and social expression up to the present day. The aim 
was to follow its pathway and ascertain the extent to which its iconography of ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’ permeates aesthetic constructions of culture both during the period of 
secularization (Enlightenment period to Modernism) and post secularization (late 
Modernism and Postmodernism). To do so it is necessary to examine how the concept 
of innocence, bred in the certainties of biblical ethics, evolved over time in literary 
symbolic constructions. This analysis hopes that by pinpointing the ambiguities and 
contradictory aspects of its biblical construction one might trace an historical 
development of the ‘lie’ that has served politics and religion alike. 
 
The idea of innocence as represented in Western literary texts finds its roots in Judeo 
Christian religion and its meaning has continued to evolve through ever changing 
social, economic and political realities. It will be argued that the literary and 
philosophical texts discussed in this thesis expose the concept of innocence – as 
represented by the will of the Father – as a lie. Although the legend of The Fall as 
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presented in Genesis depicts the concept of innocence as being unrealizable, the term 
is nonetheless used throughout the Bible as if it were. According to the biblical 
interpretation, Adam and Eve’s eating from the forbidden tree negated the possibility of 
innocence. 
 
This thesis will demonstrate that, ironically, it is only when secularized forces are in 
play that the ‘Tree of Life’ as envisaged in the Bible is represented as relevant once 
more. In this work an analysis of its relevance will focus on selected texts from 1790–
2007. The focus of this thesis will be on the representations of relationships between 
fathers and sons, the points of tension between them and the point in which the son 
becomes an orphan and as such becomes liberated from a Christian theology that 
deemed humankind as imbued with original sin. It will be explained how the idea of the 
Father is to be understood within a larger metaphorical frame of patriarchy and how 
this has changed from pre-secularization to contemporary times.iii Ideas of the Father, 
for example, may refer to the role of the church; the impact of science; enlightenment 
thinking and gender relations amongst others. This ‘lie of innocence’ is shown to be 
the resultant creation of patriarchal power, employed by the Father to portray a 
benevolent image in order to serve social, cultural and political seats of power.  
 
Literature Review 
This inquiry into the history of the ‘lie of innocence’ commenced with an examination of 
the translations of the terms ‘innocence’ and ‘innocent’ in selected English versions of 
the Bible. Starting with the King James Version (1611), each occurrence of these 
terms was correlated with the Hebrew (Old Testament) or Greek (New Testament) 
word from which it was originally translated. This same process was continued across 
four subsequent versions of the Bible in order to identify the contexts in which the 
concept of innocence was employed and to highlight changes in the translation of 
‘innocence’. A Bible Comparison Table (appendix A) was compiled to present these 
findings and to assist in ascertaining whether such changes reflect a hermeneutical 
shift in the interpretation of the concept of innocence in contemporary times.  
 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical writings provided this thesis with an alternative 
concept of innocence that is neither subject to notions of a transcendent moral order or 
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humanistic claims made in relation to the ‘knowledge of good and evil’. While the term 
‘innocence of becoming’ appears in a collection of his essays published in 1906 as Will 
to Power Nietzsche explicated the concept in his parable ‘Of The Three 
Metamorphoses’ in Thus Spake Zarathustra (1892) in which the idea of ‘becoming’ is 
poetically realized. A reading of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1987) developed this notion. Deleuze and 
Guattari further developed this concept of ‘becoming’ by representing it in many guises 
such as ‘becoming animal’, ‘becoming woman’ and ‘becoming imperceptible’ that 
contributed to my understanding of the genealogy of Nietzsche to Deleuze.  
Nietzsche’s The Gay Science (1882) argued that human knowledge (science) had 
been constructed upon error: An idea further emphasised in Beyond Good and Evil 
(1886) and served to explicate the ways in which knowledge is provisional – changing 
in relation to economic political, ethical, cultural and scientific needs of society across 
time and place. His theory of perspectivism expounded in Beyond Good and Evil has 
been instrumental in the representation of the metaphorical Orphan in this thesis, as 
has his concepts of the ‘Noble Man’ and the ‘Will to Power’ (also presented in this 
work), which are identified as defining characteristics of one who through strength of 
will create their own values. Employing the symbolism of the camel, lion and child 
Nietzsche’s novel Thus Spake Zarathustra portrays the way for humanity to return to 
the ‘meaning of the earth’, a homecoming that restores a vision of life previously 
obscured by misplaced faith in the veracity of our accumulated knowledge. 
 
Max Weber’s seminal essay ‘The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’ 
(1906) was drawn upon to identify the historical influences that contributed to the 
rationalization of Protestant Christianity for Capitalist ends. Weber’s identification that 
the notion of a ‘calling’ to work was fundamental to the theology of the Calvinist 
applied categories of the ‘elect’ and the ‘damned’, provided a framework for the 
discussion of innocence in relation to the Protestant Work Ethic as presented in the 
novels: Herman Melville’s Moby Dick and William Faulkner’s Light in August. Weber’s 
observations that the Protestant ‘elect’ demonstrate their ontological innocence 
through dedication to work and the denial of human emotions such as doubt, 
compassion and empathy were critical to my analysis of the function of the concept of 
innocence in the service of Capitalism. 
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Jacques Derrida’s essay ‘The History of the Lie’ (2001) considers how the ‘lie’ is 
difficult to extract when history itself might be seen as a story of lies (Derrida 2001, p. 
71).iv Just as the concept of the ‘lie’ has a history and culture that Derrida suggests 
‘has and continues to have, an effect on how one lies and the presentation of the lie’, 
so it will be argued that the concept of innocence has a history that mirrors the lie 
(Derrida 2001, p. 69). Derrida refers to the ‘internal historicity’ of the lie and examines 
the influences upon its transformation and the possibility of ‘ruptures’ within the 
Western tradition (Derrida 2001, p. 69). The concept of the lie is problematic because 
one cannot prove someone is lying even if it can be demonstrated that what is said is 
not true. The traditional understanding of the lie is concerned with the conscious and 
intentional desire to deceive another, rather than erroneous statements or a state of 
being that defines one as a liar.v If one speaks in error but does so in belief that what 
they have said is true, they do not lie, while one can lie even by saying what is true if 
they do so with the intention to deceive. Derrida suggests that any concept of a ‘history 
of the lie’ would be determined by ‘culture, a religious or moral tradition, perhaps more 
than one legacy (and) a multiplicity of languages’ (Derrida 2001, p. 69). Furthermore 
he contends that cultural aspects such as ‘the practice of the lie, manners, 
motivations, techniques, means, and effects of the lie’ would need to be considered 
(Derrida 2001, p. 69).vi Readings of Derrida’s writings were crucial to the argument of 
this thesis that such multi-dimensional, complex and multi-layered constructions of the 
lie are exposed by irony that looks beyond presupposed contexts, disrupting prior 
suppositions and assumed coherence. For example, Derrida’s insights assisted in the 
approach taken to Blake’s poetry in Chapter Two where Blake’s subversion of 
Christian ideas of innocence and experience are deployed by irony, as is the concept 
of innocence supposedly embodied in Melville’s Billy Budd in Chapter Four. Claire 
Colebrook was also an important critic in this investigation into the concept of 
innocence. Her discussion of Deleuze’s theory on the relationship between innocence 
and desire in Irony: The New Critical Idiom (2004) was employed to elaborate upon 
Blake’s use of irony. Her contention that irony is foremost experienced in the body of 
the subject rather than evoking a heightened consciousness of an objective reality was 
influential in my analysis of Melville’s representation of innocence in Billy Budd. 
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The literary texts selected for this study were analysed primarily through the theoretical 
and philosophical frames provided by the above writers. Nevertheless, critical 
materials on the literary texts from the time in which they emerged to the present time 
were read in order to ascertain the extent to which my subject area had been covered. 
The secondary material sought was related to Blake’s perception of a vision of life free 
from prior assumptions and established axioms of truth. Furthermore dialogue with 
secondary criticism that dealt with the following was of significance: The ways Blake’s 
poetry exposes the limitations of empiricism, rationality and religious ideology and the 
ways in which it was employed to justify the concept of innocence without the 
necessity of recourse to some alternative moral value or transcendent order. Peter 
Ackroyd’s work Blake (2005) was influential when contextualising Blake’s poetry in 18th 
Century English society and in particular highlighting the social ills experienced by the 
child. Nicholas Marsh’s analysis of Blake’s poetry in William Blake: The Poems (2001) 
identified the significance of Blake’s presentation of the interdependence of innocence 
and experience and the possibility of envisaging a third state. James Sambrook’s The 
Intellectual and Cultural Context of English Literature 1700-1789 elaborates on the 18th 
Century debate between the Enlightenment emphasis on rationality as the pathway to 
truth and the Romantic focus on divine immanence in nature and its revelatory powers 
(Sambrook 1993).  
 
Given that one of the tenets of this thesis involved exploring the concept of vengeance 
in Moby Dick and Billy Budd, the discussion of Robert Solomon’s views on vengeance 
in Arindan Chakrabarti essay ‘A Critique of Pure Revenge: Response by Robert C 
Solomon’ (2012) was significant to this thesis in that it identifies the lack of recourse to 
legal process to address perceived injustices as the motivation for vengeance, rather 
than issues of power or moral judgement. In that Herman Melville’s work demonstrates 
that judgements concerning idealized moral states – such as innocence – are in fact 
determined by economic and political imperatives the interpretive frame was primarily 
Weberian. However, Melville’s use of the ‘White Whale’ as a metaphor identified the 
multiplicity of possible meanings white has across time, place and culture. 
Furthermore the ‘White Whale’ representing that which is unrepresentable and cannot 
be rationalized nor defined according to religious, political or ideological paradigms. It 
was not unlike Nietzsche’s representation of the sublime in nature. It was developed 
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further by Robert Solomon’s treatment of sublime beauty as experienced bodily and as 
not dependent on transcendent meaning. As presented in Padmasiri de Silva’s essay 
‘Thinking and Felling: A Buddhist Perspective’ (2012), the idea that the body functions 
as a ‘second brain’ when responding to ethical or moral dilemmas was helpful in 
analysing Melville’s representation of the incongruity between emotional perceptions of 
innocence and legal determinations. 
 
When examining the works of Faulkner and Greene I accessed secondary material 
both from the times in which the works were written and since. From this vast material 
the writers that impacted on my thesis either in confirming an approach or in signalling 
new ways of seeing were:  
 
Cleanth Brooks who wrote extensively on Faulkner’s fiction and in particular his 1963 
essay ‘William Faulkner, Vision of Good and Evil’ (Brooks 1973) provided a critique of 
the social context which informed Faulkner’s Light in August (1932) identifying the 
religious heritage that continued to impact upon and inform the racial prejudice and 
economic inequality represented in the novel. Lawrence Bowling’s work ‘William 
Faulkner, The Importance of Love’ (1973) further elaborated on this critique of 
Protestantism, emphasising the importance of ‘love’ in Faulkner’s writings and its 
significance in revealing the divisive legacy of Christianity in America’s south. Harvey 
Gable’s discussion of Faulkner’s portrayal of love as a transfiguring presence that 
evoked a more humane, compassionate and honest perspective on life to perceive 
beyond the judgemental and restricting confines of constructed moralities was 
instrumental in identifying the means by which Faulkner’s fiction exposed the ‘lie of 
innocence’ (Gable 1996). This view was further supported in Michael Lackey’s essay 
‘The Ideological Function of the God-Concept’ (2006) in which ‘love’ is shown to 
quicken a transfiguration that manifests in empathy and solidarity with the blighted. 
 
Symbolism and allegory are identified in this thesis as instrumental in exposing the ‘lie 
of innocence’. Hope Hodgkins’ discussion of the sublime in relation to Greene’s 
apophatic theology and his use of symbolism alluded to the possibility of a concept of 
innocence that was neither subject to, or determined by morality or religious conformity 
(Hodgkins 2006). Graham Holderness’ essay ‘Knight-Errant of Faith? Monsignor 
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Quixote as Catholic Fiction’ (1993) was important in exploring the concept of 
innocence in relation to Greene’s political views on revolutionary action undertaken to 
alleviate human suffering and the possibility of collaboration between Communism and 
Christianity to achieve social and political ends. In his Marxist analysis of Brighton 
Rock, Trevor Williams’ contention that the characters are primarily presented with 
political choices rather than theological ones helped to define my argument that for 
Greene political choices are conversely theological concerns. (Williams 1992). 
 
My analysis of Cormac McCarthy’s post-modern novel The Road was influenced by 
the writings of Alain Badiou and in particular his work Infinite Thought: Truth and the 
Return to Philosophy (2003), providing and insight into the representation of the 
subject in literature and how fidelity in the moment as a determinate of truth is 
characteristic of Nietzsche’s ‘innocence of becoming’. 
 
The idea of the ‘Orphan’ will be introduced as a symbolic construction to represent one 
who acts authentically in relation to his/her own will and in doing so, implicitly rejects 
the will of the Father, thus forfeiting his place among the ‘innocent’ as defined by the 
Father. The metaphor of the ‘Orphan’ is representative of one who refuses to engage 
in the paradigm in which fathers and sons struggle for power. The idea of the ‘Orphan’ 
will refer to the son as, for example, the marginalized; the rebel; the alienated; the law-
breaker and what Alain Badiou would call ‘the militant thinker’ (Badiou 2007). 
Concepts will inevitably change over time, however it will be shown that consistently 
‘innocence’ is adjudged by the Father according to obedience and conformity. It will be 
argued that the application of this concept of innocence can be seen as one of 
deliberate inaction, a stasis that disempowers those who acquiesce to the Father, as 
represented in selected literary texts. 
 
Using Gilles Deleuze and Friedrich Nietzsche as interpretive frames this thesis will 
examine selected literary texts by Herman Melville, William Faulkner, Graham Greene 
and Cormac McCarthy; it will seek to take their thinking to a plane of immanence. 
Nevertheless this thesis will show how the folds of the past continue to capture the 
human imagination in positions of restraint. ‘Transcendent’ images have been 
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discarded but human consciousness still employs them when making sense of its own 
immanence.  
 
In exposing the ‘lie of innocence’ the selected literary authors affirm another concept of 
innocence, that Friedrich Nietzsche termed ‘innocence of becoming’. Nietzsche’s 
‘innocence of becoming’ is a critical response to the Western – largely Judeo-Christian 
– world’s philosophical and religious belief that humanity is endemically morally flawed 
or spiritually corrupted by ‘original sin’. The belief in this sin entails a need of 
redemption according to transcendent absolution or historical redress and 
transformation. Nietzsche asserted that in the absence of a God or transcendent order 
such moral judgments were meaningless, leaving humanity no alternative but to affirm 
life (its pleasures along with its woes) despite the absence of the promises of infinite 
life. Such life-affirmation must be experienced and acknowledged in the moment as all 
prior goals and ends are rendered as futile in the face of an on-going process of the 
re-valuation of values. This re-valuation of values is the ‘innocence of becoming’ 
where there would be a rejection of all prior axioms of truth and value judgments and 
in this absence, despite initial loss and disenchantment, freedom to create new 
‘meaning’ that was not reliant on the redemptive myth. According to Nietzsche such 
creative freedom is contingent upon the ‘absolute necessity of a total liberation from 
ends… Only the innocence of becoming gives us the greatest courage and the 
greatest freedom! (Nietzsche 2001, §787).  
 
Gilles Deleuze draws a clear distinction between morality and ethics, contending that 
morality is formed according to transcendent notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and 
represented in a restraining set of rules that judge action and intention. Deleuze 
argues that as there are no transcendent values by which life can be measured that 
what is left is an affirmation of the world as living given that it cannot be said to be 
‘true’ nor ‘real’. Hence an ethics of ‘becoming’ requires a creative response to assess 
the ways we exist in the world, evaluating the possibilities of life according to its own 
immanent ethics. It is perhaps not a mere co-incidence that the Bible chose the 
symbol of ‘trees’ to explicate the pathway of existence and that Deleuze utilized the 
image to show both ‘fixedity’ (aborescent) and ‘becoming’ (rhizomic). The idea of an 
aborescent or tree-like schema is Deleuze’s (1987) counterpoint to his model of the 
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rhizome, which he used to challenge tendencies in thinking and to suggest ways of 
‘rehabitating’ thought as a creative and dynamic enterprise (Deleuze 2003, p. 293).vii 
Borrowing from Deleuze’s idea of becoming, this thesis will refer to what I would term 
the condition of ‘becoming orphan’ which will celebrate moments of rupture against 
unexamined premises based on rationalized concepts of ‘good’.viii This thesis is 
informed by the Deleuzian view that representations and concepts do not respond to 
anything in reality. This Deleuzian perspective is explained by James Williams who 
contends that this disjuncture between representations and reality is because ‘all 
things are connected to multiplicities, that is, to unaccountable and unidentifiable 
process of becoming, rather than existing as fixed beings with identifiable and limited 
predicates or essences’ (Williams 2005, p. 125). This thesis will examine how 
protagonists took flight from a psychoanalytical impasse and embraced an ‘orphan 
state’ – a line of flight away from the Father and into a world that allowed a new set of 
connections and from a perspective that did not rely on former patterns of thought or 
former criterion that dictated how one was to interpret the world. As will be shown in 
this thesis the only time the concept of innocence ‘assumes’ a reality is when it is 
ratified by allegory, that is when the story is understood within the closed system of the 
law employed, for example in Herman Melville’s Billy Budd. On all other occasions the 
‘Orphan’ figure will be seen in a state of flight and becoming.ix The innocence of the 
‘Orphan’ is an ‘innocence of becoming’, validated by one who acts in fidelity to their 
own thoughts, values and experience. A common repulsion to violence and a desire to 
preserve life will be shown to be characteristic of ‘innocence of becoming’ and can be 
located in the presentation of the ‘Orphan’ – presented both philosophically as 
metaphor and/or as a fictional character – in each novel considered. 
 
If as Nietzsche contends in Beyond Good and Evil that humanity’s only credible 
perception of that which is ‘real’ or ‘true’ is derived by the senses (Nietzsche 1990, p. 
100), all subsequent judgments, although inevitably false, are yet absolutely necessary 
if they are ‘life-advancing, life-preserving, species preserving, perhaps even species-
breeding’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 35). Nietzsche, despite his rejection of Christianity, saw 
it as life-enhancing. Recognizing that one can’t decide to believe in what is life-
preserving, Nietzsche suggests it is the ‘will to power incarnate’ that determines one’s 
judgments, evaluations and logic. This ‘will to power’ wants to grow, ‘expand, draw to 
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itself, gain ascendency – not out of any morality or immorality, but because it lives, and 
because life is will to power’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 194). One can observe in nature a 
necessary and calculable course because it obeys no prevailing laws, for as Nietzsche 
contends, ‘every power draws its ultimate consequences every moment’ (Nietzsche 
1990, p. 53). The ‘will to power’ of which Nietzsche writes can be perceived as a 
human expression of the indifference of nature, an immanent, organic response to life 
that is symbolized by the ‘Tree of Life’. As the ‘will to power’ is other than morality and 
does not conform to a normative reading, it cannot be represented through logic but 
may be presented in art. Nietzsche’s imagery of the transfiguring power of art conveys 
a ‘sublime’ sense of a moment in which the world is once again reconciled with the ‘will 
to power’.   
 
I could imagine a music whose rarest magic would consist in this, that it no 
longer knew anything of good and evil, except that perhaps some sailor’s 
homesickness, some golden shadow and delicate weakness would now and 
then flit across it: an art that would see fleeing towards it from a great 
distance the colours of a declining, now almost incomprehensible moral 
world, and would be hospitable and deep enough to receive such late 
fugitives (Nietzsche 1990, p. 188). 
 
This thesis will identify within the literature examined sublime moments such as 
described by Nietzsche which, given their power to transfigure one’s vision of life may 
be considered to be ‘Tree of Life’ moments. 
 
In contemporary societies in which the spheres of life are increasing subjected to 
rational analysis, planning and manipulation in the pursuit of worldly goals, the 
possibility that one’s vision of life may be transfigured by the sublime is significantly 
diminished. Weber argued that the relentless pursuit of wealth had stripped life of its 
religious and ethical meaning leaving humanity disenchanted with the world and 
preoccupied with ‘purely mundane passions’ (Weber 2002, p. 124). The irony of 
course is that magical and religious forces and ethical ideas of duty were not only 
abandoned but were transfigured to serve economic means (as Weber argues). Traits 
that once represented a dutiful Protestant (hardworking and alienated due to their 
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refusal to acknowledge loneliness, guilt, doubt or sexual desire) became ones that 
‘ordained’ the capitalist spirit. In analyzing Melville’s and Faulkner’s texts one sees 
states of disassociation as man and woman sought worldly goals whilst tormented by 
shadows of a religious past that was enchanted, mystical and promised eternal 
redemption. In these environments the paternal ‘Orphans’ in flight have an ambivalent 
attitude towards two worldviews in tension.   
 
In inter-connecting innocence, secularization and ‘becoming orphan’ – new thinking 
takes place. Innocence is a state of being possible only prior rationalist concepts of 
‘good’ and ‘evil’. It became a rational idealist state within Christian milieus at The Fall. 
Post The Fall its ‘meaning’ was created by political, social, and religious institutions in 
order to justify a law – it received a function on the basis that it became a workable 
applicable concept rather than one that envisaged a utopian state. This not only was 
seen to be the case in literary representations in Christian and post Christian eras but 
it is also evident in the stories of the Bible.  Subsequently on one level this thesis will 
look at narratives that portray this history of the ‘lie of innocence’ that is exemplars of 
when the idea of innocence is being used for political or economic ends. The most 
prevalent biblical stories or symbolism identified as disclosing the lie from the Bible 
and to be analyzed are: Representations of Jesus as the ‘Good Shepherd’, ‘Dove’ of 
peace, ‘Man of Sorrows’, ‘Sacrificial Lamb’ and the crucifixion; ‘God the Father’ terrible 
in wrath and vengeance; Jonah the disobedient; Judas the betrayer; Jezebel the 
harlot; The transfiguration of Saul; The faith of Abraham and the sacrifice of Isaac; 
Wisdom of the Serpent and the sin of Cain. Dogmas related to the Roman Catholic 
Church also considered for similar purposes are the concepts of; Faith; Miracles; 
Prayer; Eucharist; Confession; Heaven; Suffering; The love of God and Hell.  
 
In understanding concepts like innocence, secularization and ‘becoming orphan’ within 
historical periods in which they emerge and change one can see how these 
connections relate and create new relations and opportunities to re-imagine the 
genesis, the violence and the rupture of thinking pertaining to the supposed condition 
of innocence. In analyzing literary texts this writer is aware that it is ‘affects’ that are 
being identified in the art. The aim is to see how these literary writers attempted in art 
to release the ideological control from the potential to imagine. Protagonists in 
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escaping the ‘law of the Father’, in becoming ‘Orphans’ ask “what if?” of the world they 
live in. “What if”, Greene asks, if a Whiskey Priest commits sins but is seen to remain 
‘holy’? “What if” Faulkner asks, a half-breed is conceived as a Christ figure? “What if?”, 
McCarthy asks, a father and son were placed in a world after the apocalypse? “What 
if” one returns to Nietzsche’s ‘All too Human’ and seeks there a different explanation of 
why these authors have made ‘holy’ that which is deemed by the societies in which the 
stories are enacted as ‘unholy’. 
 
In keeping with the overall intention outlined an interest will be sustained in the extent 
to which literary texts, even in times where secularization has become generally 
accepted, continued to engage with motifs, symbols and structures drawn from the 
Bible or Christian tradition. Perhaps in order to understand what is a backward glance 
through time it becomes instructive to firstly look at a literary text that deals with our 
worst fears wrought by human desire for power, which has been projected into the 
future from our contemporary perspective. Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2007) is 
such a text.  
 
Cormac McCarthy’s novel The Road is set against a backdrop of nuclear laden ash 
where nothing grows or survives apart from man. Amidst this barren and violent 
landscape McCarthy narrates the gripping journey of a father and his young son as 
they struggle for life in a dying world. With the human population decimated and ever 
decreasing, humanity is portrayed as having regressed to its hunter gatherer origins as 
the starving scour the land for the last meagre stores of food or descended into 
systematic, efficient and ruthless cannibalism. Religion, moral and legal codes are 
rendered meaningless in the world of The Road, as are wealth and possessions: Only 
that which contributes to survival is of importance. The very fact of the father and son’s 
continual existence makes a lie of the view that life is sacred or a precious gift, their 
very survival is a rational improbability. All references to chronological time have 
become irrelevant in an apocalyptic world that exposes the foolishness of the 
expectations and presumptions that accompany our ideas of the future.  
 
McCarthy presents a grey ‘barren, silent, godless’ earth suffocated by ash, in which life 
had been extinguished and with it the creator (McCarthy 2007, p. 2). Over the half 
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dozen years since this holocaust all religious, philosophers and guru’s had perished, 
their messages of God’s wrathful vengeance consumed by ash and hungry men 
(McCarthy 2007, p. 32). The pitiful remnants of humanity serve as testimony to an old 
vagrant’s proclamation: “There is no God and we are his prophets” (McCarthy 2007, p. 
181). There is a sense that much of the father’s bitter anger with God is directed at his 
own self-deception and complicity in the lie that a just and compassionate divinity 
would intervene in world affairs and prevent the apocalypse.  
 
It will be argued that humanity’s failure to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear 
destruction portrayed in The Road can be seen to be the inevitable culmination of the 
violence employed to legitimize the ‘law’. This thesis is designed to exemplify through 
analysis of selected literary texts, often within cross-disciplinary context, the ‘evil’ that 
brought man to the apocalypse, which also shows how religious and political sanctions 
made violence on earth necessary. At the core of this analysis is the refrain: The ‘lie of 
innocence’ has a history that found its source in the Bible and its development in 
political and social expediency. As each selected text moves further away from a 
society rationalized and ordained by Christianity, writers continue to draw on religious 
symbolism, whether to capture old myths of divine immanence/transcendence or to 
ironically recall that which has become redundant. As the old prophet in The Road 
proclaims, 150 years after first voiced by Nietzsche, ‘God is Dead’. 
 
Chapter One will examine the Bible as a source of metaphors and symbolic stories. 
Using a Nietzschean perspective this chapter will show the origin of ‘innocence’ to lie 
in its becoming, an ‘innocence of becoming’, that has been banished by the nature of 
human choice brought about by the ‘knowledge of good and evil’. It will be argued that 
the ‘lie of innocence’ constructed upon notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ was legitimized by 
the ‘majoritive’ theology that characterise much of the Bible and came to some extent 
to characterize aspects of the Christian tradition. Through an analysis of the Hebrew 
and Greek words translated as ‘innocence’ or ‘innocent’ in the Bible, it will be 
demonstrated that the concept of innocence is derived from an assortment of terms, 
represented in multiple contexts across a diverse range of texts. From this analysis it 
will be proposed that ‘innocence’ as presented in the Bible has no clearly definable 
meaning. Changes in biblical translation of the word ‘innocence’ over the past century 
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reveal a two-fold increase in the use of the term in contemporary versions of the Bible. 
These changes reflect a disassociation of ‘innocence’ from the social, political and 
religious contexts of earlier translations of the Bible. It will be argued that these 
contemporary translations represent a concept of innocence that evokes a sacrosanct 
idealism shown in this thesis to be questionable.  
 
It will be further shown that there is a marked difference between the presentation of 
‘innocence’ in biblical narrative and the pronouncements of legal and prophetic texts. 
These narratives depict innocence as inconsequential to the conflicting demands of 
wealth, the law, ethnicity and religious observance. It will be proposed that the 
significant discrepancy between the Christian tradition’s presentation of innocence and 
the plight of the ‘innocent’ as portrayed in biblical narrative, has its roots in the 
Church’s misrepresentation of The Fall legend. An alternative reading of The Fall will 
identify humanity’s fixation with the ‘knowledge of good and evil’ as the manifestation 
of ‘original sin’, upon which the ‘lie of innocence’ is constructed. It is my contention that 
this ‘original sin’ blinds humanity to the vision of the ‘Tree of Life’ – a living principle 
which I liken to Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘innocence of becoming’. 
 
Chapter Two will look at selected works of William Blake and it will demonstrate that 
his poetry is representative of the period which re-imaged the idea of the ‘child’, 
transforming the previously held view of a small dependent person, as one that was 
contextualized in terms of patriarchal power. It will be argued that Blake revealed the 
Christian notion of innocence to be a lie, constructed by the powerful to legitimize 
mortal suffering for the promise of eternal rest. Drawing upon The Songs of Innocence 
and Experience (Blake 1998), it will be shown that Blake’s poetry employed irony in 
order to subvert the moral constructions of institutionalised Christianity such as 
innocence. This chapter will consider the contradictions brought to the fore by the 
concepts of innocence and experience, in order to disparage traditional Christian 
morality. It will be argued that Blake’s poetry exposed the deceit of the use of the 
concept of innocence in both the Enlightenment and Romantic guise. Amidst Blake’s 
confrontation of the ‘lie of innocence’ his poetry presented a vision of innocence that 
can only be perceived through the reinvigoration of the imagination: A renewal of the 
mind that this thesis will argue is transfigured by the sublime.  
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Chapters Three and Four will consider the writings of Herman Melville in which the 
concept of innocence is presented as having retained its moral ascendency into an 
age in the process of secularization not yet torn from its Christian moorings. Melville’s 
novels Moby Dick (1851) and Billy Budd (1924) are rich in biblical symbolism and 
feature ‘Orphans’ – both politically and philosophically – that serve to expose the ‘lie of 
innocence’. Profit, revenge, law and duty are shown to be the dominant motivations in 
these works, relegating ideas of compassion and innocence to a matter of irrelevance. 
Chapter Three will demonstrate that religiosity and economics are intertwined. The 
passage of innocence from a Christian idea to its secular manifestation, it could be 
argued, owes much to Protestantism’s rationalization in accordance with the growth of 
Capitalism. Max Weber’s essay The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
will provide a context in which Moby Dick is read. It will be argued that the concept of 
innocence has retained a ‘sacrosanct’ virtuous quality in its secular re-inventions and 
as such, has proven to be an adaptive tool in facilitating the expansion of Capitalism. 
The applied Calvinist categories of the ‘elect’ and the ‘damned’ will be identified as 
being influential in the suppression of the human emotions, cultivating a religious 
mind-set of obedience and sacrifice that has been characterized as a quality of the 
Protestant Work Ethic.  
 
Melville’s elaboration upon ‘whiteness’ will be shown to reveal the multifaceted 
meanings of language and the impossibility of conveying absolute notions of truth. 
Ahab’s quest to kill the ‘White Whale’ will be shown to be representative of the trauma 
of the metaphysical Son in revolt against the Father. Ahab’s revolt against God and 
desire to destroy that, which opposes his will (White Whale), can be seen as the 
fulfilment of the Serpent’s prophecy. Becoming a god unto himself, it will be 
demonstrated that the destructive power struggle between Father and Son bleeds 
Ahab’s soul dry, driving him to a despairing madness. Juxtaposed to such madness is 
a sublime vision of nature in which the indifference of God is revealed, an insight that 
will be shown to open new possibilities for the ‘innocence of becoming’. 
 
In Chapter Four it will be shown that Melville’s novella Billy Budd portrays an 
allegorical presentation of an ‘innocent’ man grounded in the immanent world, one 
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which represents innocence as an ontological state of being removed from the 
dynamics of religious or political power. In a story replete with biblical symbolism 
Melville’s representation of innocence is associated with imagery of a conception of 
humanity uncorrupted by the ‘knowledge of good and evil’. Nietzsche’s concept of the 
‘innocence of becoming’ can be seen to characterize Melville’s presentation of Billy 
Budd. Melville writes of two forms of knowledge, the ‘knowledge of the world’ as it is 
interpreted according to paradigms of power and the design of the law, and the 
‘knowledge of humanity’. While both natures of knowledge are presented as co-
existent in the human soul, like Blake’s concept of ‘innocence’ Melville’s ‘knowledge of 
humanity’ is shown to be diminished by exposure to the ‘experience’ of the ‘world’. 
This chapter will demonstrate the ways in which power is acted out in the world and 
how constructs of morality are manipulated to that end. Through the character 
Claggart, for example, Melville reveals the means by which the secular world utilises 
the idea of ‘innocence’ as a tool for social, economic and political gain. Billy Budd is 
shown to be a lesson in the danger of law that dispenses justice without regard for 
compassion and the preservation of life. It will be argued that the ‘knowledge of the 
world’, upon which the law is constructed, is unable to perceive the motivations of a 
depraved heart intent on malice. Hence it will be shown that the law is rendered 
powerless to intervene on behalf of the ‘innocent’ or respond authentically to the 
intuitive testimony of the body. Melville may be writing in a world in which the idea of 
God’s existence is questionable but necessarily invoked the biblical stories, which 
were generally ascribed to by members of his social and cultural world. Subsequently 
the Bible and the Christ story in particular, feature prominently in Billy Budd.  
 
Social ills of poverty, prejudice and violence are pinpointed in Faulkner’s novel Light In 
August as social constructions. However these constructions are seen to find their 
source in religious sources as embodied in Protestantism rationalized in the service of 
Capitalism.  In Chapter Five of this thesis there will be an investigation of Faulkner’s 
subversion of people existing within a primarily secular environment but damned by an 
inherited history of supposed innocence that he represents and enacts as a lie. 
Behaviour sponsored by the work ethic that was sanctified by religion is seen to haunt 
the damned and the elect even whilst they have neither the benefits of wealth nor the 
promises of redemption. It is an environment in which human beings are denied the 
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possibility of moral choice, peace or forgiveness. Instead history has imposed on them 
not only a lack of freedom but an intolerable loneliness. This chapter will further 
examine the ways in which this is played out in relations between fathers and sons, 
and argue that it will be the ‘Orphans’ that propose the only possibility of the 
‘innocence of becoming’ or transfiguration. It is also evident that biblical symbols give 
way to re-invented parables of living in a world without grace. The character JC 
invokes imagery of the story of Jesus Christ from the New Testament as one who is 
truly and irrevocably forsaken by the father. 
 
Whereas Faulkner explores the Protestant environment in which his characters act out 
their interconnected social and religious heritage, Graham Greene argues for the 
possibility of man finding in religion a means of being human in a state of grace and 
belief. In Chapter Six it will be shown that Greene, like Faulkner, is also subversive but 
his critique of religion is to re-cast its potentiality when and if it acts out the story of 
God becoming man (as embodied in the crucifixion and the resurrection). Greene 
explores this potentiality not only through an acceptance of the mystery of life but also 
in the belief that a truly godly man is a frail one whose fight for redemption will involve 
the acceptance of his humanness. However Greene works out his plot in worlds where 
men, women and children are victims to political violence. Greene believes that the 
institution of the Church does not respond creatively to the plight of its people. The 
Church’s concepts of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ he sees as irrelevant to the social, political and 
economic conditions; the Church is disconnected and indeed its moral maxims are 
obsolete. It is in this sense one sees Greene as dealing with revolutionary thinking, 
working outside institutional axioms of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. The church gives his writings 
focus on living in the world rather than in confused abeyance for a world beyond.  
 
Greene’s dominant protagonists, for example, the Lieutenant (The Power and the 
Glory 1940) and Ida Arnold (Brighton Rock 1938) represent in their actions Greene’s 
notion of justice, which supersedes old moral certainties. Other protagonists such as 
the Whiskey Priest (The Power and the Glory) and Rose (Brighton Rock), when 
choosing love instead of Christian absolution, enact Greene’s vision of a preferred 
world where these Orphans embody humans at their best. As long as the Church 
cannot respond to the plight of the innocent – those who due to their naivety or 
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vulnerability are subject to exploitation and abuse by those in power – as long as the 
Church remains disconnected from the real world and obsessed with irrelevant 
moralities it will continue to contribute to ‘a history of the lie of innocence’. Greene 
within the construction of his plots heralds change in the implementation of new 
concepts of justice forged through relationships that advocate on behalf of the 
vulnerable and promote political and social action to alleviate their suffering.  
 
Working within this post 9/11 political environment, Chapter Seven will co-relate the 
earlier view of Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1961) and contemporary ones of Alain Badiou 
(Badiou 2003), when constructing a terrain that gives rise to the question of innocence. 
Within a society constructed upon erroneous notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ the ‘lie’ can be 
viewed as intrinsic and indeed necessary to enact change. Indeed Arendt proposes 
that there is an ‘undeniable affinity of the lie with action, with changing the world – in 
short, with politics’ – crediting the imagination as the common root of the ‘ability to lie’ 
and the ‘capacity to act’ (Arendt 1961, p. 250).x Possibly Immanuel Kant was close to 
the mark when he insisted that the ‘lie’ destroys the very fabric of civilization, when 
considered in relation to Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2007).xi The chapter will 
commence with an analysis of Graham Greene’s novel The Quiet American (1954) 
before proceeding to a discussion of The Road. In this chapter the writings of Graham 
Greene will be analysed alongside the more contemporary work of Cormac McCarthy 
in order to represent the ramifications of the ideological preference that characterized 
American foreign policy during the Cold War.   
 
In some ways indicative of Western literature of its time, The Quiet American is 
reflective of a move away from prior religious themes to an exploration of political and 
ethical concerns. It will be shown that Greene’s novel demonstrates that the concept of 
innocence had retained its political currency well after it had ceased to be determined 
by Christian representations. It will be argued that the concept of innocence had been 
employed to justify the political ideology of American foreign policy during the Cold 
War and served to legitimize its economic, political and military interventions 
throughout the world. Characterized by a detachment from the realities of human 
experience, such naivety is revealed by Greene to be the product of a fatal ignorance 
that has and continues to wreak destruction upon humanity and the environment.  
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In a letter to the Church in Rome, the Apostle Paul wrote that the law brings death: A 
prophetic word that is validated by McCarthy’s dying world (Rom. 8:2).xii Self-deception 
that hinders action is shown to be a fatal consequence of the politics that McCarthy 
implies ushered in the world’s destruction. In his presentation of a post-apocalyptic 
world laid waste by inaction McCarthy demonstrated that to lie to oneself is tantamount 
to suicide.xiii In The Road survival is portrayed as being dependent upon a 
determination to act with veracity to the experience of the world. It is in such veracity 
that McCarthy perceives a glimmer of hope for humanity’s future: An ‘innocence of 
becoming’ encapsulated in a young boy’s fidelity for life.  
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i Unless otherwise stipulated all references to the Bible are taken from the New International Version 
(1978).  
 
ii An example of a biblical narrative that conveys this fidelity for others despite the strictures of religious 
‘law’ may be identified in the story of Jesus response to criticism that his disciples ate corn on the 
Sabbath (Mark 2: 26-28). When rebuked by the Pharisees for his disciples ‘harvesting’ corn during the 
Sabbath, Jesus replies: “The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath”.  
 
iii It is important to acknowledge the psychoanalytic writings of Jacques Lacan and his representation of 
the symbolic Father, a ‘signifier’ for patriarchal order, law and logic. Lacan proposed that the function of 
the ‘Name-of-the-Father’ (Nom du Pére) in the unconscious was to assigning identity to the child 
(symbolic of ‘lack’ and ‘separation’), whilst correspondingly castrating the child from the ‘desires of the 
mother’, emphasizing the prohibitive and legislative (Lacan 1988, S1 259). Lacan argued that the ‘true 
function of the Father’ was ‘fundamentally to unite (and not to set in opposition) a desire and the Law’ 
(Lacan 1977: E 321). The Symbolic father is thus not an actual subject but a position in the Symbolic 
order (Lacan 1977).  
 
iv When each text is initially introduced in this thesis the original publishing date will be cited, thereafter 
all references will refer to the publication used by the author. Derrida draws on an article published in 
the New York Times addressing the culpability of the French State, and its responsibility for the 
deportation of tens of thousands of Jews during the Nazi occupation. The article addresses the 
numerous initiatives taken above and beyond those ordered by the Nazi occupiers under the direction of 
the Vichy Government (Derrida 2001, p. 76). Derrida notes that President Jacques Chirac’s solemn 
recognition of the French culpability and its ‘crimes against humanity’, came after six previous 
presidents had deemed such a confession to be neither ‘possible, opportune, necessary or even 
correct’ (Derrida 2001, p. 76).   
 
v In the 5th century, Saint Augustine contended that ‘the lie pertains to the saying, and to the meaning to 
say, not to the said … persons must be judged according to their deliberate intention’ (Augustine cited in 
Deferrari 1952, p. 57).  
 
vi Derrida acknowledges the complexity of attempting to discuss the notion of the ‘history of the lie’ and 
raises three considerations namely: ‘a history of the concept of the lie, a history of the lie, made up of all 
the events that have happened to the lie or by way of the lie, a true history that orders the narrative of 
these lies or of the lie in general’ (Derrida 2001, p. 69). 
 
vii Throughout the Bible, trees are referred to as geographical landmarks, resources, characters in 
parables or as bearing fruit – a symbol or productivity or blessing. Among the Books of Wisdom, 
Proverbs speaks of ‘wisdom’ as being ‘a tree of life to those who take hold of her; those who hold her 
fast will be blessed’ (Prov. 3:18). In various verses in Proverbs alternatively, ‘the righteous’ (11:30), 
‘longing fulfilled’ (13:12), and the ‘soothing tongue’ (15:4) is likened to ‘a tree of life’. In the book of 
Daniel, King Nebuchadnezzar’s Dream of a Tree is interpreted as a metaphor for the Babylonian Empire 
(Dan. 4). Perhaps the most famous reference to a tree in the Bible are credited to the teaching and 
parables of Jesus such as the cursing of a fig tree (Matt. 21:18). In the apocalyptic book of Revelation 
the author prophesises: ‘Whoever has ears, let them hear what the Spirit says to the churches. To the 
one who is victorious, I will give the right to eat from the tree of life, which is in the paradise of God’ 
(Rev. 2:7). 
 
viii The concept of ‘becoming’ is taken up by Gillies Deleuze & Felix Guattari who insist that all of life is 
on a ‘plane of becoming’ and that thinking and perception must free itself from ‘fixed foundations of man 
as the subject’, to ‘become women’, to ‘become animal’, to ‘become imperceptible’ (Deleuze 2003, pp. 
251-52, 293-94, 283-84, 291-92).  
 
ix The concept of ‘becoming’ proposes that all of life is on a ‘plane of becoming’ and that thinking and 
perception must free itself from ‘fixed foundations of man as the subject’, to ‘become women’, to 
‘become animal’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2003, p. 238).  
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x Derrida contends that ‘one lies because they desire to change things to be different from what they are 
and in affect reflects the human capacity to exercise our freedom for change’ (Derrida 1986, p. 95). 
 
xi Kant was of the view that truth was essential to the very existence of civilization, believing that the ‘lie’ 
undermined the very relationships of trust and co-operation upon which civilization was constructed.  
 
xii An initial response to this text may conclude that without ‘law’ there is no politics, however McCarthy’s 
description of small ragged cannibal armies represents the inheritance of the same social hierarchy that 
had ushered in the planet’s doom (McCarthy 2007, p. 96). 
 
xiii Contemporary political lies that have far reaching consequences for the continuation of life upon the 
Earth include the reluctance of governments to significantly reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons; 
on-going resistance of nations to act unilaterally to reduce the impact of climate change; a reticence to 
reduce dependency upon fossil fuels and the continuing disproportionate of global distribution of wealth.  
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Chapter 1 - The Bible: Etymology, changes 
across time and translations 
 
Increasingly over the past century, the concept of innocence has referred to the 
ontological ‘state’ or ‘essence’ of a person, rather than being associated with one’s 
actions.i There are numerous examples in contemporary translations of the Bible 
where the words ‘innocence’ and ‘innocent’ have been employed rather than religious 
terms such as righteous and pure or litigious language including guiltless, acquitted, 
justified or blameless used in earlier translations. In these contemporary versions of 
the Bible, the concept of innocence has is disassociated from any social, political or 
moral criteria by which it may be scrutinised. No longer are the ‘innocent’ subject to the 
critique of their actions, rather they are by degree ‘innocent’ because of who they are 
(powerful); ‘innocent’ because of what they represent (ideology); innocent due to who 
they belong to (ethnicity) and ‘innocent’ because of what they deny (sexuality). 
 
The words ‘innocence’ and ‘innocent’ appear in multiple contexts across a diverse 
range of texts and genres in the Bible making it difficult to associate the terms with any 
clearly definable meaning. It will be argued that translations of ‘innocence’ in 
contemporary versions of the Bible have further obscured its meaning. The first 
English translation of the Bible to gain wide spread acceptance was the King James 
Version (KJV), published in 1611. The KJV became the foremost translation of the 
Bible for almost three centuries until the advent of the American Standard Version 
(ASV). First released in 1901 the ASV became popular in the United States with those 
keen to distance themselves from their anglicised roots. In truth, the variations in 
translation between these works are minimal in comparison with the latest versions of 
the Bible. Similarly, the variations in the translation of ‘innocence’ in the ASV from the 
Greek and Hebrew texts are relatively few despite the span of years. The ASV makes 
reference to the word ‘innocency’ on five occasions and ‘innocent(s)’ 36 times, 
whereas the KJV makes a further three references to ‘innocent(s)’.ii The Hebrew 
words translated as ‘innocence’ in the ASV are; niqqayown (4); zakuw (1); while 
‘innocent(s)’ is translated from naqiy (29); naqah (2); chaph (1); chinnam (1).iii The 
ASV makes no reference to innocence in the New Testament however the Greek 
athoos is translated as ‘innocent’ on two occasions and akakos on another.   
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Since the publication of the ASV, there has been an exponential increase in the 
number of Bible translations with more than 30 versions currently in circulation. In 
2005, Zondervan Publishing, in partnership with the International Bible Society, 
released Today’s New International Version (TNIV): A revised edition of the New 
International Version (1978), currently the largest selling Bible version with over 251 
million copies in print according to International Bible Society estimates.iv The 
accumulation of Bible versions over the 20th century has seen a corresponding 
significant increase in the frequency of translation of the words ‘innocence’ and 
‘innocent’. With nine references to ‘innocence’ and 76 uses of the term ‘innocent’, 
TNIV has more than doubled the ASV’s translation of ‘innocence’ and its derivatives in 
a century. These changes will be examined according to the root Hebrew and Greek 
words from which ‘innocence’ has been translated to ascertain the context of these 
variations and their implications for the evolution of the concept of innocence. 
 
When comparing TNIV with the ASV, we find the original Hebrew translated as 
‘innocence’ – as opposed to the ASV’s ‘innocency’ – an additional four times; tsadaq 
(5); niqqayown (2); tsedaqah (1); yasher (1). The TNIV translates the word ‘innocent’ 
from the Hebrew on 30 more occasion than the ASV; naqiy (1); naqah (4); tsadaq (4); 
tsaddiyq (15); chinnam (1); ‘asham (1); cheleka (1); tam (1); tom (1); zak (1). Both 
versions of the Bible translate the Hebrew niqqayown, as ‘innocence’ with TNIV also 
using the terms ‘clean’ and ‘purity’. This resonates with the derivative term naqiy which 
appears in the Hebrew Old Testament on 43 occasions, of which 30 are translated in 
TNIV as ‘innocent’: The ASV differs on one occasion when it refers to the ‘guiltless’. 
Similarly, TNIV translates another derivative, naqah, as ‘innocent’ six times from 44 
references in the Old Testament, whereas the ASV offers alternatives such as 
‘iniquity’, ‘guiltless’ and ‘clear’, which are more common translations of the Hebrew. 
‘Unpunished’ is the most frequent translation of naqah with eleven references. The 
greatest variation in the translation of ‘innocence’ between the ASV and the TNIV, is to 
be found in the Hebrew tsadaq and its derivatives tsaddiyq and tsedaqah. This 
grouping appears on 24 occasions in TNIV, of which six are translated as ‘innocence’ 
and eighteen as ‘innocent’. The ASV on the other hand makes no reference to 
‘innocence’ or ‘innocent’ in the corresponding verses, most frequently translating the 
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Hebrew as ‘righteous’ (15), or ‘righteousness’ (3 ), as well as ‘just’ (3); ‘justified’ (1); 
‘clear’ (1); and ‘pure’ (1). The Hebrew chinnam appears 32 times throughout the Old 
Testament, the most common interpretations being ‘cause’ (16) and nought (6), which 
relate to specific actions, judged according to moral codes. In TNIV chinnam is 
translated as ‘innocent’ on two occasions, while the ASV makes reference to ‘innocent’ 
and ‘cause’. On only one occasion does the ASV translate the Hebrew as ‘innocent’ 
when the TNIV uses another term: Chaph is translated as ‘clean’. The remaining 
differences in the translation of ‘innocence’ and ‘innocent’ consist of single examples 
from a cross range of root terms. The ASV translates these terms as follows: Asham 
(guilty); cheleka (helpless); tam (perfect); tom (simplicity); yasher (righteous) and zak 
(pure). Amongst this assortment of translations, language that represents 
powerlessness and naivety in the ASV is translated as ‘innocence’ in TNIV. From this 
examination of the changes made in translation of the Hebrew word ‘innocence’ (and 
its derivatives) in the Old Testament over the past century, it can be seen that 
terminology, which previously indicated either a legal context or matters of religious 
purity or orthodoxy had been subsumed by the concept of innocence. Subsequently 
this two-fold increase in translation of ‘innocence’ in biblical texts has severed prior 
legal, social and religious frameworks of interpretation and deduction.  
 
Neither TNIV or the ASV refer to ‘innocence’ in the New Testament, however the TNIV 
translates the Greek as ‘innocent’ on twelve occasions. The two ASV references to 
‘innocent’ in the New Testament correspond to TNIV’s translation of athoos. Akakos is 
translated as ‘naïve’ in TNIV, as opposed to ‘innocent’ in the ASV. In four other 
instances TNIV translates ‘innocent’ from words that are relatively common in the New 
Testament; dikaios (2) (ASV righteous); katharos (2) (ASV pure; clean). The Greek 
dikaios is found 86 times in the New Testament, 44 of which are translated in the ASV 
as ‘righteous’ and a further 35 as ‘just’. Katharos appears 28 times in the New 
Testament, most frequently translated in the ASV as ‘pure’ (17) and ‘clean’ (10). The 
translations of these Greek words as ‘innocent’ in TNIV are an exception and divorced 
from the religious implications of ‘righteousness’ and the legal connotations of ‘justice’ 
that are otherwise associated with these terms. The remaining six references to 
‘innocent’ in TNIV translate from Greek words that rarely occur in the New Testament: 
Once again, the ASV employs a range of alternative terms. The ASV’s translation of 
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akeraios (2) adopts terminology that suggests powerlessness and naivety such as the 
words ‘harmless’ and ‘simple’. With the exception of the religious term hagnos (1), 
interpreted as ‘pure’ in the ASV, the remaining three references suggest a legal 
context: Anaitios (2) ‘guiltless’; dikaioō (1) ‘justified’. This analysis of the translation of 
the words ‘innocence’ and ‘innocent’ from Hebrew and Greek biblical texts in TNIV, 
has identified variations from the ASV which range from religious notions of 
righteousness and purity, legal terminology constructed upon moral codes and 
language that suggests naivety and helplessness. These changes reflect a transition 
from language previously imbedded in social, religious and political contexts, to a 
concept of innocence that is detached from history. In order to explore the implications 
of these changes in translation it is necessary to consider the contexts in which these 
references to ‘innocence’ and ‘innocent’ appear in TNIV of the Bible. 
 
In the majority of instances, the 85 references to ‘innocence’ and ‘innocent’ in TNIV 
lend themselves to three categories. Within each of these categories the innocence of 
a particular group or individual is determined by their submission to the legitimacy, 
authority and interests of those in power – ones that legitimize the Father or the 
patriarchal institution: Innocence and the Powerful; Innocence and Religious 
Observance; Innocence and the Law. The following will analyse the variations in 
translation from the ASV to TNIV in relation to these categories, identifying the 
possible criteria by which innocence is determined. It will be argued that these 
changes are representative of the evolution of the concept of innocence from a term 
primarily associated with action judged according to moral codes, to the moral ‘state’ 
of an individual, group or nation, removed from rational critique or accountability. 
 
Innocence and Patriarchy 
In TNIV of the Bible, there are 24 references to the concept of ‘innocence’ that are 
principally concerned with ‘power’, fourteen of which vary from the parallel texts in the 
ASV. These variations represents a range of terms including: ‘Guilty’ (1); ‘guiltless’ (2); 
‘righteousness’ (1); ‘simplicity’ (1); ‘righteous’ (5); ‘harmless’ (1); ‘cleanse’ (1); 
‘helpless’ (1); ‘perfect’ (1). Typically such narratives of ‘power’ address the tension 
between the will of the father and the son who pursues his own will and ambition 
despite opposition from patriarchal institutions often also embodied in actual fathers. In 
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the majority of these narratives the Father responds ruthlessly to dissension, punishing 
those who fail to comply with the constraints and expectations imposed upon them. 
The proliferation of translations of ‘innocence’ in TNIV, has come at the expense of 
legal concepts such as ‘guiltless’ and religious appeals to ‘righteousness’. The 
substitution of the term ‘innocent’ within contexts primarily concerned with power has 
removed frameworks of critique. The significance of these changes are most apparent 
when terms such as ‘simplicity’ and ‘harmlessness’ are replaced, often enveloping the 
plight of the powerless within the meaningless sentiment of ‘innocence’. 
 
On 34 occasions in TNIV ‘innocence’ is imputed as the moral ‘state’ of those who 
participate in and conform to the dictates of ‘religious observance’. Faithfulness and 
obedience to ‘religious observance’ is a prominent theme throughout the ‘Books of 
Wisdom’. That these texts often express lament for the suffering of the innocent and 
make supplication to God on their behalf suggests a concession that obedience to 
‘religious observance’ does not prevent the innocent from suffering at the hands of the 
powerful.v This admission is further emphasised in prophetic writings that repeatedly 
condemn the arrogant and proud while exalting the meek. Such humility is measured 
by one’s devotion to social and political expectations of ‘religious observance’. Within 
contexts chiefly pertaining to ‘religious observance’, TNIV introduces fifteen 
translations of ‘innocence’ that differ from the ASV, which translates the Hebrew as 
righteous (5); righteousness (3); justified (1); justify (1); clean (2); pure (1); just (2). 
These changes are mostly reflected in texts concerned with concepts of religious 
purity such as ‘righteous’ although legal terms that had previously addressed matters 
of justice, have also been subsumed by ‘innocence’.  
 
There are 27 examples of the words ‘innocence’ or ‘innocent’ in TNIV that primarily 
relate to matters of moral ‘law’. Predominantly found in the ‘Books of Law’, these texts 
typically take the form of a legal imperative followed by a decree denouncing the 
betrayal of the ‘innocent’. vi The book of Exodus provides an example of such an 
imperative: ‘Have nothing to do with a false charge and do not put an innocent or 
honest person to death, for I will not acquit the guilty’ (Ex 23.7). The determination of 
innocence or guilt is subject to moral codes that judge the action of a society or 
individual. Justice for the ‘innocent’ is also a consistent theme throughout the prophetic 
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writings. Repeatedly these texts pronounce impending judgment that awaits those who 
abuse the ‘innocent’, however the corresponding promise of deliverance for the 
oppressed is deferred to an eschatological hope of a just afterlife. The most frequent 
discrepancy in translation of the words ‘innocence’ and ‘innocent’ from the ASV to the 
TNIV are related to ‘law’, these nineteen variations include: Righteous (9); clear (1); 
iniquity (1); pure (2); just (2); guiltless (2); simple (1); justified (1). The earlier 
observations in regards to TNIV’s negation of legal terminology when translating 
‘innocence’ in relation to ‘power’ and ‘religious observance’ are amplified in contexts 
that are primarily associated with ‘law’. Subsequently the relationship between 
innocence and the legal context of these passages is unclear and lacks any definable 
criteria that would afford critical evaluation.  
 
Innocence in Biblical Narrative  
Perhaps it is in the narrative texts of the Bible that the ambiguity of the concept of 
innocence is most conspicuous due in part to the relative brevity of references. Within 
these stories innocence is shown to be dependent upon the society of its emergence, 
qualified in terms of ‘power’; the demands of ‘religious observance’; and the ‘law’. 
There are fourteen examples of biblical narrative that explicitly refers to ‘innocent’ in 
TNIV version, ten of which are concerned with ‘power’, two are centred upon ‘religious 
observance’ and two focus on ‘law’.vii Examples of each of these categories will be 
examined to determine how innocence functions within the context of the story.   
 
In the closing chapters of the book of Judges, a story unfolds concerning the rape and 
death of a concubine offered by her master to appease a violent gathering of men in 
the Benjaminite town of Gibeah. In response to this crime, the ‘Children of Israel’ - 
consisting of warriors from the other eleven Israelite tribes – demand that the culprits 
are brought to justice. The subsequent refusal of the Benjaminites to turn over the 
offenders for judgment triggers a political crisis that escalates into a devastating battle 
in which all the women and children of the tribe are killed and four hundred surviving 
Benjaminite troops flee into the hills. The ‘Children of Israel’ fear for the future of their 
chastened ‘brothers’ given that they had previously taken an oath not to intermarry 
with the tribe of Benjamin due to their disobedience. A solution is devised:  
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When the girls of Shiloh come out to join in the dancing, then rush from the 
vineyards and each of you seize a wife from the girls of Shiloh and go to the 
land of Benjamin. When their fathers or brothers complain to us, we will say 
to them, “Do us a kindness by helping them, because we did not get wives 
for them during the war, and you are innocent (asham) since you did not give 
your daughters to them.” So that is what the Benjamites did. While the girls 
were dancing, each man caught one and carried her off to be his wife. Then 
they returned to their inheritance and rebuilt the towns and settled in them’ 
(Judges 21:21-23). .  
 
If there is a moral to be learned from this story it would appear to be that when 
deemed necessary those in power may sanction the kidnapping of women to make 
amends for their previous slaughter of wives and children. The implication that the 
fathers and brothers are ‘innocent’ of breaking their oath because they did not give 
their consent to the abduction of their daughters, testifies to a conscious abuse of 
power inflicted upon the women and their families. In a context where conspiracy to 
kidnap women is planned and executed in full knowledge of the impact this action 
would have upon the victims, the suggestion that these families could find consolation 
in their ignorance illuminates the cynicism of the powerful in relation to innocence.  
 
The book of Jonah is a story in which the figure of the patriarch unwilling to tolerate 
dissent employs violence to ensure that his designs are enforced. Jonah is 
commanded to travel to the city of Nineveh where he is to deliver a prophetic message 
of repentance, lest the people be destroyed by God’s wrath. Concerned for his welfare 
Jonah has other ideas and flees from the assignment to distant lands beyond the 
Mediterranean. During his flight across the sea the ‘Lord’ foils Jonah’s will through the 
violence of a tempest, which endangers the lives of the prophet and ship’s crew. As 
the ship founders the desperate crew struggle with the religious and moral implications 
of killing an innocent man to appease an angry God and hence save their lives. 
 
Instead, the men did their best to row back to land. But they could not, for 
the sea grew even wilder than before. Then they cried to the Lord, “O Lord, 
please do not let us die for taking this man’s life. Do not hold us accountable 
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for killing an innocent (naqiy) man, for you, O Lord, have done as you 
pleased.” Then they took Jonah and threw him overboard, and the raging 
sea grew calm (Jonah 1:13-15). 
 
As the story continues, Jonah is swallowed by a great fish in which he remains for 
three days before being regurgitated upon dry land in order to take up God’s initial 
commission. Although the crew of the ship regard Jonah as ‘innocent’ of any crime 
committed against them, the narrative explicitly presents Jonah as a liability due to his 
disobedience to God’s command. The violence, fear and moral conundrum 
experienced by the crew and in particular the ‘innocent’ Jonah, are shown to be 
irrelevant before the dictates of ‘religious observance’. 
 
The vulnerability of innocence in relation to the ‘law’ is brought to the fore in the story 
of King Abimelech of Gerar and Sarah, Abraham’s wife. Upon entering the lands of 
Gerar, the Hebrew Patriarch Abraham tells Abimelech that he and Sarah are siblings. 
Free from any moral laws that would dictate otherwise Abimelech takes Sarah as his 
wife, only to find the union to be fraught with fatal consequences. 
 
God came to Abimelech in a dream one night and said to him, “You are as 
good as dead because of the woman you have taken; she is a married 
woman.” Now Abimelech had not gone near her, so he said, “Lord, will you 
destroy an innocent (tsaddiyq) nation? Did he not say to me, “She is my 
sister,” and didn’t she also say, “He is my brother?” I have done this with a 
clear conscience and clean hands (Gen. 20:3-5). 
 
As Abimelech had been deceived the narrative presents God as willing to spare the 
life of the King and his people if Sarah is returned to Abraham with due compensation. 
When confronted by an exasperated Abimelech, Abraham justifies his actions as a 
necessary response to the fear that foreigners may kill him to take Sarah, if it were 
known that they were married. It is apparent that Abimelech’s innocence matters little 
in this narrative: The law serving as a tool to bring the will of the Father – in this case 
Abraham’s God – to fruition. Through deception and the use of his wife as collateral 
Abraham is granted political favour and substantially increases his wealth at the 
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expense of a King forced to comply under the imminent threat of death. This story 
demonstrates that innocence has no currency before the designs of the Father who 
claiming justification under the ‘law’ employs violence to establish political power and 
financial gain.  
 
The Function of Patriarchy in Old Testament Narrative 
This chapter will now consider examples of biblical narrative in which the will of the 
patriarchal Father – incorporating the competing demands of the law, ethnicity, 
sexuality and religious observance – is imposed upon the literary and metaphorical 
Son. While not explicitly referring to ‘innocence’, the story of King Saul and his 
acrimonious relationship with his son Jonathon shows how the ‘law’ of the Father 
demands unconditional obedience. During a skirmish between the Israelite and 
Philistine armies King Saul had bound the people under an oath: “Cursed be any man 
who eats food before evening comes, before I have avenged myself on my enemies!” 
(1 Sam. 14:24). During a respite in the battle Jonathon reflects: ‘My father has made 
trouble for the country. See how my eyes brightened when I tasted a little of this 
honey. How much better it would have been if the men had eaten today some of the 
plunder they took from their enemies.’ Summoned to give an account of his 
disobedience a clearly bemused Jonathon responds to his Father: “I merely tasted a 
little honey with the end of my staff. And now I must die?” Saul’s judgement is 
unequivocal: “May God deal with me, be it ever so severely, if you do not die, 
Jonathon” (1 Sam. 14:29-30). In biblical narratives, the father responds to dissent in 
one of two ways: Either the son is abandoned and assumes the plight of the orphan or 
he is killed. The son who by refusing to comply with, or acknowledge the law of the 
father, is symbolic of the Orphan who rebels against unjust impositions of power, yet 
refuses to resort to the violence upon which such power is established. The son who 
refuses to collude or comply with the will of the father is never pronounced ‘innocent’.  
 
Faithfulness to religious devotion is sorely tested in the book of Job where the 
protagonist is abandoned to endure extreme suffering by a god who seeks to counter 
accusations of favouritism levelled by the Satan. At the onset of Job’s ordeal, a ‘friend’ 
poses the following rhetorical question: “Consider now: Who, being innocent, has ever 
perished? Where were the upright ever destroyed?” (Job 4:7). By implication, this 
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question suggests that the ‘innocent’ are sheltered from unjust suffering, however this 
conclusion is not supported by biblical narrative. On numerous occasions in the Bible, 
‘ethnicity’ is shown to be the mitigating factor in the wilful destruction of innocence, 
most starkly captured in narrative that speaks of divinely sanctioned genocide, acts of 
ethnic cleansing referred to as the ‘Holy Ban’ in contemporary Christian theology.viii 
One such story features the prophet Samuel commissioning King Saul to act on behalf 
of the Israelite God: ‘This is what the Lord Almighty says … Now go, attack the 
Amalekites and totally destroy everything that belongs to them. Do not spare them; put 
to death men and women, children and infants’ (1 Sam. 15:2a, 3). King Saul is duty 
bound to annihilate a people as punishment for their wickedness, dispensing 
wholesale slaughter because of the victim’s ethnicity. This story brings into question 
the conclusion deduced from Job that the ‘innocent’ are spared from destruction, as 
children and infants are openly marked for death.  
 
The book of Deuteronomy sets a legal precedent regarding one’s innocence in relation 
to the transgression of a family member: ‘Fathers shall not be put to death for their 
children nor children put to death for their fathers; each is to die for his own sin’ (Deut. 
24:19). In light of this precedent, punishment of children and infants based on ethnicity 
or alleged inherited guilt contravenes Deuteronomic law. This issue of individual 
accountability and inherited guilt is central to the story of ‘David and Bathsheba’. King 
David, having instigated a sexual liaison with Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, 
subsequently ensures Uriah’s death in battle to avoid any ramification from his 
adultery (2 Sam. 11:2-5). In response to David’s transgressions, the prophet Nathan 
declares: ‘This is what the Lord, the God of Israel, says. Because by doing this you 
have made the enemies of the Lord show utter contempt, the son born to you will die’ 
(2 Sam. 12:7. The imputation that the death of Bathsheba’s child is a consequence of 
David’s trespass, contradicts the legal proclamation that ‘each is to die for his own sin’. 
The death of David’s son and the killing of the Amalekite children expose the fate of 
the powerless under the Father’s enforcement of ethnic purity and the social control of 
sexual desire.  
 
The demand for unquestioning obedience to the will of the Father is represented in the 
story of the ‘Sacrifice of Isaac’. Acting in obedience to the command of his God 
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Abraham journeys with his son Isaac to a high mountain altar upon which Abraham’s 
instructions are straightforward: ‘Take your son, your only son, Isaac, whom you love 
… sacrifice him there as a burnt offering’ (Gen. 22:2). The story reads as a test of 
Abraham’s devotion to God, regardless of the cost of such devotion. Isaac carries the 
wood for his own sacrifice in preparation for his father Abraham to butcher him like a 
lamb. At the climax of the story – as the knife – is raised, God intervenes and stays 
Abraham’s hand, an angel suggesting a nearby ram caught in some thickets as a 
more appropriate sacrifice. Consequently, due to Abraham’s willingness to kill his son 
in obedience to God he is regarded as righteous and blessed (Gen. 22:16-18). While 
there is no suggestion in the text that Isaac is aware of his fate, he is nevertheless 
presented as willing to comply with his father’s will, even to the point of death. The 
narrative gives no indication of what one might consider a natural emotional reaction – 
whether it be despair, reticence or anger – by Abraham or Isaac to such a command. 
This narrative exhibits an absence of human empathy in the father’s claim upon the life 
of his son.ix In the Bible, there is a requirement for those who will inherit the kingdom 
to express, in life, evidence that one is a devotee to his God without question. In this 
thesis, I will explore how these narratives re-emerge and/or are re-invented across 
time. Furthermore, I will identify the contexts in which these stories occur and illustrate 
how the politics and power that gave rise to them continue to sustain them to 
contemporary times. 
 
The Christian Theology of Innocence 
Under its numerous guises, innocence appears to be beyond suspicion and hence 
avoids the circumspection necessary to evaluate the veracity of such a judgement. 
This ambiguity has endowed innocence with a religious immunity while retaining its 
socio-political currency, providing a resource for those who seek to profit from the 
construction of a sacrosanct idealism. The brevity of discourse in relation to innocence 
within biblical narrative is at odds with the imperative expressed in biblical laws, 
dictums and pronouncements. Christianity has consistently overlooked the disparity 
between its championing of the ‘innocent’ and the reality that its own stories reveal 
innocence to be inconsequential, mere ‘collateral damage’ amidst a history of power 
struggles. This discrepancy in the biblical presentation of innocence is evident in the 
disparity between Christian rhetoric and praxis – as exposed by William Blake’s poetry 
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and identified in selected literary texts – bringing into question the veracity of its claim 
to value the innocent.  
 
It may be the greatest irony that the Christian tradition – overall – has failed to 
recognise the symbolism of the biblical legend upon which some of its most damning, 
oppressive doctrines are constructed, and the concept of innocence finds its roots. In 
the Genesis story of the ‘Garden of Eden’ – also known as ‘The Fall of Man’ – a scene 
depicts a garden with only two points of orientation: The ‘Tree of the Knowledge of 
Good and Evil’ and the ‘Tree of Life’ (Gen. 2:8-9). Such conspicuous recognition 
suggests considerable significance and indeed these ‘trees’ have proved to be central 
agents in the destiny of human/deity relations.  
 
8 Now the Lord God had planted a garden in the east, in Eden; and there he 
put the man he had formed. 9 The Lord God made all kinds of trees grow out 
of the ground—trees that were pleasing to the eye and good for food. In the 
middle of the garden were the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil’. 
15 The Lord God took the man and put him in the Garden of Eden to work it 
and take care of it. 16 And the Lord God commanded the man, “You are free 
to eat from any tree in the garden; 17 but you must not eat from the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat from it you will certainly die.” 
1 ‘Now the serpent was more crafty than any of the wild animals 
the LORD God had made. He said to the woman, “Did God really say, ‘You 
must not eat from any tree in the garden’?”  
2 The woman said to the serpent, “We may eat fruit from the trees in the 
garden, 3 but God did say, ‘You must not eat fruit from the tree that is in the 
middle of the garden, and you must not touch it, or you will die.’” 
4 “You will not certainly die,” the serpent said to the woman. 5 “For God 
knows that when you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will be 
like God, knowing good and evil.” 
6 When the woman saw that the fruit of the tree was good for food and 
pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining wisdom, she took some 
and ate it. She also gave some to her husband, who was with her, and he 
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ate it. 7 Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized they 
were naked; so they sewed fig leaves together and made coverings for 
themselves’.  
(Gen. 2:8-9, 15-17; 3:1-7). 
 
Traditionally Christianity has interpreted this story as a relatively simple equation: The 
prohibition ‘Don’t eat from that tree’ is transgressed (Gen. 2:17). Hence according to 
the dominant Christian theology ‘sin’ enters the world and the state of innocence is 
lost.x Humanity is subsequently banished from paradise and removed from the 
presence of God (Gen. 3:24). It is from this reading of ‘The Fall’ that the Christian 
concept of ‘original sin’ derives, a moment when man’s disobedience bequeathed a 
transcendental rogue gene to billions of descendants. Christian leaders from St. 
Augustine of Hippo, through to Pope Benedict XVI and any number of American 
evangelists, have supported this interpretation of The Fall.xi  
 
This inquiry into innocence is derailed by transcendent knowledge such as ‘original 
sin’, which is beyond the parameters of history and thus human analysis. However, a 
symbolic reading of The Fall permits philosophy to shed a more humanly intelligible 
light on this story. Indeed, Friedrich Nietzsche more than 1,800 years later argued that 
one should seek to transform everything ‘into the humanly-conceivable, the humanly-
evident, the humanly-palpable!’ (Nietzsche, 1969, p. 110). Of course Nietzsche’s 
argument comes at a time of secularisation when he deems the biblical stories into the 
realm of parable and myth. His view is one that maintains that the old ‘myths’ 
constructed moral principles of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ dehumanised the lives of men and 
women who for centuries, were led to sacrifice aspects of being human that would 
disqualify them from eternal life with God. Indeed Nietzsche asserted that the Christian 
Church has set itself to destroy ‘all the instincts proper to the highest and most 
successful of the type man’, reversing ‘the whole love of the earthly and of the 
dominion over the earth into hatred of the earth and the earthly’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 
89). 
 
If one accepts the biblical stories as mere interpretation rather than sacred revelation, 
a Nietzschean interpretation of The Fall brings into question the dominant (literal) 
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Christian reading of this story. It might also be argued that the Christian presentation 
of innocence is a product of the intentional misrepresentation of The Fall, endorsed by 
those who seek to create an ideological ‘truth effect’ constructed upon notions of 
‘good’ and ‘evil’. This ‘lie of innocence’ is employed to justify the will of the Father, 
however the Christian representation of ‘love’ – qualified according to one’s obedience 
and unquestioning devotion – has perhaps proven to be the most persuasive in 
numerous ways. This interdependent tryst of co-opted ‘love’ and ‘innocence’ forms a 
prism through which critiques of the Father’s will are refracted: The very act of 
questioning represented as evidence of rebellion and thus deserving of God’s wrath. In 
contemporary political dialogue, similar attitudes are conveyed by language that 
condemns the ‘Orphan’ as undemocratic or unpatriotic and therefore a worthy target of 
State sanctioned retribution. A contemporary example of a political ‘Orphan’ subjected 
to such condemnation is the Australian investigative journalist and activist Julian 
Assange. Opposing government censorship and championing the freedom of the 
press, the founder and director of WikiLeaks – a body that publishes classified 
documents – incurred the wrath of the United States Government in 2010, being 
labelled by Vice-President Joe Biden as a “high-tech terrorist” (Bannerman 2010).xii 
Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard condemned Assange as undertaking “illegal 
activities” despite the then Attorney General Robert McClelland being unable to 
identify a breach of Australian law (Grattan 2010).xiii Exposing the ‘lie of innocence’ will 
require us to reconsider the perspective of the ‘Serpent’ in The Fall legend – ironically 
represented throughout the history of Christendom as the manifestation of the ‘Father 
of Lies’.xiv 
 
Traditionally, Christianity has equated the Serpent’s claim that humanity “will not surely 
die” if they attain the knowledge of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, with seditious intent. The Serpent’s 
declaration: “God knows that when you eat of (the tree) your eyes will be opened, and 
you will be like God, knowing good and evil” is regarded as tantamount to rebellion, an 
act of treason against God (Gen. 3:5). Christianity has identified Adam’s trespass of 
God’s prohibition as the event in which humanity forfeited the gift of eternal life. 
However, a symbolic reading of The Fall may interpret humanity as being cursed due 
to a fixation upon the knowledge of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ that has detracted from a vision for 
life. There are a number of stories in the Bible where characters – metaphorically 
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represented by the Orphan – undermine current paradigms of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ that has 
wrought injustice in a community, rejecting the fate imposed upon them by the 
powerful.xv The story of Jesus of Nazareth in the Gospel is perhaps the most 
significant example of a biblical character undermining prevailing paradigms of power. 
Jesus is portrayed as exposing the political treachery of the Pharisees and teachers of 
religious law (Luke 11:42-45), opposing the use of violence (Matt. 5:39) and 
insurrection against Roman rule (Luke 20:22-25). Protagonists such as the Christ 
reveal how the ‘lie of innocence’ is employed to justify political alignment, sanction 
legalistic religious observance or legitimize the pre-immanence of birth-right; they find 
their roots in the ‘Garden of Eden’. If we go beyond the constraints of the metaphor, 
the ‘Tree of life’ suggests the possibility of a living principle that is not viewed as an 
alternative mode of life, perhaps, until the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. In 
undermining the ‘truth’ factor in the ‘Tree of Knowledge of Good an Evil’ Nietzsche 
reminds one that there may be another way of living life. The metaphor of the ‘Tree of 
life’ is not developed in the Bible,: Subsumed by The Fall it loses its right to grow. It is 
my contention that the ‘Tree of Life’ can only grow within an environs that is not 
determined by fixed moralities imposed by proclamations of certainties in relation to 
what is ‘good’ and ‘evil’.   
 
Friedrich Nietzsche argued that the idea of ‘unfree will’ – such as the curse of ‘original 
sin’ – was a mythology perpetuated by the erroneous concept that the effect follows 
the cause.xvi He believed that humanity was deluded by the idea that it was shackled 
by imposed values, regarding all such constraints as a product of ignorant compliance 
to patriarchal dictates. Nietzsche saw this myth of the ‘unfree will’ as primarily 
manifesting in our propensity to shift responsibility to another or alternatively, our 
refusal to give up responsibility due to a fictitious view of oneself (Nietzsche 1990, p. 
51). Hence, according to Nietzsche we behave ‘mythologically’, having failed to 
perceive that the idea of ‘psychological unfreedom’ is a lie and that in “real life” it is 
only a question of strong and weak wills’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 51). All feelings such as 
‘compulsion, exigency, constraint, pressure’ and ‘unfreedom’ betray this weakness of 
will (Nietzsche 1990, p. 51).  
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Among the numerous allusions to the Bible in Nietzsche’s writings, there are a number 
of references that provide an alternate perspective upon The Fall legend that subvert 
customary Judeo-Christian interpretations. In Beyond Good and Evil (1886), Nietzsche 
associates the symbolism of the devil with knowledge (Nietzsche 1990, p. 99), whilst 
also equating the ‘Tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil’ with deception: ‘“Where the 
tree of knowledge stands is always Paradise”: thus speak the oldest and youngest 
serpents’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 103). Further inverting customary religious theology, 
Nietzsche suggests it was: 
 
God himself who at the end of his labor lay down as a serpent under the 
Tree of Knowledge: it was thus he recuperated from being God… He had 
made everything too beautiful… The Devil is merely the idleness of God on 
that seventh day’ (Nietzsche 1992, p. 83). 
 
This proposed interrelationship between knowledge and the devil resonates in his 
depiction of the ‘malicious fairy, romanticism’ that ‘piped and sang’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 
42).
xviii
xvii Nietzsche considered Romanticism to be a time ‘when one was not yet able to 
distinguish between “finding” and “inventing” knowledge’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 42). His 
appraisal of Romanticism as being ‘malicious’ reflects his contention that the Romantic 
poets had been deluded in their belief that knowledge of moral values could be 
perceived in nature. Nietzsche argued that values do not exist in nature and cannot be 
found in the fabric of the world. He regarded nature as being the epitome of 
indifference a power without ‘aims or intentions, without mercy or justice, at once 
fruitful and barren’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 39).  In the following chapter it will be shown 
that William Blake’s poetry pre-empted Nietzsche’s view that knowledge had seduced 
humanity into error, obscuring a vision of life that could perceive the ‘innocence of 
becoming’. This thesis will consider how literature has represented, reinvented and 
subverted biblical stories and images across time, within the philosophical, historical 
and political contexts they were written. Power, morality and laws are the common 
ground of enquiry in that they are looked at in relation to how literature reflects them 
across time in relation to the ‘lie of innocence’. 
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i Henry Giroux contends that one of the myths of ‘innocence’ is that of ‘childhood innocence’ which 
consists of a natural state, ‘one that is beyond the dictates of history, society and politics’ (Giroux 2000: 
p. 2). 
 
ii The KJV translates the Hebrew word naqah as innocent in Psalm 19:13; Prov. 6:29; Prov. 28:20, while 
the corresponding verses in the ASV use the word ‘unpunished’ twice and ‘clear’ once. In 1 Kings 2:31, 
the KJV interprets the Hebrew chinnam as ‘innocent’, whereas the KJV refers to ‘blood shed without 
cause’, as in the case of a traditional blood debt. In Rom. 18:18, the ASV translates the Greek word 
akakos as ‘innocent’, while the corresponding verse in the KJV is ‘simple’. For comparisons between 
Bible versions and analysis of Hebrew and Greek terms for innocence refer to ‘Bible Comparison Table’, 
Appendix A (attached). 
 
iii References to Greek and Hebrew words are taken from the Masoretic Hebrew text and the Greek 
Septuagint (LXX) as translated by James Strong (Strong 1890). 
 
iv Today’s New International Version, accessed on 17.02.08, <http://www.TNIV.info/story/heritage.php.  
  
v  The Books of Wisdom include Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon and much of Psalms. 
 
vi  The Books of Law refers to the first five books of the Old Testament: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, 
Numbers and Deuteronomy. 
 
vii The following Biblical narratives make reference to the word ‘innocent’, some of which will be drawn 
upon in later discussion of literary texts: 
 
Innocence and Power 
1 Sam. 19:4-6 (chinnam - ‘innocent’). Jonathan attempts to convince his father King Saul, that David 
had done his father a great favour by killing Galioth and should do no “wrong to an innocent man like 
David by killing him for no reason?”   
 
2 Sam. 3:27-29 (naqiy – ‘guiltless’). In response to Joab killing Abner to avenge the blood of his brother 
Asahel King David proclaims: “I and my kingdom are forever innocent before the Lord concerning the 
blood of Abner.”  
 
2 Sam. 4:10-12: (tsaddiyq – ‘righteousness’). Having given a prior example of killing those he has 
judged to be morally wrong, King David declares, “how much more – when wicked men have killed an 
innocent man in his own house and on his own bed – should I not now demand his blood from your 
hand and rid the earth of you!”  
 
2 Sam. 15:10-12: (tom – ‘simplicity’). Absalom, the son of King David seeks his father’s throne and 
secretly assembles an army. Two hundred men are ‘invited as guests and went quite innocently, 
knowing nothing about the matter.’  
 
1 Kings 2:30-32 (chinnam – ‘innocent’). Fleeing from King Solomon, Joab sought refuge in the tent of 
the Lord. Solomon commands that Joab be killed order to clear himself and his “father’s house of the 
guilt of the innocent blood that Joab shed.”  
 
2 Kings 10:8-10 (tsaddiyq – ‘righteous’). Having killed the sons of Ahab contrary to the command of the 
King of Judah, Jehu tells the Israelites: “You are innocent. It was I who conspired against my master 
and killed them.”  
 
Matt. 27:3-5 (athoos – ‘innocent’). When Judas saw that Jesus was condemned, he returned the thirty 
silver coins to the chief priests and the elders declaring, “I have sinned … for I have betrayed innocent 
blood.” 
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Matt. 27:18-20 (dikaios – ‘righteous’). While deliberating his response to calls to crucify Jesus, Pilate 
receives a message from his wife stating, “Don’t have anything to do with that innocent man, for I have 
suffered a great deal today in a dream because of him.”   
  
Matt. 27:23-25 (athoos – ‘innocent’).  Overwhelmed with the demand of the people to crucify Jesus and 
concerned about the growing uproar, Pilate washes his hands in front of the crowd declaring, “I am 
innocent of this man’s blood … it is your responsibility!”  
 
Innocence and Religious Observance 
Dan. 6:21-13 (zakuw – ‘innocency’). Having been sentenced to death for worshipping his God rather 
than King Xerxes, Daniel is pulled unharmed from the lion’s den, declares that God had “shut the 
mouths of the lions … because I was found innocent in his sight.” 
 
Innocence and Law 
Gen. 44:15-17 (tsadeq – ‘clear’). Joseph entraps his brothers by placing a goblet in their luggage to 
ensure his youngest brother remains with him in Eygpt. When the goblet is discovered Judah laments, 
“What can we say? How can we prove our innocence? God has uncovered your servant’s guilt.” 
 
viii For further on the idea of the ‘Holy Ban’ or ‘Holy War’ see Gerhard von Rad’s Holy War in Ancient 
Israel (Von Rad 1991). 
 
ix Nietzsche observes that as in ‘former time … it seemed proper for fathers to possess power of life or 
death over the newborn and to use it as they thought fit’. This same power is exercised in society where 
the patriarchal Father – whether they be ‘a teacher, the class, the priest (or) the prince unhesitatingly 
see in every new human being an opportunity for a new possession’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 118). 
 
x In ‘The Summa of Theology’ (1265-1274), Catholic theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas taught that 
‘original sin’ passed from Adam through the ‘body’ of humanity (Aquinas 1988, p. 43). 
 
xi In ‘The Profession of Faith’, the Catholic Catechism asserts that the concept of ‘original sin’ is an 
‘essential truth of the faith’ (Catholic Church 2005, §388). As sin is deemed to have been ‘present in 
human history’ it is argued that ‘any attempt to ignore it or to give this dark reality other names would be 
futile’ (Catholic Church 2005, §386). The Catechism locates the origins of ‘original sin’ in the ‘account of 
the fall in Genesis 3’ which ‘uses figurative language, but affirms a primeval event, a deed that took 
place at the beginning of the history of man’ (Catholic Church 2005, §390). It is claimed that due to this 
‘primeval event’ that ‘the whole of human history is marked by the original fault freely committed by our 
first parents (Catholic Church 2005, §390). For a further explication on the concept of ‘original sin’ see 
Saint Augustine (391-430) ‘Treatises on Various Subjects’ (Saint Augustine 1996).  
 
xii Move Bannerman, Lucy 2010, ‘Assange a high-tech terrorist: Biden’, The Australian, 20 December, 
retrieved 16 August 2011, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/assange-a-high-tech-terrorist-
biden/story-e6frg6so-1225973696881. 
 
xiii Grattan, Michelle 2010, ‘Gillard condemns leaking as “illegal act”’, The Age, 8 December, retrieved 5 
June 2011, http://www.theage.com.au/world/gillard-condemns-leaking-as-illegal-act-20101207-
18oc5.html. 
 
xiv In the Gospel of John, Jesus refers to the ‘Devil’ as the ‘Father of Lies’ (John 8:44). 
 
xv Examples of metaphorical Orphans in the Bible may include: Jacob, Ester, Daniel and Jesus. 
 
xvi Nietzsche argued that there is ‘nothing of ‘causal connection’, of necessity’, contending that it is ‘we 
alone who have fabricated causes, successions, reciprocity, relativity, compulsion, number, law, 
freedom, motive, purpose’, when we ‘falsely introduce this world of symbols into things’ (Nietzsche 
1990, p. 51). 
 
xvii In his reference to the fairy that ‘piped and sang’ Nietzsche appears to be drawing upon William 
Blake’s poem ‘The Piper’ in Songs of Innocence and Experience (Blake 1988).  
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xviii Nietzsche contended that humanity could not live with such uncertainty, for living demands that one 
valuate differentiate and prefer amidst the ‘indifferent magnificence’ of nature (Nietzsche 1990, p. 111). 
 
  Chapter 2: William Blake 
 
Chapter 2 - William Blake: From Irony to the 
Sublime 
 
Romantic poets were preoccupied with ideas of ‘vision’ and ‘imagination’ and concepts 
of childhood and innocence were prominent themes, developed in relation to new 
ideas about nature. Nature is a central theme in Romanticism as is a fascination with 
childhood and the desire to recapture an innocent apprehension of the world.i For 
example William Wordsworth (1802), portrays the relationship between the child and 
nature and how the imagination impacts ‘on infants minds as surely as the sun/Deals 
with a flower’ (Wordsworth 2007, p. 352).  
 
In the wake of the political revolutions of America 1776 and France 1789, the innate 
subversive nature of the child’s imagination and willingness to question established 
norms ensured that childhood was ‘neither of political disinterest nor an ideological 
neutral matter’ (Richardson 1994, p. 24). In response to the potential danger of the 
young enquiring mind, Immanuel Kant stressed the importance of not exciting or 
stimulating the child’s imagination, which should rather be ‘reined in and brought under 
rules’ for the ‘advantage of the understanding’ (Bohme 1996, p. 430). Many believed 
that if childishness were to be fostered, it would in turn grow to challenge the reason 
upon which the ethics and morality of a stable and prosperous society was 
constructed.ii The pre-eminence of reason was exalted to such a degree that the 
Irishman John Toland (1670-1722) claimed that the ‘primitive truth’ of the Christian 
gospel and the Bible must be examined under rational scrutiny, as there is nothing 
‘above reason’ (Sambrook 1993, p. 39). Similarly, Johann Tieftrunk (1794) argued that 
it is ‘impossible that reason, if practiced as thinking for oneself and inseparable from 
morality, could be the source of any malady’ (Tieftrunk 1996, p. 220). The extent to 
which reason was ‘divinised’ was expressed by Isaac Newton (1704) who declared 
that through a process of mental reflection upon our sensory experiences we could 
arrive at an understanding of the relationship between God, nature and humanity.iii 
The debate therefore raged as to whether childhood was a time of sensitivity to all 
things spiritual or something to grow out of and improved upon (Thacker 2002, p. 17). 
Within this context of debate, the way in which the Romantic poets drew on the 
concept of innocence is of particular interest to this thesis. 
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In his work Emile, A Treatise of Education (1768), Jean-Jacques Rousseau challenged 
the Enlightenment concept of how children should be treated proposing that the 
characteristics of the child were virtues to be celebrated rather than harnessed and 
redirected according to the prevailing adult needs and values (Archer 1964, p. 95). 
Romanticism held that childhood was a time of play and inquisitiveness that should be 
encouraged through the stimulation of the imagination. Deborah Thacker suggests that 
for many of the Romantics the ‘very act of imposing knowledge or enforcing ideologies 
destroys primary knowledge of transcendent truths, which are thus hidden from the 
conscious mind’ (Thacker 2002, p. 22). David Hume’s contention that religion arises 
from passion and imagination, fear and desire challenged the reign of reason and 
‘natural theology’ propagated by Isaac Newton and John Locke (Sambrook 1993, p. 
51). Unlike Locke, Hume regarded reason as the servant of our passions and moral 
judgement based primarily on our feelings: Emotions rather than ‘moral sense’, divine 
sanctions or ‘natural theology’ provided the motive for moral judgments. Robert 
Solomon discusses the relationship between reason and emotion in the formation of 
an ethical response to the world in his work No Passion’s Slave (2003), where he 
proposes that emotions affect human behaviour through processes in which the 
individual makes choices and hence exercises significant control (Solomon 2003, p. 
203). Although Solomon regards basic emotions such as hate, anger and fear to be 
‘essential to the human condition and thus pancultural’ (Solomon 2003, p. 138), he 
contends that emotions that involve ‘cognition and complex appraisals … might be 
socially constructed’ (Solomon 2003, p. 138). While  regarding feelings or ‘affects’ as 
being critical to emotion, Solomon does not consider these feelings to be ‘distinct from 
cognition or judgment’, nor does he view them as ‘mere “readouts” of processes going 
on in the body’ (Solomon 2003, p. 192). Hence Solomon likens emotions to the 
‘building blocks’ upon which the ‘Self’ is formed, ‘constituted by us according to our 
values and interests’ (Solomon 1976, p. 84).iv Solomon dismisses the notion that 
emotions are ‘either just biological or just cultural’ (Solomon 2007, p. 261), arguing that 
our emotional response is largely determined by the ‘fit’ between ‘an action (or an 
emotion) and the rest of a person’s character, circumstances, and culture, including 
his or her reflection on these’ (Solomon 2003, p. 204).v However, Solomon 
emphasises that ‘personal responsibility’ or ‘emotional integrity’ is of foremost 
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importance to an ethical emotional response to the world, asserting that ‘any theory 
that does not face up to this is itself political’ (Solomon 2003, p. 157).  
 
It is informative to consider Anthony Cooper’s late 17th Century objection to the 
presiding opinion that moral systems could be based purely on discursive reasoning. 
In his work ‘Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit’ (1699), Cooper rejected the idea that 
morality could be based upon an empirical science, rather proposing that the moral 
truth of ‘nature’s order’ resonates in one’s feelings ‘recognised intuitively in a rush of 
delight which accompanies aesthetic appreciation’ (Cooper cited in Sambrook 1993, p. 
68).vi This perception of ‘nature’s order’ was considered by many to be most keenly 
evident in the child who was deemed to ‘possess an unspoken understanding of the 
sublime and hidden meaning at the heart of the imaginative process’ due to a natural 
connection with higher order, transcendental truths (Thacker 2002, p. 16). In this 
chapter, I wish to explore the way in which Blake responded to both the Enlightenment 
view of innocence as well as the Romantic one. My intention is to demonstrate that the 
concepts of innocence, in both the Enlightenment and the Romantic guise, hold within 
them a deceit that Blake exposed. 
 
Paradoxical Irony: Imagination and the Sublime  
The Romantic poetry of William Blake does not seek inspiration from transcendent 
aspiration rather it looks to humanity: The struggles of the poor and their abuse by the 
powerful. Whereas Wordsworth believed that ‘poetry takes its origins from emotions 
recollected in tranquillity’, Blake’s poetry sought to agitate the soul and awaken the 
imagination.vii Unlike Wordsworth, Blake did not primarily draw his inspiration from 
nature nor did he seek the metaphysical realm of Coleridge’s unseen world (Cranston 
1995, p. 52). Writing in the wake of the French Revolution, Blake believed that to 
succeed revolution must first commence with changes to the inner being, before one 
could hope for the structural reformation of a state. He held that the imagination 
awakens the passion to escape from the mental prison of reason and open oneself to 
the infinite. While Blake held to a Christian faith, his idea that vision sees beyond the 
senses to the true nature of the ‘other’ is not the product of mystical or spiritualist 
transcendence. Rather the ‘vision’ of a mind invigorated by the imagination sees the 
  Chapter 2: William Blake 
 
‘whole creation’ as ‘infinite and holy, whereas it now appears finite & corrupt’ (Blake 
1998, p. 80). Blake’s poetry exposes the ‘lie of innocence’ by writing about a society 
that is dominated by reason employed by the powerful to suppress alternative visions 
of life that may bring about change and usher in a more humane future. Blake sees his 
world as being a product of invalid concepts of innocence and experience, which had 
been utilised as a means of justifying inequitable constructs of power. 
  
The paradoxical nature of Romantic irony is captured in Blake’s poetry in which a 
moral axiom or religious value is represented and subsequently exposed as being 
pernicious and symptomatic of a fallen consciousness (Colebrook 2004, p. 57). In 
Blake’s poetry the concept of innocence is shown to be determined by a standard 
other than innocence itself. It is this standard which Blake identifies as having 
assumed an authority in its own right, open to the abuse of those who seek to impose 
concepts of innocence that adhere to particular purposes and ends. Blake’s irony 
exposes the inequities of his society and the hypocrisy of the church and its 
destructive vision of innocence, horrifically presented in the abuse and exploitation of 
the child.viii Blake attacked the prevailing empiricist view that ‘all knowledge reaches 
the mind through the senses: The imagination he insisted, was the faculty which gave 
access to truth’ (Cranston 1995, p. 53).ix It would be an understatement to suggest 
Blake had little regard for the empiricism of the great English thinkers of the 
Enlightenment. He wrote; ‘I read Burkes Treatise when very Young at the same time I 
read Locke on Human Understanding and Bacon’s Advancement of Learning … I felt 
the same contempt and abhorrence then that I do now’ (Blake 1988, p. 660).   
 
The continuing process of questioning, contestation, disruption or distancing oneself 
from shared norms inherent in irony, was to find new expression in Romanticism’s 
rejection of Enlightenment reason. Blake’s irony reveals the error of claiming a 
particular perspective to be absolute and pre-empts Friedrich Nietzsche’s contention 
that there is no such thing as truth, that truth is a fiction (Nietzsche 1990, p. 50). Just 
as Nietzsche was aware that one could not logically claim that it is true that there is no 
such thing as truth, Blake utilises impossible and contradictory aphorisms to attack 
truths and laws in the knowledge that such an attack might create a new law. Blake’s 
method incorporates an ironical strategy that Colebrook represents as an irony that 
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‘has always posited some point above and beyond any particular context or value’ 
(Colebrook 2004, p. 150). Blake is able to question an assumption, position or 
definition without offering an alternative value, thus elevating himself above dialogue to 
an elitist position of discernment and questioning beyond criticism. Blake’s ironic 
portrayal of the contrary states of ‘innocence’ and ‘experience’ goes beyond 
substitution of meaning and function to question accepted concepts and social norms 
recognising that there is always more to say. The imagination is identified as being 
critical in this re-evaluation, perceiving beyond the limitations of mere facts, empirical 
measurement or systematic form to comprehend the significance or value of things. 
Perhaps Blake in his attack on the ‘lie of innocence’ is attempting to access an 
innocence of the imagination that preserves the capacity to renew ones vision of life. 
  
Many of Blake’s poems are about the inexpressible. Through the contradictions of the 
ironic form, he is able to create sublime insight that brings into consciousness that 
which is unspeakable. In ‘Milton’, Blake writes:  
 
Every Time less than a pulsation of the Artery 
Is equal in its period & value to Six Thousand Years, 
For in this Period the Poet’s Work is Done (Blake 1979, p. 283). 
 
Eternity may be experienced in a moment illuminated with such fullness and intensity 
that its impact is not only beyond the realm of empirical time but can transform a 
lifetime. The sublime defies interpretation in the same way that the ‘most elevated 
peak discourages and defies ascent’ (Deguy 1993, p. 6). Rather than seeking to 
explain or objectify the sublime, this work will identify Blake’s ironic treatment of the 
concept of ‘innocence’ and the sublime insights it creates. Pseudo-Longinus described 
the sublime as the ‘ravishment that makes one pass on, a movement of being carried 
away traversal, uplifting transport’ (Deguy 1993, p. 6).x Similarly, Theodor Adorno 
(1949) describes the Kantian theory of the sublime as an ‘art which shudders within 
itself … giving itself something other than art: Something sublime (Adorno 1967, p. 
26).xi In his work Critique of Judgement (1790), Kant sought a passage or a ‘bridge 
over the abyss’, which ‘renders possible the passage from pure theoretical reason to 
pure practical reason’ (Kant 1952, p. 12). This passage according to Kant could be 
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located within a transcendental principle of the faculty of aesthetic judgment.xii The 
sublime ‘appears as though the object were contrapurposive for our powers’ and could 
be conceived as ‘productive of a passion similar to terror’ (Kant 1952, p. 27). Kant 
describes mental agitation as characteristic of the sublime, the result of an insight into 
either the cognitive power, or the arousal of desire (Geiman 1996, p. 524). The 
sublime in this sense is beyond empirical measurement and has an infinite quality, 
which according to Kant, is an ‘expansion of the mind itself’ (Geiman 1996, p. 524). 
The aesthetic judgment of the sublime gives one access to experience/concepts (such 
as innocence) through imaginative excesses that prompt ‘so much thought as can 
never be comprehended within a determinate concept and thereby the presentation 
aesthetically expands the concept itself’ (Kant 1952, p. 183).xiii Although Kant brings 
his argument back to an intellectual understanding in his treatment of the sublime, he 
also recognises that there is an area of thought that ‘shudders within itself’. Nietzsche 
may have been referring to this same shuddering apprehension of the sublime when 
he refers to: 
 
…those miraculous moments when a great power voluntarily halted before 
the boundless and immeasurable – when superfluity of subtle delight in 
sudden restraint and petrification, in standing form and fixing oneself, was 
enjoyed on a ground still trembling (Nietzsche 1990, p. 154). 
 
It is the imaginative strength of Blake’s poetry that apprehends this ‘moment’ when 
there exists an insight into life that might set us free from our fixation with logic and 
subjugation to patriarchal laws and morality that continue to espouse the curse of the 
‘Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil’.  
 
Interdependence of Innocence and Experience 
In his Songs of Innocence and of Experience, Blake juxtaposes the ‘Two Contrary 
States of the Human Soul’.xiv The ‘Introduction’ to Innocence portrays a ‘Piper’ playing 
the music of nature through the ‘valleys wild’, invigorating emotion and imagination 
(Blake 1998, p. 58).xv In the second stanza of the ‘Introduction’ a child asks the Piper 
to twice play his song and then in the third stanza to sing the song.  Hence as Nicholas 
Marsh observes, the song is ‘performed three times becoming more and more fixed, 
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less and less spontaneous, as it develops from a purely musical expression of 
pleasure’, to its final form written, ‘In a book that all may read’ (Marsh 2001, p. 11). We 
witness a narrowing from the plural ‘songs of pleasant glee’ to a singular ‘song about a 
Lamb.’ In the third stanza the song is repeated, however the child who initially laughs, 
now ‘wept with joy to hear’ (Blake 1998, p. 59). Such a paradoxical emotion in a child 
suggests that the original spontaneous joy has given way to a remembrance, possibly 
of the songs no longer played. One perceives that something has already been lost a 
feeling further accentuated in the fourth stanza when the Piper writes the song; the 
song ceases to be heard and the child subsequently vanishes. No longer does the 
melody evoke happiness in a moment of pleasant glee. All that remains is the memory 
of what was: A singular, defined and limited memory.  
 
Language such as ‘valleys wild’, ‘rural’ and ‘water clear’ evoke an image of a world 
before the ravages of the industrial revolution, a time before the corruptive intervention 
of humanity: An Eden. The poem portrays the qualities of the world of innocence as 
natural, unspoilt, and filled with gentleness and love represented in a song about a 
‘Lamb.’ The Piper who ‘pluck’d a hollow reed’ from nature to fashion a ‘rural pen’, is 
symbolic of the inevitable corruption of innocence by knowledge and industry: The pen 
‘stain’d the water clear’ (Blake 1998, p. 59). Marsh asks the poignant question: “How 
far is the world of innocence already an artificial idea, an attempt to prolong innocence 
and protect it from change, by writing ‘joy’ into a book?” (Marsh 2001, p. 14).  
 
As the title suggests, ‘The Shepherd’ in Innocence continues the use of Christian 
imagery. Blake represents ‘innocence’ in his image of the ‘Lamb’, a symbol of Christ in 
the Christian tradition characteristically endowed with the qualities of humility, 
gentleness, love and innocence (Blake 1998, p. 61).xvi Set amidst a tranquil scene 
where the ‘innocent’ lambs and ‘tender’ ewes find ‘peace’ in the watchful presence of 
the ‘Shepherd’ subtle doubts arise as to the conditional nature of this ‘peace.’ Although 
the ‘Shepherd’ brings peace ‘from the morn to the evening’, there is a logical 
conjunction that makes us wonder what the ‘night’ may bring (Marsh 2001, p. 15). 
Similarly the peace experienced by the flock – ‘For they know when their Shepherd is 
nigh’ – suggests an awareness of the potential danger posed by the Shepherd’s 
absence. Furthermore, that the ‘Shepherd’ is ‘watchful while they are in peace’ 
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intimates that there is a need for vigilance. The ‘implication of a contrary, disturbing 
world outside’ this place of innocence is little more than an unspoken hint. 
Nonetheless, the immanence of a potential threat lurks on the borders and reflects the 
fragile nature of innocence and the inevitability of change when such innocence is 
exposed to experience.xvii 
 
In the ‘Introduction’ to Experience, the ‘Bard’ summons the listener to pay heed. 
Whereas the Piper freely plays his songs for all who would hear, the narrator of 
Experience pronounces a clear imperative to ‘hear’ the Bard who has knowledge of 
the ‘Present, Past, & Future’ (Blake 1998, p. 117). The Bard recounts the memory of 
the original innocence of the Piper’s song: ‘The Holy Word/That walked among the 
ancient trees’ (Blake 1998, p. 117).xviii The Bard calls for the ‘lapsed Soul’ and the very 
earth itself to awaken, yet his cry, “Turn away no more” seems to lack conviction and 
carries an air of resignation when considered with the following, “Why wilt thou turn 
away?” (Blake 1998, p. 117). Marsh suggests that the Bard is struggling against a 
‘recalcitrant will which prevents the world from waking, and he is far from sure that the 
coming morning will rejuvenate the world’ (Marsh 2001, p. 21). It would appear that the 
scepticism and weariness that pervades the Bard’s summons, is due to ‘experience’ 
being unable to conceive of change in the absence of innocence.xix The Bard alludes 
to the possibility of the Earth rising from its ‘slumberous mass’ through its own effort to 
rekindle the ‘fallen, fallen light’, if it would only find the desire to do so. Blake argued 
that the desire to awaken from such slumber was born in the imagination perceiving 
beyond reason, law and fear. The idea that the imagination was essential if humanity 
was to explore new and creative possibilities for life differed greatly from Kant’s 
insistence that unless the imagination was subjected to constraint and discipline, the 
free imagination ‘might produce original folly. For if the imagination is left in lawless 
freedom, all its riches produce nothing but nonsense’ (Bohme 1996, p. 430).xx Robbed 
of freedom and independence the imagination is ‘disqualified as a faculty of 
knowledge’ and relegated to the realm of aesthetics (Bohme 1996, p. 426). 
 
In ‘Earth’s Answer’ Blake suggests that our inability to rise from this ‘fallen’ state is due 
to the portrayal of God as ‘selfish’ and ‘cruel’ and while still possessing the capacity to 
delight once again, humanity is ‘chain’d’ by their own dark minds (Blake 1998, p. 118). 
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‘Fear’ of a ‘jealous’ God who imparts a ‘stony dread’, paralyses and ‘freeze(s) my 
bones around’, binding ‘delight’ and ‘love’. This ‘fear’ prevents humanity from breaking 
the ‘heavy chain’ of law, punishment and condemnation that has created such ‘grey 
despair’ (Blake 1979, p. 148). While for Blake the character of God is just and loving, 
there is another concept of God that resides in the human soul implanted by fear and 
confusion propagated by the clergy. The god ‘Urizen’ symbolizes this fear and 
incapacity to appreciate the true character of God, demanding love in return for 
acceptance and obedience before renewal.  
 
The voices of religion and reason determine that contrary qualities cannot co-exist: 
innocence is inevitability destroyed by exposure to the uncertainties and risks of 
experience. Blake’s poetry uses irony to reveal that the worlds of innocence and 
experience are not contrary states at the extremities of existence devoid of awareness 
of the other. Rather, innocence for all its idyllic harmony and peace remains in a state 
of perpetual vulnerability and fragility that fears to embrace change or adapt to the 
realities of experience. Similarly, the world of experience is portrayed as fearing hope 
itself, despite being aware that ‘buds and blossoms grow’ (Blake 1998, p. 117). These 
opening poems to The Songs of Innocence and Experience dismiss the conventional 
assumption that experience brings knowledge and wisdom, while innocence is the 
domain of the naive and ignorant. The fear that permeates both worlds conceals 
innocence’s dependence upon the authority of experience and the hope innocence 
offers to experience to free itself from the oppression of its own constructions.xxi In The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1793), Blake asserts that ‘without contraries there is no 
progression’ (Blake 1998, p. 74). Blake could be understood as a relativist in the sense 
that a quality could only exist if it could be distinguished from its opposite, whoever 
tries to reconcile them, without recognising the tension, seeks to destroy existence. 
Thus, his interest is in the third state. 
 
The Lamb & The Tyger: Naivety and a Fearful Vision 
Blake regards ‘experience’ as essential for personal growth and considers willingness 
and a capacity to learn creatively as superior to reason or any precept, instruction or 
law. In the ‘Introduction’ to Innocence the child’s engagement with the ‘songs’ as 
presentation that subsequently evolves into a written representation of a ‘song’, finds 
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parallels in the thought development of the child in ‘The Lamb’ (Blake 1998, p. 61). 
The poem’s initial question ‘Little Lamb who made thee’, is answered ‘Little Lamb I’ll 
tell thee’; proceeding to a conclusion that consciously differentiates ‘self’ and ‘other’: ‘I 
a child & thou a lamb’ (Blake 1998, p. 61). While the child’s conscious awakening 
mirrors the development of the ‘song’ in the ‘Introduction’ to Innocence there is no hint 
of the potential danger that lingers in ‘The Shepherd’. The poem’s depiction of a child’s 
happiness and references to ‘softest clothing woolly bright’ and the ‘tender voice’ that 
makes ‘vales rejoice’ speaks of a utopian existence (Blake 1998, p. 61). Blake’s 
language creates an image of peace and tranquillity somewhat removed from the 
realities of human existence, demonstrating that such childlike faith remains 
dependent on the continuing apprehension of the world as gentle and joyous.  
 
The poem ‘The Tyger’ in Experience portrays a sense of the limitations of the intellect 
to define what it perceives (Blake 1998, p. 121). Blake’s passionate rhetorical 
questioning is left unresolved, challenging the voices that judge innocence and 
experience according to particular, interested and repressive truth, while resisting the 
cold and sterile comfort of reason. ‘The Tyger’ offers a creative and dynamic portrayal 
of life employing irony to challenge the propositional and didactic mind-set of the 
Enlightenment. Blake juxtaposes the ‘vales’ that nurture the faith of the ‘Lamb’ with 
‘the forests of the night’ in which the ‘tyger’ prowls (Blake 1998, p. 121). In ‘The Tyger’ 
we find the contrary perception of life and indeed God, to that portrayed in ‘The Lamb’ 
and unlike ‘Earth’s Answer’, we find no expression of hope or the possibility of 
overcoming this fearsome vision.
xxiii
xxii Blake constructs the ‘tyger’ with imagery of power 
and industry, repeatedly posing rhetorical questions as to who could create a beast 
with such physical and mental strength. The allusion to God as the creator of this 
terrible creature is challenged in the last line of the poem while exposing the audacity 
of those who through reason and mathematical empiricism ‘Dare frame thy fearful 
symmetry’ (Blake 1998, p. 121). Blake’s challenge is ironic given the Enlightenment 
notion that reason enabled humanity to deduce understanding through a process John 
Locke (1695) equated as being ‘equal to mathematical certainty’ (Locke 1975, p. 
87).  In 1694, John Locke proposed that ‘morality is capable of demonstration as 
well as Mathematicks’ and therefore conforms to reason (Locke 1975, p. 88). 
However, if we are capable of making judgments about prior judgments of experience 
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there is no need to suppose that such ‘higher-order’ judgments involve the application 
of prior understanding or reason. Processing these ‘synthetic judgements’ as Jane 
Kellar suggests, may require the employment of the imagination and therefore could 
not be assimilated to prior categories of understanding (Kneller 1996, p. 457). The 
repeated oxymoron ‘fearful symmetry’ leads us to the question of perception: ‘How can 
one ‘frame’ this enigmatic creature, whose only sure attribute is unimaginable power? 
This leads to a further question as to how our natural reaction of fear can be 
reconciled with the concept of ‘symmetry’.  
 
While this poem does not express the weary call of hope sounded in ‘Earth’s Answer’, 
the narrator continuously baits the reader to test their courage and ‘Dare its deadly 
terrors clasp?’ Interestingly ‘The Tyger’ contains no evidence of malevolence or 
destructiveness, raising the possibility that its terror may in fact be impotent to harm 
beyond the dangers conjured by the constructions of our own fearful vision. Blake’s 
use of industrial imagery such as ‘What the hammer? What the chain’ and ‘In what 
furnace was thy brain’, gives us an indication that the ‘tyger’ is in fact a construction of 
our own design (Blake 1998, p. 121). Fear has been the architect of this design 
enslaving the population to production, prisoners of machines in the service of the 
profit-motive. Through a process of moving between abstract concepts and strong 
physical objects, Blake is able to demonstrate how ‘mental imprisonment, manipulation 
and psychological oppression’ are just as much of a ‘prison as piles of stones and 
metal bars’ (Marsh 2001, p. 127). The fifth stanza carries a hint of mockery of those 
who in the name of religion support the rationality of the terror they have constructed, 
yet pay homage to the innocence of the ‘Lamb’: ‘Did he smile his work to see?/Did he 
who made the Lamb make thee?’ (Blake 1998, p. 121). Blake’s irony delimits human 
life by positing an elevated concept that is not realized, in this case the concept that 
both visions are equally characteristic of God. Although it may appear that the ‘lamb’ 
and the ‘tyger’ are the product of contrasting deities, these images reflect contrary 
visions of God that exist in the human mind. Blake neither rejects nor attempts to 
reconcile innocence and experience, rather portraying the tension of these contrary 
states as the source of a true vision and path towards wholeness and freedom. In 
Milton (1804), Blake identifies the architect of the fear that has paralysed the 
imagination and polarised humanity’s vision of innocence and experience.  
  Chapter 2: William Blake 
 
  
Thy purpose & the purpose of thy Priests & of thy Churches 
Is to impress on men the fear of death, to teach 
Trembling & fear, terror, constriction, abject selfishness  
(Blake 1979, p. 300).  
 
The poems ‘Chimney Sweeper’ in Innocence and Experience reveal the church’s 
complicity in the creation of the destructive illusion that obscures vision through fear 
and its manifestation in the suffering of a child. 
 
The Chimney Sweeper: Collusion with the Lie  
In his work Stealing Innocence Henry Giroux contends that one of the myths of 
innocence is that of ‘childhood innocence’ which consists of a natural state, ‘one that is 
beyond the dictates of history, society and politics’ (Giroux 2000, p. 2). Blake sought to 
draw the question of morality out of the subjective inner world of self-righteous 
conviction, his use of irony opening new insight into the social and political 
representation of innocence. His poetry mocks the view espoused by writers such as 
Tieftrunk that the state functions ‘as an organisation for the promotion of morality’, 
worthy of ‘reverence and deep respect’ by those who observe ‘laws against which 
(their) self-interest so gladly makes objections’ (Tieftrunk 1996, p. 221). ‘The Chimney 
Sweeper’ in Innocence and its contrary poem in Experience exposes the 
consequences of naive ‘reverence’ and the human tragedy and suffering that proceeds 
from a vision usurped by fear. 
   
Presenting the child as a symbol of innocence, Blake indicts those who condone the 
enslavement of children in an occupation that physically deformed, created server skin 
and respiratory illness and often resulted in death.xxiv A contemporary of Blake 
described a twelve-year-old sweep: ‘…a cripple on crutches, hardly three feet seven 
inches in stature… His hair felt like a hog’s bristles, and his head like a warm cinder… 
He repeats the Lord’s prayer’ (Glen 1983, p. 93). The stark and matter-of-fact 
description of the sweep’s childhood – ‘my father sold me’ and ‘we rose in the 
dark/And got our bags & our brushes to work’ – provides a chilling introduction to ‘The 
Chimney Sweeper’ in Innocence (Blake 1998, p. 69). Inclusive language such as ‘so 
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your chimneys I sweep’ ironically implies that the sympathetic reader, as a citizen of 
the society, condones such an abhorrent practice (Blake 1998, p. 69). The reader 
confronts feelings of indignant loathing for the perpetuators of this suffering and the 
discomfort of considering one’s own collusion in such a barbaric practice of systemic 
child abuse.   
 
The tone of excitement and hope generated by the enthusiastic account of Tom 
Dacre’s dream contrasts with the emotionless description of the young sweep’s plight. 
Whilst ‘lock’d up in coffins of black’ an angel with a ‘bright key’ releases the children, 
who subsequently run ‘leaping laughing’ to ‘wash in a river’ (Blake 1998, p. 69). The 
imagery of ‘coffins of black’ is a reference to the deadly chimneys that robbed the 
sweeps of joy and light, often a literal suffocating tomb. The dream of the ‘angel’ offers 
hope, an inner liberation from which the child may find joy and comfort even midst 
appalling cruelty and physical hardship. However, the dream expresses a perverse 
irony that the price of the freedom and joy reminiscent of the ‘innocent’ delight of the 
child in the Piper’s song is death. That the angel came to free the children only after 
their death suggests the inability or unwillingness of God and the Church to alter 
cruelty or suffering in this world. The promise of eternal joy and a return to the state of 
innocence is conditional: ‘And the Angel told Tom, if he’d be a good boy/He’d have 
God for his father & never want joy’ (Blake 1998, p. 69). As Marsh contends, ‘we are 
faced by scandalous cruelty and injustice, and the religious propaganda that sustains 
injustice’ through moral blackmail (Marsh 2001, p. 111). Tom Darce may soon die if he 
continues his work, however, ‘God will indeed become his father “if he’d be a good 
boy” and climb the chimneys; it almost seems as if Tom has willingly and joyfully 
embraced his fate’ (Ackroyd 1995, p. 126). Tom’s plight appears inevitable, never 
questioned because to challenge one’s lot in life was to risk losing God’s approval and 
consequently the promise of eternal life. As noted by Ackroyd, naive and ignorant 
innocence is vulnerable to the deception that if ‘all do their duty, they need not fear 
harm’ (Ackroyd 1995, p. 126). Consequently the ‘credulous or the sanctimonious’ are 
confirmed in their belief that ‘duty’ is all that needs to be, or can be done (Ackroyd 
1995, p. 126). The ‘Eternal Father’ will welcome the sweep into ‘heaven’ if he remains 
‘innocent’ and continues to do his duty regardless of the cost. Fear of death and God’s 
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rejection denies the sweep the right to consider other possibilities than the fatalistic 
acceptance of a duty that will inevitably destroy him.  
 
The contrary poem ‘The Chimney Sweeper’ in Experience, takes on the voice of a 
sweep no longer seduced by the illusionary hope offered by the ‘Angel’ depicted in 
Innocence. The child is conscious of his abandonment by those who society has 
deemed responsible to protect him from abuse and suffering. Moreover, he openly 
names the powers that are responsible for orchestrating the abject conditions under 
which his life is forfeit, and the delusion that justifies their criminality. James Sambrook 
contends that during the late eighteenth century ‘both moral and economic theory 
supported the view that poverty was a necessary part of God’s plan’ (Sambrook 1993, 
p. 92).xxv Edmund Burke (1757) argued that due to the restraints of the economic 
market, it was not the responsibility of the ‘government … or even the rich … to supply 
to the poor those necessaries which it has pleased the Divine Providence for a while to 
withhold from them’ (Burke 1958, p. 62).xxvi   
 
The poem’s opening stanza presents the indignation of those that demand an 
explanation for this social disgrace. Confronted with ‘a little black thing among the 
snow’, passers-by look to accredit blame to ease their own discomfort: ‘Where are thy 
father & mother? Say?’ (Blake 1998, p. 119).xxvii
xxviii
 Blake’s use of language creates an 
ironic tension between the callous de-humanising reference to the child, the witness’ 
implied complicity, and the abuse and exploitation of a society that willingly betrays 
‘innocence’ for selfish gain.  We are given the impression that the ‘innocence’ of the 
child who ‘smil’d among the winters snow’, is not only something that is taken 
advantage of, but a state of being that poses a threat and hence must be purged 
(Blake 1998, p. 119). The child recognises that ‘Because I was happy upon the heath’ 
he pays the cost of not acquiescing to the common despair and subsequently ‘clothed’ 
in ‘clothes of death’ (Blake 1998, p. 119). We can find parallels with Lyca’s parents in 
‘The Little Girl Lost’ in which the child must be miserable because her parents are 
(Blake 1998, p. 128). Jealousy of Lyca’s happiness renders her innocence intolerable 
because it challenges the constructions of despair that have come to dominate her 
parent’s lives. Similarly the fear that enslaves society demands that innocence is either 
corrupted or amputated from its midst in order to protect experience from exposure. 
  Chapter 2: William Blake 
 
 
It is ironic that the very innocence that inspires the ‘sweep’ to be ‘happy, & dance & 
sing’ is co-opted to justify the abuse of those who ‘think they have done me no injury’ 
(Blake 1998, p. 119). That Blake portrays the ‘sweep’ as having retained the capacity 
for joy despite the degradation of his work, suggests the child embodies the co-
existence of innocence and experience (Marsh 2001, p. 115). The sweep knows that 
those who should have prevented such murderous exploitation had ironically ‘gone up 
to the church to pray’ and ‘praise God & his Priest & King’ (Blake 1998, p. 119). 
Blake’s irony insinuates a hidden or absent meaning that alludes to a sense of justice 
or morality that is lost to explicitly defined or articulated axioms. The final line of the 
poem brings the development of the sweep’s self-consciousness to fruition moving 
from recognition of the heartless, blind indifference that had created his suffering, to 
acknowledging the source of his abuse. It is ‘God & his Priest & King’ who condone 
the ‘sweep’s’ exploitation and are responsible for the illusion that ‘make up a heaven of 
(his) misery’ (Blake 1998, p. 119). The reference to heaven reflects the dream of Tom 
Darce in Innocence, however the church’s promise of eternal bliss and the call to do 
one’s ‘duty’ has not obscured the vision of the sweep in Experience. The ‘Chimney 
Sweeper’ provides an insight into the inequities of Blake’s society and invokes feelings 
of injustice and the sacrifice of innocence. Blake does not appeal to political 
revolutionary action or social dissension in response to such criminality. Rather he 
identifies, ‘The mind-forg’d manacles’ that legitimise repressive laws curses and 
prohibitions as the true culprit (Blake 1998, p. 118). Blake’s poetry reveals the 
hypocrisy of the Christianity presentation of innocence and its devastating impact upon 
the abuse and exploitation of children. 
 
This thesis chooses four key periods to demonstrate the continuing evolution of the ‘lie 
of innocence’. In the next chapter I wish to look at selected writings of Herman 
Melville, who in abandoning the constructs of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as dictated by Christian 
religion, is caught in a period in which the memory of old ‘truths’ impinge on the 
attempt to bring about what Nietzsche termed an ‘innocence of becoming’.      
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i Blake’s contemporary Johann Tieftrunk reflects this view: ‘The more I lose myself in the contemplation 
of nature, the more there grows in me reverence, love, and deep respect toward its great creator’ 
(Tieftrunk 1996, p. 218). 
 
ii Stanley Gardner suggests that the manipulation of a child’s limbs through the practice of swaddling 
was analogues with the Enlightenment view of pedagogy, as each limb is symbolically and literally 
bound into ‘historic shape’ and the ‘head into proper thinking’ (Gardner 1998, p. 132). 
 
iii Newton contended that ‘God obeys his laws of equity and goodness out of necessity, according to the 
natural necessary relations, fitness, and proportions of things he created’ (Newton cited in Sambrook 
1993, p. 37). 
 
iv In regards to the notion of the ‘Self’, Solomon argues that ‘every emotion is an act of self-creation, and 
the nature of emotion will remain incomprehensible without a theory of Self as background’ (Solomon 
1976, p. 84). 
 
v Solomon opposed evolutionary and neurological explanations for the formation of emotions 
considering the ‘reductionism’ of both approaches as obscuring the complex nature of the emotions: ‘An 
emotion is a holistic phenomenon, and any exclusive emphasis on one aspect or another tends to 
distort the phenomena under investigation. This is what reductionism tends to do, cognitive 
reductionism as well as biological reductionism’ (Solomon 2003, p. 32). 
 
vi Cooper proposed that ‘nature’s order’ is revealed as organic rather than mechanical, in which ‘all 
things in this world are united … as the branch is united with the tree’ (Cooper cited in Sambrook 1993, 
p. 69). 
 
vii Burke claimed that, ‘Poetry stimulated the passions through ambiguity and obscurity: It is our 
ignorance of things that causes all our admiration and chiefly excites our passions’ (Burke 1958, p. 61).  
 
viii Colebrook considers irony to be ‘enigmatic in that it is imbued with creative possibilities that challenge 
and question our inherited values and prescribed definitions, opening space for the formation of our own 
moral autonomy’ (Colebrook 2004, p. 35). 
 
ix The devotional writer William Law (1686-1761) argued that the emotional experience was the greatest 
testament to the defence of Christianity. In Law’s view ‘Our own will and desirous Imagination … 
resemble in some degree the creating power of God … indeed they are the greatest reality we have’ 
(Law cited in Sambrook 1993, p. 52). 
 
x The notion of the sublime originates in the writings of Psuedo-Longinus and re-emerges during the 
Enlightenment in the philosophical writings of Immanuel Kant. Longinus is concerned with the moment 
of perishing in which the sublime appears as the place where the ‘totality of becoming and passing 
away concentrates itself (Deguy 1993, p. 10).  Deguy regards ‘Homer’ as the master as well as the 
meter of the sublime, however Pseudo-Longinus moves the philosophical focus from the relationship 
between rhetoric and persuasion, towards the relationship between the ‘stupefying’ and ‘ecstasy’ 
(Deguy 1993, p. 14). 
 
xi Jean-Luc Nancy explores this further when he suggests that the sublime does not view art as an end 
in itself or a goal, rather art is more of a destination, presentation without any presented object. He 
states that ‘all control is limitation, which is the concern of the beautiful: the unlimited, to the contrary, is 
the concern of the sublime’ (Nancy 1993, p. 35).   
 
xii Kant contends that the sublime is a matter of ‘magnitudo’ and not of ‘quantitas’. Nancy explains the 
difference between these concepts: ‘Where as quantitas can be measured, magnitudo presides over the 
possibility of measure in general; quality rather than quantity’ (Nancy 1993, p. 38). 
 
xiii While one could argue that the notion of the sublime is too abstract a concept for wider 
generalisations, an abstract and subjective approach to the notion of the sublime does not invalidate the 
significance of the inquiry. In the case of unique phenomena, something can remain valid without being 
objectively true. Nazi Holocaust studies have found usual forms of analysis to be inadequate to express 
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the horror and intensity of that suffering. Indeed Adorno argued that ‘After Auschwitz, to write a poem is 
barbaric’, indicating that no poetry could in his view adequately represent the horror (Adorno 1967, p. 
34). Adorno’s penultimate sentence of ‘Cultural Criticism and Society’, questions the ‘very propriety and 
possibility of aesthetic representation’ (Saltzman 1999, p. 17). He reasons that as ‘the abundance of 
real suffering tolerates no forgetting … (it) demands the continued existence of art (even as) it prohibits 
it’ (Adorno cited in Saltzman 1999, p. 47). Similarly, only an empathetic approach to the notion of the 
sublime can seek to understand or at least represent that experience, which is beyond objective 
analytical terms, but nevertheless engages with an authentic experience however inadequately.  By 
contrast a more rational representation might be seen in the hymns of Charles Wesley (1707-88), 
William Williams (1721-91) and Edward Perronet (1721-92).   
 
xiv The title page of Songs of Innocence and Experience (Blake 1998).  
 
xv Blake’s use of the Piper and the presentation of his poems as songs taped into the rich vein of public 
singing that was common during the eighteenth century English love affair with religious hymns, the 
common person’s primary source of theology and poetry. 
 
xvi The Parable of the ‘Good Shepherd’ (John 10. 11-16).  The Bible would have been the source of 
continual meditation and interpretation during Blake’s childhood and ‘his poetry and painting are imbued 
with biblical motifs from the Old Testament’ (Ackroyd 1995, p. 25).   
 
xvii Peter Ackroyd contends that religion in the eighteenth century ‘attached less importance to an 
energetic life of charity and began to emphasise the duty of avoiding sinfulness’ (Ackroyd 1995, p. 147).  
 
xviii ‘Holy Word’ is a reference to the story of ‘The Garden of Eden’. Immediately after eating from the 
‘Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil’ Adam and Eve here ‘the voice of the Lord God’ as they walk 
‘in the garden in the cool of the day’ (Gen. 3:8). 
 
xix Marsh contends: ‘As such, his (Bard) insight sees a world which excludes the world of Innocence, just 
as surely as the world of Innocence is limited by excluding Experience’ (Marsh 2001, p. 20). 
 
xx Kant held that the imagination was but one of the subjective sources of knowledge and dependent 
upon judgement that adapts all objective experiences to the concepts of understanding and sensibility. 
 
xxi Hartmut and Gernot Bohme argue that the ‘reason of the Enlightenment, Kantian reason, is marked 
by strain and fear. It is a spastic reason: rigid and closed’ (Bohme 1996, p. 450). 
 
xxii In Blake’s time the tiger was a symbol of the sublime and the terrible, a creature that thirsted for 
blood with perpetual rage and blind and undistinguishable ferocity (Ackroyd 1995, p. 145). 
 
xxiii John Ray (1691) compared the intricate workings of nature with the analogy of the mechanical 
functions of a clock or watch, to demonstrate the evidence of an intelligent creator (Schmidt 1996, p. 
35). 
 
xxiv Marsh asserts that the use of children as chimney sweeps in 18th and 19th century England was a 
‘social obscenity, a scandalous system of child slavery within a society claiming to be civilised’ (Marsh 
2001, p. 111). 
 
xxv Burke goes on to argue that ‘it is not in breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, 
and consequently the laws of God, that we are to soften the Divine displeasure … which hangs over us’ 
(Burke 1958, p. 62).  During the same period Andrew Sharpe the royal chaplain proposed: ‘The wise 
Providence has amply compensated the disadvantages of the poor and indigent, in wanting many of the 
conveniences of this life, by a more abundant provision for their happiness in the next’ (Sambrook 1993, 
p. 92). 
 
xxvi Support for the political and social status-quo of the era can be identified in the writings of Berbard 
de Mandeville, who regarded the struggles of the poverty-stricken masses as a necessary evil brought 
on by their slothfulness: ‘When men show such an extraordinary proclivity to Idleness and Pleasure, 
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what reason have we to think that they would ever work, unless they were obliged to it by immediate 
Necessity?’ (de Mandeville cited in Sambrook 1993, p. 93). 
 
xxvii The title given to the ‘sweeps’ was the ‘lily-whites’ in mocking reference to the ‘May Day’ holiday 
parade. Pierre Grosley (1772) noted that during the parade the children’s faces were ‘whitened with 
meal, their heads covered with high periwigs powdered as white snow, and their cloths bedaubed with 
white paperlace’ (Grosley 2010, p. 183).  
 
xxviii Henry Giroux argues that the myth of ‘childhood innocence’ serves as a way of avoiding the all too 
often harsh reality of their experiences. 
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Chapter 3 - Moby Dick: Innocence as 
Punishment and Profit 
 
The writings of Herman Melville are significant to this inquiry for within his fiction one 
may discern the evolution of the concept of innocence in an era when God’s existence 
had become questionable. Nevertheless, Melville’s novels Moby Dick (1851) and Billy 
Budd (1924) are rich in biblical stories and institutionalized religious references 
reflecting the legacy of Christian beliefs that remained prominent for most people at 
the time.i Melville’s fiction appropriates its symbolic apprehensions from the Bible. In 
applying the insights of Max Weber’s interpretation of Protestantism as contributing 
(and sanctifying) the development of capitalism, it will be shown that the narrative 
reflects the tension between secularization and religious belief. Weber’s essay The 
Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism demonstrates how the growth of 
Protestant Christianity and in particular the advent of puritanism, precipitated a shift 
from the entrenched economic traditionalism of Catholicism to an economic rationalist 
mindset (Weber 2002, pp. 4, 7). It will be argued in this thesis that the Christian 
concept of innocence served as a tool in the expansion of capitalism due to the 
sacrosanct value the concept occupies in the moral schema of the Protestant Work 
Ethic; the concept of innocence has been utilized by capitalism to exploit the political 
currency of the child embodied with romanticist illusions. Furthermore, the idea of the 
‘Orphan’ as the embodiment of the ‘liberated’ son – one who in acting according to his 
will implicitly rejects the authority of the Father – will be identified in Melville’s writings. 
In Moby Dick, the narrator Ishmael – a political and metaphorical ‘Orphan’ – is 
employed by Melville to evaluate and appraise the story, illuminating the paradigm in 
which fathers and sons struggle for power. It will be argued that the characters 
Queequeg and Pip are further examples of the ‘Orphan’ who due to their religious and 
racial marginalization, serve to critique established religious and cultural norms. In 
exposing the hypocrisy of rationalized Protestantism calculated to either conceal or 
legitimize the pursuit of profit over all other values, these characters are shown to be 
the antithesis to the Protestant concept of innocence. However, it will be argued that it 
is in these very characters – the marginalized and cultural outcasts in Melville’s fiction 
– that one may discern the possibility of an ‘innocence of becoming’.  
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The Protestant Work Ethic and the pre-eminence of the profit motive 
In The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber examines the extent 
to which religion had taken part in the ‘qualitative formation and the quantitative 
expansion of the Capitalist spirit’ (Weber 2002, p. 49). His essay enquires how 
particular groups had selected forms of ‘organized life’ and a concept of ‘vocational 
calling’ that had ‘adapted to the uniqueness of modern capitalism’ (Weber 2002, p. 
19). Weber identified ‘systematic’ and ‘dispassionate’ ‘rationalization’ – ‘on the basis of 
strictly quantitative calculations’ – as the fundamental operating principle inherent to 
capitalism (Weber 2002, p. 35). However, Weber demonstrated that the Spirit of 
Capitalism cannot be regarded as the logical consequence of rationalism given that 
rationalist thought is the product of a multitude of starting points. Rather he identified a 
developed sense of responsibility that oriented people to ‘acquisition as the purpose of 
life’ as ‘absolutely indispensable’ to the establishment of Capitalism (Weber 2002, p. 
17). The elevation of labour as an end in itself is shown to be dependent upon ‘very 
specific and highly developed “ethical” qualities’ – qualities unlike those employed in 
the economic traditionalism of the past (Weber 2002, p. 30). Weber asked: ‘What set 
of ideas gave birth to the ordering of activity oriented purely to profit under the 
category of a “calling,” to which the person felt an obligation?’ (Weber 2002, p. 35).ii 
From the perspective of the individual’s ‘pure self-interest in happiness’, the idea of an 
obligation to one’s ‘calling’ to work ‘must appear fully irrational’ (Weber 2002, p. 37). It 
is this ‘irrational element’ (the calling) that Weber is interested in.iii In light of the fact 
that Protestantism held that the after-life was more important and in many ways more 
certain than the interests of life in this world, the idea of accumulating wealth would 
indeed appear irrational.  
 
The Puritan idea of the ‘calling’ vigorously promoted the discipline of vocational 
asceticism (Weber 2002, p. 108). This work ethic was justified according to biblical 
passages such as Proverbs 22:29: ‘Seest thou a man diligent in his business? he shall 
stand before kings’.iv Weber identified this notion of a ‘calling’ to one’s work as 
distinctive among religious traditions, a concept expressed neither in Catholic 
traditions nor in classical antiquity (Weber 2002, p. 39). Among Protestants the ‘calling’ 
served as an economic imperative as work became infused with a ‘moral accent’ and 
credited with a ‘religious value’ (Weber 2002, p. 42). The effect of ascetic 
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Protestantism’s concept of the ‘calling’ was to rationalize mundane affairs in the world, 
while remaining not of the world through one’s orientation to the divine (Weber 2002, 
p. 101).v Hence, in striving to make life holy and sanctified the asceticism of the 
devoutly religious assumed the ‘character of a business’ (Weber 2002, p. 77). The 
conception of work as a ‘calling’ was to become a signifier of one’s ‘righteousness’ and 
the predominate means by which the pious could discern their standing before God 
and the surety of their salvation (Weber 2002, p. 121). Protestantism changed the 
manifestations of Christianity. Rather than striving to attain salvation, the dogmas of 
predestination and the intelligent rational life compelled the individual to prove that he 
was ‘elected’.  
 
It will be argued that Melville’s fiction represents how Protestant Christianity concealed 
economic ambition whilst legitimizing the profit-motive under the guise of duty to one’s 
‘calling’, which led to the applied categories of the elect and the damned. The 
Westminster Confession (1646) – in which the doctrine of predestination is proclaimed 
– provides the theological premise upon which the concept of the elect and the 
damned is constructed: ‘By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some 
men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to 
everlasting death’ (Williamson 2003: no. 3). Given that eternal life was held to be 
predetermined by the discretion of God, how could the Protestant be certain of their 
election? John Calvin believed that in this life the elect could not be distinguished from 
the damned other than through the single exception of a steadfast trust in Christ given 
that ‘all subjective experiences of the chosen few… are also possible among the 
damned’ (Weber 2002, p. 64). Evidence of this true faith and the inevitability of one’ 
salvation would find expression in the Protestant’s daily life through an unwavering 
conviction that they were counted among the elect. All doubts, lack of self-confidence 
or weakness before temptation were considered to be the manifestation of insufficient 
faith, hence of imperfect grace. The exhortation of the Apostle Paul to ‘live a life worthy 
of the calling you have received’ (Eph. 4:1), is interpreted as a duty to attain certainty 
of one’s election through one’s striving in daily life. The danger confronting the 
Protestant who through the success of their labour achieved financial security was the 
temptation that idleness and leisure would become a distraction from the pursuit of 
righteousness. Protestantism held that rational labour in the fulfilment of one’s ‘calling’ 
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was the only activity that served to increase the glory of God and safeguard against 
such temptation.  
 
As the zealous pursuit of God’s kingdom gradually dissipated with the emergence of 
secularization the religious roots of the Protestant work ethic slowly withered. In this 
secular environment wealth attained through resolute devotion to labour in obedience 
to one’s ‘calling’ increasingly came to supplant inner conviction as evidence of God’s 
favour and the mark of the elect. From this doctrine the secular world at least as 
represented in the novels of Melville and Faulkner, inherited a lack of pity that reflected 
an arrested capacity to love and the despairing isolation of a society in which the 
individual was either unwilling or unable to acknowledge doubt, admit to error or seek 
forgiveness. In this secular environment the vocational ‘calling’ increasingly came to 
be defined by the ‘dispassionate virtues’ characteristic of a ‘utilitarian orientation’ to the 
world (Weber 2002, p. 119). As capitalism is constructed upon ‘mechanical 
foundations’ once established it no longer needed the justification of religion. 
Weber’s discussion of Benjamin Franklin’s views on economics argued that Christian 
moral imperatives have become subjugated to capitalist interests. Franklin held that 
‘honesty’ was a virtue primarily because of its economic value, a utilitarian rationale 
indifferent to Christian morality. According to Franklin ‘honesty’ is essential ‘because it 
assures credit’, as does; ‘punctuality, industry, frugality, and that is the reason they are 
virtues’ (Weber 2002, p. 16). Franklin’s view of ‘honesty’ bears similarities to the 
concept of innocence in that both virtues are useful in procuring social, political and 
religious credit. While ‘innocence’ may be employed to serve the same economic ends 
as ‘honesty’, an unnecessary surplus of this virtue would evidently be counter-
productive – a contention that is born out in the Melville’s novel Moby Dick. 
Throughout this work Melville illustrates the human cost of the Protestant work ethic as 
competing restraints, parameters and power dynamics that govern one’s ‘duty’ to their 
‘calling’ are shown to inevitably clash in the quest for profit.  
 
In Moby Dick, American Protestantism and its investment in the rise of capitalism is 
enacted within the microcosm of the whaling ship the Pequod. Perhaps Melville’s view 
of religion is reflected in Ishmael’s toleration of other’s beliefs as long as a ‘person 
does not kill or insult any other person because that other person don’t believe it also’ 
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(Melville 1972, p. 182). Ishmael, here, highlights a characteristic most likely not to be 
shared with his Christian counterpart and indeed learnt by him in his night spent with 
Queequeg (Melville 1972, pp. 118-120). As with Blake’s poetry, the hypocrisy of 
Protestant Christianity is a prominent theme throughout Moby Dick. The violence 
wreaked upon nature in the name of righteous profit is presented as foremost among 
Melville’s objections to Christianity – exemplified by the Quaker owners of the whaling 
ship the Pequod. Melville exposes the moral hypocrisy of those from the Quaker 
Christian traditions who scour the globe mercilessly butchering the sperm whale in the 
quest for profit, yet maintain a conscientious objection to bearing arms. Ishmael 
describes the character of this hypocrisy: ‘For some of these same Quakers are the 
most sanguinary of all sailors and whale-hunters. They are fighting Quakers; they are 
Quakers with a vengeance’ (Melville 1972, p. 169). Melville poignantly illustrates that 
the oil harvested from the Quaker’s ferocity fuels the lamps that illuminate the Church 
and metaphorically blinds the faithful to the legacy of Christian violence. The cross 
pollination of Calvinist theology and capitalist imperative is evident in Captain Peleg’s 
parting words to the crew of the Pequod: “Don’t whale it too much a’ Lord’s days, men; 
but don’t miss a fair chance either, that’s rejecting Heaven’s good gifts” (Melville 1972, 
p. 202). The Captain’s instruction is representative of how the Protestant rationalized 
Capitalistic exploits according to religious belief. While a dutiful but essentially 
tokenistic reference is made to curbing one’s enthusiasm for the hunt on a Sunday, the 
pursuit of profit is represented as being the crew’s overriding responsibility – one 
endorsed and ordained by God.   
 
Perhaps Melville’s regard for the sperm whale derives from the mammal’s resolve to 
meet death head on, displaying a willingness to rebel against fate.vi The courage to 
respond with authenticity to the inevitability of suffering and adversity is shown to be 
characteristic of the sperm whale and equally essential if man is to create their own 
meaning.vii The portrayal of the sperm whale as an historic enemy of man – bearing 
murderous intent and a lust for human blood – was common among the natural 
sciences of the 18th and 19th centuries. Melville represents this view of the sperm 
whale employed to justify the slaughter of the species:  
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…we find some book naturalists – Olassen and Povelson – declaring the 
Sperm Whale not only to be a consternation to every other creature in the 
sea, but also to be so incredibly ferocious as continually to be athirst for 
human blood (Melville 1972, p. 279). 
 
The expansionist mindset that propelled Americans ever westward into the frontier 
during the 19th Century was mirrored by their voyages upon the expanse of the sea. 
The violence that inevitably accompanied such expeditions was legitimized through 
the deliberate creation of a perceived enemy, constructed upon the dualism in which 
‘good’ was pitted against ‘evil’.viii  
 
Melville presents the relationship between Calvinist moral law and capitalism – 
encapsulated in the Protestant Work Ethic – as positing greater value on the pursuit of 
profit than the preservation of human life, stewardship of the environment or 
faithfulness and loyalty. In Moby Dick, an exchange between the First-mate Starbuck 
and his fellow officer Mr Stubb makes explicit the pre-eminence of the profit-motive 
that governs the bloody task to which they are bound: “There’s hogsheads of sperm 
ahead, Mr. Stubb, and that’s what ye came for. (Pull, my boys!) Sperm, sperm’s the 
play! This at least is duty; duty and profit hand in hand” (Melville 1972, p. 321).ix 
However, Starbuck’s enthusiastic exhortation to duty and the allure of profit is 
tempered when curious young whales approach the whaling boats like ‘household 
dogs’. In a humorous scene in which the unassailable virtue of wealth is briefly 
checked by an unlikely moment of compassion, Queequeg pats the whale’s foreheads 
while ‘Starbuck scratched their backs with his lance; but fearful of the consequences, 
for the time refrained from darting it’ (Melville 1972, p. 497). The relative value of the 
black slave boy Pip is weighed in no uncertain terms by Stubb as Melville presents 
human life to be no less a commodity than that of a whale. Having jumped from a 
whaling boat during his first hunt, Pip is informed that as a sperm whale was worth 
thirty times the boy’s value in Alabama, no future exchange would be made to save his 
life. Pip’s desperate act of self-preservation transgresses his ‘calling’, contravening the 
foundational tenant of the Protestant ethic upon which the social order was legitimized. 
Melville demonstrates that the Protestant conception of the ‘calling’ summoned 
obedience to the will of another regardless of the ramifications. The conviction that one 
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should not question their ‘lot’ in life lest they bring God’s providence into disrepute 
breeds a lethargy that paralyses action and subjugates the will. True to his word, 
Stubb continues the pursuit of a whale despite Pip once more diving into the sea, 
reasoning: ‘though man loved his fellow, yet man is a money-making animal, which 
propensity too often interferes with his benevolence’ (Melville 1972, p. 524). The 
abandonment of Pip reveals the human cost of compliance with the Protestant Work 
Ethic in which suffering is presented as tragic but unavoidable by those whose actions 
are shown to be manifestly responsible for such tragedy.  
 
In Moby Dick, the Protestant Work Ethic is undermined by Captain Ahab’s all-
consuming quest to kill the ‘White Whale’. The Captain’s desire for vengeance is 
represented as taking precedence over his duty to kill as many whales as possible. 
Ishmael reflects that the Pequod’s owners would be filled with abhorrence if they had 
known of the Captain’s priorities.  
 
Had any one of his old acquaintances on shore but half dreamed of what 
was lurking in him then, how soon would their aghast and righteous souls 
have wrenched the ship from such a fiendish man!  (Melville 1972, p. 286). 
 
In a frenzied ritual aboard the Pequod the crew – inflamed by Ahab’s lust for revenge – 
swears oaths to kill the White Whale at all costs. A Gold Doubloon nailed to the mast 
of the Pequod serves as both a symbol for the primal motivation of vengeance with 
which Ahab seduces his crew and the lure of wealth (Melville 1972, p. 541). Although 
the ‘White Whale’ is presented as being mere legend to the sailors aboard the Pequod 
the strength of Ahab’s will is shown to ignite a collective impulse to kill that which 
posed a threat to the absolute dominion of man and represented a freedom that was in 
its essence dreadfully confronting. The writings of Friedrich Nietzsche provide a 
perspective through which the motivation of the crew may be perceived in relation to 
the competing interests of profit and Ahab’s pseudo-religious crusade. Nietzsche 
argued in The Gay Science (1882) that the competing interests of valuations and 
human impulses produce a hierarchy of morality, which he regarded as always the 
‘expressions of the needs of a community and herd’ (Nietzsche 1974, p. 174).x In 
regards to the Pequod’s crew, the need of the ‘herd’ to acquire profit is balanced with a 
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communal impulse to destroy that, which challenged the legitimacy of the profit-motive 
and man’s dominion over nature. The quest to hunt the White Whale is symbolic of the 
need to do away with all who consciously rebel against the will of the Father, its very 
existence magnifying the plight of those who remain manacled to the Protestant ethic. 
However, despite the crew’s initial vows of fidelity to the cause Ahab is shown to be 
patently aware that financial failure would ultimately endanger his command and 
jeopardize his life (Melville 1972, p. 314). 
 
Prior to the Pequod’s departure, the crew attends a Protestant sermon that summons 
the faithful to obey their Christian duty and repent of the sin of ‘self-will’. The sermon 
exegetes the biblical story of Jonah, an Israelite prophet ‘called’ by God to proclaim a 
warning of impending doom to the ‘wicked’ city of Nineveh.xi Fearful of the ramification 
of such a ‘calling’ Jonah’s subsequent flight from his ordained path is decried by the 
minister as the manifestation of wilful disobedience and failure to perform one’s 
‘righteous’ duty. That God is credited with unleashing the violence of a terrible storm 
and requisitioning the services of a giant fish to ensure Jonah obeyed his ‘calling’ 
serves as a warning to the parishioners lest they too disobey their duty to God and 
turn aside to their own will. Melville satirically scolds those among the congregation 
who – having spent a lifetime at sea – question the physical realities of the events 
recounted in the Book of Jonah. The audacity of questioning God’s ‘word’ according to 
human reason is decried as the manifestation of the sin of pride. Thus the veracity of 
the sailors’ collective wisdom and experience is deemed invalid despite the fact that it 
is human reason that determines that religious behaviour co-insides with a work ethic 
that in turn sponsors Capitalism (Melville 1972, p. 474).xii Furthermore, Melville 
illustrates that humble acceptance of the righteous providence of God – regardless of 
humiliation or injury – is a prerequisite to salvation.xiii The sermon continues: 
 
But all the things that God would have us do are hard for us to do – 
remember that – and hence, he oftener commands us than endeavours to 
persuade. And if we obey God, we must disobey ourselves; and it is in this 
disobeying ourselves, wherein the hardness of obeying God consists 
(Melville 1972, p. 136).  
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The minister testifies that it is those who unquestioningly remain true to the duty of 
their ‘calling’ – even at the potential cost of their own mortal destruction – who are held 
to be ‘innocent’ in the eyes of God. Melville uses the sermon to portray the duplicity of 
the Christian presentation of innocence in relation to the profit-motive.  
 
“Now Jonah’s Captain, shipmates, was one whose discernment detects 
crime in any, but whose cupidity exposes it only in the penniless. In this 
world, shipmates, sin that pays its way can travel freely, and without a 
passport; whereas Virtue, if a pauper, is stopped at all frontiers” (Melville 
1972, p. 138). 
 
The minister warns the congregation to be wary of the lust for ‘mammon’, noting that 
despite the Captain of the vessel in which Jonah flees being intuitively aware that his 
passenger was not an ‘innocent’ man, he nevertheless accepts the fare (Melville 1972, 
p. 137). The concluding exaltation of the sermon reiterates the call to endure the 
violence of God’s will in the mortal realm in the promise of happiness after death.  
 
“And eternal delight and deliciousness will be his, who coming to lay him 
down, can say with his final breath – O Father! – chiefly known to me by Thy 
rod – mortal or immortal, here I Die” (Melville 1972, p. 143).  
 
Neither compassion nor love is characteristic of this concept of God. The Christian 
dogma that ‘calls’ for believers to embrace suffering with gratitude and claim the 
confession of Christ prior to his crucifixion – “Not my will but thine be done” – as their 
own, is the foundation upon which the sermon is constructed (Matt. 26:39). 
 
White as the Unrepresentable  
Exposed to the terror of the hunt the whaler – confronted daily with death and the 
precariousness of our mortality – is represented as being conscious of the foolishness 
of man’s securities and truths. In Moby Dick, Melville illustrates that the spectre of 
death shadows all life, symbolized by the treacherous ‘whale-lines’ that in a moment of 
chaos can snag a man and extinguish his life.   
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All men live enveloped in whale-lines. All are born with halters round their 
necks; but it is only when caught in the swift, sudden turn of death, that 
mortals realize the silent, subtle, ever-present perils of life (Melville 1972, p. 
387).  
 
Melville suggests that mirth is the only sane response to the precariousness of our 
mortality, accentuated by the peril of confronting an aggressive sperm whale. Years of 
experience amidst the terrors of the hunt is shown to provide the lens through which 
Stubb evaluates all prior notions of truth and belief as one vast practical joke.xiv Stubb 
invites the crew to laugh with him at the absurdity of their risk taking, cajoling his men 
onward in their ludicrously dangerous vocation (Melville 1972, p. 314). Ishmael reflects 
upon this mind-set:  
 
That odd sort of wayward mood I am speaking of comes over a man only in 
some time of extreme tribulation; it comes in the very midst of his 
earnestness, so that what just before might have seemed to him a thing 
most momentous, now seems but a part of the general joke (Melville 1972, 
p. 329). 
 
Confronted with the mortal peril of the whale hunt, Stubb questions whether one can 
be merciful and yet still retain the “bowels for a laugh” (Melville 1972, p. 615). 
Melville’s response would appear to be “yes”, as honest confrontation of one’s 
mortality is shown to open a multiplicity of perspectives from which the world may be 
seen anew. Elaborating upon the configuration of the whale’s eyes Melville 
emphasizes the different views from which the world may be perceived: His discussion 
a precursor to Nietzsche’s idea of ‘perspectivism’ (Melville 1972, p. 437). In his preface 
to Beyond Good and Evil (1886) Nietzsche contends that perspectivity was ‘the 
fundamental condition of all life’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 8). He argued that all knowledge 
was the product of ‘foreground evaluations, temporary perspectives’ through which 
human beings interpreted the world. Given that knowledge is a product of one’s 
perspective in a particular moment, Nietzsche argued that it was impossible to lay 
claim to truth or represent beliefs that were ‘objective’, ‘disinterested’, or ‘value-free’ 
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(Nietzsche 1990, p. 161). In his book On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), Nietzsche 
explains how perspectivism can benefit human beings proposing that the: 
 
very seeing of another vista, the very wishing to see another vista, is no little 
training and preparation of the intellect for its eternal “Objectivity” – 
objectivity being understood not as “contemplation without interest” (for that 
is inconceivable and nonsensical), but as the ability to have the pros and 
cons in one’s power and to switch them on and off, so as to get to know how 
to utilise, for the advancement of knowledge, the difference in the 
perspective and in the emotional interpretations (Nietzsche 2003, p.12).  
 
Nietzsche suggests that the inevitable bias that distorts our vision of the world can be 
mitigated by acknowledging the perspectival nature of knowledge and a willingness to 
move from different valuational perspectives. These different perspectives are not to 
be understood as the mere accumulation of subjective positions, but rather the product 
of an intentional and disciplined endeavour to employ metaphors and models from an 
assortment of domains in order to conceptualize, articulate and evaluate one’s 
thinking. 
 
In Moby Dick, Melville uses ‘wind’ as a metaphor for all that moves through life that 
could not be explained through rational thought, scientific method or religious dogma. 
He contends that all the things that ‘most exasperate and outrage mortal man, all 
these things are bodiless, but only bodiless as objects, not as agents’ (Melville 1972, 
p. 674).xv Melville demonstrates this idea of the unrepresentable by juxtaposing an 
extensive description of a whale’s physiology with Ishmael’s insistence that the sperm 
whale had ‘no face’, highlighting the limitations of such prescriptive analysis (Melville 
1972, p. 487). Contending that the whale can only truly be ‘known’ through living 
experience – as all other presentations fail to capture the nature of the creature or are 
distorted by death – Melville observes that all which is ‘truly wondrous and fearful in 
man’ has never yet been ‘put into words or books’ (Melville 1972, p. 370).xvi Given 
Melville’s exploration of themes such as transcendence, immanence and pursuit of 
existential questions relating to the meaning of existence and the search for ‘self’, the 
chapter ‘The Whiteness of the Whale’ may be viewed as pivotal in Moby Dick. ‘The 
  Chapter 3:  Moby Dick 
 
Whiteness of the Whale’ follows on from the chapter ‘Moby Dick’ in which the 
tumultuous history of Captain Ahab and the legendary White Whale is recounted. 
Detailing at length the ‘wild vindictiveness’ that Ahab ‘cherished against the whale’ due 
to past grievances, the White Whale is presented as not only the sum of the Captain’s 
‘bodily woes’, but also his ‘intellectual and spiritual exasperations’ (Melville 1972, p. 
283). Ahab is said to perceive of the creature as bearing in its very essence an 
‘intangible malignity’, which Ishmael likens to a manifestation of the Christian ‘Devil’. 
However, Ahab’s perception of the White Whale is not related to moral ‘evil’ but rather, 
a hatred for the freedom of self-determination regarding moral values against which 
‘he pitted himself, all mutilated, against [it]’ (Melville 1972, p. 283). 
 
Set apart from what Ishmael suggests are ‘more obvious considerations’ regarding the 
mortal danger of hunting Moby Dick, are what may be considered to be perils of a 
metaphysical nature. Ishmael alludes to a ‘vague, nameless horror… so mystical and 
well-nigh ineffable’ that he doubts his capacity to convey his apprehension of Moby 
Dick in ‘comprehensive form’ (Melville 1972, p. 287). However the aspect of Moby Dick 
that ‘above all appalled’ Ishmael – encapsulating the indescribable ‘horror’ from which 
he intuitively recoiled – was the ‘whiteness of the whale’ (Melville 1972, p. 287). 
Whiteness serves as a symbol through which Melville explores the multifaceted 
meanings of language in order to challenge belief in absolute values and fixed 
interpretations of truth. His discussion of whiteness juxtaposes notions of 
transcendence and deified nature with an immanent perception of humanity 
uncorrupted by constructed values systems and moral constraint.  
 
Melville begins his discussion of whiteness by noting that the aesthetic quality of white 
refines and ‘enhances beauty’ in many ‘natural objects’ (Melville 1972, p. 288). 
Proposing that this hue has been perceived throughout history as possessing a special 
virtue, Melville demonstrates how whiteness has been universally employed by 
humanity to signify that which is exulted, royal or pre-eminent (Melville 1972, p. 288). 
Alternatively, whiteness is identified with the veil of naivety that adorns the ‘innocence 
of brides’ and the powerlessness that accompanies the ‘benignity of age’ (Melville 
1972, p. 289). These apparently contrary states of supremacy and meekness are 
revealed to be constituent of the whiteness that is held to be the mark of the 
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transcendent, a sublime union likened to the transfiguring revelation that fell upon Saul 
of Tarsus whilst on the road to Damascus.
xviii
xvii Melville notes that white features 
prominently in the celebration of the ‘Passion of the Lord’ and attires the redeemed in 
the ‘vision of St. John’, standing before the ‘great white throne’ in the presence of the 
‘Holy One that sitteth there white like wool’ (Melville 1972, p. 289).  However despite 
myriad associations with that which is ‘sweet, and honorable, and sublime’, Melville 
contends that there ‘yet lurks an elusive something in the innermost idea of this hue, 
which strikes more of panic to the soul than that redness that affrights in blood’ 
(Melville 1972, p. 289).xix 
 
The example of the legendary White Steed of the Americas – held in ‘trembling 
reverence and awe’ by even the ‘bravest Indians’ – provides Melville with a deified 
image from nature that is removed from a Christian interpretative context (Melville 
1972, p. 291). The White Steed is depicted as a vision of an uncorrupted America 
before the ravages of European settlement; an ‘archangelical apparition’ of a yet 
‘unfallen’ world (Melville 1972, p. 291). A concept which is repeated throughout Moby 
Dick – and later embodied in the character ‘Billy Budd’ – is the idea of a ‘primeval’ time 
in which ‘Adam walked majestic as a god, bluff-bowed and fearless as this mighty 
steed’ (Melville 1972, p. 291). Within the mindscape of this primeval apparition, 
uncorrupted Adam and the mystical White Steed are portrayed as commensurate. It is 
the whiteness of the legendary steed that is once again credited with evoking a 
spiritual breadth or ‘divineness’ that, while ‘commanding worship’, nevertheless 
‘enforced a certain nameless terror’ (Melville 1972, p. 291). 
 
Melville suggests that it is impossible to either comprehend or account for the terror 
that whiteness stirs in the soul without the subtlety of the imagination (Melville 1972, p. 
292). Exploring the indefinable terror that whiteness quickens in the heart Melville 
considers the phenomena of the ‘Albino’ man. Perhaps this example more than any 
other provides an insight into what Melville is seeking to express in ‘The Whiteness of 
the Whale’. Having ‘no substantive deformity’ and being ‘as well made as other men’, 
Melville identifies the ‘all-pervading whiteness’ of the Albino as being the cause of 
loathing by ‘kith and kin’ (Melville 1972, p. 291). That Melville attributes this revulsion 
of the Albino to the indefinable countenance of its appearance is significant. Just as in 
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‘essence whiteness is not so much a color as the visible absence of color, and at the 
same time the concrete of all colors’ (Melville 1972, p. 296), the Albino man is 
symbolic of one who will not be defined according to customary value systems, and 
yet is the sum of all values. 
 
While Melville contends that the imagination is pivotal to comprehending the elusive 
quality that is whiteness, he alludes to the need for a more intuitive, more profound 
insight if one is to account for the indescribable terror of which Ishmael speaks. 
Signifying a distinction between observation and measureable phenomena and that 
which may be perceived as instinctive and or intuitive, Ishmael proposes: ‘Though in 
many of its aspects this visible world seems formed in love, the invisible spheres were 
formed in fright’ (Melville 1972, p. 295). Elaborating on this contention, Melville 
provides an example from nature in which the ‘invisible sphere’ of instinct is depicted 
as overwhelming the erstwhile deductions of logic and the limitations of empirical 
measure. The frightened colt though thousands of miles from the Oregon plains, is 
described as instinctively responding with fear to the ‘savage musk’ of a buffalo skin as 
if exposed to the immediate danger of ‘rendering, goring bison herds’ (Melville 1972, p. 
295). This instinctive ‘knowledge of the demonized world’ finds its human 
approximation in the trepidation of the sailor’s passage through ‘muffled rollings of a 
milky sea’ and the Indian’s apprehension of the ‘bleak rustlings of the festooned frosts 
of mountains’ (Melville 1972, p. 295). 
 
Having identified imagination and instinct as integral to comprehending the ‘incantation 
of this whiteness’, Ishmael once again asserts that we have not yet ‘learned why it 
appeals with such power to the soul’, nor why this same hue can constitute both ‘the 
very veil of the Christian’s Deity; and yet should be as it is, the intensifying agent in 
things the most appalling to mankind’ (Melville 1972, p. 295). Ishmael’s reflections 
upon the ‘marble pallor’ of the dead (Melville 1972, p. 292), the significance of white in 
burial customs and the ‘snowy mantle’ that shrouds our apparition of phantoms, finds 
its zenith in the ‘king of terror’ who ‘when personified by the evangelist, rides on his 
pallid horse’ (Melville 1972, p. 292).xx It is in relation to the certainty of death amidst 
the indifferent ‘heartless voids and immensities of the universe’ that Melville so 
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effectively employs whiteness to expose our suppressed horror at the ‘thought of 
annihilation’ (Melville 1972, p. 295).  
 
Despite the terror invoked by this conscious reckoning of one’s mortality before an 
indifferent universe, Melville suggests that whiteness in all its ‘dumb blankness’ is 
paradoxically ‘full of meaning, in a wide landscape of snows’ (Melville 1972, p. 296). 
Whiteness exposes ‘all other earthly hues’ as mere ‘subtle deceits, not actually 
inherent in substances, but only laid on from without’ (Melville 1972, p. 296). Whether 
it be ‘sunset skies’, ‘gilded velvets of butterflies’ or the innocent ‘butterfly cheeks of 
young girls’, one is liberated by the knowledge that ‘all deified Nature absolutely paints 
like a harlot’ (Melville 1972, p. 296). Like the traveler in Lapland who refuses to wear 
‘colored and colorings glasses upon their eyes’ or the ‘wretched infidel’ who ‘gazes 
himself blind at the monumental white shroud that wraps all the prospect around him’, 
Melville challenges us to create our own meaning and values in the face of this 
‘colorless, all-color of atheism from which we shrink’ (Melville 1972, p. 296). Melville’s 
representation of the ‘White Whale’ illustrates the danger of confronting a universe 
without the security or solace of absolute values, where previous internalised truths 
and meanings are rendered obsolete and cultivated ignorance can no longer suppress 
the horror of our mortality (Melville 1972, p. 371).  
 
In Melville’s fiction ‘rivers’ and the ‘sea’ are symbolic of consciousness, a place of 
unknowing from which the possibility of ‘becoming’ may be realized. Melville embarks 
upon this sea of consciousness in his exploration of the ‘self’ emancipated from the 
binding trappings of ‘civilization’ and associated constructions of ‘truth’. Ishmael 
reflects that the immensity of ‘sea’ unfettered by man’s delusions poses a threat to 
those who hold to absolute notions of ‘truth’. 
 
And still deeper the meaning of that story of Narcissus, who because he 
could not grasp the tormenting, mild image he saw in the fountain, plunged 
into it and was drowned. But that same image, we ourselves see in all rivers 
and oceans. It is the image of the ungraspable phantom of life; and this is 
the key to it all. (Melville 1972, p. 95) 
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It is informative at this point to consider the contemporary philosophical writings of 
Gillies Deleuze and Felix Guattari who describe the world as being rhizomic, a concept 
they use to describe the connections between disparate objects, thoughts and beings 
(Deleuze 2003, p. 10). The Rhizome ‘maps’ these connections revealing a multiplicity 
of transitory associations between all abstract, virtual and concrete entities that are 
both organic and non-organic in nature (Deleuze 2003, p. 12). Through this concept 
Deleuze and Guattari counter ideas and beliefs that restrict the flow of thought such as 
fixed judgments and dualistic or binary conceptions of knowledge which they term 
‘taproot’ systems. In doing so Deleuze and Guattari re-conceptualize (reterritorialize) 
prior representations of history and philosophical idioms so as to open thought to the 
random, chance or causal character of associations within evolutionary environments. 
Illuminating connections which alter the flow of desires and energies, the infinite 
networks and relations revealed by the rhizome expose the ‘aborescent thought’ of 
fixed systems and identities to be mere synthetic constructions – a conception of the 
universe that is shown to overwhelm Ishmael in Moby Dick.   
 
Upon the vastness and indifference of the sea all prior constructions of reality and 
religious certitudes are exposed as meaningless, an overwhelming comprehension 
reflected in Ishmael’s exclamation: ‘The intense concentration of self in the middle of 
such a heartless immensity, my God!’ (Melville 1972, p. 525).xxi Melville’s 
representation of an indifferent universe complete with infinite possibilities undermines 
the notion of absolute values or truth, prophesying perhaps what Nietzsche gave 
expression to in his contention that the notion of ‘truth’ and a ‘true world’ is a 
fabrication based on an ‘error’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 50). The concept of an absolute 
standard of truth, or the belief that truth is of value, is central to the Christian concept 
of a ‘just’ and ‘righteous’ divinity. However, if as Sartre (1946) proposes God is refuted 
and dismissed from the equation, ‘there can no longer be any a priori since there is no 
infinite and perfect consciousness to think it’ (Sartre 1989, p. 353). For the broken 
hearted with ‘death-longing eyes’ the ‘sea’ presents a space in which previously held 
belief in transcendent value systems and notions of absolute truth can be cast aside 
as the soul is reborn through unimaginable ‘terrors, and wonderful, new-life 
adventures’ (Melville 1972, p. 597). Melville’s fiction alludes to the possibility of a 
sublime awakening of consciousness that restores humanity to the likeness of 
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‘primeval’ Adam – yet uncorrupted by The Fall. Long contemplation of one’s existence 
upon this ‘sea’ of consciousness is shown to awaken an aspect of humanity previously 
dormant – buried beneath the dross of civilized Christian morality: An experience 
which ‘inevitably restores a man to that condition in which God placed him, i.e. what is 
called savagery’ (Melville 1972, p. 376). A generation after the publication of Moby 
Dick, Nietzsche drew upon similar imagery to Melville’s ‘sea’ of consciousness in his 
criticism of the detrimental effect of Christian morality upon human history and his 
assertion that man must courageously create their own meanings and values.  
 
…if your ship has been driven into these seas, very well! Now clench your 
teeth! Keep your eyes open! Keep a firm hand on the helm! – We sail 
straight over morality and past it (Nietzsche 1990, p. 54).   
 
Nietzsche rejected the premise that a god was the author of an absolute just and 
righteous standard of consciousness or pre-ordained human moral values. In Thus 
Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche declared; ‘Truly, men have given themselves all their 
good and evil’ (Nietzsche 1969, p. 85). Melville’s allegory of the White Whale and in 
particular his explication of ‘whiteness’ heralds Nietzsche’s denunciation of the 
concept of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, illustrating the conflicting and contradictory nature of man’s 
moral judgments and constructed value systems. An explanation for the failure of 
humanity to perceive its own self-delusion in regard to such judgments is presented in 
The Gay Science (1882), in which Nietzsche argued that man has continually inherited 
‘erroneous articles of faith’ that have over time been incorporated into the very 
character of human knowledge. Nietzsche’s four errors of knowledge represent the 
ways in which he saw the western world’s philosophical axioms of ‘truth’ to be a 
falsehood. Nietzsche believed that humanity had been educated by its errors namely: 
An incomplete view of oneself, belief in fictitious attributes, the false notion of 
superiority over animals and nature, inventing their ‘good’ and accepted them for a 
time as eternal and unconditional values (Nietzsche 1974, p. 174). In Moby Dick, the 
outworking of these errors manifest in the hubris of Captain Ahab who despite being 
emotionally crippled by self-doubt is nonetheless convinced of his own grandeur and 
the righteousness of his quest to kill the White Whale. Melville’s presentation of 
Queequeg exposes the idea that there is an eternal and unconditional ‘good’ as a lie, 
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and undermines the prevailing idea that Christianity served humanity as the agent of 
civilization.  
 
Knowing Beyond Truth: Being Equal to Oneself  
Melville employs the character Queequeg, a south-sea islander endearingly referred to 
as a ‘savage’, to provide the perspective of a religious and cultural ‘outsider’ in his 
critique of the relationship between Christianity and capitalism. Religious language is 
used to create a point of moral demarcation between the Christian Ishmael and the 
heathen Queequeg. The mutual shock that accompanies Queequeg’s unexpected 
meeting with Ishmael is expressed in a murderous roar of damnation that drowns out 
the Christian’s plaintively cries for deliverance. 
 
“Who-e debel you?” – he at last said – “you no speak-e, dam-me, I kill-e.” 
And so saying the lighted tomahawk began flourishing about me in the dark. 
 
“Landlord, for God’s sake, Peter Coffin!” shouted I.  “Landlord!  Watch!  
Coffin!  Angels! save me!” (Melville 1972, p. 117). 
 
Melville’s play on words in this instance, serves to present Christianity as being fixated 
with death, a theme later portrayed in the landlord Peter Coffin’s tale of Queequeg 
selling shrunken heads to eager Christians (Melville 1972, p. 115).xxii Late in the novel 
a gravely ill Queequeg asserts that unless overwhelmed by a superior power or force, 
to live or die was a matter of his own sovereign will and pleasure (Melville 1972, p. 
592). While such a belief is tantamount to damning conceit in the eyes of the Church, 
Melville presents Queequeg’s conviction as a manifestation of the strength of his 
will for life. This divergence of perspectives in relation to death is further emphasized 
by the importance Queequeg places upon dignity in death, juxtaposed with the 
fundamental disregard for the body of the deceased that prevailed in Christian 
seafaring traditions (Melville 1972, p. 589). Queequeg shudders at the thought of 
being ‘buried in his hammock, according to the usual sea-custom, tossed like 
something vile to the death-devouring sharks’ (Melville 1972, p. 589). The further 
irony, of course, and indicative of Melville’s play with language is that it will be the 
‘coffin’ Queequeg makes which will ensure that Ishmael is the only survivor. 
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Although Melville exhibits a sardonic response to the notion of the ‘noble savage’ he 
nevertheless portrays Queequeg as the bearer of a ‘noble heart’ and integrity 
unequalled among the Christian seamen who share his journey.xxiii There is more than 
a note of satire in Ishmael’s condescending reference to Queequeg as a ‘savage’ with 
manners. 
 
Thinks I, Queequeg, under the circumstances, this is a very civilized 
overture; but, the truth is, these savages have an innate sense of delicacy, 
say what you will; it is marvellous how essentially polite they are (Melville 
1972, p. 121). 
 
Melville presents Queequeg as an anomaly to the commonly held Christian view of the 
savage in order to expose the error of judging others according to ethnicity or 
appearance: A somewhat radical view in the mid-19th century. Queequeg’s search for 
moral enlightenment among Christians for the betterment of his people is shown to be 
a dismal failure, the practices of whalemen convincing him that ‘even Christians could 
be both miserable and wicked; infinitely more so, than all his father’s heathens’ 
(Melville 1972, p. 151). Although a prominent outsider aboard the Pequod – a heathen 
among Christians – Queequeg is shown to reveal an innate sensitivity and peace 
unique to his Christian shipmates. Within the character of Queequeg a ‘simple honest 
heart’ is portrayed as coexisting with ‘fiery black and bold’ eyes, reflecting strength of 
spirit that would ‘dare a thousand devils’ (Melville 1972, p. 144). Ishmael reflects on 
the harmony of these qualities: 
 
…he seemed entirely at his ease; preserving the utmost serenity; content 
with his own companionship; always equal to himself. Surely this was a 
touch of fine philosophy (Melville 1972, p. 145). 
 
Melville bestows upon Queequeg the ‘sublime’ peace of one who through self-
knowledge is free to act in authenticity to their will (Melville 1972, p. 145). Later in the 
novel Melville employs an analogy of ‘Tahiti’ – an ‘insular’ island ‘full of peace and joy’ 
encompassed by the ‘appalling ocean’ replete with ‘all the horrors of the half known 
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life’ – to illustrate the disposition of the landlocked soul (Melville 1972, p. 381). Melville 
suggests that ignorant trust in securities and absolute truths may provide a semblance 
of peace for the ‘soul’ yet to have set sail upon the treacherous ocean. However, once 
having ventured from land and exposed to the ferocity of the elements all prior 
securities of the ‘soul’ are revealed to be mere self-delusion. It is within this context 
that the peaceful collaboration of heart and mind that characterizes Queequeg is 
significant. 
 
In representing the means by which man may be ‘always equal to himself’ and 
emulate the ‘serenity’ Ishmael observes in Queequeg, Melville again draws on the 
physiology of the whale, which despite the chill of the artic or the heat of the tropics 
preserves the integrity of its ‘inner spaciousness’. Ishmael entreats humanity to find a 
similar equanimity:  
 
Oh, man! admire and model thyself after the whale! Do thou, too, remain 
warm among ice.  Do thou, too, live in this world without being of it. Be cool 
at the equator; keep thy blood fluid at the Pole. Like the great dome of St. 
Peter’s, and like the great whale, retain, O man! in all seasons a temperature 
of thine own  (Melville 1972, p. 414). 
 
The temperate state of being to which Melville alludes may be likened to the soul of 
man which although immersed in the moral constructions of civilization, may through 
fortitude of will retain the inner freedom to actualize the ‘innocence of becoming’. 
 
It is perhaps ironic that the sadness and anger borne by Ishmael, comes in time to be 
‘redeemed’ by the peace of one whose ‘nature’ is free from the ‘civilized hypocrisies 
and bland deceits’ of Christian society (Melville 1972, p. 146). It is of particular interest 
to this thesis that Melville describes the peace of Queequeg as a product of his 
‘indifference’: A state of being that finds parallels in Pip’s vision of an ‘indifferent God’ 
later in the novel. The narrator observes of Queequeg:  
 
No more my splintered heart and maddened hand were turned against the 
wolfish world.  This soothing savage had redeemed it. There he sat, his very 
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indifference speaking a nature in which there lurked no civilized hypocrisies 
and bland deceits (Melville 1972, p. 146).   
 
The ‘indifference’ of which Melville writes relates primarily to Queequeg’s disregard for 
constructed notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ that constitute Christian value systems and bind 
civilisation to oppressive moral laws and religious sectarianism. Melville illustrates the 
profound importance of friendship in overcoming the ignorance that sustains this 
divisive Christian morality. The relationship of Queequeg and Ishmael exemplifies 
loyalty and generosity, values which Melville shows to be starkly absent in the 
Protestant Christian tradition, one ratified in the originally Calvinist dictates that a truly 
‘elected’ man should never express doubt. Ishmael reasons early in his acquaintance 
with Queequeg: ‘I'll try a pagan friend, thought I, since Christian kindness has proved 
but hollow courtesy’ (Melville 1972, p. 146). In portraying a distinctly ecumenical 
friendship Melville is able to present Ishmael joining Queequeg in heathen rites of 
worship, while bringing into question any concept of God that could be so small as to 
manifest jealousy of an ‘innocent little idol’.  
 
Roped together as they precariously straddle the carcass of a whale they butcher, the 
fate of Ishmael and Queequeg is presented as being symbolic of the bloody union and 
‘dangerous liabilities’ that Melville suggests is shared by all humanity. The bound fate 
of these sailors illustrates what was for Melville the ‘precise situation of every mortal’ 
connected with one another in a plurality of ways (Melville 1972, p. 426). 
 
I seemed distinctly to perceive that my own individuality was now merged in 
a joint stock company of two; that my free will had received a mortal wound; 
and that another’s mistake or misfortune might plunge innocent me into 
unmerited disaster and death. Therefore, I saw that here was a sort of 
interregnum in Providence; for its even-handed equity never could have so 
gross an injustice (Melville 1972, p. 426). 
 
Melville presents the idea of ‘free will’ and hence the concept of innocence as being 
profoundly dependent upon relationship, a mutual interdependence of humanity that 
inevitably subverts the notion of the providence of an omniscient God (Melville 1972, 
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p. 426). Queequeg’s generous act of dividing his money into equal portions with 
Ishmael prior to their voyage challenged the belief that wealth was bestowed upon the 
elect according to the providence of God. Such an expression of friendship is akin to 
the betrayal of the Protestant Work Ethic and the capitalist principles of competition 
that it serves and it is not by chance that Queequeg is presented as dividing ‘some 
thirty dollars in silver’: A reference to Judas accepting thirty pieces of silver to betray 
Jesus (Melville 1972, p. 147).xxiv  
 
Madness, Violence and the Will consumed with Vengeance  
In Captain Ahab, Melville personifies the concept of the eternally doomed, tragic figure 
– destined to die at the hands of the White Whale. Throughout Moby Dick the fatalism 
characteristic of the Calvinist doctrine of Predestination haunts Ahab’s sacred quest 
and ultimately, indiscriminately condemns both ignorant and naïve alike. Captain Ahab 
incarnates in the mortal sphere the doom of one foreordained to ‘everlasting death’ yet 
is nonetheless depicted by Melville as being worthy of respect. Melville contends that 
unlike those who dwell upon the shore and attain prominence by fortune or ill will, the 
man who rises to the office of captain aboard a whaling ship have earned his standing. 
The narrator comments upon this arduous journey: 
 
Be it said, that in this vocation of whaling, sinecures are unknown; dignity 
and danger go hand in hand; till you get to be Captain, the higher you rise 
the harder you toil (Melville 1972, p. 588).  
 
Captain Ahab is from the first a contradictory character shrouded in mystery, 
portraying an outward appearance that serves to conceal a profound madness 
cunningly harboured from sight. Considering the mystery of Ahab, Ishmael reflects on 
the elusive nature of such madness: ‘Human madness is oftentimes a cunning and 
most feline thing. When you think it fled, it may have but become transfigured into 
some still subtler form’ (Melville 1972, p. 284). In his presentation of Captain Ahab, 
Melville delves beyond the realm of rational thought, his fiction exploring the 
relationship between madness and the will taken by self-delusion. While recognizing 
the importance of the intellect in the initial formation and subsequent exercise of 
independent thought, Melville illustrates that once consumed by madness the will 
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subjects experience to the formation of its own delusional reality (Melville 1972, p. 
284). The strength of Ahab’s intellect transforms all possibilities into probabilities, as 
fixations come to resonate with the same certainty as Christian rationalizations of the 
world (Melville 1972, p. 300). At the heart of Ahab’s madness is his obsession to kill 
the White Whale which – among other interpretations – is symbolic of the 
independence of thought, the like of which the Captain can no longer claim as his own. 
Poignantly Melville depicts Ahab as colourless for like the Greek legend of 
Prometheus, he has become a slave to the soul corroding delusion of his own 
creation: Bled of all that was once himself.  
 
Therefore, the tormented spirit that glared out of bodily eyes… a formless 
somnambulistic being, a ray of living light, to be sure, but without an object to 
colour, and therefore a blankness in itself. God help thee, old man, thy 
thoughts have created a creature in thee; and he whose intense thinking 
thus makes him a Prometheus; a vulture feeds upon that heart for ever; that 
vulture the very creature he creates (Melville 1972, p. 303). 
 
In Ahab, Melville presents the trauma of the metaphorical Son in revolt against the 
Father as internalized dogmas and conceptions of truth violently wrenched from the 
soul, murdering any last vestiges of innocence. Cursing ‘God the Father’ for his 
indifference to human suffering, Ahab’s  physical disfigurement – having previously 
lost a leg to the White Whale – is symbolic of the metaphysical despair that has 
sapped life from his anaemic soul. The self-righteous vengeance that fuels Ahab’s 
revolt against God – symbolically represented in his hate for Moby Dick – casts the 
Captain as a fulfilment of the biblical ‘Serpent’s’ prophecy: Becoming a god unto 
himself, “knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:5).  
 
The Christian tradition has long demarcated vengeance as being the sole domain of 
God. Drawing upon biblical references such as ‘Vengeance is mine sayeth the Lord’ 
(Rom. 12:19, KJV) to legitimize their actions the faithful have zealously ensured that 
God’s ‘will be done’. Although Ahab’s desire for vengeance constitutes a transgression 
of God’s moral jurisdiction and hence ‘sin’ according to Christian dogma Melville’s 
empathetic presentation of Ahab suggests an alternative perspective: One that may be 
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identified in the contemporary philosophical writings of Robert Solomon. In his 
discussion of vengeance in relation to the conception of justice, Solomon considers 
the sophisticated cultures of ancient Athens, ancient India and modern Japan in which 
vengeance was intrinsically associated with the expression of human dignity 
(Chakrabarti 2012, p. 72). Matters of family honour or personal pride are highlighted as 
the principle motivations for vengeance in these cultures, a response compelled due to 
‘impatience or despair’ wrought by the absence of an ‘effective higher power’ 
(Solomon cited in Chakrabarti 2012, p. 74). Solomon observes that in circumstances in 
which reason has failed and recourse to legal proceedings has been denied or 
compromised (Chakrabarti 2012, p. 75), vengeance may be perceived as not only 
‘legitimate and justifiable but obligatory’ (Solomon cited in Chakrabarti 2012, p. 75). It 
is in this context that vengeance is associated with the ‘hero’ who deprived of all other 
avenues of redress acts in the prosecution of their conception of justice. Solomon 
acknowledges that the extreme and excessively violent forms of vengeance depicted 
in the Old Testament may be regarded as ethically reprehensible today (Chakrabarti 
2012, p. 76). However he suggests that despite the coercive transfer of money 
employed in contemporary law suits to exact vengeance (Chakrabarti 2012, p. 70), 
there remains in society a ‘righteous schadenfreude – social confirmation of personal 
emotion’ (Solomon cited in Chakrabarti 2012, p. 81), that resonates with the desire for 
vengeance. Solomon considers this ‘righteous schadenfreude’ to be the expression of 
a conception of justice that is grounded in the immanent world: ‘Not what is saintly but 
what would be normal and acceptable, even “human all too human” (Solomon cited in 
Chakrabarti 2012, p. 80). 
 
Melville’s depiction of Ahab’s desire for vengeance expresses the frustration and 
sense of abandonment Solomon identifies as being characteristic of those who despair 
at the impotence or failure of those in seats of power to act on behalf of the blighted. 
Ahab is portrayed as being both heroic and demonic in his revolt against the 
indifference of God, his willingness to exact vengeance upon the White Whale 
symbolic of what Nietzsche would later claim to be a principle cause of secularization: 
The dismissal of ‘God the Father’. Nietzsche’s response to his question, ‘Why atheism 
today?’ conveys much of what Melville sought to represent through his treatment of 
Ahab’s vengeance. 
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The father’ in God is thoroughly refuted; likewise ‘the judge’, ‘the rewarder’. 
Likewise his ‘free will’: he does not hear – and if he heard he would still not 
know how to help (Nietzsche 1990, p. 80). 
 
Presented as being endowed with a mighty intellect and educated by the experiences 
of myriad perilous voyages, Ahab is portrayed as being consumed by an intoxicating 
hubris that manifests in the same tyrannical disposition as ‘God the Father’ against 
whom he rails: “O head! thou hast seen enough to split the planets and make an infidel 
of Abraham, and not one syllable is thine!” (Melville 1972, p. 418). Aghast at the 
transforming power of Ahab’s pathology First-mate Starbuck perceives the danger 
posed by the madness that had consumed his Captain: 
 
Flat obedience to thy own flat commands, this is all thou breathest. Aye, and 
say’st the men have vow’d thy vow; say’st all of us are Ahabs. Great God 
forbid! (Melville 1972, p. 623). 
 
The mania of Ahab’s vengeance threatens to infest the lives of all aboard the Pequod. 
Exuding a passion akin to religious zeal that takes on a life of its own, no amount of 
reasoning, remonstration or entreaty can turn the Captain from his ‘righteous’ quest 
(Melville 1972, p. 302).xxv Ahab appeals to that which is primal in humanity beyond the 
platitudes and securities which had formed the crew’s prior sense of reason. Although 
conscious of Ahab’s madness Starbuck loses the capacity to reason when confronted 
with the force of the Captain’s will.  
 
My soul is more than matched; she’s overmanned; and by a madman! 
Insufferable sting, that sanity should ground arms on such a field! But he 
drilled deep down, and blasted all my reason out of me!  I think I see his 
impious end; but feel that I must help him to it (Melville 1972, p. 266). 
 
Aware that some think him mad, Ahab declares that a “demoniac” will drives his 
sacrilegious resolve: “What I’ve dared, I’ve willed; and what I’ve willed, I’ll do!” (Melville 
1972, p. 266). Late in the novel the narrator makes reference to Italian Art in which 
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Jesus is portrayed as hermaphroditical, meek and submissive, in contrast to the 
prominence and power that characterized representations of ‘God the Father’ (Melville 
1972, p. 484).xxvi This imagery of an androgynous Son subject to the will of the Father 
symbolically reflects what Nietzsche later identified as the subordination of 
humankind’s natural drives and instincts to the pursuit of the ‘knowledge of good and 
evil’. Nietzsche proposed that through the process of ‘civilization’ human beings had 
come to view these instincts as ‘evil’ condemned according to transcendent notions of 
‘innocence’ and the ‘good’. Nietzsche describes the annexation of humanity’s natural 
drives:   
 
Henceforth not only faith and conviction but also scrutiny, denial, mistrust, 
and contradiction became a power; all “evil” instincts were subordinated to 
knowledge, employed in her service, and acquired the splendour of what is 
permitted, honoured, and useful – and eventually even the eye and 
innocence of the good (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 170-171). 
 
That Nietzsche associates the ‘eye’ with ‘innocence’ is significant in that he identifies a 
relationship, which Blake viewed as being crucial to perceiving a vision of innocence 
that transcended Christianity morality. Through his portrayal of Ahab, Melville warns of 
the peril confronting all who employ such knowledge to revolt against the Father, lest 
they too become enslaved to a pale image of the very will they had sought to 
denounce. Just as Ahab’s ‘madness’ is multi-faceted within the symbolic mould of 
Moby Dick, so too, is Pip’s. Each madness informs and mirrors the other – each in 
seeking ultimate meaning is deemed ‘mad’.  
 
The Transfiguring Love of an Indifferent God  
In Moby Dick, Melville’s portrayal of a young slave boy named Pip echoes the plight of 
Blake’s ‘Chimney Sweep’ in relation to the exploitation of the child for profit. The 
brightness and joy that characterizes Pip early in the novel is soon darkened by fear 
as the boy is forced to endure extraordinary danger. Pip’s prayer for deliverance from 
those who would imperil his life expresses this mortal fear (Melville 1972, p. 522).  
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“Oh, thou big white God aloft there somewhere in yon darkness, have mercy 
on this small black boy down here; preserve him from all men that have no 
bowels to feel fear!” (Melville 1972, p. 276). 
 
Pip is representative of the powerless, those who are vulnerable due to their age, 
ethnicity or poverty: A naïve child whose love for life instinctively surpasses all other 
commands or summons to duty. Terrified during the hunt Pip throws himself from a 
whaling boat for a second time. While in the throes of drowning Pip perceives a vision 
of sublime beauty: The indifferent yet joyous nature of creation.   
 
The sea had jeeringly kept his finite body up, but drowned the infinite of his 
soul. Not drowned entirely, though. Rather carried down alive to wondrous 
depths, where strange shapes of the unwarped primal world glided to and fro 
before his passive eyes; and the miser-merman, Wisdom, revealed his 
hoarded heaps; and among the joyous, heartless, ever-juvenile eternities, 
Pip saw the multitudinous, God-omnipresent, coral insects, that out of the 
firmament of waters heaved the colossal orbs. He saw God’s foot upon the 
treadle of the loom, and spoke it; and therefore his shipmates called him 
mad. So man’s insanity is heaven’s sense; and wandering from all mortal 
reason, man comes at last to that celestial thought, which, to reason, is 
absurd and frantic; and weal or woe, feels then uncompromised, indifferent 
as his God  (Melville 1972, p. 525). 
 
This sublime vision in which terror and awe are joined in wonder is shown to evoke a 
transfiguration in the soul of Pip, unveiling a primal wisdom otherwise obscured by the 
reason of man. Although Melville depicts Pip as subsequently falling into madness, he 
nonetheless conveys a subtle sense of liberation. Through Pip’s speech this madness 
is revealed, his ramblings incompatible with reason as language is disjointed from 
experience. Whereas Blake’s irony repeatedly insinuated a sense of lost justice or 
morality, Melville employs the notion of madness to undermine the credibility of reason 
and the language upon which it is constructed. Pip’s manic praise of his masters and 
excessive self-depreciation is symptomatic of Melville’s disdain for such sentiments 
and the Protestant Ethic upon which these judgments are derived. Ahab’s 
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compassionate response to Pip’s madness is important in that it alters our perception 
of the Captain – if only momentarily – as Melville reconfigures the relationship between 
the Father and the Orphan. Taking the traumatised boy by the hand Ahab bares 
witnesses to the “holiness” of one whose ‘love’ and ‘gratitude’ is testimony to a 
transfiguring vision of an indifferent God (Melville 1972, p. 630).   
 
“Lo! ye believers in gods all goodness, and in man all ill, lo you! see the 
omniscient gods oblivious of suffering man; and man, though idiotic, and 
knowing not what he does, yet full of the sweet things of love and gratitude. 
Come! I feel prouder leading thee by thy black hand, than though I grasped 
an Emperor’s!” (Melville 1972, p. 631). 
 
Ahab’s rebuke of his crew conveys the scorn that is characteristic of Melville’s 
representation of ignorance that fails to see beyond appearances to comprehend that 
which is great in humanity. Nietzsche who proposed that ‘there are holy experiences 
before which they (herd) have to take off their shoes and keep their unclean hands 
away – it is almost their highest advance towards humanity’ also expresses this view 
(Nietzsche 1990, p. 203).  
 
Ahab speaks to Pip of heaven’s silence before the suffering of humanity and the idiocy 
of glorifying such an indifferent God. While empathetic to Pip the madness that 
consumes Captain Ahab takes on vastly different manifestation. Unlike Pip neither 
moral sensitivity nor maritime code of honour can dissuade Ahab from the vengeance 
of his quest. Although beseeched by the desperate captain of the Rachel to assist in 
the search for his lost son Ahab remains unmoved, standing ‘like an anvil, receiving 
every shock, but without the least quivering of his own’ (Melville 1972, p. 640). The 
contrast with Pip pronounced in the boy’s lament for his lost sense of ‘self’.    
 
“Queequeg dies game! – mind ye that … but base little Pip, he died a 
coward; died all a’shiver… No, no! shame upon all cowards – shame upon 
them!  Let em go drown like Pip, that jumped from a whale-boat. Shame! 
shame!” (Melville 1972, p. 591).  
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Melville employs the notion of shame and cowardice ironically to disparage the 
economic practices and ethical void that had contributed to the child’s trauma. From 
Pip’s apparent weakness of character flows heartfelt compassion for Queequeg, as he 
mourns with ‘soft sobbings’ the apparent passing of a loved friend (Melville 1972, p. 
591). While the connection between Pip and Queequeg is obvious – fellow racial 
outcasts – what marks Melville’s presentation of their relationship is their mutual 
affirmation of life.  
 
In the prologue to Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche's despair for civilization and 
humanity in general leads him to seek salvation through the select few willing to free 
themselves from imposed values of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Although the deaths of the 
characters Pip and Queequeg bring to an end Melville’s exploration of the ‘innocence 
of becoming’, it will be argued that they serve as portents for his future depiction of the 
‘Orphan’. It will be argued in the following chapter that over the forty years that elapsed 
between the publication of Moby Dick and the draft of Billy Budd – unfinished at the 
time of his death in 1891 – Melville increasingly conceived that the ‘Orphan’ could not 
ultimately survive when exposed to the constraints of law in the service of rationalism.    
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i When Herman Melville died in 1891the manuscript of Billy Budd was unfinished. The novella was first 
published by Raymond M Weaver in 1924, having discovered an unfinished manuscript whilst compiling 
a biography on Melville. The manuscript proved to be confusing and Weaver’s version published as 
‘Volume XIII’ in his Standard Edition of Melville’s Complete Works (1924) was later regarded as 
inaccurate and at times a misrepresentation of Melville’s work. After close analysis of the manuscript, 
Harrison Hayford and Merton Sealts published Billy Budd, Sailor: An Inside Narrative in 1962. This 
edition remains the definitive version of the text and the one used in this thesis. 
     
ii Weber identifies Bible translators as being responsible for having fashioned the idea that one is ‘called’ 
to a particular task by God, suggesting that the ‘spirit’ of the original texts conveys a sense of call to 
eternal salvation (Weber 2002, p. 39). New Testament references 1 Cor. 1:26; Eph. 1:18, 4:1, 4:2; 
Thess. 1:11; Heb. 3:1 and 2 Pet. 1:10 all refer to this idea of the call to salvation. Martin Luther 
translated two distinctly different concepts from the single term beruf – the idea of being called to eternal 
salvation and the notion that devotion to work heightens one’s moral worth. Luther derives this later 
concept from the Apocrypha book of Jesus Sirach 11:20-21, which resembles the Protestant 
understanding of attaching religious significance to daily work (Weber 2002, p. 39). 
 
iii Weber argues that it is through the ‘spirit of the translator’ rather than the extant Greek biblical texts 
that the idea of a ‘calling’ has been formed (Weber 2002, p. 39). 
 
iv This Bible reference is from the King James Version rather than the New International Version as it 
more accurately reflects Weber’s translation of the passage. 
 
v This idea of being in the world but not of it was drawn from the teachings of the Apostle Paul who 
wrote: ‘And be not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye 
may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God’ (Rom. 12:2, KJV). 
 
vi Melville describes the ‘whole head’ of the sperm whale as redolent of ‘an enormous practical 
resolution in facing death’ (Melville 1972, p. 443). 
 
vii Melville illustrates the courageous nature of such authenticity in the face of suffering: ‘There is 
a wisdom that is woe; but there is a woe that is madness. And there is a Catskill eagle in some 
souls that can alike dive down into the blackest gorges, and soar out of them again and become 
invisible in the sunny spaces’ (Melville 1972, p. 535). 
 
viii Although broad public concern for the protection of the environment was in its infancy in the mid-19th 
century, Melville nevertheless considered the long term impact of whaling, raising the possibility that the 
creatures may well be hunted to extinction (Melville 1972, p. 541). 
 
ix As has been interpreted by numerous literary critics, it would appear that Stubb’s exhortation is an 
example of Melville playing with sexual innuendo.   
 
x Nietzsche contended that morality was always associated with the valuation and ranking of human 
actions and impulses. He argued that these ‘valuations and orders of rank are always expressions of 
the needs of a community and herd: whatever benefits it most – and second most – and third most – 
that is also considered the first standard for the value of all individuals’ (Nietzsche 1974, p. 174). 
 
xi Jonah, fearful of the persecution he will inevitably encounter when prophesying the doom and 
destruction of Nineveh – lest the people repent and turn from their ‘wicked’ ways – seeks to escape his 
duty by fleeing to a distant land (Jonah 1:3).  
 
xii By employing Christian notions of faith and belief to denounce the skepticism of experienced sailors 
as nothing more than ‘foolish, impious pride, and abominable, devilish rebellion against the reverend 
clergy’ (Melville 1972, p. 474), Melville in turn demonstrates the ignorance upon which such blind 
assertions of faith are based. 
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xiii Jonah’s prayer from the fish’s belly is highlighted by the preacher as an exemplar of a man 
acknowledging the justice and legitimacy of God’s judgment – a ‘true and faithful repentance; not 
clamorous for pardon, but grateful for punishment’ (Melville 1972, p. 141), (Jonah 2:1-2). 
 
xiv Ishmael describes the nature of this dark humour that is shown to pervade Stubb’s soul: 
‘There are certain queer times and occasions in this strange mixed affair we call life when a man 
takes this whole universe for a vast practical joke, though the wit thereof he but dimly discerns, 
and more than suspects that the joke is at nobody’s expense but his own’ (Melville 1972, p. 
329). 
 
xv Deleuze employs the term ‘affect’ to express a singular reaction – be it emotional, psychological or 
physiological – to an encounter with an event or experience that is independent of the particular 
occurrence being perceived or experienced. An ‘affect’ refers to one’s response as a consequence of 
time or movement upon ‘bodies’ – whether corporeal, spiritual, animal, mineral, vegetable and or 
conceptual – that is not contingent of a particular experience or associated with a defined meaning and 
while being ‘knowable’ in its lived dimensions, otherwise remains indefinite and indefinable, free from 
organizing subjects. For further see (Deleuze 2003, pp. 258-59, 260-61, 400) 
 
xvi Melville elaborates on this idea of the unrepresentable through the symbolism of the whale, asserting 
that it is only when one is actually engaged in the ‘heart of quickest perils; only when within the eddying 
of his angry flukes; only on the profound unbounded sea, can the fully invested whale be truly and 
livingly found out’ (Melville 1972, p. 541). 
 
xvii Ishmael comments: ‘Was not Saul of Tarsus converted from unbelief by a similar fright?  I tell you, 
the sperm whale will stand no nonsense’ (Melville 1972, p. 309) (Acts 9:3-4). 
 
xviii (Rev. 20:11). 
 
xix In his contention that white as presented in ‘nature’ stirs the heart and fills the imagination with 
wonder and dread, Melville comments on Romanticism and in particular the poetry of Samuel Coleridge: 
‘Bethink thee of the albatross: whence come those clouds of spiritual wonderment and pale dread, in 
which that white phantom sails in all imaginations? Not Coleridge first threw that spell; but God’s great, 
unflattering laureate, Nature’ (Melville 1972, p. 289). 
 
xx In the book of Revelations ‘Death’ rides upon a pallid horse, the final horseman of the apocalypse  
(Rev. 6:8) 
 
xxi Melville contends that when confronted with the vastness of the sea – both literally and 
metaphorically – one may glimpse that ‘mortally intolerable truth; that all deep, earnest thinking is but 
the intrepid effort of the soul to keep the open independence of her sea; while the wildest winds of 
heaven and earth conspire to cast her on the treacherous, slavish shore?’ (Melville 1972, p. 203). 
 
xxii Ishmael confesses that his initially reaction to Queequeg was governed by fear of the ‘inexplicable’, 
acknowledging that as ‘ignorance is the parent of fear’ he likened this meeting in the dead of night to an 
apparition of the ‘devil’ (Melville 1972, p. 115).  
 
xxiii The term noble savage refers to the concept of an idealized indigene or ‘other’, an expression of 18th 
century sentimentalism that promoted the idea of a romantic primitivism. The idea of the ‘noble savage’ 
was derived from the belief that humanity was innately endowed with a goodness and moral sense that 
was not the product of, or subject to, religious indoctrination. For further see (Ellingson 2001; LeBlanc 
2003).  
 
xxiv (Matt. 26:49). 
 
xxv Acknowledging that the mind is leagued with the soul, Melville casts Ahab as summoning ‘all his 
thoughts’ and sheer inveteracy of will’ in revolt against ‘gods and devils’, his all-consuming purpose 
manifesting as a ‘kind of self-assumed, independent being of its own’ (Melville 1972, p. 302).   
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xxvi Ishmael considers these pictures ‘so destitute as they are of all brawniness, hint nothing of any 
power, but the mere negative, feminine one of submission and endurance’, which Melville regards as 
forming the ‘peculiar practical virtues of his teachings’ (Melville 1972, p. 484). 
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Chapter 4 - Billy Budd: The Sacrificial Lamb 
 
Through his use of irony, William Blake exposed the Christian notion of innocence to 
be mere pretence employed by the Church to mask the neglect and abuse 
experienced by the vulnerable in late 18th century English society. In the story of Billy 
Budd (1924), Herman Melville sustains this critique of Christianity through his 
allegorical presentation of an ‘innocent’ man, unconscious of the deceits of power and 
religion that ultimately conspire to determine his fate. In this novella, the development 
of Melville’s philosophical thought and in particular, his conception of innocence is 
apparent. Unlike the characters Queequeg and Pip in Moby Dick who are 
demonstrably ‘outsiders’, Melville’s creation of Billy Budd is an experiment in the 
representation of innocence from within the dominant socio-religious culture. Melville is 
able to envisage a character who despite remaining subject to the strictures of law, 
nonetheless dwells outside the comprehension of the Christian tradition. Billy Budd is 
the story of a young sailor pressed into military service aboard an English warship 
during the Napoleonic wars with France. Unique in his ascetic beauty and universally 
‘loved’ by his fellow sailors Budd immediately engenders the same fondness and 
affection among his new comrades in arms: With the exception of Claggart the 
‘Master-at-arms’. A spiteful character driven by envy and ambition Claggart wrongly 
deduces that Budd’s popularity is evidence of his mutinous intent. Accusing Budd of 
sedition in the presence of the ship’s captain, the mortified Budd spontaneously strikes 
Claggart to the forehead in avertedly killing the officer. Consequently Budd is tried for 
the murder of the ‘Master-at-arms’ despite the presiding officers being convinced of his 
moral innocence and the unintentional ramifications of the sailor’s actions. 
 
It will be argued that Melville presents Billy Budd as an ontological innocent in order to 
subvert the foundations of law upon which such essentialist judgments are 
constructed. Max Weber’s analysis of the Protestant Work Ethic is helpful to this 
inquiry in that his work identifies the historical development of the Christian notion of 
‘election’ – the belief that those ‘predestined’ by God possess a moral ‘state’ of being 
that is neither subject to action or subject to event. There is a correlation between the 
idea that the elect possess a transcendent morality and the Protestant portrayal of 
ontological innocence removed from the immanent sphere of social or political 
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scrutiny. While Melville presents Billy Budd as possessing a ‘state’ of innocence, such 
innocence is neither moral nor transcendent in nature. Billy Budd – like Ishmael in 
Moby Dick – is cast as a political, philosophical ‘Orphan’, a ‘foundling’ symbolically 
removed from the Father, and thus the genealogy of ‘original sin’ from which 
Christianity has constructed its presentation of. The ontological innocence that Melville 
presents as being characteristic of Budd is shown to be the expression of another kind 
of knowledge, one that in its very origins is indifferent to the morality derived from the 
‘Tree of the knowledge of good and evil’. 
 
Melville endows Budd with ‘intelligence’ that finds meaning in the experience of life 
rather than in aspirations for the transcendent. Drawing upon the Christian tradition in 
order to subvert it, Melville refers to the legend of The Fall in his renunciation of the 
manufactured morality he viewed to be characteristic of Christianity. The narrator 
describes Budd as: 
 
…possessing little or no sharpness of faculty or any trace of the wisdom of 
the serpent, nor yet quite a dove, he possessed that kind and degree of 
intelligence going along with the unconventional rectitude of a sound human 
creature (Melville 1986, p. 300).  
 
Unconscious of Christian values of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, Budd is neither aligned with 
neither the ‘Serpent’ of Genesis nor the ‘Dove’ of the Gospels.i Rather, Melville 
presents Budd as an incarnation of a concept of humanity, ‘exceptionally transmitted 
from a period prior to Cain’s city and citified man’ (Melville 1986, p. 301). Melville’s 
reference to the biblical story of Cain – cursed for the murder of his brother Abel and 
portrayed as the founding father of the first city – alludes to a concept of humanity 
uncorrupted by the institutionalized violence that has plagued ‘civilization’ (Genesis 
4:8-17). An image of this primal innocence is conveyed in Melville’s depiction of the 
ascetic beauty of Budd, a ‘fine specimen of the genus homo’ that might ‘in the nude … 
have posed for a statue of young Adam before the Fall’ (Melville 1986, p. 345). 
Melville’s reference to Budd as an ‘upright barbarian’ revives the imagery of the ‘noble 
savage’ presented in Moby Dick. 
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Billy in many respects was little more than a sort of upright barbarian, such 
perhaps as Adam presumably might have been ere the urbane Serpent 
wriggled himself into his company (Melville 1986, p. 301).  
 
While the biblical references in Blake’s poetry convey a sense of authority, Melville 
employs the Bible symbolically in order to contrast his concept of innocence with 
established Christian doctrinaire. Melville’s use of Greek mythology to represent the 
exceptionality of Budd further distances his presentation of innocence from Christian 
undertones. Captain Graveling of the merchant ship ‘Rights of Man’ beholds the vision 
of the departing Budd: “Here he comes … Apollo with his portmanteau!” (Melville 
1986, p. 296). The character of Billy Budd is an allegorical presentation that embodies 
much of what Friedrich Nietzsche saw as a possibility in humanity’s future. Nietzsche’s 
concept of Übermensch – or ‘overman’ as translated by Walter Kaufman – is 
employed as a structural concept pertaining to the future possibility of life-affirmation in 
which humanity in remaining ‘faithful to the earth’ (Nietzsche 1976, p.3), may recover 
from a history marred by its polarization from nature. In his novel Thus Speak 
Zarathustra (1892) Nietzsche declares that it is the Übermensch who will ‘teach 
humans the meaning of their existence’ (Nietzsche 1976, p. 7). This meaning of 
existence – or ‘meaning of the earth’ in some translations – will be expressed through 
life-affirmation an experience in the world that is relational, a circulatory or symbiotic 
interchange between humanity and nature that surpasses ordinary human experience. 
Nietzsche describes this ‘meaning of the earth’ as a ‘luxurious surplus’ where a: 
 
 …stronger way (Art), a higher type (Typus) steps into the light, which 
possesses different conditions of origin and maintenance than the average 
man. My concept, my parable for this type is, as one knows, the word 
“Übermensch” (Nietzsche 1967, p. 462).   
 
Nietzsche argued that our failure to ‘allow the unique and incomparable to raise its 
head again, and the more we abjure the dogma of the “equality of men”’, the greater 
the malaise that diminishes humanity to mediocrity (Nietzsche 1974, p. 177). Melville 
again looks to Greek antiquity to convey a concept of innocence not depreciated by 
such mediocrity, depicting Budd as bearing ‘that humane look of reposeful good nature 
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which the Greek sculptor in some instances gave to his heroic strong man, Hercules’ 
(Melville 1986, p. 299).   
 
Budd’s enthusiasm for life rescinds the melancholy that resonates throughout Blake’s 
poem ‘Experience’ and the mediocrity that for Nietzsche had become the hallmark of 
Christian morality. During his brief sojourns on land, Budd celebrates life upon the 
‘fiddler’s-green’ with a freedom and joy evocative of Zarathustra’s dance. Nietzsche’s 
assertion that such freedom is only possible through a creative response to life is 
expressed in Zarathustra’s proclamation that one must become ‘like a child: Innocence 
and forgetfulness, a new beginning ... a sacred “Yes” (Nietzsche 1976, p. 55). Yet 
unlike Zarathustra who consciously rejects the limitations imposed by belief in 
transcendent value systems, Budd is attributed with a level of self-consciousness that 
one may ‘reasonably impute to a dog of Saint Bernard’s breed’ (Melville 1986, p. 299). 
Budd responds freely and innately to life, uninhibited by the constructed moralities and 
judgments that plague the consciousness of humanity. Captain Gravelling is emphatic 
in his estimation of the crew’s affection for Budd:  
 
“But they all love him. Some of ‘em do his washing, darn his old trousers for 
him; the carpenter is at odd times making a pretty little chest of drawers for 
him. Anybody will do anything for Billy Budd; and it’s the happy family here” 
(Melville 1986, p. 296). 
 
Although described as a ‘child-man’, unlike a ‘child’s utter innocence’ and ‘blank 
ignorance’ that ‘wanes as intelligence waxes’, Melville’s presentation of Budd explores 
the idea that experience does not necessarily erode innocence (Melville 1986, p. 336). 
The narrator attributes the preservation of Budd’s ‘simple nature’ to his capacity to 
remain ‘unsophisticated by those moral obliquities which are not in every case 
incompatible with that manufacturable thing known as respectability’ (Melville 1986, p. 
301).  
 
Neither ‘vain’ nor ‘conceited’ Budd is naïve to the ‘complexities of factitious life … the 
ampler and more knowing world’ he is soon to experience aboard a great warship 
(Melville 1986, p. 299). Conscripted into the military Budd bids farewell to his life in the 
merchant navy: “And good-bye to you too, old Rights-of-Man” (Melville 1986, p. 297). 
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While Budd’s parting remark is symbolic of the fate that befalls all pressed into military 
service, Budd’s words are construed as carrying no suggestion of ‘sinister dexterity’, 
‘double meanings’ or ‘insinuations of any sort’ (Melville 1986, p. 297). Rather 
distinguished by courage and a spirit unaffected by fear, suspicion or trepidation, Budd 
is a transfiguring presence. Captain Gravelling recounts the unique and indefinable 
influence of Budd:   
 
“…it was like a Catholic priest striking peace in an Irish shindy. Not that he 
preached to them or said or did anything in particular; but a virtue went out of 
him, sugaring the sour ones” (Melville 1986, p. 295)  
 
Amused by the Captain’s despair at the loss of his “peacemaker!” a naval recruiting 
officer light heartedly jibes; “Well, blessed are the peacemakers, especially the fighting 
peacemakers!” (Melville 1986, p. 296). Melville’s reference to the ‘Beatitudes’ is 
indicative of his penchant for reinventing biblical themes and pre-empts his later 
exploration of the inherent conflict of interest that compromises the role of Chaplin 
aboard a vessel of war (Matt. 5:9).  
 
Two Paradigms of Knowledge 
Melville’s fiction suggests that there are aspects of humankind undefinable by rational 
thought, legal prescription or scientific method. In the late 19th century, such a 
proposal was an affront to the rationalist principles of science. Nonetheless, Melville is 
open to the possibility of a ‘spiritual’ dimension to life experienced within distinctly 
human environs. In Billy Budd, Melville contends that within the human soul reside 
contrary natures of knowledge: The ‘knowledge of the world’ – constructed upon 
foundations of law – and the ‘knowledge of humanity’. Melville elaborates on these two 
forms of knowledge:   
 
I am not certain whether to know the world and to know human nature be not 
two distinct branches of knowledge, which while they may coexist in the 
same heart, yet either may exist with little or nothing of the other. Nay, in an 
average man of the world, his constant rubbing with it blunts that fine 
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spiritual insight indispensable to the understanding of the essential in certain 
exceptional characters, whether evil ones or good (Melville 1986, p. 324).ii  
 
There are similarities between these opposing paradigms of knowledge and Blake’s 
contention that two divergent concepts of the Christian God vie within the human soul. 
Characterized by fear, law and consuming violence, the god Urizen has much in 
common with Melville’s presentation of the ‘knowledge of the world’. Likewise the 
‘knowledge of humanity’ reflects much of the wisdom Blake recognized to be intrinsic 
to a concept of God that acknowledged the creative potential of the tension between 
innocence and experience. Blake’s poetry showed that innocence was unavoidably 
diminished when exposed to experience in much the same way as Melville’s 
‘knowledge of humanity’ is proportionally eroded by ‘knowledge of the world’.iii 
However Budd is an exception to the rule, blessed with an ‘intelligence’ that remains 
uncorrupted by the legalism of the ‘knowledge of the world’. Given that Blake regarded 
innocence as awful and experience exciting but harmful, he looked to the possibility of 
a third contrary state. The ‘innocence of becoming’ that characterizes Melville’s 
presentation of Billy Budd reflects much of Blake’s concept of the third state. John 
Bishop’s discussion of Robert Solomon’s views on spirituality provides a contemporary 
perspective from which to consider Melville’s ‘knowledge of humanity’ and the 
manifestation of the ‘innocence of becoming’.  
 
John Bishop proposed that the antithesis between reason and passion could be 
overcome by a ‘naturalised spirituality’ characterized by a ‘thoughtful love of life’ 
(Bishop 2012, p. 352). Bishop identifies in Solomon’s philosophy an immanent or 
‘naturalized’ spirituality in which thought and passion are indistinguishable in one’s 
actions. Solomon reflected: ‘Spirituality means to me the grand and thoughtful 
passions of life, a life lived in accordance with those grand thoughts and passions’ 
(Solomon 2002, p. 6). Significantly Solomon identifies the importance of a ‘life lived’ 
according to these thoughtful passions, a spiritual life actuated through one’s 
willingness to accept responsibility for their passions an act with ‘devotion and 
enthusiasm in the face of uncertainty’ (Solomon 2002, p. 32). Bishop suggests that at 
the very heart of this ‘naturalized spirituality’ are passions that ‘may be equivalent to 
judgments’, expressed in the virtues of love, trust, reverence and gratitude (Bishop 
2012, p. 355). Courage and imagination are essential if one is to live in response to 
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this immanent spirituality, choosing as Solomon advocates to ‘see the world as 
beautiful or sublime instead of an industrial resource or a merely contingent set of 
facts’ (Solomon 2002, p. 36). The difficultly of this ‘faith-venture’ is recognized by 
Bishop who acknowledges that one’s ‘motivating belief must itself be sustained other 
than on an evidential basis’ (Bishop 2012, p. 381). Bishop contends that such an 
optimistic view of the world can only be sustained through a ‘faith-commitment’ that is 
commensurate with one’s ‘perseverance in moral endeavours’ (Bishop 2012, p. 385). 
 
The faith-commitment and moral resolution identified by Bishop as being intrinsic to a 
‘naturalized spirituality’ can be perceived in Melville’s contention that the biblical 
prophets primarily gained spiritual insight into the ‘knowledge of humanity’ through the 
discipline of contemplation rather than divine revelation.iv In Billy Budd this ‘knowledge 
of humanity’ is portrayed as having been lost to those who inhabited the land, its 
remaining vestiges lingering among the fraternity of sailors who he deems to be free 
from the deceits of the ‘knowledge of the world’. The ‘knowledge of humanity’ may be 
understood as an expression of what Melville terms ‘natural law’, a concept of morality 
that contests Christianity’s right to moral judgment. He argues that at no point did 
morality and religion come into contact, a point that Nietzsche, perhaps writes more 
bluntly in his assertion that Christianity proffered:  
 
Nothing but imaginary causes (‘God’, ‘soul’, ‘ego’, ‘spirit’, ‘free will’, - or 
‘unfree will’): nothing but imaginary effects imaginary effects (‘sin’, 
‘redemption’, ‘grace’, ‘punishment’, ‘forgiveness of sins’) (Nietzsche 1990, p. 
137).  
 
Nietzsche proposed that the question, “how are synthetic judgments a priori' 
possible?” be superseded with “why is belief in such judgments necessary?” 
(Nietzsche 1990, p. 42). In laying bear the imaginary ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ upon which 
Christian morality is constructed, Nietzsche challenged the legitimacy of such 
judgments. Melville’s portrayal of Budd as illiterate removes any possibility that his 
unique ‘intelligence’ is the product of language, the primary vehicle through which the 
‘imaginary’ value systems of Christianity are propagated. Although Budd’s illiteracy 
prevented him from partaking in the ‘questionable apple of knowledge’ he could 
nevertheless sing and ‘like the illiterate nightingale was sometimes the composer of 
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his own song’ (Melville 1986, p. 301). Melville’s depiction of Budd as the composer of 
his ‘own song’ is reminiscent of Blake’s portrayal of the Piper in Songs of Innocence.  
Uninhibited by the morality and value systems prescribed by the Father, Budd 
responds to life with a freedom akin to the ‘Piper’ spontaneously playing his pipe for 
joy. The narrator observes that the exceptional nature revealed in Budd’s positive 
response to life is not the product of culture.  
 
…certain virtues pristine and unadulterated peculiarly characterize anybody 
in the external uniform of civilization, they will upon scrutiny seem not to be 
derived from custom or convention (Melville 1986, p. 301).  
 
Such ‘pristine and unadulterated’ virtues speak of a concept of innocence that is not 
subject to the customs or conventions inherent to the ‘knowledge of the world’ and the 
laws upon which it is established. Melville presents the ‘knowledge of humanity’ as 
organic in nature, consisting of rhizomic connections and relationships between 
individuals, collective bodies and the environment and as such, resonates with 
Nietzsche’s invalidation of absolute values. Nietzsche proclaimed the need for the re-
evaluation of values, a perspective that would contribute significantly to his conceptual 
framework of the ‘innocence of becoming’. This concept heralds the capacity of each 
person to create their own values, representing that state of unknowing where one is 
free from any subordination to a goal, the expectations of others, or the will of a god. In 
The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche’s writes of an on-going process of resistance 
as one seeks to remain conscious of the provisional nature of truth and meaning is 
sought and fulfilled in every moment (Nietzsche 1993, p. 64).v Although there are 
similarities between Nietzsche’s ‘innocence of becoming’ and Melville’s ‘knowledge of 
humanity’, Billy Budd possesses a consciousness wholly devoid of vigilance against 
the deceptions of religion and power.  
 
Depravity of the Heart 
The story of Billy Budd is in its most elementary form an acknowledgment – or possibly 
even a warning – of the precarious nature of innocence. Melville illustrates that 
although Budd is ‘loved’ by his peers, the very virtues that kindle this response in 
others ‘does yet in a moral emergency not always sharpen the faculties or enlighten 
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the will’ (Melville 1986, p. 319). Lacking ‘experience and address and without any 
touch of defensive ugliness’, Budd is shown to be vulnerable to the designs of others 
who seek power at his expense (Melville 1986, p. 319). It is through the enmity of 
Claggart – the ‘Master of Arms’ aboard the warship – that Budd’s innocence is 
revealed to be fatally naïve. Melville’s fiction explores the motivations concealed in the 
‘heart’ and hence more often than not unconscious to the mind. In the character of 
Claggart Melville introduces the somewhat vague and intangible notion of ‘depravity’. 
A product of the passions of ‘envy’ and ‘antipathy’ Melville demonstrates that as 
‘depravity’ originates in the ‘heart’ rather than the intellect the bearer typically remains 
ignorant of its presence (Melville 1986, p. 327).vi While the manifestation of ‘depravity’ 
may bear many of the hallmarks of ‘evil’, Billy Budd reveals its roots to run deeper than 
the trespass of Christian mores or the violation of legal prohibitions’.vii Failure to 
discern the mephitic workings of ‘depravity’ is attributed to a legalistic mind-set 
ignorant of the ‘knowledge of humanity’. The guise of respectability that conceals 
Claggart’s darker motivation is the product of a self-authenticating rationalism 
constructed upon an exaggerated sense of self-righteousness. The narrator describes 
those who bear such ‘depravity’ as possessing a phenomenal pride which:  
 
…excludes them from anything mercenary or avaricious. In short the 
depravity here meant partakes nothing of the sordid or sensual. It is serious, 
but free from acerbity (Melville 1986, p. 325).  
 
Melville notes the incapability of the predominately rational, litigious Christian society 
to respond to the injury inflicted by such antipathy: ‘Not many are the examples of this 
depravity which the gallows and jail supply’ (Melville 1986, p. 325).viii Melville notes 
that as in the case of ‘envy’ the intellect dismisses the presence of ‘depravity’, and 
‘since its lodgement is in the heart not the brain, no degree of intellect supplies a 
guarantee against it’ (Melville 1986, p. 327). The indignation that is portrayed as 
consuming Claggart is shown to have ‘little to do with reason further than to employ it 
as an ambidexter implement for effecting the irrational’ (Melville 1986, p. 325).  
 
Melville identifies the danger posed by rationality employed to disguise the true 
aspirations of malicious intent. In Billy Budd the ‘depravity’ that is shown to have 
possessed Claggart is exposed as working towards the ‘accomplishment of an aim 
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which in wantonness of malignity would seem to partake of the insane’ (Melville 1986, 
p. 326). While appearing to be of ‘cool judgment sagacious and sound’, Claggart is 
revealed to be among the most dangerous of ‘true madmen’, principally because the 
manifestation of his ‘lunacy is not continuous but occasional, evoked by some special 
object’ (Melville 1986, p. 326). Melville demonstrates that the lie of respectability that 
conceals Claggart’s caustic motivation is not always discernible as the fixation of the 
‘depraved’ intellect is ‘never declared’ and from an ‘outward proceeding are always 
perfectly rational’ (Melville 1986, p. 326). The deceptive nature of the ‘depravity’ 
Melville portrays challenges Emmanuel Kant’s contention that the ‘lie’ could be 
measured, recognized, and categorized as such and hence subject to rational 
examination and the authority of legal jurisdiction (Kant 1993). In his essay ‘On a 
Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns’ (1799), Kant proposed that 
as the ‘lie’ necessarily did harm to humanity in general inasmuch as it ‘vitiates the 
source of right’, it must be ‘unconditionally banned’ lest ‘humanity’s social bond is 
ruined in its very principle’ (Kant 1993, p. 64). Kant’s contention that the ‘lie’ could be 
discerned through empiricism and rational thought was to be further undermined by 
Nietzsche who in rejecting the notion of absolute truth, argued that ‘reason is the 
cause of our falsification of the evidence of our senses’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 46).   
 
The particularly venomous ‘envy’ that is identified as having fashioned Claggart’s 
depraved intellect is described as no ‘vulgar form of the passion’ (Melville 1986, p. 
327). Drawing once more upon the Bible, Melville likens Claggart’s ‘envy’ to the ‘streak 
of apprehensive jealousy’ which ‘marred Saul’s visage perturbedly brooding on the 
comely young David’ (Melville 1986, p. 327), (1 Sam. 18:10-11). Melville’s analogy 
with the biblical story of the Israelite King Saul and his tumultuous relationship with the 
shepherd David provides a further insight into the origins of such envy. Alternating 
between murderous rage or overwhelming depression, Saul is portrayed as being 
conscious that the younger David was more courageous, capable and exceedingly 
popular among his subjects. Although throughout the story David is depicted as 
repeatedly confirming his faithfulness to the King through word and deed, Saul is 
shown to be intuitively aware that in time his throne would be lost to one eminently 
more equipped to rule and blessed by God. Melville writes of Claggart: 
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For what can more partake of the mysterious than an antipathy spontaneous 
and profound, such as is evoked in certain exceptional mortals by the mere 
aspect of some other mortal, however harmless he may be, if not called forth 
by this very harmlessness itself? (Melville 1986, p. 323).  
 
Claggart’s ‘depravity’ is revealed to be have taken root from a seed of acrimony 
harbored against one whom he ‘magnetically felt, had in its simplicity never willed 
malice or experienced the reactionary bite of that serpent’ (Melville 1986, p. 327). 
Perceiving that Budd had never sought to harm, judge or condemn another Claggart is 
consumed with envy and blinded by resentment. As one of the few ‘intellectually 
capable of adequately appreciating the moral phenomenon presented in Billy Budd’ 
Claggart’s comprehension merely serves to intensify his hatred rather than curb it 
(Melville 1986, p. 328). Of all the ‘various secret forms’ that envy assumes in Claggart 
it is the manifestation of ‘cynic disdain – disdain of innocence’ that evokes his greatest 
malice. Claggart’s comprehension of Budd’s indifference to the restless power 
struggles at play among the officers and crew drive him to despair: ‘To be nothing 
more than innocent!’ (Melville 1986, p. 328). Nietzsche warned of the danger of 
exposing the lies upon which others have rationalized their values and claims to truth: 
‘He who makes no secret of himself, excites anger in others: that is how much you 
should fear nakedness!’ (Nietzsche 1969, p. 83). The cynical disposition of the 
depraved mind is shown to conceive of ‘beauty’ and ‘love’ as suspect and a potentially 
threat. This suspicion is expressed in Claggart’s mediated voice: “Not for nothing does 
he insinuate himself into the good will of his shipmates, since at the least all hands will 
at a pinch say a good word for him at all hazards” (Melville 1986, p. 344).  
 
Exhibiting the distrust that is inherent in the Father’s response to the Orphan, Claggart 
assumes that Budd’s popularity amongst his peers is the product of subversive 
treachery. Incapable of comprehending a phenomenon only understood through 
consciousness of the ‘knowledge of humanity’, the Pharisaic nature of Claggart knows 
nothing of unreciprocated malice (Melville 1986, p. 328). In Moby Dick, Ishmael 
observes that authority hates the superior pride of ‘manhood’ expressed in an 
underling.  
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…when a person placed in command over his fellow-men finds one of them 
to be very significantly his superior in general pride of manhood, straightway 
against that man he conceives an unconquerable dislike and bitterness 
(Melville 1972, p. 349).  
 
Such bitterness manifests in Claggart’s jealousy of the ‘manhood’ revealed in Budd, a 
hatred that is inflamed by the innocence of one whose very presence acts as a mirror 
to Claggart’s own corruption. With his conscience serving as a ‘lawyer’, Claggart 
channels his ‘justified animosity into a sort of retributive righteousness’ (Melville 1986, 
p. 330). Melville exposes the self-deluding pity that often compensates for moral self-
deception through his biblical analogy of Claggart bearing a ‘look like the man of 
sorrows’ (Melville 1986, p. 338).ix Claggart’s nostalgic view of Budd masks what 
Nietzsche regarded to be the life denying and mortally dangerous sentimentality of 
pity. Nietzsche argued:  
 
Pity stands in antithesis to the tonic emotions, which enhance the energy of 
the feeling of life; it has a depressive effect… The loss of force which life has 
already sustained through suffering is increased and multiplied even further 
by pity… If one judges pity by the value of the reactions, which it usually 
brings about, its mortally dangerous character appears in a much clearer 
light (Nietzsche 1990, p. 130).  
 
The narrator suggests that in Claggart’s ‘melancholy expression’ one may perceive an 
air of predestination: ‘…a touch of soft yearning, as if Claggart could even have loved 
Billy but for fate and ban’ (Melville 1986, p. 338).x Claggart’s pity conveys a tone of 
resignation that arguers ominously for Budd, a fatalism that subsumes individual 
responsibility for the veracity of one’s attitude and actions. The ‘mania of an evil 
nature’ that motivates Claggart is ‘not engendered by vicious training or corrupting 
books or licentious living, but born with him … a depravity according to nature’ 
(Melville 1986, p. 326). To be born with such a malignant seed in one’s heart raises 
serious doubts as to the generosity of a deity that consigns one to the moral legacy of 
a scorpion.  
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With no power to annul the elemental evil in him, tho’ readily enough he 
could hide it; apprehending the good, but powerless to be it; a nature like 
Claggart’s surcharged with energy as such natures almost invariably are, 
what recourse is left to it but to recoil upon itself and like the scorpion for 
which the Creator alone is responsible, act out to the end the part allotted it 
(Melville 1986, p. 328). 
 
In the act of betraying Budd, Claggart is likened to an asylum-physician, his clinical 
demeanour detached from any semblance of empathy or emotion, his eyes ‘those 
lights of human intelligence losing human expression, gelidly protruding like the alien 
eyes of certain uncatalogued creatures of the deep’ (Melville 1986, p. 349).xi  
 
A century later in his existentialist novel The Outsider (1942), Albert Camus embarked 
upon a similar experiment to Melville in his portrayal of Meursault (Camus 1983). The 
Outsider has a simple plot whereby a young man living in Algiers, murders an Arab 
shortly after the funeral of his own mother, and subsequently is tried and sentenced to 
death not for his murderous actions, but rather because he did not mourn in a manner 
considered appropriate. Meursault is in a process of becoming a man and as-yet 
remains ‘pre-conscious’ in a world devoid of meaning beyond the sensory experience 
of a moment. Jean-Paul Sartre (1955) suggests that Meursault is portrayed as ‘one of 
those terrible innocents who shock society by not accepting the rules of the game’ 
(Sartre 1968, p. 28). Although he is aware of social norms of behaviour – how often 
one may use the telephone during work – Meursault is unable to associate an action 
with a particular value or meaning let alone appreciate the intention behind action 
(Camus 1983, 44). During the trial of Meursault for the murder of an Arab, his defence 
council declares, “Here we have the epitome of this trial. Everything is true and yet 
nothing is true!” (Camus 1983, p. 88). Camus creates this paradox to represent the 
impossibility of determining a position of ‘truth’ from which we can prove someone has 
lied. Furthermore, as Derrida notes, there remains the difference and 
misunderstanding that accompanies the ‘said, the saying and the meaning-to-say’ and 
recourse to statements of good faith, meaning and intention (Derrida 2001, p. 68). 
Considering the possible causes for misrepresentation of truth Derrida inquires ‘what 
is it a matter of here? Incompetence? Lack of Lucidity or analytical acuity? Good faith 
ignorance? Accidental error? Compulsion and logic of the unconscious? An outright 
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false witness, perjury, lie?’ (Derrida 2001, p. 83). Given that the reasons for the 
evidence of a lie inevitably ‘contaminate one another and no longer lend themselves to 
a rigorous delimitation’, it would appear impossible to categorically determine that one 
is lying.  
 
Derrida reasons that the misrepresentation of truth may not be a product of practice 
but rather the result of pure practical reason. He proposes that if the lie ‘addresses 
belief rather than knowledge’, it is possible that the lie is constructed upon a desire to 
produce a simplistic ‘truth effect’ that confirms a previously held belief (Derrida 2001, 
p. 86). Similarly, we may conclude that one lies to oneself to fulfil a given agenda or 
the demands of an ideology or belief (Derrida 2001, p. 60). This self-deception is not 
‘bad faith’ in the sense that Sartre gives it, but as Hannah Arendt suggests, may be 
symptomatic of the ‘unconscious promoting of the lie’ (Arendt 1961, p. 43). Throughout 
Billy Budd ‘landsmen’ are symbolic of the deception and avarice that characterizes 
those who lie in the pursuit of power and wealth. Having served in the military prior to 
taking to the seas, the internalized deceit of Claggart is characteristic of a ‘landsman’, 
employing moral treachery as a tool for social, economic and political gain. Seeking to 
illicit favour with his captain for the sake of self-promotion and eager to remove from 
his presence the vestige of a superior manhood, Claggart falsely accuses Budd of 
leading a plot to mutiny.  
 
Justice without Compassion: The Denial of Humanity 
As previously discussed Melville demonstrates that despite Budd’s exceptional 
humane virtues, naivety of the ‘knowledge of the world’ leaves him vulnerable in the 
face of moral treachery. Aghast at the perfidious allegations levelled against him by a 
superior Budd stutters uncontrollably. The speech impediment that inflicts Budd is 
symbolic of the susceptibility of innocence and the failure of rhetoric to respond 
adequately to the debilitating power of reason in the service of a lie. The narrator 
suggests that had Budd: 
 
…been conscious of having done or said anything to provoke the ill will of 
the official, it would have been different with him, and his sight might have 
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been purged if not sharpened. As it was, innocence was his blinder (Melville 
1986, p. 338). 
 
Confronted with Claggart’s treachery Budd engages in ever more ‘violent efforts at 
utterance’ producing a paralysis of the face ‘which was as a crucifixion to behold’ 
(Melville 1986, p. 350). Unable to employ language in defence against the malicious 
accusations levelled against him Budd impulsively strikes Claggart’s forehead: The 
domain of the intellect. Significantly, it is in the moment in which Budd awakens to the 
‘knowledge of the world’ that he responds with violence. Budd tries to make sense of 
his reaction: 
 
“Could I have used my tongue I would not have struck him. But he foully lied 
to my face and in presence of my Captain, and I had to say something, and I 
could only say it with a blow, God help me!” (Melville 1986, p. 357).  
 
In a horrifying instant Budd’s consciousness awakes to the deceits of the ‘lie of 
innocence’, employed by an envious heart to conceal its own corruption and desire for 
power. The subsequent death of Claggart denies Budd the opportunity to continue to 
compose his own song within a growing consciousness of the ‘knowledge of the 
world’.  
 
Billy Budd illustrates the vulnerability of innocence when exposed to justice dispensed 
without regard for compassion, empathy and the preservation of life. Accentuating the 
gravity of Budd’s plight following the death of Claggart, Melville provides a darkly ironic 
perspective on the ‘mystery’ of divine will. While convinced of the innocence of Budd’s 
intentions, Captain Vere nonetheless prophesizes, “Struck dead by an angel of God! 
Yet the angel must hang!” (Melville 1986, p. 352).xii From the outset, Captain Vere 
comprehends the tragic fate of Budd who being subject to martial law is destined to be 
condemned to death despite his innocent intentions. A military court convenes to judge 
Budd’s actions according to a singular relationship of cause and effect, a paradigm 
that Nietzsche argued was incapable of interpreting the complexity of human 
behaviour. Nietzsche’s views on cause and effect challenge the validity of a concept of 
innocence constructed upon legally defined notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Nietzsche 
extrapolates on this error: 
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Cause and effect: such a duality probably never exists; in truth we are 
confronted by a continuum out of which we isolate a couple of pieces, just as 
we perceive motion only as isolated points and then infer it without ever 
actually seeing it (Nietzsche 1974, p. 173). 
 
The inherent duality of cause and effect reflects a perception of life that is divisive and 
conditional, fostering a mind-set ignorant of the rhizomic continuum of the ‘innocence 
of becoming’. Nietzsche considers this fractured presentation of life as having 
contributed to a history in which humanity has ‘merely perfected the image of 
becoming without reaching’ (Nietzsche 1974, p. 172). In a context in which the 
deliberations of the military court are limited to the cause and effect of a singular 
action, the ostensible moral innocence of Budd is irrelevant.  
 
Captain Vere is portrayed as possessing an exceptional soul in which ‘knowledge of 
the world’ is held in creative tension with ‘knowledge of humanity’. While Vere 
reassures a mortified and penitent Budd, “I believe you, my man”, it is significant that 
the Captain’s voice expresses a ‘suppressed emotion not otherwise betrayed’ (Melville 
1986, p. 357). Throughout the proceeding trial the officers who preside over Budd’s 
fate become increasingly agitated, their physical unease testimony to their doubts 
concerning the justice of the court. Empathy for the suffering of another is 
characteristic of Melville’s concept of the ‘knowledge of humanity’ and is brought to the 
fore by Vere’s acknowledgement of the, “clash of military duty with moral scruple – 
scruple vitalized by compassion” (Melville 1986, p. 361). Wracked by silent 
convictions, the officers of the military court are ‘less convinced than agitated by the 
course of an argument troubling but the more the spontaneous conflict within’ (Melville 
1986, p. 362).  
 
The members of the military court experience a whole of body reaction that betrays the 
veracity of rationalized ‘justice’. Although social and cultural factors contrive to militate 
against doubt, those mandated to determine Budd’s fate are nonetheless afflicted with 
the guilt of men who act in ‘bad faith’ to their consciences. 
 
  Chapter 4: Billy Budd 
Gilles Deleuze’s notion of ‘superior irony’ is helpful to reflect upon Melville’s depiction 
of Billy Budd’s trial in that it removes the elitist or superior position from which 
traditional irony has looked down upon an event or situation, implying a common 
understanding or awareness. Although on the surface the emotional travails of the 
court do not convey a sense of humour there is nonetheless an element of incredulity 
in the irony of an ‘innocent’ man being court-martialled for the unintentional murder of 
a devious pathological liar intent upon destroying such innocence. Deleuze’s view that 
the body’s response to humour is a sign that transcends the limitations of language to 
open up a ‘joyous multiplicity of incommensurable perceptions’ (Deleuze 1994, p. 
182), provides a perspective from which to consider Melville’s portrayal of the 
presiding officers’ unease. Just as laughter reflects an awareness of the contradictions 
of the ‘lie’ that transcends language and is revealed in the immanent – often 
autonomous – response of the body, the physical discomfort experienced by the 
officers unintentionally betrays the absurdly inadequate value judgements, error and 
determinate meaning that govern the fate of the accused.  
 
Padmasiri de Silva’s discusses the significance of the body as an adjudicator of one’s 
own truth and how emotions form a ‘bridge between the physical and the mental’ (De 
Silva, 1995, p. 233). While noting cultural and social influences upon the experience of 
emotions, de Silva suggests that emotions emerge as a ‘joint product or perceptions, 
feelings, desires, beliefs, appraisals, and physiological arousal’ (De Silva, 1995, pp. 
109-120).xiii He concludes that as emotions are the physical manifestation of 
psychosomatic communication between the body and the brain, the body may be 
likened to ‘second brain’ (De Silva, 1995, p. 232). Melville’s illustration of the 
significance of the body’s testimony in ethical deliberation resonates with Robert 
Solomon’s writings on the importance of ‘bodily feelings (not just sensations) in 
emotion’ (Solomon, 2004, p. 85). Solomon argued that we actively cultivate and 
construct our emotions and rather than being ‘merely passive victims’, we are 
responsible for them and our subsequent behaviour (Solomon 2007, p. 3).  
 
Nietzsche’s observations regarding humanity’s historical averseness to taking 
individuality responsibility for freedom of thought helps to illuminate the moral struggle 
experienced by the members of the military court. Nietzsche writes of this reticence: 
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During the longest period of the human past nothing was more terrible than 
to feel that one stood by oneself. To be alone, to experience things by 
oneself, neither to obey nor to rule, to be an individual – that was not a 
pleasure but a punishment; one was sentenced to ‘individuality’. Freedom of 
thought was considered discomfort in itself (Nietzsche 1974, p. 175).   
 
Obligated to uphold the letter of the law the officers of the court are denied recourse to 
compassion or the freedom to respond with authenticity to the ‘intuition’ of their bodies. 
Captain Vere is shown to be torn between what Melville terms ‘primeval’ compassion 
for an ‘innocent’ and his duty to satisfy the demands of the law he is commissioned to 
uphold. The Captain is haunted by a conscience beset by the ‘knowledge of humanity’ 
and despite his resolve to subjugate his emotions they remain as ‘strong as the wind 
and the sea’ (Melville 1986, p. 360).  
 
Melville’s discussion of motive explores issues of provocation and power, highlighting 
the inadequacy of any concept of justice that failed to acknowledge let alone 
comprehend the ‘knowledge of humanity’. During Budd’s trial, the ‘Officer of the 
Marines’ questions the accused:  
 
“You tell us that what the Master-at-arms said against you was a lie. Now 
why should he have so lied, so maliciously lied, since you declare there was 
no malice between you?” (Melville 1986, p. 358).  
 
The officer’s question looks for a motive that cannot be unveiled by rational 
discernment or identified according to anecdotal evidence. The tone of the question 
suggests an element of bemusement that is reflective of a moral quandary rather than 
an accusative interrogation. Melville confronts the ‘Officer of the Marines’ with the 
moral dilemma of judging Budd’s innocence or guilt according to a particular action, 
irrespective of provocation and the complex and often ambiguous realm of human 
motive. Although identified as being able to discern the ‘depravity’ from which 
Claggart’s malice emanated, Captain Vere nonetheless dismisses the significance of 
motive. 
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“Quite aside from any conceivable motive actuating the Master-at-arms, and 
irrespective of the provocation to the blow, a martial court must needs in the 
present case confine its attention to the blow's consequence” (Melville 1986, 
p. 358).  
 
As the legal parameters of the military court are restricted to a singular relationship of 
cause and effect, Captain Vere is duty bound to advise his fellow officers that it was 
with the “prisoner’s deed – with that alone we have to do” (Melville 1986, p. 359). 
While acknowledging that the case raised a “mystery of iniquity”, Vere regards such 
mystery to be a “matter for psychological theologians to discuss” (Melville 1986, p. 
359). Moved by what he perceived to be an inexorable miscarriage of ‘natural law’ 
soon to befall an ‘innocent’ man, the Officer of Marines implores that Budd, “surely 
purposed neither mutiny nor homicide” (Melville 1986, p. 363). As intent is irrelevant 
under the constraints of martial law the accused is judged according to his actions 
alone. Captain Vere makes this apparent in his final summation to the court: “War 
looks but to the frontage, the appearance. And the Mutiny Act, War’s child, takes after 
the father. Budd’s intent or non-intent is nothing to the purpose” (Melville 1986, p. 
363).  
 
Innocent yet Legally Guilty 
In Billy Budd, the call of duty to King and Country overrides all other values, relegating 
the notion of ‘natural’ justice to a matter of insignificance. The distinction Melville 
makes between ‘feminine’ matters of the ‘heart’ and the cool ‘head’ of the ‘law’ is 
reflective of his distinction between ‘knowledge of humanity’ and the masculine 
‘knowledge of the world’.xiv Despite conceding that Budd is worthy of compassion Vere 
consigns the ‘feminine’ nature of such empathy to a matter of the ‘heart’. Given that 
Captain Vere is “mindful of paramount obligations”, he strives “against scruples that 
may tend to enervate decision” (Melville 1986, p. 361). Vere sums up the predicament 
of all who serve under the strictures of military law: 
 
“But in natural justice is nothing but the prisoner's overt act to be 
considered? How can we adjudge to summary and shameful death a fellow-
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creature innocent before God, and whom we feel to be so?” (Melville 1986, 
p. 361).  
 
The fate of Billy Budd is sealed by the Captain’s unequivocal assertion that he and his 
fellow officers having received their commissions had henceforth “in the most 
important regards ceased to be natural free-agents” (Melville 1986, p. 362). Having 
sacrificed the freedom to act according to their convictions of ‘natural justice’, the 
officers are powerless to advocate on behalf of the ‘innocent’. Captain Vere 
acknowledges as much when he counsels the court not to let “warm hearts betray 
heads that should be cool” as they fulfil their “avowed responsibility” to ensure that 
military law is upheld “however pitilessly that law may operate” (Melville 1986, p. 362).  
 
As agents sworn to uphold the sovereignty of the King of England the justice of 
Captain Vere’s court and the ‘masculine’ law upon which it is constructed is portrayed 
as beyond reproach. This obligatory diffidence to patriarchal law can be identified in 
the Puritan conception of a ultra-transcendent God. In his essay The Protestant Work 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber contends that Puritan Christianity was 
interested ‘solely in God, not in man; God does not exist for men, but men for the sake 
of God’ (Weber 2002, p. 58). Chapter V of the Westminster Confession states: ‘…to 
apply earthly standards of justice to His sovereign decrees is meaningless and an 
insult to His Majesty’ (cited in Weber 2002, p. 59). The Puritan notion of an ultra-
transcendent God denies humanity the moral right to question the ethical merits of a 
particular action done in the name of the divine. Weber identified a profound absence 
of empathy in this image of God, one that holds a ‘fundamental antagonism to 
sensuous culture of all kinds’ (Weber, 2002, p. 60). Puritan Christianity asserted that 
the sensual had no place in the scheme of salvation and recognition of the body as a 
legitimate source of wisdom or arbiter of truth condemned as idolatry.  
 
The disregard for intuition and the denial of the body as a credible source of moral 
discernment are fundamental tenets of patriarchal law. Friedrich Nietzsche was 
vehement in his criticism of the Christian attitude to the body, accusing the Church of 
being responsible for the ‘castration’ of life. 
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The Church combats the passions with excision in every sense of the word: 
its practice, its ‘cure’ is castration. It never asks: “How can one spiritualize, 
beautify, deify a desire?”… to attack the passions at their roots means to 
attack life at its roots; the practice of the Church is hostile to life’ (Nietzsche 
1990, p. 52).  
 
Just as Nietzsche laid bare Christianity’s hostile condemnation of the body and 
subjugation of desire, Melville reveals the inhumanity of a concept of justice 
impervious to empathy or compassion.xv While representing the vulnerability of 
innocence exposed to such inhuman ‘justice’, Melville’s concerns go beyond the 
intransigence of law. Billy Budd powerfully illustrates that the laws of the patriarchal 
Father are endorsed and sustained by an entrenched culture of cultivated ignorance. 
Captain Vere acknowledges that even if the marital court had the discretionary power 
to grant clemency to Budd, fear of how the crew would interpret such leniency 
prevents even the possibility of entertaining the thought of mercy. The Captain 
ventures that the crew: ‘long moulded by arbitrary discipline have not that kind of 
intelligent responsiveness that might qualify them to comprehend and discriminate’ 
(Melville 1986, p. 363). Jacques Derrida recognized that the desire to speak the ‘truth’ 
is beset with an assortment of interpretive factors that suggest ‘the imperative is not as 
sacred and unconditional as Kant wished’ (Derrida 2001, p. 80).xvi Nietzsche identified 
humanity’s penchant for wilful ignorance as having had a profound impact upon its 
capacity to comprehend the legitimacy of its own moral choice.  
 
Free Will was very closely associated with a bad conscience; and the more 
unfree one’s actions were and the more the herd instinct rather any personal 
sense found expression in an action, the more moral one felt (Nietzsche 
1974, p. 175). 
 
Melville demonstrates that the power of martial law emanates from the conscience of 
the herd, legitimized by a common mind-set that inevitably reinforces the will of the 
Father and creates ‘Son’s’ in its image. Moulded by a culture of cultivated ignorance 
and ‘arbitrary discipline’, the crew is unable to comprehend the justice of a lesser 
sentence than death. The execution of the morally innocent Budd is imperative in 
order to maintain discipline and the authority of the Father. 
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The Sacrifice of Innocence  
In Billy Budd Melville reveals the incongruous dynamics of power relations. Although 
mutually subject to the oppressive dictates of martial law, there is not even the 
pretence of solidarity or camaraderie among the officers and crew – an absence in 
stark contrast to the ritualistic bonding of Ahab and his fellow ‘warriors’ in Moby Dick. 
There is no suggestion in Billy Budd that the crew’s compliance to the status-quo is 
due to fear of retribution or resignation to a collective melancholia. Such acquiescence 
to the will of the Father suggests the presence of a debilitating guilt I argue as being 
ingrained in human consciousness: The knowledge of one’s complicity in the ‘lie of 
innocence’.  
 
Although one is not privy to the conversation in which Captain Vere informs Budd of 
his fate, Melville alludes to the extraordinary nature of their meeting as the two ‘melt 
back into what remains primeval in our formalized humanity’ (Melville 1986, p. 367). 
Melville suggests that through the radical ‘sharing in the rarer qualities of our nature – 
so rare indeed as to be all but incredible to average minds however much cultivated’ 
judge and condemned form a profound understanding (Melville 1986, p. 367). Melville 
likens the relationship between Captain Vere and Billy Budd to the biblical story of 
Abraham and his son Isaac, portrayed as a compliant sacrifice to the will of the Father 
(Gen 22:16-18), and an exemplar of Jesus sacrifice ‘in obedience to the exacting 
behest’ of his father’s will (Melville 1986, p. 367).xvii It is this demand for sacrifice that 
Nietzsche vehemently denounces in his repudiation of Christianity and rejection of the 
belief that suffering through punishment brings regeneration: ‘punishment is what 
revenge calls itself – it feigns a good conscience for itself with a lie!’ (Nietzsche 1969, 
p. 115). Budd’s sacrifice to appease the demands of military ‘justice’ illustrates what 
Nietzsche argued to be the very foundation and function of Christianity.  
 
The Christian faith is from the beginning sacrifice: sacrifice of all freedom, all 
pride, all self-confidence of spirit, at the same time enslavement and self-
mockery, self-mutilation (Nietzsche 1990, p. 75). 
 
The description of the ship’s chaplain as the ‘minister of Christ’ who nevertheless 
received his stipend from ‘Mars’ – the Roman God of War – testifies to the duplicity of 
  Chapter 4: Billy Budd 
Christianity employed in the service of institutional power. Illustrating the hypocrisy of 
this relationship between violence, power and Christianity, Melville makes explicit the 
enslavement to which Nietzsche refers: ‘Bluntly put, a chaplain is the minister of the 
Prince of Peace serving in the host of the God of War – Mars’ (Melville 1986, p. 374). 
The chaplain’s futile attempts to impress upon the ‘barbarous’ Budd a macabre fear of 
death and impending horror of Hell – lest he turn to the ‘Saviour’ – reflects the 
diminishing power the threat of eternal damnation held during the emergence of 
secularization (Melville 1986, p. 373). Informed of the events that had befallen Budd 
the chaplain ‘felt that innocence was even a better thing than religion wherewith to go 
to Judgment’ (Melville 1986, p. 373). Nietzsche challenged those with the strength of 
spirit to fathom the alienation and weight of responsibility one endures when they 
perceive that there is ‘no rewarder and recompenser, no final corrector – no longer any 
reason in what happens’ (Nietzsche 1977, 236). Possessing a ‘peace’ that Melville 
suggests is born from the joy of life, Budd retains a freedom that is ‘wholly without 
irrational fear’ of death or punishment (Melville 1986, p. 372). The chaplain is taken by 
a:  
 
…peradventure feeling that even he the minister of Christ, tho’ receiving his 
stipend from Mars, had no consolation to proffer which could result in a 
peace transcending that which he beheld (Melville 1986, p. 372).xviii  
 
In the final moments leading up to his imminent execution,  Budd sleeps deeply like a 
child, his face diffused with a ‘serene happy light born of some wandering 
reminiscence or dream’ (Melville 1986 p.371). The inconceivable peace with which 
Budd goes to his death is reminiscent of Camus’ Meursault in The Outsider, who – 
having furiously rejected the theological solicitations of the Priest – recognizes he had 
always been happy. However, whereas Meursault’s happiness is be the product of his 
final revolt against those who seek to manacle life in God’s name, Budd’s peace 
reflects a life lived in profound gratitude.xix This gratitude for life itself can be seen to 
infuse Melville’s presentation of innocence throughout his fiction and whether it be 
Queequeg or Billy Budd, comes to define the Orphan’s response to life amidst tragedy. 
Melville does not suggest to what or whom one should direct this gratitude for life, nor 
does he portray such gratitude as merely the expression of some detached cognitive 
principle or learnt mantra. Rather the “thanks” with which Melville’s Orphans respond 
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to life is primarily a bodily experience set in the immanent world of human 
relationships, sublime beauty and awe at the indifference of nature. Robert Solomon 
emphasizes the importance of gratitude for life regardless of the tragedies that may 
befall us. 
 
Gratitude, I want to suggest, is not only the best answer to the tragedies of 
life. It is the best approach to life itself… The proper recognition of tragedy 
and the tragic sense of life is not shaking one’s fist at the gods or the 
universe in scorn or defiance but rather, going down on one’s knees and 
giving thanks… It is the importance and the significance of being thankful, to 
whomever or whatever, for life itself (Solomon 2002, p. 105). 
 
In an act symbolic of the moment when Judas betrayed the Christ, the chaplain kisses 
the condemned on his ‘fair cheek’ and ‘reluctantly withdrew’ in the knowledge that one 
such as Budd ‘could never convert to a dogma’ (Melville 1986, p. 373).xx Yet despite 
his conviction of the ‘essential innocence’ of Budd, the chaplain lifts ‘not a finger to 
avert the doom of such a martyr to martial discipline’ (Melville 1986, p. 373).  
 
Having argued that the idea of a ‘true world’ was built upon error and vilifying 
Christianity as not only an antithesis to human desire but a bulwark to the creation of a 
morality for life, Nietzsche’s summation of the role of the priest is an apt depiction of 
the function of Melville’s ‘Chaplin’.  
 
…so long as the priest, that denier, calumniator and poisoner of life by 
profession, still counts as a higher kind of human being, there can be no 
answer to the question: what is truth? One has already stood truth on its 
head when the conscious advocate of denial and nothingness counts as the 
representative of truth (Nietzsche 1990, p. 132). 
 
Although the Chaplin is convinced of Budd’s moral innocence, any attempt to 
intervene on behalf of the condemned would be tantamount to acknowledging a notion 
of justice other than that prescribed by the law of the Church and Crown. Thus through 
his failure to plead for clemency on behalf of Budd, the Chaplin assumes the mantle of 
an ‘advocate’ for the denial of ‘truth’ and in doing so, abandons Budd to be subsumed 
  Chapter 4: Billy Budd 
by the ‘nothingness’ ascribed to all who possess such innocence. Melville presents the 
sacrifice of the innocent as being synonymous with Christianity, exemplified by the 
office of the Chaplin, which ‘lends the sanction of the religion of the meek to that which 
practically is the abrogation of everything but brute Force’ (Melville 1986, p. 374). 
Nietzsche’s explication of the relationship between power and religion reflects the 
dualistic nature of the Chaplin’s duty to God and King. Nietzsche regarded religion as: 
 
…one more means of overcoming resistance so as to be able to rule: as a 
bond that unites together ruler and ruled and betrays and hands over to the 
former the consciences of the latter, all that is hidden and most intimate in 
them which would like to exclude itself from obedience (Nietzsche 1990, p. 
86). 
 
Despite the fact that Budd is executed by hanging he remains uncommonly still 
prompting the ship’s Purser to comment that the “absence of spasmodic movement 
was phenomenal” (Melville 1986, p. 377). Melville creates the unique circumstances 
that accompany Budd’s death to subvert the scientific and medical thought of the day. 
The Surgeon summarily dismisses explanations for the stillness of Budd’s final 
moments that canvas imaginative or metaphysical concepts. 
 
“Euthanasia, Mr. Purser, is something like your will-power: I doubt its 
authenticity as a scientific term – begging your pardon again. It is at once 
imaginative and metaphysical – in short, Greek” (Melville 1986, p. 377).  
 
Melville juxtaposes the Surgeon’s rejection of all that does not conform to rational or 
clinical diagnosis with biblical imagery imbued with symbolism from nature.  
 
…the vapory fleece hanging low in the East, was shot thro’ with a soft glory 
as of the fleece of the Lamb of God seen in mystical vision… Billy ascended; 
and ascending, took the full rose of the dawn (Melville 1986, p. 376). 
 
At the moment of Budd’s death a cloud is transfigured by the breaking dawn. 
Appearing like a ‘fleece’ this vision summons the biblical image of Jesus as the ‘Lamb 
of God’ sacrificed to martial Roman Law and recounts the ‘fleece’ laid by the Israelite 
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Gideon in an act of prayer for the deliverance of his people (Jud. 6:36-37). Melville 
draws on the story of the Israelite Prophet Elijah ascending to heaven upon a chariot 
of fire (2 Kings 2:11-13) as he depicts Billy as having ‘ascended’ with the dawn. As the 
prophet’s mantle falls upon Elisha – symbolic of wisdom bequeathed to his protégé 
Elijah – so Budd’s death ushers in the ‘meek light’ of a new morn and the renewed 
possibility of ‘becoming’ (Melville 1986, p. 374).xxi 
  
The seeds of discontent between the laws and its transgressors are evident in the 
biblical stories that feature prominently in the story of Billy Budd, providing Melville with 
a literary resource from which to challenge the Protestant concept of innocence that 
actually asks of the faithful to be what they are. Read retrospectively, one sees the 
seeds of modern protagonists who in defining their way differently from the Father’s 
way pre-empt the narratives of modernist texts. Melville presents the idea of innocence 
as quintessentially human, a quality neither childlike or naïve, religious nor legal. It is 
an allusive quality that Melville reveals predominately through the responses and 
observations of those who journey with Budd, rather than through description of the 
character himself. Perhaps Melville’s reflections upon love come closest to 
encapsulating this concept of innocence: Love for life as an expression of humanity 
fully alive. Although Melville’s fiction alludes to the possibility of an ‘innocence of 
becoming’ – symbolized by my notion of the ‘Orphan’ – (my notion of the Orphan is 
someone who has dispensed with Father and in calling himself an Orphan is a ‘militant 
of truth’) there is more than a suggestion in Billy Budd that such innocence cannot 
ultimately survive. While secularism ushered in tremendous political and social 
change, it is telling that Budd must inevitably die: The idea of the Orphan remained a 
political and religious anathema in Melville’s 19th century world. Nietzsche’s contention 
that that humanity had deluded itself with an ‘image’ of ‘becoming’ – an error that failed 
to comprehend ‘beyond the image or behind it’ – is a pertinent elucidation of the 
challenge Melville faced (Nietzsche 1974, p. 172). As the memory of the Christian 
monopoly on truth waned in the secular age, the Protestant Work Ethic gave way to a 
new morality: It would be through humanism that the claims of capitalism would now 
be justified. It will be argued that the humanist revolution that found prominence in 
modernism, served to replace one master with another, the concept of innocence 
reinvented by the state, the collective and the individual according to their particular 
designs of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.   
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i Christianity has on the whole interpreted the ‘Serpent’ in Genesis Chapter 3 as the incarnation of 
Satan, while the ‘Dove’ has been held to be the representation of the ‘Holy Spirit’ descending upon 
Jesus when Baptized by John (Matt. 10:16, Mark 1:10, Luke 3:22, John 1:32). 
 
 ii The narrator cites an example of how one versed in the ‘knowledge of the world’ may yet prove to be 
ignorant concerning matters of the ‘heart’ due to their neglect of the ‘knowledge of humanity’: ‘In a 
matter of some importance I have seen a girl wind an old lawyer about her little finger. Nor was it the 
dotage of senile love. Nothing of the sort. But he knew law better than he knew the girl's heart’ (Melville 
1986, p. 324). 
 
iii Throughout Billy Budd, Melville illustrates that humanity’s preoccupation with the ‘knowledge of the 
world’ has come at the expense of the ‘knowledge of humanity’ and the environment. 
  
iv Melville observes that a characteristic of the Hebrew prophets who ‘shed so much light into obscure 
spiritual places’ was that they were ‘mostly recluses’ (Melville 1986, p. 325). 
 
v Joan Stambaugh contends: ‘Everything literally is in a process of becoming; there is no reality beyond 
or outside the world of becoming about which one must feel guilt’ (Stambaugh cited in McCulloch & 
Goodrich 2002: 4). 
 
vi Melville explains that within the depraved heart two apparently irreconcilable passions may co-exist: 
‘Now envy and antipathy, passions irreconcilable in reason, nevertheless in fact may spring conjoined 
like Chang and Eng in one birth’ (Melville 1986, p. 327). 
 
vii Melville attributes the following definition of ‘depravity’ to Plato: ‘Natural Depravity: a depravity 
according to nature’ (Melville 1986, p. 324). Noting that the manifestation of such depravity may on 
occasion appear to legitimize Calvinist moral teaching, Melville contends that it by no means reflects 
Calvin’s claim that all of humanity is corrupted by sin (Melville 1986, p. 325). 
 
viii Melville observes that to confess to being envious is ‘universally felt’ to be ‘more shameful than 
admitting to felonious crime’ (Melville 1986, p. 327). 
 
ix Melville makes reference to the book of Isaiah in which the prophet writes of one who is ‘despised and 
rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief’ (Isa. 53:3, KJV). This passage has 
traditionally been interpreted by Christianity as a prophecy of the future sufferings of the Christ.  
 
x Melville reinterprets the biblical story of the Hebrew patriarch Jacob deceived by his sons after their 
betrayal of Joseph. Such deception is likened to Claggart’s treacherous renunciation of Budd before 
Captain Vere: ‘a look such as might have been that of the spokesman of the envious children of Jacob 
deceptively imposing upon the troubled patriarch the blood-dyed coat of young Joseph’ (Melville 1986, 
p. 346). 
 
xi There are similarities between Faulkner’s description of the Dietician’s ‘bland and innocent eyes’ as 
she betrays JC in Light in August (Faulkner 2005, p. 102), and Melville’s description of Claggart 
deliberately advancing ‘within short range of Billy, and mesmerically looking him in the eye, briefly 
recapitulated the accusation’ (Melville 1986, p. 349).   
 
xii Once more Melville draws on the Bible primarily as a resource to evoke the memory of Christian belief 
that endured in an increasingly secular age: ‘Suddenly, catching the Surgeon’s arm convulsively, he 
(Captain Vere) exclaimed, pointing down to the body – “It is the divine judgment on Ananias! Look!”’ 
(Melville 1986, p. 351).  
 
xiii De Silva highlights the significance of Candace Pert’s research into the endocrine system (Pert 1997) 
and in particular her findings regarding the function of the brain in the emergence of emotion. Pert 
demonstrated that rather than being limited to the endocrine system, the endorphins released by the 
brain during the advent of emotion could be located throughout the body. These cellular signals 
  Chapter 4: Billy Budd 
                                                                                                                                          
transform knowledge into physical reality. Pert concluded that the ‘emotions are the nexus between 
matter and mind, going back and forth between the two and influencing the two’ (Pert 1997, p. 71). 
 
xiv Captain Vere is implicit in his rejection of matters of the ‘heart’, which he regards as ‘feminine’ in 
nature and hence immaterial to the ‘masculine’ domain of law: “Well the heart here denotes the feminine 
in man is as that piteous woman, and hard tho’ it be, she must here be ruled out” (Melville 1986, p. 362). 
  
xv This religious worldview is represented in a modernist context through Graham Greene’s portrayal of 
the trauma and suffering endured by the ‘Whisky Priest’ in The Power and the Glory.  
  
xvi Derrida contends that when considering the veracity of a claim to ‘truth’ one needs to take into 
account ‘hypothetical imperatives, pragmatic opportunity, the moment, the forms of the statement, 
rhetoric, the addressee, and so forth’ (Derrida 2001, 80). 
 
xvii Here Melville alludes to Jesus praying in the Garden of Gethsemane prior to his crucifixion (Luke 
22.42). 
  
xviii Elaborating on his concept of the ‘higher man’, Nietzsche describes the impact of ‘Difference 
engender haine’ upon the herd mentality. Nietzsche states: ‘whenever some sacred vessel, some 
precious object from a closed shrine, some book with the marks of great destiny is carried by’ there is 
‘an involuntary falling silent, a hesitation of the eye, a cessation of all gestures, which reveal that a soul 
feels the proximity of something most worthy of respect’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 202). The chaplain exhibits 
this comprehension in the presence of Budd.  McCulloch suggests that Nietzsche ‘believed that there 
were some human beings that were distinct from the rest of mankind. They represented an image of 
true humanity (McCulloch 1983, p. 18). 
 
xix In his Myth of Sisyphus, Camus argued that given the surety of our mortal fate – or ‘mortal condition’ 
– only shaking our fist at the gods in scornful defiance gives meaning to life. Solomon notes that 
considering Camus’ philosophy is ‘throughout a kind of celebration of life, one cannot help but notice 
that it is always also a fascination with death…’ (Solomon 2002, p. 117). For further discussion of 
Solomon’s views on gratitude and his response to Camus’ idea of rebellion see (Weidler 2012, pp. 301-
303). 
 
xx The Priest’s kiss is symbolic of Judas’ betrayal of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane (Matt. 26:49). 
  
xxi The narrator describes the moments after Budd’s death: ‘But, like the prophet in the chariot 
disappearing in heaven and dropping his mantle to Elisha, the withdrawing night transferred its pale 
robe to the breaking day. A meek shy light appeared in the East, where stretched a diaphanous fleece 
of white furrowed vapour’ (Melville 1986, p. 374). 
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Chapter 5 - Light in August: Secular 
Reinventions of the Lie of Innocence 
 
William Faulkner’s modernist novel Light in August is a test case for identifying the 
ways in which American fiction embodies in its characters the inheritance of prescribed 
values within a secular environment when there are no longer the promises of 
redemption. This chapter will identify what are referred to in this thesis as Orphans and 
it will be argued that their emergence exposes enduring Protestant notions of 
‘innocence’ as a lie, functioning in the service of the patriarchal Father. Light in August 
is of significance to this study as the main character Joe Christmas is presented as an 
allegorical representation of Christ. Set in the fictional Yoknapatawpha County in the 
deep south of the United States during the depression years of the early 1930’s, Light 
in August brings to the fore abuses of power that manifest in the social ills of poverty, 
prejudice, and violence. The Modernist world in which Faulkner’s society is placed is 
shown to be emerging from a traditional to a non-traditional society.i It is evident that 
despite secularization the emergent society is unable to shed the manacles of its 
religious inheritance that legitimize abuses of power. The religious inheritance 
represented by Faulkner in Light in August is primarily Calvinist. In particular the 
theory of the elect features prominently expressed in characters that, due to their 
conviction of moral ‘innocence’ before God, lay claim to the right to exercise violence 
in accordance with misogynist views, the pursuit of wealth and the enforcement of 
racial purity. This assurance of Divine ‘election’ is shown to be dependent upon 
unqualified faith in the righteousness of one’s actions. Subsequently the expression of 
doubt and compassion is disallowed as it is would be perceived as proof that one was 
not elected.   
 
Light in August illustrates how the inherited values and rationalisations of Protestant 
Christianity sustained the festering wounds of hatred, inequality, racism and the 
collective shame of defeat in the South. This chapter will analyse how, in Faulkner’s 
novel the concept of innocence had come to be employed by the patriarchal Father to 
sustain necessary lies. Faulkner’s fiction illuminates the function of the ‘lie of 
innocence’ as a means of both legitimizing and concealing social, cultural and political 
constructions of power amidst the emergence of the State as the primary moral 
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stakeholder in the wake of secularization. The abuses of power that Faulkner exposes 
are shown to be masked by patterns of behaviour that serve to perpetuate prejudice 
constructed upon Calvinist Christian doctrine. Faulkner demonstrates that although 
society, on the whole, no longer held to the religious faith that had once legitimized 
them, the legacy of the Calvinist tradition continued to impact upon Southern value 
systems. Bringing to the foreground powerful cultural and psychological currents in 
America’s south, Faulkner identifies the troubled motivations and actions that are 
obscured or minimized by language embedded in righteous rhetoric or patriotic idiom. 
The interplay between wealth/poverty, ethnicity, and sexuality in a society in the 
process of being modernized, suggests that any concept of innocence emerging 
during this time will reflect this shifting paradigm. It is important to evaluate critical 
responses to this novel that observe as Cleanth Brooks does that Faulkner’s 
‘…characters come out of a Christian environment and represent, whatever their 
shortcomings and whatever their theological heresies Christian concerns’ (Brooks 
1973, p. 117).  
 
Admittedly, redemption and forgiveness emerge as central themes in much of 
Faulkner’s work however; it is within the dynamics of interpersonal relationships that 
his fiction illustrates the political social and religious dynamics of the South. Although 
these conventions and values wear a Christian facade, it will be demonstrated that 
they are in fact modes of behaviour that serve an economic and political end rather 
than a religious one.  
 
Faulkner’s Light in August is set amidst a backdrop of economic hardship wrought by 
the Great Depression upon the already impoverished South, still struggling to come to 
terms with the challenges associated with reconstruction sixty years after the trauma 
of Civil War. Faulkner’s fiction portrays the plight of the displaced and the 
disenchanted among Southern societies oppressed by doubt and anxiety for an 
uncertain future. This period of transition provides Faulkner with a unique opportunity 
to explore enduring social and religious norms in the South and the impact of these 
ingrained beliefs upon the most vulnerable in society; in particular women, children, 
the poor and those of African descent. Dysfunctional families feature prominently in 
many of Faulkner’s fictional works portraying a microcosm of larger social issues and 
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conflicts he sought to address.ii  However, Light in August is an exception, for unlike 
Faulkner’s novels Absolom, Absolom! (1936), or The Sound and the Fury (1929) – that 
together comprise the ‘Yoknapatawpha County’ trilogy – it does not focus upon a 
central family relationship; family ties are distant and obscure with the nominal 
exception of Doc Hines and his grandson Joe Christmas.iii In projecting the focus of 
the novel beyond the family unit Faulkner brings to the foreground an assemblage of 
dislocated and alienated characters. It is through these characters that Faulkner is 
able to illustrate the interconnectedness, breadth and complexity of the religious and 
social heritage that permeated all political and racial strata in the South. It is this that 
encourages a careful analysis of his representation of characters; this study takes this 
approach as Faulkner used character and their inter-relations with others in their social 
group as a means of investigating a society that although secular was one imbued with 
religious sanctions that no longer, at least for some of the protagonists, offered eternal 
redemption. 
 
Although each of the characters in Light in August serves as allegorical presentations 
of the social and religious ills Faulkner sought to address, he nevertheless avoids 
casting stereotypes and hence perpetuating the prejudice inherent in such treatments. 
Lisa Nelson comments on Faulkner’s use of allegory noting that although Lena Grove 
is presented as a pregnant ‘virgin’ and JC – born on Christmas eve and ‘crucified’ at 
the age of 33 – evokes imagery of the Christ, a reading of Light in August need not be 
reduced to this allegorical structure (Nelson 2004: 55). Rather, Faulkner creates 
complex and typically contradictory characters whose inner conflict embodies the 
larger ethical impasse that has beset much of his society as it reluctantly and with 
reticence is thrust into the complexities of living in a modern world severed from the 
religious certainties that had hitherto dictated much of the social and political makeup 
of the South. One is not to be confused by the fact that Faulkner’s characters speak 
about God and that they seem to believe in him. Faulkner is deconstructing the nature 
of this belief: Its historical pathway and the reason for its particular kind of 
construction. It therefore makes sense that the structure and form of the work as well 
as its content moves across time referentially. When we meet a character evidently 
representing the worst aspects of the Calvinist elect it is expected that this 
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construction is understood in terms of the time it was made and the time enacted in 
the novel. 
  
Protestantism: The Repudiation of Moral Choice 
Faulkner denunciates Protestantism in the South as being responsible for denying the 
individual the right of moral choice and the grace to forgive and be forgiven, preventing 
the possibility of healing for the individual and society. In an image that powerfully 
condemns Christianity for its violent rejection of peace, Faulkner depicts the churches 
of the world ‘like one of those barricades of the middle ages planted with dead and 
sharpened stakes, against truth and against that peace in which to sin and be forgiven 
which is the life of man’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 366). Nietzsche identifies this fundamental 
vice of Christianity when he notes: ‘One is most dishonest towards one’s God: he is 
not permitted to sin!’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 90). The main character with the obvious 
initials of JC is the only Christ that can exist in a society that has learnt to act out 
Calvinist prescriptive behaviour, yet trust in none of the promises of redemption. 
Faulkner employs biblical allegory to represent the Christ, which frames Joe 
Christmas’ story. The use of such biblical analogy does not imply that Christmas’ 
character embodies some ultimate meaning from which may be gleaned a pseudo-
divine moral lesson that underwrites the novel. Rather, Faulkner’s use of the Bible is 
one among many sources drawn upon in this allegorically rich novel to create 
meaning. It is through the clash of images, symbols and metaphors that Faulkner is 
able to illustrate the struggle of his characters to enact their own agency in response to 
social codes calculated to dictate their futures.iv 
 
The story of JC reads of an orphaned boy of ambiguous racial heritage whose 
childhood formation is utterly devoid of love. Adopted by the Presbyterian Simon 
McEachern, the boy is plunged into a world of unremitting violence, coercive language 
of religious indoctrination and the soulless demands of the Protestant Work Ethic. JC 
grows to replicate the violence and misogyny that is characteristic of his adopted 
father and in time comes to embody the self-fulfilling prophecy to which he was 
damned. Upon reaching adulthood, JC assaults McEachern in an act of self-defence 
and commences a lifetime of aimless wandering reminiscent of the Christ entering into 
the wilderness (Matthew 4:1-2). While primarily fleeing from himself JC’s restlessness, 
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fuelled by revolt against a society, which sought to categorize him. Although 
professing hate for religion, JC comes to place the same faith in violence as those who 
inflicted their religious dogma upon him. His brief sojourn from drifting culminates in a 
turbulent sexual liaison with Joanna Burden, somewhat ironically killed by JC in self-
defence. Hunted by the authorities and townsfolk alike, intent upon exacting 
vengeance for the alleged crimes of this abhorrent ‘nigger’ murderer, Faulkner once 
again alludes to Christ as JC presents himself to his accusers and is subsequently 
killed and mutilated as a scapegoat for the prejudice and hatred of Southern society. 
 
The Indemnity of the Elect and Perpetuation of Social Ills 
The Calvinist doctrine of the elect finds its American roots in the Puritan tradition, 
predominately presented in Light in August through the characters Doc Hines and 
Simon McEachern. Faulkner employs these characters to illustrate how the notion of 
the elect has served to justify rationalized behaviours that manifest in social ills, while 
providing indemnity from moral accountability or ethical critique. Shadowing JC 
throughout Light in August is his maternal grandfather Doc Hines, whom Faulkner 
portrays as an inevitable product of Calvinist doctrine that legitimizes violence in the 
name of God. The fire and damnation of Hines’ charismatic Protestantism exemplifies 
the unwavering conviction of one convinced of his place among the elect. As an agent 
of God’s vengeance, Hines entertains grandiose delusions of messianic proportions as 
he exercises his right, indeed his duty, to kill. In Light in August characters such as 
Doc Hines, believe they are the recipients of ‘true’ knowledge, discerned through an 
‘epistemological organ’ that like its object is immutable and hence cannot be 
scrutinized.v From the perspective of the elect, the authority to take vengeance upon 
the damned is divined from a spiritual or meta-cognitive ‘knowing’. JC who lacks the 
capacity to comprehend spiritual matters is denied the right to question them. This 
idea of transcendent or ‘true’ knowledge constitutes the governing moral principle of 
the sermon in Moby Dick, a theme reintroduced by Melville in his depiction of the 
ignorance of the crew in Billy Budd. In Light in August innocence is typically ascribed 
according to the discernment and judgment of one claiming to possess transcendent 
knowledge and as such, resonates with the Romantic poet’s diffidence to feeling as 
the arbiter of reality – a idea subverted in William Blake’s poetry such as the ‘Piper’ in 
which pristine nature is stained with the ink of knowledge.vi Faulkner’s fiction 
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demonstrates that those who claim to possess divine insight, which in its substance is 
apolitical and hence beyond moral or ethical scrutiny, inevitably leave a trail of 
violence, despair and death in their wake. 
 
Faulkner’s fiction demonstrates how particular elements of Protestantism had 
extrapolated a concept of God from the Bible that served to perpetuate the notion of 
ontological inferiority, logically necessitating the construction of an oppressive 
ideology.vii Racial prejudice is depicted as being a root cause of inequality in Light in 
August. The character Joanna Burden – a ‘northerner’ – is analogous of the 
multigenerational, religious sanctioned racism that Faulkner sought to expose. An 
outcast from white society due to her association with ‘blacks’, Burden is portrayed as 
living out her life in service to the memory of her father and brother killed in the 
fictional town of Jefferson sixty years earlier for supporting the black vote. The ‘curse’ 
Burden inherits from her family condemns her to a life of mindless devotion to appease 
a vengeful God, sacrificing her sexuality and the possibility of human intimacy and 
friendship in the process. Michael Lackey’s argues that although Burden sacrifices 
herself through philanthropic works to assuage the ‘curse’ of the black race, her 
actions and mind-set merely serves to propagate that which she seeks to oppose 
(Lackey 2006: 1). Lackey’s view is pertinent here; the assumptions that compel 
Burden are shown to be characteristic of prevailing interpretations of religious truth 
that succoured the ‘phantom of the old spilled blood – horror, anger and fear’ – that 
haunted the South (Faulkner 2005, p. 37).  
 
The hate with which northern racial dogma is held is expressed by a Jefferson local 
who recalling the views of his grandfather, asserts that fire should have consumed the 
Burden house fifty years earlier, started with ‘a little human fat meat’ (Faulkner 2005, 
p. 38). Racism is portrayed as being indicative of the common mind-set in 
Yoknapatawpha County, a community all too willing to believe that Joanna Burden had 
been sexually violated before her murder, an: 
 
…anonymous negro crime committed not by a negro but by Negro and who 
knew, believed, and hoped that she had been ravished too: at least once 
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before her throat was cut and at least once afterward (Faulkner 2005, p. 
216).  
 
For those who watch Burden’s house burn, hearsay is accepted as fact and the 
question of the assailant’s race given greater heed than the murder itself. Such racism 
is characteristic of the local law enforcement officers. In response to his allegation that 
JC was a “nigger” and had killed Burden, the Marshall warns Byron Birch: “You better 
be careful… I don’t care if he is a murderer or not!” (Faulkner 2005, p. 75).viii  
 
With the exception of JC – whose bloodline is debatable – and cameos by the 
Armstids, Light in August represents racism in the South from the perspective of white 
characters. Apart from his grandfather Doc Hines, characters throughout Light in 
August remain ambiguous as to JC’s ethnicity until told. Faulkner employs this literary 
device to reveal the concept of race as a social construction, a view that opposed the 
prevailing opinion that race was a biological given. Commenting on the social 
construction of race Thadious Davis contends that Faulkner represents ‘negro’ in Light 
in August as ‘not a matter of blood but a matter of style, adherence to preconceived 
behavioral norms … a social code … a prescribed pattern of acting’ (Davis cited in 
Nelson 2004: 56). In her discussion of race in Light in August, Judith Wittenberg 
concurs with Davis, arguing that as race is a ‘linguistic and social construct rather than 
a biological given’ the novel focuses ‘more on the concept of race than on actual race 
relations’ (Wittenberg 1995, p. 146). Faulkner’s portrayal of JC’s questionable heritage 
blurs the boundaries of ethnic categorization, subverting the language of science and 
law instrumental in constructing and maintaining racial identity. It is clear that JC is a 
victim to the patriarchy that in its constructions of the law dictates that JC is one of the 
damned within this Protestant environment. 
 
Thinkers of the mid to late twentieth century displaced the traditional notion of the 
‘self’. Jacques Derrida challenged the notion of the ‘I’ – the personality we claim as our 
identity – as an assembly of disparate ideas and experiences (Derrida 1976, p. 158). 
Similarly, Gilles Deleuze argued that the notion of the ‘self’ is merely a product of our 
desire for ‘stability and certainty upon which we can construct our meanings’ (Deleuze 
1994, p. 181). Derrida coined the term ‘differance’ to describe how ‘meaning is never 
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fully defined and is constantly being differed’ (Derrida 1978, p. 280). Deleuze goes 
further in his proposal that rather than ‘the one and the many’ there is only the ‘variety 
of multiplicity – in other words, differance’ (Deleuze 1994, p. 182).ix It seems there is 
an agreement that there is no ‘true’ subjective reality underlying the socially created 
‘self’, or an objective reality underlying our socially constructed intelligibility of the 
world (Harland 1991, p. 68).x Nevertheless Colebrook’s view that ‘one cannot speak 
from a position of groundlessness’ (Colebrook 2004, 121) strikes a chord with this 
investigation, when one considers the fact of desire and the inevitability of actions that 
do not necessarily accord with supposedly fixed political or moral positions. Faulkner’s 
presentation of JC is an example of a literary character acting independently of moral 
expectations or politically defined categories; Faulkner in his representations 
undermines the essentialist views of race propagated in the South.   
 
The Sins of the Forefathers Visited upon the Sons 
The music of the Jefferson Presbyterian Church is described as ‘…deliberate and 
without passion so much as immolation, pleading, asking, for not love, not life, 
forbidding it to others, demanding in sonorous tones death as though death were the 
boon’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 276). This music is a call to death, metaphoric of the cost 
exacted by the demands of religious observance and the Protestant Ethic. The 
character Reverend Gail Hightower reflects upon this call to death: ‘And so why should 
not their religion drive them to crucifixion of themselves and one another’ (Faulkner 
2005, p. 276).xi Ostracized and rejected by the Greater Presbyterian Church due to the 
scandal of his wife’s mysterious death, Hightower holds to the hope that redemption 
lies in the acceptance of his alienation and martyrdom. Nietzsche warns of the cost of 
such martyrdom: ‘Take care … and beware of martyrdom! Of suffering “for the sake of 
truth”! Even defending your selves! It spoils all the innocence and fine neutrality of 
your conscience’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 56). Hightower’s self-imposed penance serves 
as a necessary self-deception lest he confront his culpability in the emotional privation 
of his wife and acknowledges his role in her subsequent suicide. The narrator 
observes that Hightower was ‘too innocent’ to understand his wife’s desire to escape 
from the strictures of her Presbyterian upbringing (Faulkner 2005, p. 361). Although an 
exile from the Church Rev Hightower is shown to remain subject to the moral 
judgments of Christianity as he languishes in the martyred hope that ‘their remains yet 
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something of honour and pride, of life’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 47). Perceiving that in his 
suffering he bears the sins of the church, Hightower’s prayer is reminiscent of Christ 
during the crucifixion; forgive them for they ‘do not know what they are doing!’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 47).xii Hightower’s martyrdom reduces his life to endless sacrifice 
and self-imposed damnation, merely perpetuating the law of the Father by which he 
had been condemned. As events unfold in the novel Hightower despairs at the 
enduring cost of his long-suffering quest for innocence, his sleep emanating a quality 
of profound and complete surrender. 
 
Not of exhaustion, but surrender, as though he had given over and 
relinquished completely that grip upon that blending of pride and hope and 
vanity and fear, that strength to cling to either defeat or victory, which is the 
I-Am, and the relinquishment of which is usually death (Faulkner 2005, p. 
296).xiii  
  
Just as Hightower accepts a life of suffering in the hope of final redemption, Joanna 
Burden sacrifices her life to Christian dogma. Burden is the last of a family lineage 
deceived by Protestant theology that equated hatred and selfishness with love and 
self-sacrifice (Bowling 1973, p. 114). A victim of the sins of her ancestors Burden’s 
exegesis reveals the Protestant racial theory that had possessed her family: ‘The 
curse of the black race is God’s curse. But the curse of the white race is the black man 
who will be forever God’s chosen one because He once cursed Him’ (Faulkner 2005, 
p. 191). The ‘curse’ enslaves Burden and as years of servitude pass she is 
transformed, coming to see ‘black folk’ not as people, but as a thing, a shadow in 
which (she) lived, we lived, all white people all other people’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 190).  
 
As previously discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, Puritanism presented an 
image of an ultra-transcendent God fundamentally antagonistic to human emotion and 
sexual desire. Years of emotional and sexual privation are credited with transforming 
Burden’s femininity, her ‘spiritual privacy so long intact that its own instinct for 
preservation had immolated it, its physical phase the strength and fortitude of a man’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 176). Sexual encounters with JC take on an ‘imperious and fierce 
urgency that concealed an actual despair at frustrated and irrevocable years’ 
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(Faulkner 2005, p. 194). The bitter self-sacrifice of years past finds emotional release 
in deviant sexual behaviours and ‘wild throes of nymphomania’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 
195). Burden manifests extreme psychological distress, torn between human desire 
and the moral codes of good and ‘evil’ to which she is enslaved. Transgressing 
religious and racial boundaries, Burden’s venture into the world of human intimacy is 
akin to spiritual suicide: Defaulting on her hard won innocence, she is condemned to 
the ranks of the damned (Faulkner 2005, p. 198). Burden clings to a last hope of 
redemption, offering JC the path to salvation through the opportunity to study law at a 
‘black’ college. JC responds incredulously to the precondition of his enrolment that he, 
“Tell niggers that I am a nigger too?” (Faulkner 2005, p. 198). Burden’s racism is 
obscured by her attempts to raise the stature of black people, a goal, which entails the 
categorization or ‘niggerization’ of JC (Wittenberg 1995, p. 156). JC’s violent rejection 
of the proposition moves Burden to lament, “Maybe it would be better if we both were 
dead” (Faulkner 2005, p. 209).  
 
Andre Bleikasten argues that JC and Burden mutually resign themselves to a suicide 
pact to escape the psychic conflict they share: a product of the ‘chronic and endemic 
disease’ of racism in Jefferson (Bleikasten 1987, p. 84). He nominates the ease with 
which JC is later captured and his passive resignation to being killed in Hightower’s 
house as evidence of JC’s initial compliance to this suicide pact (Bleikasten 1987, p. 
84). I agree with John Lutz’s view that the self-loathing JC and Joanna Burden share is 
the fruit of their indoctrination as children. However, his contention that JC is plagued 
by guilt or seeks to expunge psychic trauma through an act of self-sacrifice is 
questionable, given that Faulkner repeatedly portrays JC as devoid of any spiritual 
faculty (Lutz 1999, p. 10).xiv JC’s rejection of the proposed suicide pact is consistent 
with Faulkner’s portrayal of the character’s lifelong fight for survival. Although sickened 
by the perceived “filth” of his sexual relationship with Burden due to issues of power 
and dependence, JC knows of no angst or guilt before God. Burden’s desire to die is 
the product of her fornication with the forbidden. Lost to her former ideal of racial and 
religious purity Burden has no choice but to renounce life – the knowledge of which 
ironically seals her doom. Nietzsche’s contention that the notion of ‘unfreedom of will’ 
is in general conceived as a problem from two completely antithetical standpoints’ is 
particularly relevant to Faulkner’s portrayal of the pathology that motivates the 
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martyrdom of Joanna Burden and Gail Hightower. On the one hand, both characters 
hold on to their sense of ‘responsibility’ and self-belief at all costs. Alternatively, both 
are shown to sustain the contrary position of not accepting responsibility for anything, 
their ‘inner self-contempt’ wanting to ‘shift off’ responsibility somewhere else 
(Nietzsche 1990, p. 52). As shown in the execution of Billy Budd in the previous 
chapter, sacrifice is a constituent of this extreme Protestantism and necessary to 
sustain the ‘lie of innocence’. 
 
Created in God’s image: Fathers, Sons and the Necessity of the Lie 
Light in August shows that for the son, innocence is determined according to their 
obedience to the prescribed will of the Father. Repeatedly Faulkner illustrates the 
dehumanizing consequences of religious and racial indoctrination that condemns the 
son to be nothing more than an image of the Father. However, for the central 
character Joe Christmas there is no possibility of redemption, remaining until his brutal 
murder an Orphan beyond grace. Raised in religious violence, starved of emotional 
intimacy and disconnected from meaningful others, JC is an Orphan both politically 
and psychologically. As a child he is described as ‘sober and quiet as a shadow’, 
symbolic of his indistinguishable ethnicity and incomplete sense of self (Faulkner 
2005, p. 120). Wittenberg succinctly appraises the legacy of his grandfather’s 
pathology:  
 
The concepts of the innocent child’s grandfather set in motion the tragic 
course of his life, while Joe’s subsequent internalization of those ideas 
results in extremely self-destructive behaviour (Wittenberg 1995, p. 155).xv 
 
Crippled emotionally as a child, his formation incomplete and devoid of any sense of 
identity, JC is thrust into the world of the Protestant Work Ethic when adopted by 
Simon McEachern. Faulkner employs this character to portray the dehumanizing 
process by which the individual is reduced to the function of a mere cog in the service 
of capitalism. 
 
McEachern’s callous appraisal of JC at the orphanage: “I’ve no doubt the tyke will do”, 
is likened by the narrator to the evaluation of a horse rather than a vulnerable child. 
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From the outset JC is denied a childhood, such freedom perceived by McEachern as 
dangerous and a threat to the principles of the Protestant Work Ethic. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Immanuel Kant warned of the potential danger of the child’s imagination 
and the need to ‘curb’ the child to conform to the rule of law, which he argued to be 
essential for the development of understanding. This same view of the child is evident 
in McEachern’s demand that JC learn the Presbyterian Catechism, the language of 
patriarchal Protestantism. JC’s subsequent refusal to comply with McEachern’s 
demand earns him his initial whipping (Faulkner 2005, p. 112).xvi The concepts 
presented in the Presbyterian Catechism, such as ‘God the Father’, are meaningless 
to a boy cast as an orphan from the moment of his birth. Faulkner’s chilling account of 
JC being whipped with ‘slow deliberate force’ is all the more haunting given that ‘both 
boy and man’ are described as ‘calm – more convinced than the other’ (Faulkner 
2005, p. 114). As the child collapses face first into unconsciousness, McEachern’s 
ignorance of the destructive ramifications of his actions is evident as he asks JC, “are 
you sick, are you alright?” (Faulkner 2005, p. 114). Faulkner illustrates how the 
violence that characterizes JC’s Protestant indoctrination negates the boy’s humanity 
– a process internalized by JC who comes in time to accept such cruelty as a condition 
of life. The dehumanization of JC culminates in the boy resorting to eating food off the 
floor like a dog (Faulkner 2005, p. 118). Divorced from any sense of his own self-worth 
JC comes to accept whippings as perfectly logical, reasonable and inescapable, willing 
to walk ‘back to the kitchen side by side’ with his assailant (Faulkner 2005, p. 121).  
 
Carl Benson observes that there is much to suggest that JC is a ‘volitionless servant’ 
pilloried by exterior forces and caught in a cycle of social prejudice. However, he 
argues that Faulkner does not exonerate JC from personal moral responsibility, citing 
JC’s acceptance of McEachern’s cruelty in preference to the ‘love’ of his step-mother – 
because the later confused him – as an example of the character’s self-destructive 
choices (Benson 1973, p. 264). Writing from a post-modernist perspective Owen 
Robinson focuses more on the constructed nature of identify in relation to gender, 
asserting that JC primarily rejects his step mother’s love due to the desire to define 
himself rather than be created by society (Robinson 2003: 127). Both these views 
need to be considered in light of Faulkner’s presentation of gender. Throughout Light 
in August misogyny is co-joined with racism; they are by-products of the Protestantism 
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that Faulkner sought to expose. Formed amidst the hard ruthless justice of men, 
Faulkner represents women as a threat to JC because they evoke in him vulnerability. 
JC’s violent assault upon a black girl during his first sexual encounter (Faulkner 2005, 
p. 119) is characteristic of his relationships with women throughout the novel. Likening 
his relationship with Joanna Burden to falling into a sewer (Faulkner 2005, p. 192), JC 
is threatened by kindness primarily due to the fear that it will erode his strength of will 
to revolt. Denied emotional intimacy in his infancy, JC is incapable of experiencing 
love, defining such expressions of emotion as an attempt to control him.xvii JC can be 
seen to be a product of the Presbyterian conception of a dutiful Protestant, his 
emotional retardation, social alienated and inability to feel compassion or experience 
sexual gratification reflective of the Calvinist inheritance that fashioned his childhood.    
 
Faulkner’s fiction inverts Christian value systems of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in order to disrupt 
accepted moral conventions and challenge religious assumptions. As Warren Beck 
(1941) asserts, one of the strengths of Faulkner’s fiction is his ability to penetrate the 
veil of religious and social dogma through multiple dimensions and oscillating 
perspectives (Beck 1973, p. 153). Throughout Light in August, the women of the 
Jefferson Presbyterian Church exemplify the oppressive judgementalism that 
characterizes Faulkner’s depiction of Calvinistic Protestantism. Represented as 
possessing knowledge that is the right of all who are ‘good without being kind’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 12), the narrator observes that these ‘good’ women ‘don’t forget 
things easily, good or bad, lest the taste and savour of forgiveness die from the palate 
of conscience’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 51). Due to the faithful vigilance of the Presbyterian 
women, the town of Jefferson is portrayed as being convinced ‘that the ladies knew 
the truth since that bad women can be fooled by badness, since they have to spend 
some of their time not being suspicious’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 51).xviii Kindness and 
compassion are relegated to the domain of the ‘bad’ as the narrator observes, ‘only a 
bad women herself would be kind to Lena’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 12). The legacy of 
Calvinism is evident in the inhumanity of the Jefferson women who in their 
determination not to be tainted by ‘sin’, lack the capacity or desire to empathize with a 
‘fallen’ woman such as Lena.  
 
The Damned: Faulkner’s Subversion of the Protestant Work Ethic 
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Light in August was written at a time when the South was experiencing the greatest 
environmental destruction in its history due to reckless agricultural practices and 
extensive deforestation. Historian Thomas D Clark emphasized the human cost of this 
unrestrained capitalism, arguing that ‘in some fashion every major social problem in 
the South had grown out of the land and its mismanagement’ (Clark 1984, p. 73).xix 
Matthew Sivils’ observation that ‘race, poverty, class, and other social factors are 
environmental issues’ is significant to this thesis (Sivils 2006: 490). Throughout the 
novel Faulkner demonstrates that the land and race paradoxically function in a 
semiotic relationship. African Americans were dependent upon the land for survival 
and its destruction directly impacted upon their capacity to find shelter and food – a 
point acknowledged by Sivils who observes, ‘The colour of the land and the colour of 
the man depend upon their treatment by whites’ (Sivils 2006: 493). Through his self-
centred and exploitative character Byron Birch, Faulkner represents the greed that had 
permeated the South and contributed to its environmental, economic and social 
malaise.xx Indicative of millions of itinerant Southern males, Birch is alienated ‘persona 
non-gratis’, searching for work during the ‘Great Depression’. Portrayed as lazy, 
squandering money and illegally distilling whiskey during the prohibition years, Birch is 
an antithesis to the principles espoused by the Protestant Work Ethic (Faulkner 2005, 
p. 33). Without roots, meaningful relationships or belonging, Birch is converse to the 
fertility of Lena Grove, an opportunistic locust who feeds off life. Rather than 
perpetuating the prejudice held by many against itinerant workers, Faulkner’s work 
depicts the moral vacuum of one who, due to his self-obsession, is devoid of 
compassion or social conscience. Birch is disparagingly described by a co-worker as 
having the “look of a car with a radio on but no one in it” and compared to a “worthless 
horse (that) looks good but develops a sore hoof when it comes to work” (Faulkner 
2005, p. 29). Birch is to be perceived as both ignorant and a fool, breaking the law for 
the sake of it (Faulkner 2005, p. 67). Betraying Lena and abandoning his new born 
child, yet demanding his ‘rights’ as an ‘American citizen’, Birch rejects any 
responsibility for his actions (Faulkner 2005, p. 330). Being convinced of his innocence 
– despite escaping police custody – Birch vehemently demands justice: “Just justice … 
That was all. Just my rights” (Faulkner 2005, p. 330).    
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Gregory Meyerson and Jim Neilson’s socialist critique of Light in August proposes that 
Faulkner’s depreciating depiction of Birch is indicative of the common attitude held in 
relation to the itinerant poor in the South. Meyerson and Neilson argue that the 
character is portrayed as a ‘predator – eating and propagating apocalyptically. Here 
victims become victimizers, prey predators’, rather than being depicted as an 
‘exploited proletarian’ (Meyerson 2008: 26).xxi This critique does not consider 
Faulkner’s attempt to identify and subsequently dismantle generalizations and 
stereotypes that predominated America during the 1930’s. Defining Faulkner’s 
portrayal of Birch according to an economic equation disregards the significance of the 
Protestant theology Light in August consistently appraises and the degree to which 
religion is shown to be instrumental in the economic and social formation of his 
characters. The emphasis Faulkner places on Birch’s lack of moral substance 
suggests his interest lay in illustrating the importance of individual responsibility in a 
context of social and economic marginalization. Byron Birch is an antithesis, an affront 
to the Protestant Work Ethic, displaying the same reckless attitude for money as he 
had exhibited in his relationship with Lena. Flouting social norms that demanded a 
‘Sabbath appearance on Monday morning’ – regardless of how one had lived on the 
weekend – Birch presents unshaven and dishevelled ‘like he was naked’ (Faulkner 
2005, p. 33). Unlike the proletarian hero or victim of systemic political and economic 
abuse, Birch is one of the fortunate Southerners to find employment yet remain 
reluctant to work.  
 
Light in August captures the struggle of the poor who suffer under the calamitous 
weight of the ‘depression’.xxii Born into a family with a ‘bleak heritage’ whose very 
survival is dependent upon ‘stubborn and despairing fortitude’, Lena is representative 
of the Southern poor crushed under the weight of poverty and Calvinist theology. The 
story of Lena Grove frames Light in August; her quest to find the absent father of her 
unborn child is pivotal to the unfolding of the novel. Faulkner offers an alternative 
perspective on religious and social norms through his positioning of Lena Grove as a 
naïve ‘innocent’, infusing the character with an agency that is allegorical of ‘Mother 
Nature’, the giver and bearer of life. Abandoned when pregnant, Lena sets out on a 
journey of hope in the faith that she will be reunited with Birch before the birth of their 
child. Faulkner’s portrayal of Lena serves as a foil, a counterpoint to the vindictive, 
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cynical and judgmental Protestantism that characterizes the women of the Jefferson 
Presbyterian Church. Despite her sexual violation of religious and social taboos, 
Faulkner does not damn her according to the expectations of established morality. 
Faulkner utilizes the Puritan notion of the ultra-transcendent God as he distances Lena 
from the ‘corruption’ of the body, symbolizing her sexual liaison with Birch in terms of 
an inanimate object: a window. The author’s only concession to her ‘sin’ is confined to 
Lena’s acknowledgement that it would have been better if she had not ‘opened it at all’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 7). Lisa Nelson comments on the paradox of Lena’s innocence: 
‘Like the Virgin Mary, she (Lena) is at once hugely with child and sexually innocent’ 
(Nelson 2004: 57).  
 
Faulkner further analyses the Protestant Work Ethic through his association of JC with 
women and ‘ill-gotten gain’. JC’s first experience of money as a child at the orphanage 
is enmeshed in manipulation and deceit due to a series of random events that 
conspired to trap the boy in the Dietician’s bedroom closet – exposed to the sounds of 
an illicit affair (Faulkner 2005, p. 93). Concerned that JC would tell of her sexual liaison 
the Dietician attempts to buy his silence with a financial bribe. Humorously Faulkner 
describes JC wanting the Dietician’s ‘silver dollar like he would a bright cap from a 
bottle of beer’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 95). JC’s failure to comprehend the purpose of such 
a transaction is met with threats of violence and racial abuse, the Dietician cussing: 
“You little Nigger Bastard” (Faulkner 2005, p. 95). As has been previously noted, later 
in the novel JC takes from Mrs McEachern’s secret and forbidden stash and uses this 
‘sinful’ money to pay ‘for pleasure’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 144). Although ignorant of the 
fact due to his naivety, JC’s only relationship of meaning is with the prostitute Bobbie, 
a relationship contingent upon gifts (Faulkner 2005, p. 150).xxiii Faulkner further 
undermines the Protestant Work Ethic and it’s fixation with wealth through 
McEachern’s hypocrisy. Despite warning JC not to frequent a particular Jefferson 
establishment, as the premises served as the front of house for a brothel, McEachern 
nonetheless eats there because the food was cheap. 
 
The Alienated Orphan Unconscious of the Script 
Light in August portrays a community in which ‘memory believes before knowing 
remembers’, ‘seeing gives way to believing’ and belief ‘orders one’s memory into 
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knowledge’ (Faulkner 2005, pp. 91, 119). Faulkner demonstrates how memory is 
dependent upon belief and determines how life is experienced and remembered. His 
characters are unconscious of the outworking of the social and religious indoctrination 
that has formed their being. In his creation of Joe Christmas Faulkner explores the 
nature of ‘revolt’. The adult JC is first introduced in Light in August as a man with ‘cold 
quiet contempt on his face’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 26) inviting rejection with his ‘indolent 
and contemptuous attitude’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 27). JC abhors both the black 
community of Jefferson, which at night he likens to the abyss (Faulkner 2005, p. 89), 
and himself; a ‘phantom’, ‘lost spirit’, ‘alienated from all humanity’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 
87). The culmination of years of self-imposed alienation and social marginalization 
begins to propel life ‘so fast that accepting would take the place of knowing and 
believing’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 135).xxiv Driven by an unconscious fatalism JC is 
presented as being ignorant of the programming that dictates his inner life. Although 
portrayed as rejecting the religious programming of his childhood, JC is shown to 
remain a victim of the script fashioned for him by the Protestant fundamentalism of the 
South. Locked in a dualism in which the hate and violence of his revolt merely serves 
to endorse the very judgment he abhors, JC is metaphorically the fulfilment of Satan’s 
prophecy in the Garden of Eden. If as Faulkner suggests ‘memory believes before 
knowing remembers’ then it is through the reinforcement of memory that religion keeps 
the ‘knowing’ of remembering – actual realities of our experience – veiled from 
consciousness (Faulkner 2005, p. 9).   
 
Brooks argues that the fatalism that imbues Faulkner’s presentation of JC can be 
likened to a perversion of the Calvinist doctrine of predestination (Brooks 1973, p. 
129). In this sense rather than choosing sin, JC may be seen as the inevitable product 
of the deterministic attitudes of a society, which work to deny him the possibility of 
choice or assimilation into society. Similarly, Lutz is of the view that the powerlessness 
and abjection that characterizes JC is a consequence of the social imprisonment of 
systematic victimization, persecution and cruelty (Lutz 1999, p. 2).xxv While both views 
provide a plausible interpretation of the fatalism that accompanies JC, the question 
remains as to whether the character is the product of his own choice or the victim of 
cause and effect. Robinson’s conclusion that JC is ‘neither and both, which is to say 
that we cannot conclude at all’ is evocative of Faulkner’s characteristic distancing from 
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such judgments (Robinson 2003: 128). However, the novel consistently portrays JC as 
being denied redemption, damned by Protestant Christianity and sacrificed for the sins 
of the forefathers. 
 
Faulkner’s fiction illustrates how the damned such as JC, are unable to break free from 
the script fashioned for them once internalized, regardless of changes in their external 
environment. Truth is destructive to one such as JC who, having unconsciously 
orientated his life in revolt against the prejudicial lies of his religious and social 
indoctrination, is unable to assimilate such knowledge. The indifference of a northern 
prostitute to JC’s apparent ‘black’ genealogy triggers a vicious assault that almost kills 
the woman. Faced with a crisis of identity and unable to purge his anger through the 
cathartic cycle of violence that had thus far dictated his life, JC internalizes his rage 
and plunges into a state of physical illness: ‘He was sick after that. He did not know 
until then that there were white women who would take a man with a black skin’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 169). This realization is shown to overwhelm the emotional and 
cognitive programming that had formed his sense of alienation and self-hatred. 
Faulkner again draws upon biblical symbolism, presenting JC as becoming sick at 
‘thirty-three years old’, the age at which the Christ was crucified (Faulkner 2005, p. 
170). JC remains unable to maintain meaningful or intimate relationships, his aimlessly 
wandering briefly halted by the prospect of marrying Joanna Burden. JC contemplates 
the prospect: ‘Why not? It would mean ease, security, for the rest of your life. You 
would never have to move again’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 199). Yet having survived thus far 
through passionate hatred of his neighbour, JC perceives marriage to be yet another 
form of repression and abdication of self-will. Phyllis Hirshleifer (1949) makes the 
poignant observation that JC is a martyr who has abdicated his life through ‘irrational 
flight’, as opposed to Hightower whose martyrdom manifests in an ‘irrational refusal’ to 
flee (Hirshleifer 1973, p. 252). Alienated from self and an anathema to society, Light in 
August conveys a sense that there is nowhere that JC belongs. 
 
Transformation: The Righteous become Villains 
As agued in this thesis, the enduring influence of the ‘lie of innocence’ is dependent 
upon constructed values of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – necessary after The Fall, at which point 
innocence was no longer possible. When challenged as to the veracity of their moral 
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judgments, those invested in the ‘lie of innocence’ evoke a dualistic absolutism, 
defining others as being either for or against them. Faulkner’s fiction demonstrates that 
this transformation primarily manifests in the exercise of power over the dissenter. 
Having failed in her attempt to promote the earthly prospects of JC as a means to 
redeeming the ‘sin’ of her sexual liaison, the homicidal Joanna Burden turns to saving 
his soul from damnation in “hell … forever and ever and ever” (Faulkner 2005, p. 210). 
As she prays for JC’s soul Burden exhibits an unconscious, detached inhumanity 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 211). Assuming the voice of God, the transformed Burden 
commands the ontologically inferior JC to obey: “Joe, for the last time. I don’t ask it. 
Remember that. Kneel with me” (Faulkner 2005, p. 212). JC’s firm “No” is met with a 
pistol, Burden’s eyes holding ‘no heat in them, no fury. They were calm and still as all 
pity and all despair and all conviction’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 212). Burden’s altered state 
is a consequence of having sacrificed her humanity to appease the ‘curse’ of a 
vengeful God.  
 
Doc Hines serves as a further example of the transformation of a character into the 
instrument of God’s vengeance. Summarily executing the ‘coloured’ father of his 
grandson, Hines proclaims that God, “showed me the right road and he held the pistol 
steady” (Faulkner 2005, p. 283). Convinced that he is among the elect and 
entertaining grandiose delusions of messianic proportions, this agent of God exercises 
his right, indeed his duty, to kill. Albert Camus could have been referring to Hines 
when he writes in The Plague (1947) that the ‘most incorrigible vice’ is ‘ignorance 
which fancies it knows everything and therefore claims for itself the right to kill’ (Camus 
1968, p. 110). As discussed in Chapter One, contemporary Protestant versions of the 
Bible have contributed to the continuation of the notion of the elect and ontological 
superiority through the translation of the word ‘innocence’. Removed from any socio-
political or moral criteria by which such judgments can be critiqued, the ‘lie of 
innocence’ has served as a cloak to both conceal and justify abuses of power and 
egregious acts of violence perpetrated by the elect in the name of the Father. As 
suggested by Hirshleifer, violence, whether inflicted upon oneself or another, is the 
true faith of those representing the Protestant clergy in Light in August (Hirshleifer 
1973, p. 248). Faulkner’s writing reflects his revulsion for the violence that he believed 
had become synonyms with much of Southern Protestantism. Whether portrayed in 
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Hines’ charge to ‘watch over’ JC or the loneliness of Hightower’s penance, there is a 
shadow of Calvinistic predestination in Light in August, expressed in a faith that not 
only justified violence, but summoned the elect to commit God sanctioned murder. The 
parallels Lackey identifies between Socrates’ description of the investment of 
knowledge to poets and seers and the disposition enjoyed by American 
fundamentalists, is helpful to extrapolate on the nature of Hines’ transformation: ‘In a 
moment of inspiration, “the deity” divests the inspired ones of their senses’. The deity 
does this so that:  
 
we listeners may know that it is not they who utter these precious revelations 
while their mind is not within them, but that it is the god himself who speaks, 
and through them becomes articulate to us (Socrates cited in Lackey 2006: 
10).  
 
Faulkner’s depiction of Simon McEachern galloping to his final showdown with JC 
possessed by a ‘cold and implacable and undeviating conviction of both omnipotence 
and clairvoyance’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 153), further represents the transformation of the 
elect. Like Hines, the boundaries between McEachern and God are indistinguishable 
as noted by the narrator, ‘Perhaps if he were thinking at all, he believed that he had 
been guided and was now being propelled by some militant Michael Himself as he 
entered the room’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 153). Faulkner draws on biblical analogy as 
McEachern enters the social dance and rebukes Bobbie – the prostitute who had 
accompanied JC: “Away, Jezebel! … Away, harlot!” (Faulkner 2005, p. 153). 
McEachern’s transformation into an omniscient retributive soldier of God comes to 
fulfilment as religious symbolism is substituted for JC’s humanity: ‘…it was not the 
child’s face, which he was concerned with: it was with the face of Satan’ (Faulkner 
2005, p. 154). Standing ‘just and rocklike and with neither haste nor anger’ amidst a 
sea of ‘sluttishness of weak human men’, McEachern is described as being convinced 
that all looked on in terror at the ‘actual representative of the wrathful and retributive 
Throne’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 153). Exuding a detached external calm belying an inner 
hubris consumed with exhuming hate through sacrifice, McEachern is reminiscent of 
Claggart accusing Budd to gratify the envy of his depraved heart. Lackey comments 
on the extent to which McEachern is removed from human emotion and thus free from 
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personal sentiment: ‘McEachern does not even believe that it is his hand that strikes 
his thoroughly secular and all-too-human son’ (Lackey 2006: 12). Faulkner’s novel 
demonstrates that when abstracted from personal or sectarian interests, violence is 
perceived by ‘spiritual beings’ as a legitimate means to ensure that ‘non-spiritual 
beings’ are cast into slave-like roles within a culture. Lackey observes that in order to 
maintain this demarcation ‘violence, marginalization, and/or banishment is not just 
allowed’ in such cultures, ‘it is psychologically and politically necessary’ (Lackey 2006: 
7). 
 
Cleanth Brooks contends that ‘the tendency to call one’s own hates the vengeance of 
a just God is a sin to which Protestantism has always been prone’ (Brooks 1973, p. 
127). Through Faulkner’s presentation of the elect it is possible to observe the 
mechanisms through which the ‘Serpent’s’ prophecy – as perceived through a 
Nietzschean reading of The Fall legend – is shown to be fulfilled, each character 
becoming like ‘gods’ as they pronounce judgment on others according to their 
individual constructs of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. As Hirshleifer observes, McEachern does not 
function as a righteous instrument of justice, but rather as one of the ‘unrighteous who 
originate and perpetuate the curse of evil which is on all mankind’ (Hirshleifer 1973, p. 
249). The evolution of the ‘lie of innocence’ from its Christian origins to its secular 
reincarnation in the form of national patriotism is apparent in the character Percy 
Grimm. Faulkner’s presentation of Percy Grimm – the leader of the Jefferson National 
Guard – as a patriotic warrior entwines religion and the state, his relentless pursuit of a 
fleeing JC resonant of McEachern galloping to confront Satan. Transformed into an 
instrument of patriotic justice and moral righteousness, Grimm is ‘served by certitude, 
the blind and untroubled faith in the rightness and infallibility of his actions’ (Faulkner 
2005, p. 345).xxvi The narrator draws this relationship out as righteousness and state 
sanctioned justice morph to transform Grimm and his men: ‘It was upon them, of them: 
its shameless savageness. Out of it their faces seemed to glare with bodiless 
suspension as though from haloes’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 348).  
 
The religious idealism that hailed America as the ‘New Israel’ finds its roots in New 
England Calvinism and Jefferson Deism of Virginia.xxvii Geographically and morally set 
apart from the wicked and corrupt ‘Old World’ by God’s providence, the nation of 
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America laid claim to being a land set apart for the renewal of innocence.xxviii Derived 
from the beliefs of the Ancient Hebrews, the conviction that America was the ‘New 
Israel’ laid the foundation for the belief in the justice and innocence of the nation 
regardless of its actions.xxix Exalting patriotism as the greatest good through language 
such as “order” and “course of justice”, Grimm is fixated with letting, “the people see 
that we have worn the uniform of the United States” (Faulkner 2005, p. 341). Faulkner 
demonstrates that the language of patriotic ideology extinguishes the voice of 
humanity and contributes to the subversion of democracy. C Van Woodward 
comments on the pitfalls of such patriotism: ‘We have been tempted to define loyalty 
as conformity of thought, and to run grave risk of moral and intellectual stultification’ 
(Vann Woodward 1961, pp. 204-205). Grimm holds a: 
 
…sublime and implicit faith in … blind obedience, and a belief that the white 
race is superior to any and all other races and that the American is superior 
to all other white races and that the American uniform is superior to all other 
men (Faulkner 2005, p. 339). 
 
Faulkner ironically represents these ‘saints’ of the National Guard as bearers of truth, 
dispensing impartial justice as they stumble and vomit before the macabre violence 
Grimm visits upon JC. Castrating JC, Grimm springs back and flings aside a bloody 
butcher’s knife crying, “Now you’ll let white women alone, even in hell” (Faulkner 2005, 
p. 349).xxx The brutal murder and disfigurement of JC indicates a projection of hatred 
incommensurate with Grimm’s voluntary office in the National Guard and suggests 
Faulkner was concerned with themes of greater import. As racial purity was held by 
many to be essential to the preservation of Southern culture, JC’s apparent violation of 
Burden incurs the wrath of his society. Grimm’s violence serves to preserve a racial 
order that insisted upon the strict separation of black and white, mulattoes and children 
of slavery (Williamson 1980, p. 69). In Grimm’s eyes JC is ‘other’ than ‘white’ and 
therefore free to be punished outside of the law, subject to the higher authority of the 
Father in whom matters of religion, ethnicity and gender are shown to override judicial 
process and preside over one’s innocence or guilt. Strict adherence to the notion of 
white supremacy in the face of ontological and spiritual pollution becomes paramount 
for Grimm and critical to the very security of his nation. Faulkner demonstrates the 
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dark reality that nationalistic justice – like the vengeance of its righteous cousin – is 
enforced by the violent actions of those who remain steadfastly convinced of their 
impartiality.xxxi 
 
Immanent Transfiguration: Ruptures and the Will to be Human  
Thomas Osborne suggests that we can ‘act in good faith, as with Nietzsche, even in 
attempting to get rid of the truth, and in bad faith … by protesting too much in the 
name of truth’ (Osborne 1998, p. 34). Indeed John Barnes contends that ‘not to speak 
the truth is sometimes a duty’ proposing that a ‘society in which all truths were bluntly 
exposed would be more like a hell than a paradise’ (Barnes 1994, p. 156). Derrida is of 
a similar opinion advising that while truth and veracity are certainly necessary, ‘they 
must not be put into operation in just any fashion, at just any price’ (Derrida 1986, p. 
80). In Light in August, the question of whether to expose the self-deception of others 
features prominently in Faulkner’s presentation of the ‘innocent and profound’ 
unreason of Lena (Faulkner 2005, p. 8). Religion validates Lena’s hopeless quest to 
find the father of her unborn child and keep at bay the reality of her plight. Wittenberg 
suggests that Lena’s assured tale of Birch’s departure and their impending reunion, 
acts as a ‘linguistic shield’ (Wittenberg 1995, p. 157), reinforced through repetition and 
preserved throughout the novel. Those she meets on her journey are reluctant to 
either openly challenge Lena’s story or proffer an alternative truth to expose her self-
deception (Faulkner 2005, p. 20).  
 
Similar to the concept of the ‘knowledge of humanity’ presented by Herman Melville in 
Billy Budd, Light in August alludes to a form of knowledge that, although not 
exclusively, is shown to be primarily perceived by women and characterized by 
honesty and acts of compassion. In the dialogue between Lena and Mrs Armstid, 
Faulkner refers to this knowledge. It is under the unyielding gaze of Mrs Armstid – as 
they ‘looked at one another, suddenly naked, watching one another’ – that Lena 
admits to having fabricated her tale of abandonment: “I told you false” (Faulkner 2005, 
p. 16). The ‘knowing’ of Mrs Armstid is shown to be the product of experience, her 
accusing lament “You men, You darn men” (Faulkner 2005, p. 15) born from bitter 
years of poverty, toil and child raising. The silence that educes Lena’s honest 
response is ‘other’ than language and as such removed from masculine codes of 
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‘good’ and ‘evil’ upon which her prior self-deceit had been constructed.xxxii Although 
conscious of the girl’s wilful foolishness, Mrs Armstid nevertheless acts with 
compassion to prevent another suffering the hardships she had endured. The act of 
giving Lena her meagre savings contrasts with Joanna Burden’s philanthropic works 
designed to appease the legacy of her forefathers and assure her eternal salvation. If 
there is a moral stance in Light in August, it is that consciousness is quickened by 
compassion: The act of empathy rather than the commiserations of sympathy are 
paramount here.  
 
According to Brooks, natural drives instinct and intuition equip women to access 
‘wisdom’ that is concealed from man and male codes such as language. If such virtues 
can be deduced from Faulkner’s fiction, they are neither derived from an essentialist 
theory pertaining to women’s biological capacity for truth, nor the product of spiritual 
insight possessed by the elect. In an interview years after the publication of Light in 
August, Faulkner stressed, “…ideas and facts have very little in common with truth … I 
must try to express clumsily in words what the pure music would have done better” 
(quoted in Slatoff 1973, p. 171).xxxiii In his portrayal of the interaction between Lena 
and Mrs Armstid, Faulkner deconstructs the girl’s self-deception through the gaze of 
experience formed amidst suffering. It is this vision that challenges the authenticity of 
Lena’s truth and circumvents the masculine language upon which had sustained her 
providential hope (Faulkner 2005, p. 16).  
 
In Light in August, a transfiguration takes place in the stories of Lena, Byron Bunch 
and Gail Hightower. On each occasion, the catalyst for this transfiguration is 
compassion. Lena is endearing because she is naïve rather than ignorant, initially 
responding to the revelation that she had found Byron Bunch rather than tracked down 
Byron Birch, with the astonishment of a child (Faulkner 2005, p. 39). However, as she 
waits to give birth Lena is transfigured, her naïve innocence replaced by wisdom 
perceptible upon a face that is ‘neither innocent nor dissimulating. Neither is it placid 
and serene’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 309). The wonder of new life that envelopes Lena upon 
the birth of her child brings about profound change and while portrayed as being more 
prudent, her characteristic peace and trust remains. Carl Benson’s (1954) claim that 
Lena experiences ‘no moral change or achievement’ throughout the novel is 
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questionable given Lena’s response when reunited with Birch after the birth of their 
child (Benson 1973, p. 267).xxxiv Birch displays the callous deception that is the 
trademark of the self-convicted liar: “If it aint Lena. Yes, sir. So you got my message 
last month as soon as I got settled down and I thought it had got lost” (Faulkner 2005, 
p. 323). The ‘grave, unwinking, unbearable gaze’, of Lena’s response lays bare Birch’s 
lie and ‘all that remained in him of pride’ and the ‘desire for justification was fled from 
him and left him naked’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 323). Lena’s gaze is evocative of the 
discerning gaze levelled upon her by Mrs Armstid an examination that perceives truth 
beyond words. Harbouring no resentment for Birch, the transfigured Lena exercises 
honesty that enables her to see deceit in others. 
 
Throughout Light in August, Faulkner’s most consistent theme is that without love one 
cannot be a human being fully alive. The stories of Rev Gail Hightower and Joanna 
Burden serve to illustrate this idea of humanity. Despite years of grief, self-imposed 
isolation and emotional privation, a spark of compassion can still redeem Hightower 
because he can still see the humanness of others. In contrast, Burden can no longer 
feel compassion due to her devotion to a Calvinist ideology devoid of human emotion. 
I concur with Gable’s suggestion that perhaps Faulkner is primarily concerned with the 
rebirth of Bunch, Hightower and JC, ‘each experiencing a moment of light and power 
in the Mississippi August’ (Gable 1996: 9).xxxv Supporting Lena in childbirth is shown to 
be the catalyst for a profound transfiguration in the Reverend’s vision of the world and 
the moment in which he expresses a renewed gratitude for life. The subsequent 
expression of Hightower’s transfiguration may be likened to a manifestation of what 
Robert Solomon terms ‘naturalized spirituality’ (Solomon 2002, p. 6).  
 
In Spirituality for the Skeptic (2002) Solomon describes ‘naturalized spirituality’ as the 
‘thoughtful love of life’ (Solomon 2002, p. 6), which encompasses a ‘generalized erotic 
love of other people, a love that has learned to appreciate their depth and mystery, a 
love that has learned to listen, probe, and share’ (Solomon 2004, p. 38). In the case of 
Hightower the sublime experience of new birth quickens the flame of love harboured 
by his long grief and evokes a gratitude for life that manifests what Solomon refers to 
as an ‘ethics of love’: A willingness to act on behalf of others and end his self-imposed 
isolation. Although Solomon acknowledges that ‘love’ is a passion he also contends 
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that a ‘thoughtful love of life’ is primarily self-taught. Hence to live such love one must 
take responsibility to ‘look at others from an enchanted perspective’ and ‘view the 
world … as an object of love and fascination’ (Solomon 2004, p. 36). Love therefore 
concerns our perception of others and the world. Just as William Blake’s poetry calls 
for our vision to be invigorated by the imagination, Solomon sees ‘love’ as an 
experience that ‘improves and intensifies … our perceptions’ (Solomon 2004, p. 36). In 
his philosophical work In Defense of Sentimentality (2004), Solomon proposes that 
both grief and gratitude are moral emotions because they “involve … an admission of 
our vulnerability and our dependence on other people” (Solomon 2004, p. 76). 
Solomon argues that grief is a continuation of love, an ‘experience of expansion of 
ourselves,’ an ‘over flowing’ in which the self is transformed (Solomon 2002, p. 34). 
This idea of grief and gratitude as being moral emotions helps to elaborate upon the 
transfiguration of Hightower and perhaps provide an insight into Faulkner’s perspective 
on love.  
 
Commencing with an acknowledgement that his delusional ‘faith’ had compelled him to 
become his wife’s ‘seducer and her murderer, author and instrument of her shame and 
death’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 367), Hightower’s renewed vision of life dismantles his prior 
religious indoctrination and self-delusion. Hightower reflects: ‘…if I am the instrument 
of her despair and death, then I am in turn the instrument of someone outside myself’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 369). The idea that one is instrumental in the lives of others is a 
central concept in Light in August, however there is a stark contrast between 
Faulkner’s presentation of Hines and McEachern as instruments of God’s will and 
Hightower’s consciousness of his own agency. Hightower confesses: ‘there must be 
some things of which God cannot be accused by man and held responsible. There 
must be’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 367). Amidst the Reverend’s musings, Faulkner illustrates 
the necessity of the lie in order to change perceptions of reality that harbour the 
potential for suffering. Hightower ponders ‘there are more things in heaven and earth 
too than truth’, such as man’s ingenuity to ‘supply himself in crises with shapes and 
sounds with which to guard himself from truth’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 359). Through 
Hightower’s transfiguration, Faulkner explores the idea of self-deception, challenging 
the capitalist notion that each individual is only responsible for himself. 
 
  Chapter 5: Light in August 
 
Once this transfiguration has commenced compassion returns to Hightower as evident 
in his lament for the condemned JC: “Poor man. Poor fellow. No man is, can be, 
justified in taking human life; least of all, a warranted officer, a sworn servant of his 
fellowman” (Faulkner 2005, p. 311). Perhaps Hightower can be seen to experience a 
Nietzschean moment whereby he recognizes synthetic value judgments as a lie and 
chooses to follow his conscience, ‘resisting customary value-sentiments in a 
dangerous fashion’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 37). Lying in God’s name to save JC from the 
vengeance of Percy Grimm, Hightower renounces God pledging allegiance to one 
victimized.xxxvi
xxxvii
xxxviii
 As proposed by Lackey, Hightower acts on behalf of the ‘innocent 
human who has been God’s victim, the Isaac who never chose to have his life 
sacrificed in the name of faith’ (Lackey 2006: 17).  The transfigured Hightower 
abandons his religion coming to realize what ‘every other man has thought: how false 
the most profound book turns out to be when applied to life’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 
361).  In a similar vein to Melville’s presentation of Captain Ahab accusing an 
‘indifferent God’ of abandoning humanity to meaningless suffering, Faulkner captures 
the same feeling in his portrayal of Hightower who, resigned to his imminent death, 
resists the temptation to pray. Conscious that ‘with all air, all heaven, filled with the lost 
and unheeded crying of all the living who ever lived, wailing like lost children among 
the cold and terrible stars’, it was pointless (Faulkner 2005, p. 370).  
 
The reoccurring theme of a ‘life force’ embodied in gallant acts of his Confederate 
Grandfather define Gail Hightower’s story. Hightower’s dying apotheosis is the 
culmination of a process of transfiguration quickened by the ‘new life’ of Lena’s baby: 
A living incarnation of this ‘life force’. This interpretation of the Reverend’s final 
moments differs from the view held by the consensus of scholars who regard 
Hightower’s dying vision as a final proclamation of his moral and spiritual failure. 
However, Harvey Gable considers Hightower’s vision to be a ‘new birth that relieves 
him of the burden he has dragged throughout the work’ (Gable 1996: 10).xxxix This 
reading holds that Hightower’s final apotheosis is a ‘true revelation’ only made 
possible through intense physical suffering and the intervention of compassion. Gable 
contends that in Hightower’s last moments, the ‘power of his grandfather’s spirit 
descends to fill the empty vessel with a fresh wave of power, an absolute experience 
of the Spirit’s fullness’ (Gable 1996: 13). An alternative reading may attribute this 
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visionary experience to the Reverend’s prior transfiguration rather than a climactic 
moment of spiritual power. That which unites this ‘life force’ with the recurring vision of 
the gallant Confederate Grandfather is Hightower’s honesty and willingness to 
acknowledge the denial and self-deception that had governed his life. Faulkner 
demonstrates that it is through the living experience of the ‘life force’ rather than 
grandiose illusion, that one awakes to a profound insight of self.  
 
It is perhaps through the transfiguration of Byron Bunch that Faulkner makes his 
strongest statement in Light in August of the significance of love and the power of 
desire to break the yoke of the Protestant Work Ethic. Byron Bunch is representative 
of the poor Southern white male during the Depression and an embodiment of 20th 
century behaviour sponsored by the Protestant Work Ethic. The possibility that Bunch 
may be counted among the elect is slim at best his only hope of redemption in the 
eyes of his community is his slave like devotion to work and the possibility that this 
would reward him financially. Alienated from meaningful relationships and isolated 
from human intimacy due to his fear of contamination by sinful humanity, the 
character’s life is dictated by the fear that one is ‘bound to get into trouble/mischief as 
soon as he quits working’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 43). Bunch’s unquestioning devotion to 
his work at the Jefferson Mill is taken to ridiculous lengths as he hauls timber on his 
‘shoulder which others would say they could not carry’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 39), an 
analogy of Christ bearing the weight of the cross (John 19:17). His evangelical duties 
on Sundays contribute to the faintest of hopes that against all odds he may yet be 
adjudged ‘innocent’ before God. Contrary to the sober tradition of his ‘austere and 
jealous country raising’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 38) Bunch falls in love with Lena through 
his inadvertent participation in the events surrounding the birth of her child. Having 
previously subjugated his will to the Protestant ethic due to the fear of eternal 
damnation and despite his vigilant avoidance of the contaminants of fallen humanity, 
Bunch’s intuition of a ‘young women (Lena) betrayed and deserted’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 
41) awakens desire, relegating ‘the former dilemma of his conscience’ to ‘a matter for 
children’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 63). Human intimacy is shown to infuse Bunch’s 
masculinity overwhelming the self-imposed asceticism that had previously castrated 
him. Light in August illustrates the transfiguring power of love to expose the ‘lie of 
innocence’. 
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The tendency to overlook the significance of love in Faulkner’s work has much to do 
with the tradition in literature to relegate the notion of love to romance, nostalgia, the 
illicit or the sexual. Faulkner’s fiction illustrates how love can be the catalyst for 
transfiguration and a journey of regeneration in the stories of Gail Hightower, Byron 
Bunch and Lena Grove. Bowling identifies love as being a central theme in all of 
Faulkner’s significant writings (Bowling 1973, p. 110). During his acceptance of the 
1950 Nobel Prize for Literature, Faulkner emphasized the significance of love and the 
passions of the heart to his own work. Faulkner states that a writer must leave:  
 
“…no room in his workshop for anything but the old verities and truths of the 
heart, the old universal truths lacking which any story is ephemeral and 
doomed – love and honour and pity and pride and compassion and sacrifice” 
(cited in Bowling 1973, p. 109).  
 
In Light in August, the importance of love is often emphasized indirectly, perceived 
through the absence of compassion amidst acts of depravity and desperation. It is in 
his portrayal of the spiritual affinity between family, nature and the ‘other’ – expressed 
primarily through compassion, loyalty and endurance – that Faulkner’s concept of love 
is to be found.  
 
Echoing the vision of the Romantic poets who perceived a relationship between nature 
and the awakening of consciousness, Faulkner’s fiction alludes to the transfiguring 
potential of nature to reinvigorate one’s vision of life. Writing at a time when the world 
despaired for true knowledge, Camus contends in his philosophical work The Myth of 
Sisyphus (1942) that all he could know was the heart he could feel and the world that 
he could touch: ‘There ends all my knowledge, and the rest is construction’ (Camus 
2000, p. 24). In Light in August, nature opens the tomb of Hightower’s existence as he 
walks among the woods after the birth of Lena’s child. Likewise JC is portrayed as 
being transfigured by his time in the wilderness, feeling the ‘…intermittent sun, the 
heat, smelling the savage and fecund odour of the earth, the woods the loud silence’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 305). It is during this ascetic journey into the wilds as he flees from 
the law – alive to the truth of the sensate – that JC breaks free from the will of the 
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Father and the script that had henceforth dictated his life. Illustrating the disposition of 
the ‘Orphan’ who refuses to comply with the expectations and behaviours fashioned 
for him by the social and racial prejudices of the South, JC freely walks among his 
accusers. Faulkner makes his strongest analogy with Christ; JC remains silent when 
taken into custody, rejecting language – the masculine domain of the Father – and the 
inhibiting fear of violence. A confused citizenship wonders why JC neither surrenders 
nor resist incarceration, exhibiting a boldness that challenges a society desperate to 
uphold its racial codes. James Spenko notes that fifty years since Light in August was 
published JC’s passive suicide remains a mystery (Spenko 1982, p. 260).xl Bleikasten 
seeks to explain JC’s behaviour in terms of one who has ‘set out and made his plans 
to passively commit suicide’ (Bleikasten 1987, p. 84). An alternative to Bleikasten’s 
theory of psychic suicide may lay in Faulkner’s description that JC, “…never acted like 
either a nigger or a white man. That was it. That was what made the folks so mad” 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 263). JC is a threat to the social order because he is both black and 
white, his very existence exposing Southern racial ideology as fiction.xli From this 
perspective I agree with Watkins’ contention that JC must ‘either be contained within a 
racial category, thus restoring balance to the social system, or he must be destroyed’ 
(Watkins 1994: 13). However, JC’s actions do not necessarily suggest that Faulkner 
tailors his story so as to conform to Southern expectations, removing a racial blight 
abhorred above all else in the South. In light of the Christ analogy to which Faulkner 
alludes, JC’s passivity may be interpreted as the response of one who is no longer 
willing to react according to the paradigm of power that had thus far orchestrated his 
life.  
  
Reference to the biblical narratives of Samuel’s call to the Levitical Priesthood and 
Abraham’s call to sacrifice his son Isaac may be discerned in JC’s mediated voice: 
“They all want me to be captured, and then [when] I come up ready to say Here I am” 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 253).xlii In these biblical narratives the expression “Here I am” 
functions as either a response to the call of ordination or a command to sacrifice. In 
her study of the prevalence of conscience and religiosity in the formation of the 
‘ideological’ subject, Judith Butler (1997) examines Faulkner’s use of the phrase “Here 
I am”. She argues that JC is an example of one who due to his prior ideological 
formation responds obediently to the law’s call to turn around. According to Butler the 
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statement “Here I am” implies that one ‘accepts the terms of the call, one feels guilty 
enough to turn around and submit’ (Butler 1997, p. 109).xliii Submission to the law’s call 
to ‘turn around’ therefore entails both an initial acceptance of religious condemnation 
and a subsequent willingness to accept the cost demanded to assuaged their guilt. 
Butler concludes that JC’s utterance is one of final submission before the law and an 
acceptance of the terms of its racial and legal pronouncement. However after his 
sojourn in the wilds, JC is portrayed as no longer being bound to the strictures of the 
law and the dualism that demands that one obey or revolt. Faulkner reinterprets the 
biblical “I am”, presenting JC not as a faithful servant attentive to the Father’s will, but 
rather as one who for the first time in his tragic history, acts according to the 
authenticity of his own volition: it is the presentation of self – Ecco Homo – Nietzsche’s 
‘behold the man’.xliv The character JC is presented as an Orphan and as such is 
removed from the law of the Father. It is therefore fitting that JC is hunted down and 
killed at the hands of one bearing the pseudo legality of the National Guard. Crouched 
behind an overturned table JC lets ‘them shoot him to death, with that loaded and 
unfired pistol in his hands’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 338). JC’s capture is the product of his 
rebellion against the script fashioned for him by society and his Protestant upbringing. 
His later refusal to fire upon Grimm provides a further example of his refusal to 
continue resisting the Father through the violent retaliation that had previously 
determined his life. Such passive resistance finds parallels with the civil rights activism 
of Martin Luther King Jnr and is reminiscent of the metaphysical revolt of Camus’ 
slave.xlv  
 
Considering JC’s litany of destruction it is perhaps ironic that Faulkner adopts the 
symbolism of the Christ figure. However, as Hirshleifer contends, JC is not so much 
presented as the ‘Son of God, but as the Son of Man’. Hirshleifer explains this 
distinction:  
 
(JC is) the figure of everyman driven by a violent past into a violent present, 
burdened by the curse of his ancestry, crucified as Hightower sees every 
man crucified (Hirshleifer 1973, p. 247).  
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Spenko concurs with Hirshleifer’s view that Faulkner’s presentation of JC holds 
significance for all who suffer under the curse of racism, legalism and violence. As this 
‘Son of Man’ lays shot and castrated, the horrified men from the Jefferson National 
Guard gaze upon JC not as a ‘damnable villain but as an unforgettable victim’ (Spenko 
1982, p. 254). Faulkner employs JC to illuminate the chasm between what we think 
and actual experience – a disparity that is further highlighted by the ludicrous hope of 
Lena’s blessed journey. Light in August illuminates the transformative power of the ‘lie 
of innocence’ upon those convinced of their moral superiority – whether derived from 
Christian beliefs or secular in conviction – and its susceptibility to judgementalism and 
egregious acts of violence. Repeatedly Faulkner reveals the foolishness of our 
assumptions and judgment of other’s behaviour and motivation – shown to be even 
more irresponsible when such conclusions rest upon the assumed authority of a book. 
Juxtaposed to those characters deluded by their perceived ‘ontological innocence’ are 
stories of healing in which empathy and compassion are shown to unite heart and 
mind, renew vision and signal the possibility of ‘innocence of becoming’.  
 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate two major themes of this study. In the first 
instance it was argued that Faulkner constructs a narrative that reflects the way in 
which innocence had been woven into the economic and political rationalization of a 
former Calvinist environment and thus the ‘Tree of Knowledge’ was identified in the 
way the characters represent fundamental allegiance to questionable concepts of 
good and evil. The second part of this chapter pinpoints the emergence of what I refer 
to as the Orphan character that ignites the almost extinguished flame of the Tree of 
Life and casts aside all categorizations that either named people as elect or damned. 
This shows yet again the extent to which these classifications said more about political 
rationalization via an inherited religion than about religion itself. The most pertinent 
aspect of this inheritance is that the behaviour sponsored by Calvinist ideology was 
bereft of the promises of redemption and so JC in going to his death life Meursault in 
The Outsider accepts the indifference of the universe and yet displays the courage 
and authenticity of one who has come to know himself.   
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i Linda Wagner was among the modernist critics who wrote about Faulkner’s representation of the 
emergence of a non-traditional society from its traditional roots (Wagner 1973). 
 
ii The dysfunctionality of family relations in Faulkner’s work is noted by Andre Bleikasten, who observes 
that Faulkner ‘told stories about stray sons and formidable fathers, both were obsessed with guilt, pain, 
and death, and both conjured up stark and powerful visions of extremity’ (Bleikasten 1995, p. 93). 
 
iii For further discussion of Faulkner’s use of the family to embody the larger social issues that 
challenged southern society during the mid-30s, see (Hirshleifer 1973).  
 
iv In Faulkner's Un-Christlike Christians: Biblical Allusions in the Novels (1983), Jessie McGuire Coffee 
likens Joe Christmas to a ‘robot, directed by invisible forces ... doomed and damned ... his fate 
predestined’ (Coffee 1983, p. 41). Lisa Nelson contends that Coffee’s reading of Light in August 
primarily through Faulkner’s use of biblical allegory tends to limit the possibilities of extrapolating 
meaning from the text. Furthermore she argues that by ‘collapsing the analogy’s components – 
human/divine is the same as black/white – Coffee erases the agency Christmas exercises as he attempt 
to be one or the other’ (Nelson 2004: 57). 
 
v McEachern’s divine insight places him in the tradition of the Ancient Hebrew’s who held to the 
conviction that they were providentially blessed with the capacity to know God’s will and discern that 
which is ‘right’ and ‘just’ because they were chosen by God and hence ontologically superior. The Old 
Testament book of Deuteronomy states, ‘For you are a people holy to the Lord your God. The Lord your 
God has chosen you out of all the peoples on the face of the earth to be his people, his treasured 
possession’ (Deut. 7:6). See also Deut. 14:2; 1Kings 8:44 and 2 Chron. 6:34. 
 
vi In the ‘Introduction’ to Songs of Innocence and of Experience, Blake portrays an idyllic image of a 
pristine world soon corrupted by the quest for knowledge, represented by the Piper writing down his 
song while the ink from his ‘rural pen’ stains the ‘water clear’ (Blake 1998, p. 59). 
 
vii Charles Carroll’s book “The Negro a Beast” or “In the Image of God” (1900), is an example of 
literature that supported the violation of culturally designated inferiors. This 380 page biblical exegesis 
attempts to justify the following theology: People of African descent do not have a soul and are therefore 
beasts (p. 93); By supporting a philosophy of “social equality” white people violate God’s “Plan of 
Creation” (pp. 145, 212, 219) and God’s will is fulfilled when Christians assert “dominion” (pp. 145, 218) 
over “lower animals” (Carroll 1990).  
 
viii Faulkner demonstrates that although slavery had been abolished in America in 1865, freedom for 
African Americans remained nothing more than an illusion in the South where the attitudes and beliefs 
that created the justification for slavery remain unchanged (Faulkner 2005, p. 358).  
 
ix Deleuze regards irony itself as ‘multiplicity – or rather, the art of multiplicities: the art of grasping (the) 
ideas and problems they incarnate in things, and of grasping things in incarnations, as cases of solution 
for the problems of Ideas’ (Deleuze 1994, p. 182). 
 
x In the mid-19th Century the theologian Søren Kierkegaard (1849) argued that a ‘self, every instant it 
exists, is in process of becoming, for the self … does not actually exist, it is only that which it is to 
become’ (Kierkegaard 1954, p. 163). 
 
xi Italics used by Faulkner. The mediated voice of Hightower reflects upon the ingrained violence that 
Faulkner presents as being endemic to Protestantism in the South: ‘Pleasure, ecstasy, they cannot 
seem to bear: their escape from it is violence, in drinking and fighting and praying; catastrophe too, the 
violence identical and apparently inescapable’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 276). 
 
xii Faulkner draws upon the words of Christ during his crucifixion: ‘Jesus said, “Father, forgive them, for 
they do not know what they are doing”’ (Luke 23:34). 
 
xiii “I Am” is used in reference to the self-designated title of God, as revealed to Moses in the book of 
Exodus (3:14). 
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xiv As a child, JC is shown to express bemusement while McEachern prays for his soul, ‘talking, 
adjuring, arguing with a Presence who could not even make a phantom indentation in an actual rug’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 117). 
 
xv Doreen Fowler aptly describes Hines as a ‘white-male supremacist, (who) stands for difference, 
boundaries, and repression; his life’s work can be read as an effort to police the borders between self 
and other’ (Fowler 1997, p. 64). 
 
xvi The disparity between the language used by McEachern and JC’s absolute incomprehension of 
concepts such ‘home’, the ‘abominations’ of ‘sloth and idle thinking’, the ‘two virtues of work, or fear of 
God’, highlights the foolishness of McEachern’s vain attempts to inflict his moral code upon the boy 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 110).  
  
xvii JC is compromised when Mrs McEachern divulges the secret of her hidden stash of money and food 
– ironically implicating JC in an act of deception while attempting to establish trust (Faulkner 2005, p. 
127).  
 
xviii As living expressions of ‘goodness’ the women of the Jefferson Presbyterian Church are represented 
as having no self-awareness or capacity for self-critique: ‘By being good herself she does not need to 
worry anymore about hers or anyone else’s goodness’ and therefore has time left to ‘smell out sin’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 51).  
 
xix Southern environmental historian Thomas D. Clark contends that the mid-decade of the 1920s was 
for the South ‘the point of no return to the days of reckless agricultural practices or the slashing away of 
the magnificent first forest’ (Clark 1984, p. 73). 
 
xx Don Doyle writes of the environmental exploitation of the Southern states as ‘Northern lumber 
companies having cut most of the North Woods of the Upper Midwest, now came South to take 
advantage of cheap land, cheap labour, and abundant timber’ (Doyle 2001, p. 302).  Vernon H Jensen 
states that by 1934, ‘of the 263 largest Southern mills, only 75 had access to enough timber to permit 
lasting operation’ (Jensen 1971, p. 17).  
 
xxi With a note of sarcasm Meyerson suggests that Faulkner represents Birch as little more than a 
‘malingering womanizer’ who ‘would complain about working “ten hours a day … (for a) little piddling 
fifteen cents an hour”’ (Meyerson 2008: 20). 
 
xxii Commenting on the disastrous economic collapse that took place in America during the period in 
which Faulkner wrote Light in August (August 17, 1931 to March 1932), John Bauman estimates that 
‘net income in the United States fell 60%. By the end of 1932, 15 million Americans were unemployed’ 
(Bauman 1988, p. 3). Bauman identifies the South as experiencing the greatest economic hardship 
during this time given that one-third of the nation’s population lived in the Southern states yet possessed 
but one-fifth its wealth and wages (Bauman 1988, p. 4). 
 
xxiii JC’s profound lack of comprehension is evident in his ‘fainting amazement’ upon learning that Bobbie 
was a prostitute (Faulkner 2005, p. 163). Perceiving that her livelihood had been compromised by JC’s 
assault on his Father-in -law, Bobbie racial abuses JC: “Bastard! Son of a bitch! Getting me into a jam, 
that always treated you like you were a white man. A white man!” (Faulkner 2005, p. 164). Racial 
equality is shown to be irrelevant when one’s wealth is threatened. 
 
xxiv JC wondered from Chicago to Mexico, his road ran ‘through yellow wheat fields waving beneath the 
fierce yellow days of labour and hard sleep in haystacks beneath the cold mad moon of September’ 
(Faulkner 2005, p. 169). Like the Christ of the Gospels, JC is represented as nomadic and homeless: 
‘Jesus said, “Foxes have dens and birds have nests, but the Son of Man has no place to lay his head”’ 
(Matt. 8:20).   
 
xxv John Lutz discusses the ‘profound economic and social investments’ the South had in ‘continuing to 
deny the suppressed voices within it’ (Lutz 1999: 4).  
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xxvi Faulkner demonstrates that the extreme emotion evoked by blind patriotism is reminiscent of 
religious zeal. The pervading influence of such patriotic zeal is represented in the town’s sudden 
acceptance of Grimm and their collective emotions of ‘respect and perhaps a little awe and a deal of 
actual faith and confidence, as though somehow his vision and patriotism and pride in the town, the 
occasion, had been quicker and truer than theirs’ (Faulkner 2005, p. 343).     
 
xxvii The idea that America was predestined to become the ‘New Israel’ finds its roots in New England 
Calvinism, which held that God had providentially chosen a new land for his people free from the 
corruption of the old world of Europe. This mythology has long served as a source of identity, motivation 
and self-righteousness among the American people and their leaders. For further regarding America as 
the “New Israel” see Conrad Cherry’s, God’s New Israel: Religious Interpretations of American Destiny 
(1971). 
 
xxviii The theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (1952) discusses the idea of America as the ‘New Israel’ and the 
dream of creating a ‘new humanity’ that restored ‘man’s lost innocence’ (Niebuhr 2009). Southern 
historian Comer Vann Woodward attributes the resilience of this idea of a nation called unto God as 
being fostered by the ‘American legend of success and victory … that has been preserved past infancy 
and into national adulthood’ (Vann Woodward 1961, p. 197). 
 
xxix Lackey contends that by ‘controlling the epistemological/ontological recursive loop, the Ancient 
Hebrews justify committing atrocities against the Canaanites with emotional, psychological, and legal 
impunity’ (Lackey 2006, p. 4). To ensure that America does not fall victim to similar moral perils, Vann 
Woodward affirms Niebuhr’s call to ‘disavow the pretensions and illusions of innocence derived from our 
national childhood, along with all self-righteousness, complacency, and humorless idealism’ (Vann 
Woodward 1961, p. 198). 
 
xxx Watkins elaborates upon the sacrosanct ideal of racial purity in the South, citing Bertram Wyatt-
Brown’s assertion that the ‘most psychologically powerful expression of Southern horror is the sexual 
dread of black blood in a white womb. In the patriarchal imagination, no humiliation was greater’ (Wyatt-
Brown cited in Watkins 1994: 20).  
 
xxxi Van Woodward notes that it is darkly ironic that morality upheld by nationalism in the name of justice, 
inevitably results in amoral and violent actions that undermine the political and moral foundations upon 
which peace is built (Vann Woodward 1961, p. 205).  
 
xxxii Bleikasten observes that Faulkner’s capacity to ‘empathize with the dispossessed and the 
humiliated’ and his ‘keen sense of evil and suffering’, have moved the French in particular to identify his 
work as tragic genius (Bleikasten 1995, p. 93). 
 
xxxiii In an interview with Cynthia Grenier, Faulkner stated, “I think people try to find more in my work than 
I’ve out there. I like to tell stories, to create people, and situations. But that’s all. I doubt if an author 
knows what he puts into a story. All he is trying to do is to tell what he knows about his environment and 
the people around him in the most moving way possible” (Faulkner quoted in Slatoff 1973, p. 171). 
 
xxxiv Benson argues that Lena can ‘no more break out of communal patterns of behaviour than 
Christmas can break into them; and it may be said that she experiences no moral change or 
achievement’ (Benson 1973, p. 267). 
 
xxxv Gable comments that the title of the novel Light in August is a pun on “going light”, rural slang for 
giving birth (Gable 1996: 9). 
 
xxxvi In his essay ‘innocence’, Alfonso Lingis suggests that ‘action of itself produces discontinuity, a 
return to emptiness, to innocence’ (Lingis 1999, 206). 
 
xxxvii Lackey concludes that ‘in the name of compassion, intimacy and love’ Hightower abandons God 
and in doing so is ‘able to see and act with compassion for others’ (Lackey 2006, p. 19). 
 
xxxviii As Wadlington notes, Faulkner’s characters have profound experiences either early in their lives 
when they have yet to develop the capacity to process them or they come too late leaving only a sense 
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of nostalgia. This literary style ensures that the struggles of the character’s subsequent or prior 
experiences can be juxtaposed with a significant event to highlight the chasm between worldview and 
the realities of experience (Wadlington 1995, p. 207). 
 
xxxix Gable discusses the various interpretations of Hightower’s visionary experience, observing that the 
consensus amongst scholars holds that this vision is a final acknowledgment of failure (Gable 1996: 1). 
Carole Ann Taylor regards ‘the thundering phantoms’ of Hightower’s vision as arriving in time to ‘turn 
back self-revelation’ (Taylor 1982, p. 219). Donald M. Kartiganer views Hightower’s dying apotheosis as 
evidence that the Reverend has ‘only summoned new energies to serve the illusion that is still 
paramount’ (Kartiganer cited in Bloom 1988, p. 26). 
 
xl Spenko suggests that whether JC is driven by ‘fate or by his own free will or by some combination of 
the two’ it may be impossible to understand the motives behind his apparently passive suicide with any 
precision, due in large to the complex psychological issues raised by Faulkner (Spenko 1966, p. 160). 
For further on this discussion see (Longley Jr. 1966, pp. 166-171) and (Thompson 1967, p. 74).  
 
xli In 1957 Faulkner stated that Joe, “didn’t know what he was, and there was no way possible in life for 
him to find out” (Gwynn 1959, p. 72). James Snead posits that JC is a pivotal Faulknerian figure 
because he represents that which is the ‘quintessence of indeterminable essence’ and so ‘resists 
signification’ (Snead 1986, pp.87-88).  
 
xlii The response, “Here I am” appears in the book of Genesis: ‘Some time later God tested Abraham. He 
said to him, “Abraham”. “Here I am”, he replied’ (Gen. 22:1), and the book of Samuel: ‘Then the Lord 
called Samuel; Samuel answered, “Here I am”’ (1 Sam. 3:4). 
 
xliii Butler argues that ‘(t)his readiness to accept guilt to gain a purchase on identity is linked to a highly 
religious scenario of nominating call that comes from God and that constitutes the subject by appealing 
to the need for the law, an original guilt that the law promises to assuage through the conferral of 
identity’ (Butler 1997, p. 109). 
 
xliv Ecco Homo (1888) is the title of Nietzsche’s final work, completed just months before his collapse 
into unconsciousness and subsequent paralysis.  
 
xlv JC’s refusal to respond with violence when confronted by Grimm may be interpreted as an act of 
rebellion against a society in which violence is legitimized by the patriarchal Father. Albert Camus (195) 
extrapolates on the nature of such a response to violence, contending that one ‘rebels’ when he is 
confronted by ‘an order of things which oppresses him with the insistence on a kind of right not to be 
oppressed beyond the limit that he can tolerate’ (Camus 1956, p. 13).  
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Chapter 6 - Graham Greene as ‘Militant’ 
Writer 
 
The works of Graham Greene provide a Roman Catholic (English) perspective from 
which the function of the ‘lie of innocence’ may be examined. Although writing in the 
secular age, that is when the church and politics in western society supposedly exist in 
separate realms, Greene – unlike Melville and Faulkner – still held to a belief in God. 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, Faulkner briefly refers to the necessity of the 
lie for those seeking to repress or deny realities or truths they deem to be threatening. 
It is perhaps important to see if it is possible to conceive of a world that might exist 
without this lie. Nevertheless, it prevails and some writers explore why it does. Greene 
for example argues that a particular kind of consciousness that embraces the fact of 
freewill will allow one to identify and remain aware of the detrimental effect of the 
political and religious representations of the ‘lie of innocence’. Through Greene’s 
writing the concept of innocence will be explored in relation to representations of 
sexuality, religious observance and power, which this thesis has extrapolated from the 
Bible as presiding themes. Subsequently this analysis will bring a ‘Catholic’ 
perspective to many of the themes identified in the previous chapters. Whereas it has 
been argued that Protestantism as portrayed in the selected literary texts, represented 
innocence as being a purely subjective state exemplified by adherence to the 
Protestant Work Ethic, innocence as represented by the Catholic Church will be shown 
to be dependent upon one’s obedience to and affirmation of Catholic doctrine. If as 
has been argued that Faulkner was a secular writer using Christian motifs, Greene 
may be considered a religious writer invoking not only Christian motifs but also 
Catholic doctrine/dogma to both condone and question the teaching of the Catholic 
Church.   
 
Although raised as an Anglican, Greene converted to the Catholic faith as a young 
man. Perhaps it was the nature of his conversion that enabled Greene to remain a 
‘protesting’ adherent who brought to his new religion a critical stance. Anglicanism had 
not made the issue of belief relevant to Greene’s philosophical views nor did it provide 
the ritual and philosophical questions endemic to Catholicism. Greene’s philosophical 
views wanted less the rules and laws of religious duty but more a symbolic network in 
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which God was a necessary enigma and yet crucial for the human spirit. It was not that 
he put rationality aside but instead applied it to a set of questions and understandings 
that had both personal and political meaning to him. Greene disputed whether that the 
Anglican religion touched the core of God’s significance given their dysfunctional 
representations that according to him bled the necessary symbols dry. Converted to 
Roman Catholicism through a process of instruction, Greene finally became 
‘convinced of the probable existence of something we call God’ (Greene 1972, p. 120). 
He states, ‘I can only remember that in January 1926 I became convinced of the 
probable existence of something we call God … there was no joy in it at all, only a 
sombre apprehension’ (Greene 1972, p. 120). 
 
Given Greene’s need to understand God’s divinity it was inevitable that there would be 
a fraught relationship with the Roman Catholic Church as well: One born from his need 
to rational explicate the experience of humanity rather than to submit to a compulsion 
to repentance and dutiful devotion.i Hence Greene retained a critical distance as a 
‘Protestant’ within a frame of Catholicism, exercising the freedom to question the 
dogmas of papal infallibility and aligning imperatives in relation to obedience, 
demonstrating a resolution to pursue that which his experience, reason and 
imagination revealed to be authentic rather than that prescribed as ‘truth’ by the 
Church. One of the most significant aspects of Graham Greene’s writing is the fact that 
he was willing to challenge the primacy of the Catholic Church as the sole mediator of 
religious faith and truth. Cates Baldbridge identifies this characteristic in Greene’s 
‘thematic juxtaposition of the mediated and the absolute’ within his novel The Power 
and the Glory, through which institutionalized religion is represented as ‘fatally 
inadequate in their self-proclaimed roles and conduit between the individual and God’ 
(Baldbridge 2000, p. 71). For Catholics in the 1940’s the humanization of sinful man 
gave hope that compassion born of subjective experience rather than strict adherence 
to moral dictums or mediated divine revelation might allow continuing a relationship 
with God.   
 
Immanence and Symbolism: Mystery, Magic and the Miraculous  
One of the principal themes explored in Greene’s fiction is the idea of unhappiness 
and the extent to which such unhappiness occurs due to the fact of sin. This idea 
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reoccurs throughout Greene’s novels Brighton Rock (1938) and The Power and the 
Glory (1940), providing a perspective as to why the ‘lie of innocence’ was/is necessary 
in living in our world. Belief in God and original sin is necessary for Greene because as 
Richard Hoggart suggests, disbelief would expose unhappiness and suffering to be 
senseless and render the ‘whole situation meaninglessly cruel’ (Hoggart 1953: 448). In 
The Lawless Roads (1939), Greene explains the nature of his faith: 
 
And so faith came to one – shapelessly, without dogma, a presence above a 
croquet lawn, something associated with violence, cruelty, evil across the 
way. One began to believe in heaven because one believed in hell, but for a 
long while it was only hell one could picture with a certain intimacy (Greene 
1982, p. 3). 
 
In response to such profound unhappiness Greene comprehended God as a mystery 
that could not be directly presented by language, yet nonetheless was present in the 
symbols of the Church and amidst the longing, suffering and fidelity of humanity. The 
Catholic view of language as a means of expressing the interrelationship of reality as a 
unified whole is at odds with the Protestant traditions in which, language functions to 
dislocate experience into individualized segments open to critique and judgment. 
Albert Gelpi’s discussion concerning the religious tension between Roman Catholicism 
and Protestant traditions within American culture elaborates on this divergence of 
language.ii Gelpi cites Paul Giles who considers this tension to be an extension of ‘that 
eternal argument between Aquinas and Luther, Catholicism and Non-conformism, the 
organization and the individual’ (Giles cited in Gelpi 1999: 205). Arguing that Catholics 
tend to see fallible individuals as needing a shared and supportive community that 
mediated God’s presence and their relation to the divine, Gelpi proposes that the 
language employed by Catholicism ‘works to bring things together’ (Gelpi 1999: 207). 
The logical extreme of the Protestant application of language is Calvinism and its 
message of the utter corruption and worthlessness of humanity – a theology which 
Gelpi contends works to ‘keep things distinctively apart’ (Gelpi 1999: 207). 
Consequently, the Protestant emphasis on individual conscience and individual belief 
differs from what Gelpi regards as the Catholic emphasis on ‘a (religious or artistic) 
tradition, which necessarily incorporates and objectifies the individual’ (Gelpi 1999: 
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205-206). Whereas Catholic theology holds that language may open the creative 
possibility of the revelation of absolute reality, Protestantism held that language is 
fragile and hence holds little possibility of conveying divine revelation. Weber perhaps 
explains this in the Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism where he 
demonstrates that removing ‘grace’ and ritual left men in an ‘iron cage’ (Weber 2002, 
p. 124).   
 
As the intellectual conviction that precipitated his conversion to Catholicism waned 
Greene’s faith became increasingly more mystical as instinct, ‘magic’ and the 
‘miraculous’ came to increasing prominence (Holderness 1993: 269). Years later in an 
interview with Mane-Francois Allain (1979), Greene reflected on this development in 
his faith: “I’m inclined to find superstition or magic more ‘rational’ than such abstract 
ideas as the Holy Trinity. I like the so-called ‘primitive’ manifestations of the Faith” 
(Greene cited in Allain 1991, p. 156). Greene saw no contradiction between intellectual 
belief in God and the superstition of Mexican peasants, finding magic preferable to the 
“abstractions of Methodists and Anglicans” (Greene cited in Allain 1991, p. 146). For 
Greene prayer was a product of the consciousness of man and as such was 
potentially contaminated by the corruption of man’s fallen state and language 
employed to create an illusion of ‘good’ and ‘right’. Greene perceived that the mystery 
of God’s presence in the Eucharist was a tangible earthly expression of God that was 
not subject to the vagaries of the individual, the fallibility that bedevilled language or 
the error of human interpretation. As demonstrated in The Power and the Glory, the 
Whiskey Priest who can no longer pray, finds strength in his faith in the ‘Host’: ‘the 
Host was different: to lay that between a dying man’s lips was to lay God’ (Greene 
2001, p. 150).iii Greene’s personal struggle with his faith and the persistent doubt that 
accompanied his belief in God is evident in his acknowledgment: “The trouble is I don’t 
believe my unbelief” (Greene cited in Hestenes 1999: 312).iv Greene considered faith 
and belief to be different; faith being a gift of God and above belief which he 
considered to be founded upon reason.v Commenting on Greene’s perspective on 
faith Graham Holderness notes: ‘Doubtless it would be possible to identify some 
pivotal point where existential resignation passes into religious trust, mere hunger for 
belief mutates into instinctive faith’ (Holderness 1993: 276). He suggests that Greene’s 
experience of faith was much like reading a novel where one who voluntarily chooses 
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to trust, finds fantasy, fact and fiction indistinguishable in the creative possibilities of 
the imagination (Holderness 1993: 280). This understanding of faith considers the 
creative potential of the imagination to be dependent upon one’s willingness to move 
beyond the boundaries of possibility imposed by rationality or prescriptive religious 
thought. It will be argued that Greene’s fiction repeatedly reveals the imagination as 
being indispensable in the creation of renewed perceptions of self and the ‘other’, 
disempowering prior assumptions and judgments. In his discussion of fantasy, 
Thomas Wendorf’s contention that The Power and the Glory, like JRR Tolkien’s The 
Lord of the Rings (1954), paradoxically disclose and conceal what he terms the ‘whole 
of reality’ is a helpful one to elaborate on the significance of the imagination in 
Greene’s works. Wendorf expresses the view that to ignore the relationship between 
realism and fantasy dismisses the power of fiction to reveal mystery, ‘that essential 
oneness of morality, mystery, and reality’ of mythic dimensions that may be attributed 
to religious classics (Wendorf 2002: 163). In his essay ‘On Fairy-Stories’ (1938), 
Tolkien argued that the artistic ability to create ‘secondary belief’ though fantasy 
provided ‘freedom from the domination of observed fact’ (Tolkien 1972, p. 67).vi  
 
While Tolkien’s modern fantasy distances itself from explicit religious elements, 
Greene’s modern Christian realism demands what Wendorf regards as a ‘represented 
distance between the myth and what is, between Christ and followers of Christ: in 
effect, realism of content’ (Wendorf 2002: 88). The Whisky Priest’s mythical 
association with Christ in The Power and the Glory is identified by Wendorf as an 
example of the use of allegory that avoids the potential to compromise the artistic 
integrity of the novel for the sake of a pattern. The novel tells the tale of a Priest who 
on the surface appears to be the antithesis of what a good Catholic Priest should be. 
Repeatedly in the novel the Priest rues his lack of discipline and failure of character. 
Riddled with guilt due to his alcoholism, fear of persecution and refusal to repent of his 
love for his illegitimate daughter, the Priest furiously rejects even the semblance of 
self-worth (Greene 2001, p. 160). However, throughout the narrative Greene shows 
that the Whiskey Priest is to be revered rather than damned. The Priest’s doubt, 
uncertainty and apparent moral failings do not fit the pattern of a Christ figure yet work 
to create a credible character that is, paradoxically, enhanced as a mythical figure 
(Wendorf 2002: 89). Greene’s fiction draws our attention to the significance of 
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symbolism and mystery, and in doing so disrupts our assumptions and single meaning 
interpretations of life. His attempt to represent God’s immanence in fiction places 
Greene as a contender for what Deleuze describes as characteristic of ‘minor 
literature’.vii 
  
The Apophatic God: Faith through Negation 
The Power and the Glory is primarily set in the territory of Chiapas, which Greene 
regarded as one of the more ‘primitive’ territories of Mexico. During his travels through 
that region in 1938, Greene observed that the Indians in remote enclaves practiced a 
primitive Christianity that awakened in him, ‘flashes … of something simple and 
strange and uncomplicated, a way of life we have hopelessly lost but can never quite 
forget’ (Greene 1982, p. 170).viii The authenticity of the indigenous Christians appealed 
to Greene who regarded their faith to be impervious to revolutionary progress.ix 
Greene spoke of the “fervour of the peasants … who suffered for their faith” and the 
testimony of their fidelity which “assumed such proportions, that (he) couldn’t help 
being profoundly moved” (Greene cited in Allain 1991, p. 155). Returning to England 
after his travels in Mexico, Greene wrote of his experience attending church:  
 
Mass in Chelsea seemed curiously fictitious; no peon knelt with arms out in 
the attitude of the cross, no woman dragged herself up the aisle on her 
knees. It would have seemed shocking, like the agony itself. We do not 
mortify ourselves. Perhaps we are in need of violence (Greene 1982, p. 
224).  
 
While Greene’s passing comment on violence in no way suggests that the author 
regarded violence or suffering as being of intrinsic worth, it does reflect his concern for 
the malaise he perceived to have spread throughout the Western world – a 
meaningless superficiality that once moved him to comment that the Church would be 
better off under Soviet repression than American indifference (Greene 1991, p. 138). 
Despite the fervour and faithfulness of these indigenous communities there is a sense 
in Greene’s works that trust in either the Catholic Church or biblical promises of 
salvation for deliverance from temporal suffering are pitifully naïve. The Priest’s 
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description of an indigenous mother beseeching her adopted Christian God to restore 
life to her child is one such example.  
 
The woman had gone down on her knees and was shuffling slowly across 
the cruel ground towards the group crosses; the dead baby rocked on her 
back. Did she expect a miracle? Faith, one was told, could move mountains, 
and here was faith – faith in the spittle that healed the blind man and the 
voice that raised the dead (Greene 2001, p. 153). 
 
An answer to the Priest’s question may lie in his earlier contemplation: ‘Why, after all, 
should we expect God to punish the innocent with more life?’ (Greene 2001, p. 153). 
Greene’s earlier portrayal of a child’s death evokes a sense of anger and betrayal, 
exposing biblical promises of protection for the innocent as empty. In the moment in 
which the mortally ill child kisses the Whiskey Priest’s hand, symbolising devotion and 
trust in the power of the Church, she dies. The immediacy of the girl’s death and the 
vividness of Greene’s description accentuate the irrelevance of the supposed 
innocence of the child and the stark absence of God. 
 
At that moment, while her lips were on his hand, the child’s face wrinkled, 
the eyes opened and glared at them, the tiny body shook with a kind of fury 
of pain; they watched the eyeballs roll up and suddenly become fixed, like 
marbles in a solitaire-board, yellow and ugly with death (Greene 2001, p. 
150). 
 
The accusative tenor of the passage searches for someone to blame for the tragic 
suffering and senseless death of the child, however Greene does not appear to be 
incriminating God. In the Catholic tradition the devout offer a kiss to the bishop’s ring, 
a kiss representative of one’s obedience to and trust in the power of the Church. The 
Priest as representative of Christ and the Church is powerless before the agony and 
death of the child. The absence of God amidst the child’s suffering and indeed 
throughout The Power and the Glory, may be construed as evidence of Greene 
consistently affirming faith through negation.x  
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Although any attempt to interpret Greene’s presentation of religion is fraught with 
difficulties, his novels and in particular, The Power and the Glory express an apophatic 
theology. The apophaticism employed by Greene negates traditional religious imagery 
and language to ask questions about love and reconsider paradoxical formulations 
about God.xi Greene’s rhetoric refuses our attempts to either judge or understand in 
any direction, a critical aspect of what Hope Hodgkins describes as ‘the overlap of the 
mystical and the linguistic that suggests the integral nature of Greene’s apophasis’ 
(Hodgkins 2006, p. 54). An apophatic response to Christian doctrine and theology 
afforded Greene the possibility of representing mystery.xii Through the creation of a 
sense of absence, Greene’s ‘negative’ rhetoric signals a reality beyond words, a 
reality, which Hodgkins suggests is experienced outside time and impossible to 
capture in narrative (Hodgkins 2006, p. 71).xiii Hodgkins quotes from the writings of 
Pseudo Dionysius in support of her view that the notion of God is better served by an 
imagery of ‘incongruous dissimilarities’ (Hodgkins 2006, p. 56).xiv Dionysius illustrates 
the incongruity of our notions of God in relation to individual consciousness:  
 
…leave behind you everything perceived and understood, everything 
perceptible and understandable, all that is not and all that is, and, with your 
understanding laid aside, to strive upward as much as you can toward union 
with him who is beyond all being and knowledge (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987, p. 
135). 
 
Dionysius’ apophatic theology presents God as being unrepresentable, a conception 
of divinity that can neither be portrayed through language nor limited to the 
understandings or perceptions from which knowledge is formed. Rather, Dionysius 
instructs that God can only be known in the living experience of the sublime moment, 
just as Melville asserted that the whale could only be known in the fury of the hunt. All 
attempts to represent God through language and thus convey knowledge of the divine 
– as is characteristic of Protestantism – can be seen to confirm Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
contention that ‘all control is limitation’: The unlimited ‘is the concern of the sublime’ 
(Nancy 1993, p. 35).   
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If Greene’s fiction suggests an ‘implied affirmation’, as proposed by Hodgkins, it does 
so in relation to the promise of eternity rather than alluding to an image of fallen and 
unconscious humanity languishing due to the absence of the divine.xv As reflected in 
the Whiskey Priest’s mediated voice, Greene represents such despair as a form of 
self-deception in the face of death: ‘You could trust God to make allowances, but you 
couldn’t trust smallpox, starvation, men’ (Greene 2001, p. 63). 
 
Greene’s fiction explores the relationship between individual motivations and their 
political and ideological contexts without the necessity of conforming to ethical 
guidelines, arguments of persuasion, or intellectual convictions that govern theological 
discussion (Holderness 1993: 277). The Power and the Glory places Catholic dogma 
within the political milieu of human interaction and social relationships. In the opening 
scene of the novel, the Whiskey Priest responds to a child’s inquiry as to why he 
endured a life of suffering when he could choose to “renounce” his faith. The 
embodiment of freewill sacrificed to the Church, the Priest definitively states: “It’s 
impossible. There’s no way. I’m a priest. It’s out of my power” (Greene 2001, p. 36). 
Living in constant fear of execution the Whiskey Priest is conflicted by his desire to flee 
persecution and the sincerity of his devotion to his priestly office. The failure of the 
Priest to see beyond a value system that is shown to be increasingly meaningless 
within his political context is, according to Lucio Ruotolo, distinctive of Jean Paul 
Sartre’s characters in that ‘they cannot or will not break through their loneliness and 
fear into consciousness’ (Ruotolo 1964: 428).xvi  
 
Reversing the model of a traditional detective novel in which a question precipitates a 
search, Greene postpones the capture of the Priest to create a space for the 
transfiguration of his character and the renewal of faith (Malamet 1994: 214). Over 
time the crippling effect of guilt and self-condemnation come to diminish the Priest’s 
inclination to judge others: ‘He looked a good man: perhaps he was a good man. 
Perhaps, the priest thought, I have lost the faculty of judging’ (Greene 2001, p. 174). 
Later in the novel the Priest is imprisoned as a hostage and facing imminent execution 
if his identity is exposed, rejects the notion that he is a martyr for the faith declaring: 
“…martyrs are holy men … I tell you I am in a state of mortal sin” (Greene 2001, p. 
125).xvii The irony of the Priest’s self-denunciation is that his acts of compassion, 
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loyalty and willingness to defy the tyrannical laws of the revolutionary State, indeed 
signify him as a martyr. Greene demonstrates that the suffering experienced by the 
Priest creates a capacity to empathize with the plight of others. However, the 
compassion that is aroused by such insight is shown to be suffocated by Christian guilt 
due to theological concepts such as ‘mortal sin’ and the ‘pride of the flesh’.   
 
The Function of the ‘Lie of Innocence’ in the experience of the Child  
Greene’s presentation of the child differs significantly from the notion of childhood 
innocence portrayed by the Romantic poets, his fiction exposing such innocence as 
mere naivety cultivated by ignorance and sustained by evasion. In The Power and the 
Glory the dialogue between a mother and daughter regarding the Catholic faith 
emphasises this evasion.  
 
“Mother,” the child said, “do you believe there’s a God?”  
The question scared Mrs Fellows. She rocked furiously up and down and 
said, “Of course.”  
“I mean the Virgin Birth – and everything.”  
“My dear, what a thing to ask. Who have you been talking to?” (Greene 
2001, p. 49). 
 
Coral’s questions are parried away by an agitated mother seeking to deny her own 
doubts lest they trouble her religious certitude. Through appeals to emotion and non-
specific generalisations the mother reflexively redirects her daughter’s questions. In 
doing so the mother denies the child the opportunity to make inoperative the ‘lie of 
innocence’ and develop a new consciousness. The mother’s response is contrasted 
with Coral’s atheism and her response to life with a pragmatic honesty uncommon for 
her age. It is both ironic and instructive that Greene creates an atheist child with the 
consciousness of an adult to save the life of the Priest. Adamant that her Christian 
mother could not be trusted due to fear of government reprisals it falls to the courage 
of a child to harbour the Whiskey Priest in the family barn to avoid capture (Greene 
2001, p. 32). In his discussion of atheism in Another Mexico (1939), Greene comments 
on the qualities needed to live as an atheist: ‘to accept nothing at all – that requires 
some stubbornness, some courage’ (Greene 1964, p. 32). Given that Greene held that 
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the only explanation for the sufferings of humanity was that the world was corrupted by 
sin, the atheist required courage to look upon this same suffering and retain a 
perspective of life that remained hopeful and positive about the prospects for 
humanity’s future.   
 
Greene dispels the Romantic notion of the spiritually enlightened ‘innocent’ child 
juxtaposing the fear and desperation of the Priest with the calm self-assurance of 
Coral. Asserting that she would not pray with the Priest because, “I don’t believe in 
God”, the child employs practical measures such as Morse code in order to keep the 
priest safe (Greene 2001, p. 37). Coral’s atheism is an affront to the Church and her 
actions treasonable to the State, yet Greene reserves for her a moral integrity 
otherwise compromised – with the possible exception of the Whiskey Priest – by each 
character in the novel. Nonetheless, there is a hint of sadness conveyed in Coral’s 
worldview and a sense of something lost that suggests a distinct distaste for the adult 
world into which she had graduated. Greene writes of her lost childhood: 
 
…the word ‘play’ had no meaning to her at all – the whole of life was adult … 
it was incomprehensible like a ceremony she hadn’t learned: she couldn’t 
see the point of pretending (Greene 2001, p. 50). 
 
The child represents Greene’s philosophical ideas concerning the nature of innocence 
and his child characters exact his antagonism to the assumption that children are mere 
blank ‘tableau’ upon which Catholic doctrine may be imposed without question. Early 
in The Power and the Glory Greene portrays a Catholic family in which the mother has 
assumed the responsibility of instructing her children in the faith. The children vary in 
their responses to their mother’s instruction, the son remaining steadfastly sceptical 
while his two younger sisters ‘with beady intense eyes’ are described as ‘drinking in 
the sweet piety’ (Greene 2001, p. 20). As the smiling mother calmly and happily recites 
the story of ‘Juan’ the martyr, her son waits impatiently: ‘the shooting never failed to 
excite him, and he always waited anxiously for the coup de grace’ (Greene 2001, p. 
216). Willing to neither abdicate his intelligence nor surrender his will to the suicidal 
fate endorsed by his mother’s morality the son revolts, shouting in rage, “I don’t 
believe a word of it… Nobody could be such a fool” (Greene 2001, p. 47). Although the 
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boy rejects the virtue of martyrdom and the Catholic ‘truths’ proffered by his mother, 
his sisters remain ‘motionless, their eyes large and brown’, representative of the 
callous piety of children and adults alike who willingly indulge in stories of sacrificial 
death and martyrdom in the name of religion (Greene 2001, p. 47). 
 
Employing the image of a lifeless town Greene annuls the concept of innocence from a 
land where it had lost meaning and rendered irrelevant in the face of suffering, death 
and the strictures of law. The grave of a young child provides the context in which a 
mourning father deliberates with Padre José as to the value of innocence under the 
law of the revolutionary State. The desperate father asks the Priest to pray for his 
daughter exclaiming; “She was – innocent”. The narrator observes that belief in 
innocence had long been abandoned, the ‘word in the little stony town sounded odd 
and archaic and local, outdated’ (Greene 2001, p. 44). In fear of retribution by the 
State the Padre is unequivocal in his refusal to offer a prayer for the child: “It is against 
the law”’ (Greene 2001, p. 44). As previously discussed in relation to Blake’s Songs of 
Innocence and Experience, the ‘lie of innocence’ is perhaps most harshly exposed in 
the exploitation of the child due to their apparent naivety. In The Power and the Glory, 
Greene challenges the notion of childhood innocence, his portrayal of the Priest 
meeting his illegitimate daughter for the first time brings into question the Catholic 
teaching on the ‘age of accountability’.xviii The girl screeches and giggles in response 
to the Priest’s attempt to greet her with a kiss, crying in an ‘ancient voice’; “Don’t you 
touch me” (Greene  2001, p. 79). Samuel Terrien’s suggestion that the girl mistook the 
nature of the Priest’s intentions due to the likelihood that she was a victim of prior 
sexual molestations in her village seems plausible (Terrien 1992: 437). The Priest 
finds solace in the conviction that ‘every child was born with some kind of knowledge 
of love … the saving or the damning kind. Lust too was a kind of love’ (Greene 2001, 
p. 79). Greene’s treatment of sexuality in relation to the Whiskey Priest’s daughter 
challenges the Catholic notion that childhood was a state of innocence and exposes 
the assumption of naivety upon which the ‘lie of innocence’ is constructed.  
 
In the novel Brighton Rock a similar critique of the Catholic idea of innocence may be 
discerned. Set in the Southern coastal city of Brighton, England, seventeen year old 
Pinkie seizes the leadership of a small band of gangsters after the murder of their 
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previous leader. The protagonist of sorts in the novel is Rose, a young waitress who 
inadvertently meets with Hale shortly before he is murdered by Pinkie. Rose is 
subsequently embroiled in the midst of a narrative that pits Pinkie against Ida Brown, a 
‘good’ woman and brief companion of Hale intent upon seeing justice done. 
Relentlessly pursued by Ida the desperate young gangster marries Rose to ensure 
she cannot be summoned to testify against him in court for the murder of Hale. 
Determined to remove all traces of guilt and to free himself from his marriage of 
convenience, Pinkie coerces Rose to join him in a suicide pact which, he had no 
intention of fulfilling. Filled with resentment for the social and economic inequality of 
his childhood and driven by revolt against the Church, Pinkie is portrayed as knowing 
no limit to his ambition. Betrayal and murder become legitimate tools in the eyes of a 
young man who denied the possibility of innocence is incapable of feeling compassion, 
empathy or love. Repressed images, Latin creeds and doctrines of damnation haunt 
Pinkie, providing a window into the social and religious alienation experienced by 
many of the Catholic poor prior to the Second World War.xix Laughing ‘softly with in-
finite contempt and superiority at a world which used words like innocence’ (Greene 
2004a, p. 201), Pinkie’s mediated voice attests that innocence died at birth:  
 
…you had to go back a long way further before you got innocence; 
innocence was a slobbering mouth, a toothless gum pulling at the teats; 
perhaps not even that; innocence was the ugly cry of birth (Greene 2004a, p. 
155). 
 
Pinkie’s confronting view of innocence being ruptured at birth is at odds with Catholic 
doctrine that considers the naïve child to remain innocent until the age of 
accountability. Greene alludes to a time of reckoning when all children become 
conscious of the inevitability of betrayal and the naivety of innocence is lost: ‘There is 
always one moment in childhood when the door opens and lets the future in’ (Greene 
2001, p. 6).xx  
 
Beyond Redemption: Betrayal and the Fatalism of the Alienated 
Betrayal features prominently in Greene’s novels and is shown to be a principle cause 
of the despair and disillusionment personified in many of his characters. In Brighton 
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Rock betrayal is instrumental in the formation of Pinkie, his hatred of innocence and 
the motivation for his lust for power and revenge. A life of social alienation and 
emotional repression manifests in the fatalism and hubris that consumes Pinkie: ‘…he 
had a momentary sense of his own immense cleverness … If only one could boast of 
one’s cleverness, relieve the enormous pressure of pride’ (Greene 2004a, p. 195). 
Greene’s presentation of Pinkie provides an insight into the devastating cost exacted 
upon one who seeks to establish their will through the conquest of another. With ‘grey 
inhuman’ eyes (Greene 2004a, p. 12), that reveal a depth of experience unfathomable 
to the sum of his years, Pinkie is depicted as looking older than his years: ‘the slate 
eyes were touched with the annihilating eternity from which he had come and to which 
he went’ (Greene 2001, p. 20). Possibly, Greene’s darkest confession of life is 
presented in Pinkie’s fatalistic yet pragmatic assessment of the fate of humanity. 
 
“I’ll tell you what it is. It’s gaol, it’s not knowing where to get some money. 
Worms and cataract, cancer. You hear ‘em shrieking from the upper 
windows – children being born. It’s dying slowly” (Greene 2004a, p. 247). 
 
Scholars have offered a number of explanations for the darkness of Greene’s literary 
world (often called Greeneland) and the predominance of suffering, pain, isolation and 
decay. In his discussion of ‘Greeneland’, Mark Hestenes notes that Kenneth Allott and 
Miriam Farris (1951) ‘minimize Greene's religious thought and focus on his childhood 
obsessions’, while Francis Kunkel (1959) pictures Greene as having ‘primarily a 
religious concern for the utter depravity of mankind’ (Kunkel cited in Hestenes 1999: 
312).xxi Writing from a Marxist perspective, Trevor Williams argues that Greene 
provides an underlying materialist explanation for the formation of Pinkie, which is 
overshadowed by theological concerns. For example Williams cites the ‘enforced 
Saturday night witnessing of (Pinkie’s) parents copulation’ as a passage that can 
easily be read from a materialist perspective as purporting a lack of ‘adequate housing 
and proper privacy’ (Williams 1992: 6).xxii Despite what he regards as ‘distortions 
caused by the imposed Catholic framework’ Williams contends that Brighton Rock, 
albeit unconsciously, challenges us to recognize deeper social and political questions 
as to the fallen state of the world and attempt to change it (Williams 1992: 8). Williams 
attributes Greene’s socio-political contextualisation of the novel to the author’s 
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emotional commitment to both ‘Catholicism and socialism’ (Williams 1992: 2). While 
his Marxist interpretation of Brighton Rock identifies many of the political and social 
concerns presented in the novel, Williams’ claim that Greene emphasises ‘some 
theological infinity of pain’ rather than ‘social determination’ (Williams 1992: 2) does 
not take into consideration the interrelationship between poverty, power and violence. 
The gangster Colleoni’s rational explanation of his ‘business’ to Pinkie conveys the 
dynamics of this relationship: “I’m just a business man … nothing you might try to do to 
my men could affect me … I can afford it. I don’t have to worry” (Greene 2004a, p. 67). 
In response to Pinkie’s threat of revenge, Colleoni advises the young man: “It wouldn’t 
pay. There wouldn’t be any faked alibis for you. It would be your witnesses who’d be 
scared” (Greene 2004a, p. 67). There is much to suggest that Pinkie’s pessimism is a 
product of equally oppressive forces of Catholicism and social marginalization.  
 
For Pinkie the guarantee of eternal damnation was underwritten by his experience of 
life, ‘Heaven was a word: hell was something he could trust’ (Greene 2004a, p. 248). 
Unable to conceive of peace, Pinkie’s worldview echoes Kurtz’s cry: “the horror, the 
horror” in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (Conrad 1995, 137). Williams attributes 
“the horror” to Greene’s apparent ‘theological evasion, an attempt to mystify what is 
totally explicable by the action of men pursuing, in all instances, goals which are 
economic even before they are political’ (Williams 1992: 3).xxiii Williams regards 
questions as to the relative value of ‘good’ over ‘right’ or whether the ‘evil’ of Pinkie is 
somehow preferable to Ida Arnolds’ obsession with justice as moral abstractions. He 
argues that a weakness of Brighton Rock is that the novel necessitates one 
sympathizes with ‘Pinkie merely on the grounds that he was a ‘Roman’ and therefore 
in touch with something eternal called evil’ (Williams 1992: 2). However, this reading of 
Brighton Rock overlooks the point that Greene is equally dismissive of the notion of 
‘evil’ as he is of the idea of ‘wrong’, his fiction illustrating his deeper concern for those 
who suffer due to the abuse of power and the erroneous value systems in which this 
abuse triumphs.xxiv  
 
Shortly before his death, Isaiah Berlin described his impression of Greene as “sinister” 
(Gray 2000:1). In his essay ‘A touch of evil’ (2000), John Gray suggests that if Greene 
was indeed “sinister”, it was because he was a nihilist who lacked a sense of evil.xxv 
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Gray identifies a ‘peculiar type of moral ambiguity’ in Greene’s works, which he 
suggests is made possible because the author did not believe in evil. Indeed the evil 
with which Pinkie is beset is shown to endow him with an uncommon insight into the 
corruption of the world that is veiled from those who conform to the terms of 
conventional morality. While I concur with the view that Greene did not believe in evil, 
an alternative explanation for his perceived nihilism may lay in his rejection of Catholic 
dogma regarding ‘good’ and ‘evil’. In his early reflections on faith Greene commented 
that the “primary symbols” for goodness and evil may be understood as “two countries” 
that “lay side by side”: One was inevitably “an inhabitant of both countries” (Greene 
1964, pp. 2-3). The portrayal of Greene as a nihilist does not take into consideration 
his presentation of ‘evil’ in relation to atypical Catholic denouncements of vice or sin. 
Although portrayed as the personification of evil Pinkie cares nought for the trappings 
of sin commonly associated with drunkenness, fornication and greed. Rather Pinkie’s 
evil is laid bare through his desire for power and freedom from the oppression that had 
determined his life, conscious that such revolutionary intent amounted to certain 
damnation. Revolt against the dictates of the Church through the exercise of one’s 
freewill constitutes ‘mortal sin’ in the Catholic tradition, ensuring Pinkie will never be 
deemed innocent. 
 
Greene demonstrates that for Pinkie the choice of evil offers no respite from 
condemnation. Conscious of how the concept of innocence is a mere abstraction 
referring to an unrealizable state yet locked within the dualistic paradigm of its 
judgment, Pinkie is doomed to oppose power with power. As Pinkie drives Rose to ‘the 
spot he has selected to kill her’ he intones, “Dona nobis pacem” (Greene 2004a, p. 
248).xxvi Despite Pinkie’s attempts to remove all threats and kill off all dangers, he fails 
to find the peace he craves but has never known. Tragically Pinkie betrays himself, 
remaining a victim of arbitrary edicts clarifying behaviour as either ‘good’ or ‘evil’ and 
condemned to pursue the same course of violence as the society that had spawned 
him.   
 
In the closing stages of Brighton Rock, faced with the prospect of his imminent death, 
Pinkie contemplates the words of the Catholic Mass taken from the Gospel of John: 
‘He was in the world and the world was made by Him and the world knew Him not’ 
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(Greene 2004a, p. 262).xxvii The language of the Catholic mass reflects Pinkie’s 
alienation from a world that having formed him is in turn made by him in his image. 
Pinkie’s inability to repent is couched in his refusal to deny the realities of his 
experiences and acquiesce to the deceit endemic to the myth that innocence was a 
realizable state of being.  
 
Desiring ‘no more human contacts’ or ‘other people’s emotions washing at the brain’ 
(Greene 2001, p. 251) Pinkie’s inability to comprehend love – ‘whatever that meant’ – 
ensures that Rose is far more threatening than the criminal machinations of Colleoni 
(Greene 2004a, p. 203).xxviii Fear of intimacy and the perceived vulnerability and 
weakness associated with the sexual act repulses Pinkie, ‘to be touched, to give 
oneself away, to lay oneself open – he had held intimacy back as long as he could at 
the end of a razor blade’ (Greene 2001, p. 145). After his triumphal graduation ‘in the 
last human shame’ Pinkie is moved by ‘a faint feeling of tenderness’ and pinches Rose 
on her ear (‘Greene 2004a, p. 198). However, like JC in Light in August, Pinkie’s 
primary means of survival is dependent upon self-alienation sustained through the 
perpetual violence of his personal revolution. To a soul consumed by hatred, the 
‘goodness’ of Rose is perceived as ‘merely a refinement of cruelty’ (Greene 2004a, p. 
135). Greene’s juxtaposition of the ‘evil’ Pinkie with the ‘good’ of Rose works to expose 
the symbiotic relationship of these “two countries”. Pinkie remains intrinsically bound to 
that from which he seeks to be free, acknowledging ‘what was most evil in him needed 
her: it couldn’t get along without goodness’ (Greene 2004a, p. 135). 
 
Brian Diemert’s observes that Pinkie is elevated to the ‘tragic stature’ of Macbeth or 
Milton’s Satan, damned ‘because he professes a belief in a divine order against which 
he defiantly rebels: “Credo in unum Satanum”’ (Diemert 1992: 3).xxix This view helps to 
explain the nature of the fatalism that envelops Pinkie and predestines his course. 
Although the character may be perceived as an inevitable product of his socio-
religious formation, it is also evident that Pinkie’s revolt against God and humanity is a 
choice for power. Reasoning that ‘God couldn’t escape the evil mouth which chose to 
eat its own damnation’ (Greene 2004a, p. 194), Pinkie’s revolt affords him immunity 
from divine retribution for the term of his mortal life. Resigned to eternal damnation 
Pinkie holds that death ‘didn’t horrify him: it was easier than life’ (Greene 2004a, p. 
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225). Pinkie’s alienation is distinctive of one betrayed by the Father, his revenge and 
violence testament to a life that has exposed the notion of innocence to be a lie.  
 
In the Divine Comedy (1472) Alighieri Dante portrays the most fiendish depths of ‘Hell’ 
as being reserved for those guilty of betrayal and treachery – a sin he held to be more 
heinous than murder.xxx A similar view is apparent in The Power and the Glory in 
which the Whiskey Priest compares the significance of betrayal with the murderous 
deeds of a Yankee outlaw: “He only killed and robbed. He hasn’t betrayed his friends” 
(Greene 2001, p. 75). The impending betrayal unto death of the Whiskey Priest is a 
central theme in The Power and the Glory, the Priest’s Metizo guide symbolic of the 
biblical Judas.xxxi The allegorical representation of the betrayal of Jesus reflects 
Greene’s penchant for re-inventing biblical themes to address contemporary issues 
such as trust and deception. Greene demonstrates how the ‘lie of innocence’ is 
employed to create a smoke screen of good intentions in order to allay the fear of 
betrayal. The Metzio attempts to conceal his intentions by accusing the Priest of being 
distrustful of help freely offered by a fellow Christian. 
  
He said accusingly, “You don’t trust me. Just because I am a man who likes 
to do a good turn to strangers, because I try to be a Christian, you don’t trust 
me.” He seemed to be working himself into a little artificial rage. He said, “If I 
wanted to rob you, couldn’t I have done it already? You’re an old man” 
(Greene 2001, p. 86). 
  
The accusation mirrors political rhetoric employed to conceal true motive and 
illustrates Jacques Derrida’s argument that the ‘lie’ maintains the oppositional and 
traditional distinction between truth and the lie because it operates its deception from 
within this tradition (Derrida 1986, p. 91). The Metzio’s reassurance, “I wouldn’t betray 
you. I’m a Christian”, merely serves to confirm the Priest’s fears that he ‘was in the 
presence of Judas’ (Greene 2001, p.88). Greene uses this devious character to 
comment on the nature of the relationship between wealth and morality: “A poor man 
has no choice, father. Now if I was a rich man – only a little rich – I should be good” 
(Greene 2001, p. 97). Poverty that induces the poor to betray another for financial gain 
knows no religious adherence to ideas of innocence or guilt.  
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Graham Greene as Revolutionary 
A characteristic of the works of each writer examined in this thesis is that neither the 
authors nor their writings lend themselves to simplistic binary categorization. The 
novels considered undermine such classifications and even apparent antagonists such 
as the Lieutenant in The Power and the Glory are often ‘half right’ – as is evident in his 
declaration that the children who stand to inherit the revolutionary state “deserve 
nothing less than the truth – a vacant universe and a cooling world” (Greene 2001, p. 
58). Cates Baldbridge suggests that for Greene the Lieutenant’s comment is both true 
and false in that ‘the universe is not vacant, for the merciful God of the Whiskey Priest 
exists’, however ‘the world is cooling, and so is the God who created it’ (Baldbridge 
2000, p. 84). Just as Greene’s characters cannot be defined according to fixed moral 
axioms or absolute notions ‘good’ or ‘evil’ his political views can be said to be equally 
evasive of categorization. Greene referred to himself as a ‘social democrat’ (Cassis 
1994, p. 453), which Brian Diemert interprets as ‘a kind of ideal socialism able to guard 
and preserve the rights and dignity of the individual’ (Diemert 1996: 49). At play 
throughout Greene’s works is an on-going contrast and comparison between 
Christianity, liberalism and Marxism and it is within this multiplicity of connections, co-
existence and parallels that Greene’s politics rests. 
 
Commenting on politics and religion in relation to his fiction, Greene writes:  
 
“I don’t as a rule write to defend an idea. I’m content to tell a story and to 
create characters. In an article one can try to express a direct point of view 
but not in a book. I don’t want to use literature for political ends, nor for 
religious ends” (Greene cited in Allain 1991, p. 78).  
 
While it is well documented that Greene associated with Marxist leaders such as Fidel 
Castro and Omar Torrijos and sympathized with various revolutionary struggles 
throughout Latin America during the 1950’s and 60’s, it is simplistic to label Greene as 
a Marxist. In Greene’s novel The Comedians (1976), the communist Dr. Magiot 
discriminates between different aspects of leftist orthodoxy:  
 
  Chapter 6: Graham Greene 
 
“I have grown to dislike the word ‘Marxist.’ It is used so often to describe only 
a particular economic plan. I believe of course in that economic plan – in 
certain cases and in certain times – But communism, my friend, is more than 
Marxism, just as Catholicism … is more than the roman Curia. There is a 
mystique as well as a politique” (The Comedians 1976, p. 286).  
 
Greene stated, “I don’t believe in perfectibility any way, on either (the Christian or 
Marxist) side. We can improve conditions, but I don’t think we can expect a perfect 
world” (Cassis 1994, p. 470). It is the conviction that conditions for humanity could be 
improved that seems to be at the heart of Greene’s interest in Marxism, a view 
supported by Neil McEwan who considers Greene’s respect for Communists as being 
grounded in their greater awareness of ‘social evil … than the complacent majority of 
people’ (McEwan 1988, p. 14). Greene’s concern for the plight of the oppressed and 
his advocacy for revolutionary political and social activism to bring about change, was 
of particular interest to modern Christians in the 1950’s and 60’s. McEwan’s contention 
that Greene ‘dreamed of a Communism that does not and could not exist’ is 
reasonable given that while Greene saw the value of Marxism for improving conditions 
for humanity, he nevertheless admitted it harboured only “the hopeless hope of a 
human face of Communism” (Cassis 1994, pp. 194, 302). 
 
The political context of The Power and the Glory owes much to Greene’s travels 
through Mexico in the aftermath of the socialist revolution that had transformed the 
country. In this political climate, the Roman Catholic Church came under significant 
persecution and in some remote territories where Catholic priests were banished 
under the threat of death. Although at the time of Greene’s visit to Mexico in 1938, the 
anti-clerical polices of the revolutionary government had on the whole softened, the 
isolated tropical states of Tabasco and Chiapas continued to suffer severe religious 
privations under local authorities. Prior to his journey Greene wrote in his diary; “and 
why Mexico? Did I really expect to find there what I hadn’t found here? ‘Why, this is 
hell,’ Mephistopheles told Faustus, ‘nor am I out of it” (Greene 1964, p. 6). Greene had 
hoped that Mexico would liberate (“release”) him from the banality of cheap and empty 
materialistic values to refocus upon important deliberations and contemplation 
regarding human existence. These hopes were initially dashed while watching the 
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crowds at a cockfight, an experience, which Greene was to later recall as the moment 
he “began to hate the Mexicans” (Greene 1964, p. 46). Greene explains his reaction: 
“Suddenly one felt an impatience with all this mummery, all this fake emphasis on what 
is only a natural function [in this case, death]” (Greene 1964, p. 46). According to 
Sheryl Pearson, Mexico was to provide Greene with a ‘likely image of condemned 
humanity, of a ravaged and lawless world offering up the ironic possibility of gratuitous 
salvation’ (Pearson 1982: 280).  
 
Greene’s view of revolution appears to have been influenced by his experience of 
witnessing a strike organized by a Mexican priest in 1938. Greene reflects on the 
experience:  
 
“This strike was the first example I had come across of genuine Catholic 
action on a social issue, a real attempt, led by the old, fiery, half-blind 
Archbishop, to put into force the papal encyclicals which have condemned 
capitalism quite as strongly as Communism” (Greene 1982, p. 28).  
 
The Vatican’s assessment of the moral credibility of The Power and the Glory 
exemplifies what Greene regarded as the Church’s historical denial of political 
realities: ‘literature of this kind does harm to the cause of the true religion’ and 
therefore ‘in the future he (Greene) should behave more cautiously when he writes’ 
(Godman 2001: 85).xxxii Greene proposed that a humane response to revolution was 
primarily dependent upon remaining unyielding to capitalist interests. However as 
proposed by Stephen Benz, he also supported ‘altering Marxist interpretations when 
necessary’ in order to ‘act independently and to think beyond dogma’ (Benz 2003: 
119). Anthony Newbury denotes Pius Xl’s (XII) encyclicals Quadragesimo anno (1931) 
and Divini Redemptoris (1937) as examples of a pontificate glossing over the ‘worst 
crimes of capitalism while even the minor mistakes of the communists were vigorously 
criticised’ (Newbury 2000: 70). This same tendency to equate Marxism with great evil 
characterized the reign of Pope John Paul II in the mid 1980’s. In response to the 
Vatican’s political stance, Greene wrote a letter to The Times on 11th September 1984 
in which he stated, ‘To him (John Paul II), as to President Reagan, Marxism is the 
great enemy, black against white, and the word Marxist becomes more and more a 
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vague term of abuse’ (Hawtree 1991, p. 225). Again in 1985 Greene rebuked John 
Paul II as hypocritical: “I see no logic in the fact that he is a political pope and yet he 
refuses to let priests be political priests” (Greene 1985, p. 5).xxxiii 
 
Although he regarded human beings as corrupt due to sin, Greene’s non-fiction writing 
on Latin America nevertheless conveys his conviction that one must take the side of 
justice for the oppressed in order to alleviate suffering. At a conference in Moscow, 
Greene proclaimed:  
 
“we are fighting – Roman Catholics are fighting – together with the 
Communists, and working together with the Communists. We are fighting 
together against the Death Squads in El Salvador. We are fighting together 
against the Contras in Nicaragua. We are fighting together against General 
Pinochet in Chile … There is no division in our thoughts’ (Greene 1990, pp. 
316-17).  
 
Of Greene’s encounters with Latin American leaders it was Omar Torrijos who he 
regarded as “one of my best friends”, a leader that did not think dogmatically (Greene 
cited in Allain 1991, p. 56). Panama was of particular interest to Greene because he 
“was fascinated to see such a little country holding its own against the Americans” 
(Greene 1984, pp. 37-38).xxxiv Greene argued that a revolution with a human face was 
contingent upon a leader who is an “idealist without a formal ideology, except a 
general preference for left over right and a scorn for bureaucrats” (Greene 1984, p. 
38). Greene regarded revolution as a legitimate response of the Church to injustice.  
 
I know that all too often throughout history the Church has sided with the 
powerful, but this has happened less frequently in the twentieth century. I 
think that at the moment, especially so far as Latin America is concerned, 
she has effectively rediscovered a technique for revolution (Allain 1991, p. 
116). 
 
In his later work The Comedians (1966), Greene’s view of revolution is expressed in 
Doctor Magiot’s confession: “I would rather have blood on my hands than water like 
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Pilate” (Greene 1976, p. 286). The Comedians was written in the aftermath of the 
Cuban Revolution during which Fidel Castro leading the ‘26
xxxvi
th of July Movement’ – 
reformed as the Communist Party of Cuba in October 1965 – overthrew the 
oppressive and corrupt dictatorship of Fulgencio Bastista in 1959 after a six year 
struggle.xxxv Greene held that cooperation between Christianity and revolutionary 
politics was crucial to an understanding the Gospels, agreeing with Fidel Castro that “a 
revolutionary can have a religious belief” (Greene 1990, p. 219).  Moreover, he 
“argued for the possibility, not of a mere chilly coexistence, but of cooperation between 
Catholicism and Communism” (Greene 1981, p. 308). However as Marie-Béatrice 
Mesnet suggests, it was primarily in the religious fervour of indigenous Mexican 
Christian cultures that Greene perceived an alternative to communism, convinced, 
“only Christianity … could satisfy the real aspirations of these peoples” (Greene cited 
in Mesnet 1974, p. 113).  
 
Allain contends that Greene objected ‘to many beliefs traditionally regarded as central 
to Catholic teaching – the existence of Hell, the concept of sin, the doctrine of 
judgment’ – reiterating his ‘fundamental uncertainty as to even the existence of God’ 
(Allain 1991, p. 161). Greene’s hope for humanity lay not in adherence to Catholic 
doctrine, but in the future possibility that the Christian can say, “I do not always 
believe” and the Marxist can agree: A future ‘based on the failure always to believe’ 
(Greene cited in Holderness 1993: 266).xxxvii In Monsignor Quixote (1978) one of 
Greene’s last works of fiction, the Priest suggests that perhaps a: “…true Communist 
is a sort of priest” (Greene 1978 p. 105). The sharing of doubts rather than belief is 
distinctive of Greene’s presentation of Monsignor Quixote, who is inspired by the 
dream of a ‘deepening friendship and a profounder understanding, of a reconciliation 
even between their disparate faiths’ (Greene cited in Holderness 1993: 267). 
 
The presentation of corrupt revolutionary leaders in The Power and the Glory is largely 
a response to Greene’s experiences in Mexico. In the novel secrecy and deception are 
identified as characteristic of the revolutionary government, employed in order to 
maintain authority and conceal crimes against humanity. The dialogue between the 
Jefe and Lieutenant concerning the capture of the Whiskey Priest – the last remaining 
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Catholic Priest in the territory – conveys the deceit that inexorably accompanies violent 
revolution. 
 
“You know I trust you. Do what you think best.” 
“Will you put that in writing?” 
“Oh – not necessary. We know each other…” 
“Didn’t the Governor give you anything in writing?” the Lieutenant asked.  
“No. He said we knew each other” (Greene 2001, p. 52) 
 
The Lieutenant is the instrument by which the land will be cleansed from the corrupting 
influences of religion, foreigners and political self-interest. Envisaging a utopian world 
where children would be free from ‘everything which had made him miserable, all that 
was poor, superstitious, and corrupt’ (Greene 2001, p. 54), the Lieutenant seeks to 
free his fellow Mexicans from the legacy of three centuries of oppression and 
exploitation by the Spanish in league with the Catholic Church (Terrien 1992: 438). 
Greene’s novel does not attempt to justify the prior political culture and its relationship 
with the Catholic Church, nor is it openly critical. Rather his fiction illustrates the 
inherent dangers of revolution – such as he experienced in Mexico – solely intent upon 
dismantling prior seats of oppression, while failing to envision a future that may fill the 
void so violently created. The Lieutenant is willing to create a new world with only the 
children in a desert, being quite prepared to make a ‘massacre for their sakes’ in order 
to bring it about. He seeks to rationalize this absurdity: ‘they deserved nothing less 
than … the right to be happy in any way they chose’ (Greene 2001, p. 54). The dark 
irony of the Lieutenant’s fantastical ideology is obvious: In such a moral desert, the 
children would have a hard time exercising their ‘right to be happy in any way they 
chose’.  
 
Demonstrating a fanaticism akin to religious zeal the Lieutenant regards violence as 
both unavoidable and necessary to usher in his nihilistic new order. The barrenness of 
the Lieutenant’s revolutionary extremism is reflected in the rhetoric of his reassurances 
to the poor: ‘“I want to give you” – he made a gesture with his hands, which was 
valueless, because no one saw him – “everything”’ (Greene 2001, p. 74). Greene 
demonstrates that the nihilism inherent in the Lieutenant’s political ideology is 
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metaphoric of the spiritual condition of the Revolutionary State, a desolateness that 
reflects his portrayal of the Mexican landscape. Deluded by the notion that he bore a 
‘secret of love’ for his people the silence and fear of the villages infuriates the 
exasperated Lieutenant who cries, “Why won’t you trust me?” (Greene 2001, p. 74). 
Taking a hostage as ransom for information concerning the Whiskey Priest’s 
whereabouts, the Lieutenant’s ‘dull voice’ suggests the influence of an external agency 
that had subsumed his soul (Greene 2001, p. 74).xxxviii  
 
Expressing an utter disregard for life the Lieutenant’s revolutionary mind-set dismisses 
the killing of a few men as doing “no real harm” unlike the heinous ‘treason’ of religion 
(Greene 2001, p. 17).xxxix Portrayed as possessing ‘the dignity of an idea … polished 
boots and his venom’ (Greene 2001, p. 17), the naivety and ignorance that constitute 
the ‘lie of innocence’ is exemplified in the Lieutenant. Pearson contends that the 
character represents a ‘startling and even appalling spiritual anomaly: deliberate 
nihilism in a “good man,” a philosophical toughness in a childish consciousness’ 
(Pearson 1982: 287). Having captured his quarry the Lieutenant calls furiously from his 
empty police station: ‘“Is there nobody here?” a figure of hate carrying his secret of 
love’ (Greene 2001, p. 55). Left bereft ‘as if life had drained out of the world’ (Greene 
2001, p. 205) the Lieutenant’s question encapsulates the vacancy and purposeless 
existence of his philosophical orientation. Greene’s fiction shows that there is no cure 
for the nihilism represented by the Lieutenant’s spiritual vacancy.   
 
Justice and the Curse of the Good 
In Brighton Rock, Graham Greene explores the notion of justice in relation to one’s 
conviction of what is ‘right’ through his presentation of the self-righteous secular lay 
detective Ida Arnold. Greene presents this concept of justice as being primarily 
dependent upon the emotional conviction of the individual and as such, is reflective of 
the Protestant notion that divine knowledge of the ‘good’ manifests in the feelings of 
the elect. Ida is introduced as neither religious nor believing in heaven or hell, 
regarding the Church as more concerned with what came after death than life itself. 
However, Ida is described as taking life with a deadly seriousness, ‘prepared to cause 
any amount of unhappiness to anyone in order to defend the only thing she believed 
in’ (Greene 2004a, p. 35). Early in the novel the narrator cautions that there was 
‘something dangerous and remorseless in her optimism’ (Greene 2004a, p. 35). A 
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funeral service provides the context in which Greene represents the humanism that 
sustains such optimism. During the service the celebrant proclaims: “Truth is beauty 
and there is more beauty for us, a truth-loving generation” who upon death will be 
“reabsorbed in the universal spirit” (Greene 2004a, p. 34). Writing Brighton Rock on 
the eve of the Second World War, there is a sense of the sardonic in Greene’s tone 
that suggests he held little faith in the spirit of this ‘truth-loving generation’. As the 
novel unfolds a clear distinction appears between the ‘good’ of the Catholic Church – 
primarily concerned with obedience to dictates that govern behaviour – and the ‘right’ 
of Ida Arnold based upon the moral value of her intentions.  
 
Ida is determined to see that justice is done and the murder of Hale atoned for, 
correctly deducing that Pinkie was his murderer. Positioned as a humanist foil to the 
‘evil’ Pinkie, Greene portrays Ida as a ‘god’ unto herself, exhibiting a heightened sense 
of self-righteousness and utter conviction in the virtue of her quest. Greene draws on 
biblical law from the book of Leviticus in his depiction of Ida’s morality: 
 
An eye for an eye. If you believed in God, you might leave vengeance to 
him, but you couldn’t trust the One, the universal spirit… And vengeance and 
reward – they both were fun (Greene 2004a, p. 36).xl 
 
It is the case that some people who act in accordance with their concepts of ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ may coincide with their concepts of justice with those of Christian morality 
without having any affinity with Christianity itself. That natural justice may vary from 
Christian morality is also not the point here. Instead what is being acknowledged is 
that one is concerned with intentions and intentions are considered relevant from the 
two perspectives in different ways. 
 
Greene reveals Ida’s motivation to be primarily concerned with the personal 
satisfaction and emotional gratification of being on the ‘right side’. While on the surface 
Ida’s actions appear to be the outworking of a ‘honest’, ‘kindly’ benevolent spirit – one 
of the ‘great middle law-abiding class’ – she is nonetheless described as having ‘no 
more love for anyone than they had’ (Greene 2004a, p. 84). Compelled by her 
‘formidable’ righteous indignation, Ida is resolute in her determination to bring justice 
down upon the ‘wrong’ (Greene 2004a, p. 129). Poignantly Greene’s depiction of Ida 
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as a ‘warship going into action … in a war to end wars’ is juxtaposed with the 
disclosure that ‘her big breasts, which had never suckled a child of her own, felt a 
merciless compassion’ (Greene 2004a, p. 129). Ida’s character is intentionally 
contradictory, a construction of endemically flawed and hypocritical notions of justice 
that feed her merciless compassion. Ida’s confidence in her sense of justice is further 
enhanced by the belief that her actions are in harmony with God’s determination to 
see that ‘evil suffered’ (Greene 2004a, p. 164). In her single-minded determination to 
legitimize her ‘middle-class’ morality, Ida is shown to manifest ambivalence to those 
who suffer for her peace of mind. Her concern for the future of Rose is in many ways 
more destructive than Pinkie’s hatred. Described as hooking on a smile as one would 
‘hook on a wreath’, Ida justifies her actions: “Why if I let you be, I wouldn’t sleep at 
nights. It wouldn’t be Right” (Greene 2004a, p. 215).  
 
Throughout Brighton Rock the character of Ida is carefully created by Greene to 
illustrate the error of imposing notions of ‘truth’ upon the actual experience of others. 
Richard Hoggart notes that on a number of occasions throughout the novel Ida is 
‘directly and violently disparaged’ because she does ‘not recognize sin and will go on 
talking about right-and-wrong’ (Hoggart 1953: 449). Hoggart’s observation resonates 
with Brian Diemert’s view that Greene mocks Ida for her spiritual ignorance and 
exposes her morality as devoid of compassion or empathy (Diemert 1992: 3). Diemert 
considers this negative presentation of Ida as suggestive of Greene’s intent to expose 
the fallacy of claiming truth according to a socio/political reading of the surface of 
things. I concur with Diemert’s view: 
 
Ida is mocked by the narrative in which she appears: her understanding of 
the case and of the world she inhabits is clearly shown to be limited by her 
inability to see beneath the surface of things (Diemert 1992: 2). 
 
Greene’s negative depiction of Ida Arnold serves to highlight the caustic effect of 
imposing concepts of ‘justice’ or ‘truth’ upon others. In Brighton Rock a scared Rose 
implores Ida: “Why do you interfere with us? You’re not the police” (Greene 2004a, p. 
214). Ida’s cheerful impersonal reply is likened to ‘ordering a pound of tea’ – “I’m like 
everyone else. I want justice” – expressing the callous egotism that Greene sought to 
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expose (Greene 2004a, p. 214). The supposed naivety of Rose functions to reveal the 
self-interest and thoughtlessness that is characteristic of concepts of ‘justice’ imposed 
without compassion. Ida’s threat to make the terrified Rose, “listen” to her “evidence” is 
rebuffed by the girl who with ‘innocent and experienced eyes’ exclaims; “You don’t 
know a thing” (Greene 2004a, p. 130). The ignorance of Ida’s summation that Rose 
‘didn’t understand (because) She was only a kid’ (Greene 2004a, p. 265) is 
compounded by her subsequent view that what ‘a girl needs at a time like this are her 
mother and dad’ (Greene 2004a, p. 265). The reader is well aware that her parents 
had previously sold Rose to Pinkie for a meagre dowry of fifteen guineas (Greene 
2004a, p. 156).  
 
Throughout the novel it is the worldly Ida rather than the ‘innocent’ Rose who is 
portrayed as the ignorant party, unable or unwilling to conceive of wisdom other than 
her own. Greene expresses his scepticism of individual or collective claims to a single 
meaning or possession of absolute truth through his creation of Ida Arnold. Poignantly 
the light hearted and somewhat shallow gangster Dallow exposes Ida’s narcissism as 
being responsible for setting in motion the events that drive Rose to the brink of death 
(Greene 2004a, p. 257). Greene’s fiction illustrates the danger of individual 
presumptions of innocence that are the product of emotional diffidence to what feels 
‘right’. Perceiving that the death of Pinkie had fulfilled her mission to punish the ‘wrong’ 
Ida concludes, “He’s not on my conscience anyway” (Greene 2004a, p. 266). Ida is 
symbolic of the internalization of false adherence of actuality of an innocent state, 
compelled to act according to feelings as she strives to vindicate herself as being 
among the ‘right’.  
 
Rebellion for Love: Formation of the Orphan 
Contemptuous of religion the Lieutenant regards Christians as cowards who seek the 
comforts of faith, ‘safety, toleration, and complacency’ (Greene 2001, p. 31) rather 
than confront the causes of their poverty and suffering.xli The Lieutenant condemns the 
Priest’s faith: “I hate your reasons … If you see somebody in pain, people like you 
reason and reason. You say pain’s a good thing, perhaps he’ll be better for it one day” 
(Greene 2001, p. 197). As discussed previously, Greene’s criticism of the Catholic 
Church for failing to advocate on behalf of those who suffer due to the abuse of 
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political power or social and economic inequality can be discerned in the Lieutenant’s 
reproach. Association implicates the Priest as being among those responsible for 
necessitating the violence committed at the behest of the revolution. The fatalism, 
which Greene perceived to have pervaded the Catholic response to the poor is 
expressed in the Priest’s reply: “But why should we give the poor power? It’s better to 
let him die in dirt and wake in heaven – so long as we don’t push his face in the dirt” 
(Greene 2001, p. 197).xlii The legacy of Christian guilt is instrumental in the formation 
of the fatalism that possesses many of Greene’s characters. In the presence of the 
Lieutenant the Mexican peasants are depicted as wearing an air of people already 
condemned, resigned to the notion that ‘authority was never wrong’ (Greene 2001, p. 
71). Notably it is the ‘inquisitive’ children among the villagers who yet to be lumbered 
by this yoke of fatalism remain ‘unfrightened’. Having finally escaped to a more 
tolerant territory the Whiskey Priest’s decision to return to his flock is shown to be the 
product of guilt remorselessly overriding his reason. Despite the likelihood of his 
capture and subsequent execution, the Priest knowingly returns to danger and 
imminent betrayal, willing to accept death as a release from the burden of his guilt. 
The Priest’s homily expresses the profound hopelessness of his tortured soul deluded 
by the notion that suffering and sacrifice are an expression of the love of God.  
 
“I tell you that heaven is here: this is a part of heaven just as pain is a part of 
pleasure.” He said, “Pray that you will suffer more and more and more. 
Never get tired of suffering. The police watching you, the soldiers gathering 
taxes, the beating you always get from the Jefe because you are too poor to 
pay, smallpox and fever, hunger … that is all part of heaven – the 
preparation” (Greene 2001, p. 66).  
 
While Greene appears to reject the Catholic notion that suffering in and of itself is 
worthwhile or of some intrinsic value, human solidarity in the midst of suffering remains 
a prominent theme throughout Brighton Rock and the Power and the Glory. As time 
elapses in the hunt for the Priest, Greene depicts the emergence of freewill amidst the 
ambiguity of religious duty, acknowledging the confusing and contradictory demands 
of the priestly office. The Priest is torn between the desire to flee persecution and the 
ramifications of such a choice upon his soul, ‘I shall go to confession: I shall feel 
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contrition and be forgiven: eternal life will begin for me all over again’ (Greene 2001, p. 
62). Conceding that ‘the Church taught that it was every man’s first duty to save his 
own soul’ (Greene 2001, p. 62), the Priest is nonetheless convinced that leaving the 
province would be tantamount to sacrificing his only means of redemption: Love for his 
daughter and those to whom his life had become an act of penance. Through his 
suffering the Priest becomes conscious of the ‘unbearable creature he must have 
been’ prior to the revolution, when ‘in his innocence, he had felt no love for anyone’ 
(Greene 2001, p. 137). Friedrich Nietzsche proposed that suffering experienced due to 
honest deliberation created greatness in the soul of a man, a concept that helps 
illuminate Greene’s depiction of the Whiskey Priest’s transfiguration. 
 
That tension of the soul in misfortune which cultivates its strength, its terror 
at the sight of great destruction, its inventiveness and bravery in undergoing, 
enduring, interpreting … and greatness has been bestowed upon it – has 
been bestowed through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? 
(Nietzsche 1990, p. 155). 
 
Moving beyond the despair of losing his former security and eminence the Priest 
becomes open to new possibilities and the freedom to trust in his own will. Just as 
Faulkner demonstrated that innocence could not be attributed to a socially constructed 
‘self’ – invalidating the notion of the ontological elect – Greene shows that neither 
status nor action is a determinate of innocence. Amidst a multiplicity of possibilities 
one must take action in order to enact change. Although pillared by external forces the 
compassion awoken in the Priest takes on a transfiguring life of its own. In making the 
choice to continue to suffer with the powerless, the Priest signs his fate, ensuring 
condemnation by the State and guaranteeing eternal damnation by the Church.xliii 
 
A reoccurring theme throughout The Power and The Glory is the Whiskey Priest’s 
refusal to deny the legitimacy of his love for his illegitimate daughter. Greene 
demonstrates that to repent of such love in order to comply with Christian moral law is 
soul destroying. The confused Priest giggles in bewilderment at his inability to repent 
of his love reasoning that he had lost his faculty for repentance. The narrator describes 
the Priest’s moral conflict:  
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He couldn’t say to himself that he wished his sin had never – existed, 
because the sin seemed to him now so unimportant and he loved the fruit of 
it. He needed a confessor to draw his mind slowly down the drab passages 
which led to grief and repentance (Greene 2001, p. 126). 
 
Having ‘felt bound to his sin by love’ for his daughter and incapable of repentance, the 
Whiskey Priest is guilty of ‘mortal sin’ and hence damned in accordance with the 
teachings of his Catholic faith (Greene 2001, p. 170). Sexuality and the Catholic 
doctrine of ‘mortal sin’ plague the soul of the Whiskey Priest and features prominently 
in the relationship of Pinkie and Rose in Brighton Rock. Greene’s fiction identifies the 
destructive influence of shame and guilt that pervades Catholic teaching on sexuality.   
 
In The Power and the Glory, the Whiskey Priest tires of hearing confessions from the 
many that have trespassed against the moral dictums of Catholic sexual dogma. The 
frequency and familiarity of these disclosures moves the Priest to lament, ‘Man was so 
limited he hadn’t even the ingenuity to invent a new vice: The animals knew as much’ 
(Greene 2001, p. 94). Religious judgments of innocence and guilt in relation to sexual 
conduct verge on the ridiculous when considered within the context of those 
languishing in jail. The prison scene in The Power and the Glory pits human solidarity 
in the midst of suffering against the sexual piety of the Catholic devout.  
 
Again the cry came, an expression of intolerable pleasure. The woman said, 
“Stop them. It’s a scandal.” He felt fingers on his knee, grasping, digging. He 
said, “We’re all fellow prisoners. I want drink at this moment more than 
anything, more than God. That’s a sin too.”  
“Now,” the woman said, “I can see you’re a bad priest. I wouldn’t believe it 
before. I do now. You sympathize with animals” (Greene 2001, p. 129). 
 
Greene’s treatment of sexuality reveals the threat human intimacy and the desires of 
the body poses to the will of the Father. The contemporary writings of John Bishop 
identify the creative potential of sex as a source of renewal for humanity, a view that 
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reflects Greene’s portrayal of the interconnectedness between sexuality and 
spirituality. 
 
Much of the excitement of sex might be understood in terms of our 
vulnerability, our openness to others, and ultimately our openness to the 
world and to our natural being. In this excitement, too, we recognise the 
passions of spirituality (Bishop 2012, p. 357)   
 
Subtly and not without a little irony Greene exposes the Catholic image of the 
‘innocent saint’ to be inhuman, wholly devoid of desire, empathy or compassion. In 
response to the exasperation and pious disgust of his fellow prisoner, the Priest 
describes sexuality as ‘beauty’.  
 
“Such a lot of beauty. Saints talk about the beauty of suffering. Well, we are 
not saints, you and I. Suffering to us is just ugly. Stench and crowding and 
pain. That is beautiful in that corner – to them. It needs a lot of learning to 
see things with a saint’s eye: a saint gets a subtle taste for beauty and can 
look down on poor ignorant palates like theirs. But we can’t afford to” 
(Greene 2001, p. 128).xliv 
 
Greene subverts the qualities of the saint through the Whiskey Priest’s self-
denunciation and in doing so portrays this ‘sinner’ as a markedly ‘human’ saint.xlv 
Greene’s representation of the way innocence is used in religion reminds us that ‘irony 
allows for detachment and an ‘eternal’ point of view; the ironic self can question 
whether life might not be otherwise, whether ‘we’ might create ourselves differently’ 
(Colebrook 2004, p. 122). Inhibiting individual creativity according to a default morality 
of constructed notions of sin and debauchery, the way one acts in relation to sex is 
shown to be a determinate of one’s loyalty to Catholic instruction regarding ‘good’ and 
‘evil’. Although the Priest’s sexual trespass comes in time to blossom into love for his 
daughter, he nevertheless views all subsequent acts of kindness and generosity 
through the prism of his ‘mortal sin’ (Greene 2001, p. 91). Greene’s fiction 
demonstrates how legalistic Catholic dogma regarding sexuality detracts from 
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meaningful dialogue, sundering relationships that may otherwise have provided a 
context to explore moral questions of a more pressing social and political nature. 
 
Thinking beyond Dogma: Solidarity and Compassion  
In The Power and the Glory, the virtue of the Catholic concept of God’s love is 
challenged by Greene’s representation of love as an expression of human intimacy. 
The Priest makes reference to the Bible as he describes God’s love as a power that 
would move a “sinful man” like himself to “run a mile to get away if he felt that love” 
(Greene 2001 p. 197).  
  
“It would be enough to scare us God’s love. It set fire to a bush in the desert 
didn’t it, and smashed open graves and set the dead walking in the dark” 
(Greene 2001, p. 97). 
  
Throughout the novel the Priest’s compassion, courageous acts of kindness and 
personal experiences of love differ greatly from his Catholic rhetoric. This “sinful man” 
offers himself as a hostage to spare the lives of villages, reasoning that as he ‘was no 
one’s husband or son’ his loss would not be mourned (Greene 2001, pp. 74-75). 
Dislocated from the Church and condemned by the State the Whiskey Priest assumes 
the status of an ‘Orphan’ and hence considers that he is expendable. Perceiving 
himself as the lowest of sinners the Priest nonetheless calls God to account 
demanding as Wendorf contends, ‘his own damnation as an act of justice should 
anyone else in the ravaged state be damned’ (Wendorf 2002: 92). The Priest declares: 
“I just want Justice, that’s all’ (Greene 2001, p. 198), a justice that is other than the 
self-righteous justice of Ida Arnold. The grief and humility expressed in the Priest’s 
prayer for his daughter – while sitting on a rubbish heap – suggests a longing for 
justice founded upon love rather than law: “O God, give me any kind of death without 
contrition, in a state of sin only save this child” (Greene 2001, p. 79).  
 
In his novel of the same name, Greene’s Monsignor Quixote represents love rather 
than justice (Greene 1978, p. 41), intuition rather than rules (Greene 1978, p. 134) and 
trust in divine mercy rather than anxiety and submission (Greene 1978, p. 182). I 
agree with Holderness’ contention that ‘Monsignor Quixote’s innocent trust in human 
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love merges imperceptibly into his innocent trust in a loving God’ (Holderness 1993: 
280). Love in this instance is characteristically ‘happy and open’ whereas Greene 
depicts ‘secret’ or ‘unhappy love’ as indicative of ‘the loss of God’ (Greene 2001, p. 
169). In The Power and the Glory, the Whisky Priest is imprisoned with a pious woman 
prisoner who despite claiming to love God, is depicted as holding much of humanity in 
righteous contempt. The Priest challenges his fellow prisoner’s concept of love: “How 
do you know? Loving God isn’t any different from loving a man – or a child” (Greene 
2001, p. 170). The Priest’s question reflects Greene’s view that it is in the freedom of 
imagination and consciousness of the intricate details of the other that the immanence 
of God’s love may be perceived.  
 
When you visualized a man or woman carefully, could always begin to feel 
pity – that was a quality God’s image carried with it. When you saw the lines 
at the corners of the eyes, the shape of the mouth, how the hair grew, it was 
impossible to hate. Hate was Just a failure of imagination (Greene 2001, p. 
129). 
 
Confronted by the pious judgment of his Catholic cellmate – representative of the hate 
and prejudice indicative of the revolutionary State responsible for their suffering and 
incarceration – the Whiskey Priest chooses to stand in solidarity with the condemned. 
This same fidelity characterizes Rose’s loyalty to Pinkie in Brighton Rock and 
illustrates Greene’s concern for those who suffer due to the abuse of power.  
 
Rose serves as a counter point to the fatalism of Pinkie, a young woman equally 
disenfranchised by life who in choosing to marry outside the Catholic Church is guilty 
of ‘mortal sin’.xlvi The couple’s deliberate transgression of Catholic dogma and 
subsequent refusal to repent, propel them on a path of self-destruction. Rose 
abandons the confessional in the knowledge that; ‘It wasn’t any good confessing’, 
while Pinkie with ‘bitter relish’ declares: “It’ll be no good going to confession ever again 
– as long as we’re both alive” (Greene 2004a, p. 183). Despite the certainty of 
religious condemnation and the likelihood of legal prosecution, Rose displays the 
loyalty and fidelity of one willing to be damned for love and the freedom of choice. 
Rose reflects on the ramifications of her choice: ‘What was the good of praying now? 
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She’d finished with all that: she had chosen her side: if they damned him they’d got to 
damn her, too’ (Greene 2004a, p. 207). Convinced that Pinkie knew ‘an awful lot about 
things’, Rose’s blend of ‘horror and admiration’ repulses Pinkie who accusatively 
dismisses the girl as “innocent” and “green” and therefore not equipped to comment 
(Greene 2004a, p. 53). Filled with contempt for such apparent innocence Pinkie 
unconsciously pinches Rose, accusingly stating, “You don’t know anything” (Greene 
2004a, p. 53).  
 
Repulsed by the self-righteousness of Ida, Rose implores Pinkie: “I’m bad … I want to 
be bad if she’s good” (Greene 2004a, p. 136). Although Rose is naïve, as Ruotolo 
suggests ‘she is not altogether blind; she knows far more about Pinkie than her 
unquestioning allegiance suggests’ (Ruotolo 1964: 428). Greene bestows upon Rose 
a knowledge that is alien to the ‘worldly’ knowledge of Ida, possessing an insight that 
sees beyond the limitations of evidence and the law. Rose’s indefatigable 
pronouncement, “I love him” is unfathomable to the humanistic justice of Ida as is her 
belief in equability and reciprocity (Greene 2004a, p. 175). Pilloried by retributive 
forces of ‘good’, each seeking to possess her will and betray her love for Pinkie, Rose 
chooses ‘evil’. Her choice defies the law, Ida Arnold’s justice and Catholic dogma: An 
act of rebellion that delineates her will for the creation of self. As Pinkie’s pursuers 
close in he acts to remove all incriminating evidence, cajoling his wife to join him in a 
suicide pact. Rose is shown to be mindful of the religious implications of such an act of 
desperation: ‘It was said to be the worst act of all, the act of despair, the sin without 
forgiveness’ (Greene 2004a, p. 249). Although conscious of Pinkie’s perversity Rose 
nonetheless remains unequivocal in her devotion: ‘he was going to damn himself, but 
she was going to show them that they couldn’t damn him without damning her too’ 
(Greene 2004a, p. 249). There is no demarcation between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ for Rose who 
feeling ‘responsibility move in her breasts … wouldn’t let him go into that darkness 
alone’ (Greene 2004a, p. 249).  
 
The narrator suggests that Rose remains faithful to Pinkie – despite the somewhat 
pitiful nature of their relationship – due to the emotional privation of her childhood, 
personified in her emotionally dysfunctional parents willing to sell their daughter for 
fifteen guineas (Greene 2004a, p. 156). Human intimacy is of paramount importance 
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for Rose considering as Hodgkins notes, parents who’s ‘absolute refusal to speak 
shows their lack of commitment to even the most basic unit of community’ (Hodgkins 
2006, p. 62) had emotionally starved her. At stake for Rose is the freedom to love 
unconditionally in the knowledge that such fidelity is perhaps unrequited: A love shown 
to be foreign to the Church as represented by Greene. Rose is willing to love Pinkie 
despite the moral taboos of her society and possible legal consequences, her resolve 
garnered from her experience of humanity rather than knowledge of the ‘world’. Rose 
embodies the tragedy of one who sees through the eyes of experience, yet remains 
naïve to the machinations and deceptions of one who employs knowledge of the world 
to destroy life. 
 
It is helpful to consider Williams’ view that characters in Brighton Rock are presented 
with political choices rather than theological questions: ‘Either this world's “not a bad 
old place” or it’s a place where you die “slowly”’ (Williams 1992: 7). Williams contends 
that Ida is representative of the status quo while Pinkie chooses to take a 
‘revolutionary step’ (Williams 1992: 7). Greene portrays Rose as beset by a choice of 
evils: The legalism of the Church, the self-righteous humanist justice of Ida Arnold or 
the revolutionary violence of Pinkie. Confronted with the prospect of suicide Rose’s 
willingness to exercise her free will becomes a matter of fatal importance. Unlike Coral 
in The Power and the Glory who is anything but naïve, Rose is portrayed as being ‘like 
a child who crosses her fingers and swears her private oath’ (Greene 2004a, p. 121). 
However as Diemert argues, although Rose is seduced by Pinkie’s knowledge and 
accuracy in reading life due to her ‘own textual ignorance’ she is consistently shown to 
hold doubts about Pinkie throughout the novel (Diemert 1992: 10).  
 
Rose’s ‘simplicity, the long experience of her sixteen years’ (Greene 2004a, p. 121) is 
confronted with a moral dilemma of fatal consequence. Holding a gun in her hand at 
the place designated by Pinkie to kill herself, Rose is ‘visited by an almost 
overwhelming rebellion … refuse to play. He couldn’t make her kill herself: life wasn’t 
as bad as that … Nothing was decided – there was always hope’ (Greene 2004a, p. 
260). However, despite her desire for life Rose’s rebellion is shown to be compromised 
by her ignorant trust in Pinkie: ‘She felt his will moving her hand – she could trust him. 
She put up the gun again’ (Greene 2004a, p. 263). After Ida’s timely intervention and 
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Pinkie’s subsequent death Rose attends confession during which a Catholic Priest 
fails to dissuade her convictions with logic. Confounded by the girl’s unwavering fidelity 
to Pinkie the Priest makes a last desperate appeal to the, “appalling … strangeness of 
the mercy of God” (Greene 2004a, p. 268) counselling that the explanation for the 
discontinuity between Rose’s will to love and her experience of suffering was beyond 
the girl’s reckoning.xlvii Perhaps Ruotolo is close to the mark in his summation that the 
‘meaning of Rose’s life is somehow always beyond the facts of her existence, in a 
hope that is paradoxically glorious and naïve’ (Ruotolo 1964: 428). 
 
Through Greene’s writings we observe the importance of people being conscious and 
willing to exercise their freewill. For humanity to ameliorate itself from its condition – a 
chronic separation of self and ‘other’ – freewill is essential. Such consciousness is not 
the product of one suffering for its own sake but a product of an imagination that is 
touched by the intimacy of another. Greene viewed violent revolution in which people 
are oppressed in the name of justice and the law as a failure of imagination. Rather 
than following the revolutionary path against the state, society, or religion, Greene 
looks to the possibility of individual rebellion. Through non-violent rebellion Greene 
saw the opportunity to challenge abusive and degenerate power structures built upon 
violence.  
 
For Greene the role of the Church in the world should be to interpret the Gospel in 
favour of the oppressed, seeing in Latin America the emergence of such a movement. 
Opposed to traditional Catholic beliefs in relation to moral judgment Greene is equally 
dismissive of secular concepts of human justice. Greene stated that human nature “is 
not black and white but black and grey” (Greene 1962, p. 42). It is in this ‘grey’ that his 
fiction alludes to the apophatic God and a distinctly immanent concept of love revealed 
in and through its absence.  
 
This chapter argues that Greene in his fiction explores the possibilities of destroying 
fixed ideas whether represented by Catholic Church law, espoused by political 
ideology, or acted out by those determined to impose his or her idea of good, evil or 
principles of justice. In doing so, Greene identifies that it is only via the human 
relationship of love and the teachings wrought by suffering that one can bring about 
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new consciousness from acts of free will. If he exposes a ‘lie of innocence’ he does so 
by also showing that human relationships can subvert it not so much by creating 
Orphans but instead recognizing their suffering and acting with them to fight against 
abuses of power that contribute to this suffering. However, Greene rather than 
‘becoming innocence’ in the Nietzschean sense proclaims the need to recognize the 
irrelevance and destructive powers of fixed moralities and instead places optimism in 
the power of creating new subjectivities. It is in this solidarity of purpose motivated by 
compassion that Greene perceives God’s presence. In contrast to the Protestant view 
of the individual as innocent by ‘becoming’, Greene’s fiction portrays an ‘innocence of 
becoming’ that can only be realised within relationships: reflective of a Catholic view of 
the need for a shared and supportive community that recognizes a mutual will to live 
outside strictures and laws. 
 
  
  Chapter 6: Graham Greene 
 
 
                                                     
i There were aspects of Catholicism that appealed to Greene’s penchant for mystery such as Holy 
Communion and the doctrine of Transubstantiation. The same compassion for humanity that moved 
Greene to respond favourably to the cathartic experience of confession, in turn motivated his rejected of 
the Body/Spirit dualism that was foundational to Catholic teaching on sexuality. Perhaps it was due to 
this need to rationally explicate the sufferings experienced by humanity that Greene openly challenged 
Catholic dogma regarding the infallibility of the Pope – particularly on politics matters – and the authority 
of the clergy. In §2032 of the ‘Moral Life and the Magisterium of the Church’ the Catholic Catechism 
declares that the Catholic Church ‘has received this solemn command of Christ from the apostles to 
announce the saving truth’. Therefore the Church asserts its providential right to ‘always and 
everywhere to announce moral principles, including those pertaining to the social order, and to make 
judgments on any human affairs to the extent that they are required by the fundamental rights of the 
human person or the salvation of souls.’ Furthermore the Catholic Catechism states that as the Roman 
Pontiff and the bishops are ‘authentic teachers’ their ‘supreme degree of participation in the authority of 
Christ is ensured by the charism of infallibility. This infallibility extends as far as does the deposit of 
divine Revelation; it also extends to all those elements of doctrine, including morals, without which the 
saving truths of the faith cannot be preserved, explained, or observed’ (Catholic Church 2005, §2035). 
This authority of the Magisterium is claimed to also extend to the ‘specific precepts of the natural law, 
because their observance, demanded by the Creator, is necessary for salvation’ (Catholic Church 2005, 
§2036).  
 
ii Albert Gelpi (1991) considers the influence of Catholicism upon the cultural history of America and 
notes its growing presence in education, economics and politics since the Second World War. In his 
discussion, Gelpi makes a distinction between Protestant discourse, which he regards as tending 
towards logic and Catholic discourse, which he views as commonly being more analogical.  
 
iii The Whiskey Priest’s reflection that the Host embodied the immanence of God amidst a religious 
culture of insincerity expresses the aspect of religious symbolism that most appealed to Greene. The 
Priest asserts that the Host ‘was a fact – something you could touch’ whereas prayer had become ‘no 
more than a pious aspiration’ (Greene 2001, p. 150). 
 
iv Mark Hestenes cites Greene from an interview quoted in the work of Leopold Duran, Graham Greene 
– Friend and Brother (1994). 
 
v Greene elaborates upon this perceived difference between belief and faith: “With age ... doubt seems 
to gain the upper hand ... I have, if you like, more doubts, but my faith has grown too. There’s a 
difference between belief and faith. If I don’t believe in X or Y, faith intervenes, telling me that I’m wrong 
not to believe. Faith is above belief. One can say that it’s a gift of God, while belief is not. Belief is 
founded on reason. On the whole I keep my faith while enduring long periods of disbelief... My faith 
remains in the background, but it remains” (Allain 1991, pp. 172-173). 
 
vi Greene responds to those who dismiss fiction as the pursuit of the escapist: ‘In using Escape in this 
way, the critics have chosen the wrong word, and, what is more, they are confusing, not always by 
sincere error, the Escape of the Prisoner with the Plight of the Deserter’ (Greene 1972, p. 76). 
 
vii ‘Minor literature’ is a term conceived by Deleuze for literature that creates a sense or evokes a sound 
that expresses that which previously had remained hidden, ignored or never envisaged due to the 
constraints of representation and communication. Such ‘minor literature’ conveys a lightness and 
creativity that disrupts and dislocates established literary traditions constructed upon masculine codes 
of reason, power and activity. Deleuze and Guatarri write of the difference between ‘majoritarian’ which 
‘implies a constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it’ – a 
language ‘that assumes a state of power and domination’ – as opposed to ‘minoritarian’, which 
conceptualizes ‘potential, creative and created, becoming’. Minorities in the Deleuzian sense are ‘seeds’ 
of ‘becoming’, which are described as triggering ‘uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations’ of 
those standards and axioms that constitute the ‘majority’ (Deleuze 2003, pp. 105-06).  
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viii Greene writes in his travel diary that the religiosity expressed by these indigenous Mexican Christians 
was closer to some elemental form of Christianity than European faith which he regarded as ‘too apt to 
minimize the magic element in Christianity’ (Greene, 1982, p. 171). 
 
ix Throughout his journey through Mexico, Greene registered his admiration for the religiosity of the 
indigenous Christians. Observing these people kneeling for Mass, holding out their arms, minute after 
minute, in the attitude of crucifixion, Greene concluded; ‘Perhaps this is the population of heaven’ 
(Greene 1982, p. 170). 
 
x In her analysis of the apophaticism employed by Greene, Hope Hodgkins notes a change in the critical 
history of ‘Catholic novels’ arguing that ‘where earlier readers laboured to decipher the presumed 
religious affirmations, a more recent audience has embraced Greene’s via negativa while ignoring or 
denying its theological implications’ (Hodgkins 2006: 53). 
 
xi Pseudo-Dionysius’ writings expresses the apophatic technique or style that Hodgkins recognizes as 
characteristic of Greene’s negative rhetoric. Dionysius reflects on the unrepresentable nature of God: 
‘(W)e cannot know God in his nature, since this is unknowable and is beyond the reach of mind or of 
reason … he cannot be understood, words cannot contain him, and no name can lay hold of him. He is 
not one of the things that are and he cannot be known in any of them. He is all things in all things and 
he is no thing among things. He is known to all from all things and he is known to no one from 
anything... This is the sort of language we must use about God’ (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987, pp. 108-109)  
 
xiii Hodgkins makes reference to the words of St. John of the Cross who describes the revelation of the 
knowledge of God as a ‘wise unknowing’ that ‘burst(s) the mind’s barrier’ (St. John of the Cross 1979, 
poem 29).  
 
xiv (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987, pp. 147-48). According to Jaroslav Pelikan, Thomas Aquinas quotes 
Dionysius about 1700 times (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987, p. 21). 
 
xv Jean-Luc Marion suggests that a radical apophasis is not incompatible with the belief that ‘God (is) 
agape’ (I John 4:8). Marion contends: ‘Love does not suffer from the unthinkable or from the absence of 
conditions, but is reinforced by them (Moreover) love ... does not pretend to comprehend, since it does 
not mean at all to take; it postulates its own giving, giving where the giver strictly coincides with the gift, 
without any restriction, reservation, or mastery. Thus love gives itself only in abandoning itself...’ (Marion 
1991, p. 47).    
 
xvi Ruotolo suggests that for Sartre ‘man’s estrangement is final, since God is absent or nonexistent. 
Greene’s God does not appear to offer man a more tangible assistance’ (Ruotolo 1964: 428). 
 
xvii According to the Catholic Catechism a person is guilty of ‘mortal sin’ if they willingly and consciously 
trespass against Catholic moral dictums and refuse to repent of such ‘sin’. In ‘The Dignity of the Human 
Person’ the Catechism states: ‘When the will sets itself upon something that is of its nature incompatible 
with the charity that orients man toward his ultimate end, then the sin is mortal by its very 
object’(Catholic Church 2005, §1856). 
 
xviii The idea of the age of accountability is founded upon Catholic doctrine that considers a child to be 
morally responsible for their actions when they can employ reason in their decision making. Catholic 
Cannon Law stipulates that a child attains the capacity to reason at the age of seven: ‘With the 
completion of the seventh year … a minor is presumed to have the use of reason (Catholic Church 
1997: Law 97, §2). An exception is made for those who being deemed to ‘habitually’ lack the use of 
reason (non sui compos) are equated with infants (Catholic Church 1997: Laws 97, 99). 
 
xix In 1938 shortly after the publication of Brighton Rock, Jane Southron of the New York Times 
described Greene’s work as a ‘brilliant and uncompromising indictment of some of the worst aspects of 
modern civilization, showing us the hard-boiled criminal mind not as a return to savagery but as a 
horrible perversion of cerebration’. Jane Southron 1938, ‘Brighton Rock’, New York Times, 26 June, 
retrieved 2 March 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/1938/06/26/books/greene38-brighton.html?_r=0. 
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xx Greene considers the child fortunate to be naïve to the lies and betrayal which the adult seeks to 
suppress or deny, suggesting ‘we should be thankful we cannot see the horrors and degradations lying 
around our childhood, in cupboards and bookshelves, everywhere’ (Greene 2004a, p. 6). 
 
xxi For further discussion of ‘Greeneland’ see (Allott 1951) and (Kunkel 1959). 
 
xxii Similarly Williams suggests that imagery such as the ‘cement school-playground, the dead fire and 
the dying man in the St. Pancras waiting-room, his bed at Frank’s and his parents’ bed’ are also open to 
a materialist interpretation (Greene 2004a, p. 228). 
 
xxiii Williams argues that this evasion is depicted in the film Apocalypse Now (1979), where the ‘madness 
committed on behalf (ultimately) of American economic goals is accounted for by the ‘evil’ of a single 
individual,’ an evasion exposed by Greene in The Quiet American (Williams 1992: 3). 
 
xxiv Brighton Rock abides a method of reading that guards against both political and intellectual 
domination, rather than promoting what Neil Nehring regards as Greene’s ‘anarchist’ politics (Nehring 
1991: 227). 
 
xxv Gray contends that ‘Greene was a nihilist, who devoted much of his life and work to flirting with a 
condition of the soul in which he did not believe’ (Gray 2000, p. 2). 
 
xxvi Latin for “Grant us peace” – a phrase in the Agnus Dei section of the Roman Catholic mass. 
 
xxvii (John 1:10). 
 
xxviii Pinkie’s desire for aloneness, removed from the danger of all intimacy, mirrors Greene’ portrayal of 
the child Phillip in The Fallen Idol (1936) who due to being manipulated by the lies of adults, withdraws 
from intimate relationships and learns never to trust again (Greene 1977,  p. 159).  
 
xxix “Credo in unum Satanum” is Latin for “I believe in one of Satan’. (Lewis 1959, p. 243) and (Kelly 
1984, p. 41) are further critics who regard Pinkie as a tragic figure. 
 
xxx The innermost zone of the ninth and final circle of Hell in Dante’s Divine Comedy is Judecca, named 
after Judas Iscariot the betrayer of Jesus (Dante 1995, Cantos 34:10-15). 
 
xxxi Wendorf makes the observation that Greene’s narration grounds concepts of the divine in the 
immanent world of human experience and the natural environment so as to evoke contemplation of 
eternal possibilities (Wendorf 2002: 83).  
 
xxxii Greene was advised by the Holy Office to ‘lend a more constructive tone to his books, from a 
Catholic point of view.’ Without mentioning Greene’s name, Cardinal Griffin issued a pastoral letter 
deploring ‘certain trends in contemporary literature’, which he deemed to be responsible for leading the 
faithful into temptation (Godman 2001, p. 86). 
 
xxxiii “Graham Greene returns to his old haunts”, The Times, 17 December. 
 
xxxiv Greene described the Panama leader Torrijos as a ‘lone wolf’ whose ‘dream’ was of a ‘social 
democratic Central America which would be no menace to the United States, but completely 
independent” (Greene 1984, p. 37). 
 
xxxv For further on the Cuban revolution see Aviva Chomsky’s A History of the Cuban Revolution 
(Chomsky 2010) 
 
xxxvi Liberation Theology grew out of Catholic political and social activism in Latin America during the 
1950’s and 60’s. The movement interpreted the teachings of Jesus Christ as calling for the liberation of 
the poor and marginalized from political, social and economic oppression. By the 1970’s Liberation 
Theology had become an inter-denominational struggle against political and economic injustice, coming 
to wider prominence with the 1971 publication of A Theology of Liberation, written by the Peruvian priest 
Gustavo Gutiérrez (Gutiérrez 1988). Detractors have condemned Liberation Theology as a such as a 
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form of Marxised Christianity, a view echoed by the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
in 1984. The Congregation criticized the movement for identifying the Catholic Church hierarchy in Latin 
America as belonging to the same social class responsible for the systemic sin that had long oppressed 
the indigenous peoples (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2010: 876-909).  
 
xxxvii Quotes taken from notes written in Greene’s copy of Albert Camus’ Carnets (1962).  
 
xxxviii Greene writes that his creation of the Lieutenant owes much to a chance meeting with a man from 
Wisconsin who personified the paradox of innocence discernible in much of his fiction. Greene 
describes his observation of this man: ‘Suddenly … the old good pink face disclosed the endless 
vacancy behind. It was like suddenly finding a cruel intelligence in a child’ (Greene 1964, p. 32). 
 
xxxix Greene’s contempt for ‘revolutionary’ justice that disregards the value of human life is further 
emphasised in the dialogue between the Lieutenant and Captain Fellows:  
“He is wanted on a very serious charge.”  
“Murder?”  
“No. Treason.”  
“Oh, treason.” 
Captain Fellows said, all his interest dropping; there was so much treason everywhere it was like petty 
larceny in a barracks’ (Greene 2001, p. 30). 
 
xl Lev. 24:20, states that a just response to violence is to equate ‘fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth 
for tooth’. See also Exod. 21:24 and Deut. 19:21. 
 
xli A similar fear/hate for weakness can be identified in Greene’s depiction of Pinkie in Brighton Rock and 
Faulkner’s portrayal of JC in Light in August.  
 
xlii There is a suggestion of inevitability in the Priest’s comments regarding the poor that resonates with 
the Gospel story of the anointing of Jesus with perfume. Jesus declares: “The poor you will always have 
with you” (Mark 14:7). 
  
xliii In an interview with Marie-Francoise Allain, Greene suggests that the Catholic Church should recruit 
and train men for the priesthood who – like commandos – are willing to sacrifice themselves for the 
cause (Allain 1991, p. 167).  
 
xliv Greene’s presentation of the Whiskey Priest appears to have been influenced by his admiration for 
the history of political and social justice activism lead by Fr. Miguel Pro Juarez, S.J. (Greene 1955, pp. 
52- 53). 
 
xlv The priest ponders, ‘It is astonishing the sense of innocence that goes with sin … only the hard and 
careful man and the saint are free of it’ (Greene 2001, p. 169). 
 
xlvi The marriage of Pinkie and Rose by a Civil Registrar trespasses Catholic Cannon Law, which 
stipulates, ‘Only those marriages are valid which are contracted before the local ordinary, pastor, or a 
priest or deacon delegated by either of them’ (Catholic Church 1997: Ch. 5, §1108). 
 
xlvii Flannery O’Connor writes of the problem confronting the novelist who wishes to write of a human 
encounter with God and how to render that experience – which is both natural and supernatural – 
understandable, and credible, to the reader. (O’Connor 1961, p. 161). 
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Chapter 7- From The Quiet American to The 
Road 
 
In the Introduction to this thesis the question was posed as to how the world could be 
imagined as descending to a representation of the post-apocalyptic hell portrayed in 
Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. The political, moral and social malaise that 
characterizes this book is presented in Graham Greene’s 1954 novel The Quiet 
American. This final chapter will therefore build connecting points between these two 
texts despite the fact they are separated by 53 years. My question is: are there 
representations of human behaviour in this book written just prior the Vietnam War that 
have at its core warnings about the detrimental effects of ideological conflict dictated 
by an obsessive need to be the most powerful nation? Both these books are 
concerned with the destructive impact of concepts of innocence. Whereas in The Quiet 
American the idealistic innocent Pyle is seen to be destructive, in The Road all 
innocence even the ‘lie of innocence’ is dead. Instead in this text when the world has 
been destroyed it is the child that Nietzsche prophesised would come who embodies 
the ‘innocence of becoming’. McCarthy’s The Road will therefore be examined in light 
of Hannah Arendt’s exposition of the ‘modern lie’ and Alain Badiou’s theory regarding 
the formation of the ‘subject’. 
 
Greene’s work is seen to be of continuing relevance to this investigation due to his 
particularly astute critique of the ethics and politics that shaped the secular and 
existential world of alienated 20th century man. It will be argued that The Quiet 
American reveals how political and ideological deception is employed in order to 
establish and maintain the will of the patriarchal Father. Such deception will be shown 
to intentionally obscure vision of the Tree of Life and inevitability precludes the 
possibility of ‘innocence of becoming’. 
 
Later in his life, Greene commented that he felt: 
 
used and exhausted by the victims of religion... A better man could have 
found a life’s work on the margin of that cruel sea, but my own course of life 
gave me no confidence in any aid I might proffer (Greene 1972, p. 120).  
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Experiences during his visit to Vietnam in the 1950s and his subsequent publication of 
The Quiet American marked a movement in Greene’s literary focus. Whereas his early 
novels can be seen to address specific Catholic concerns, Greene’s later works 
present his observations regarding political and ideological matters, many of which 
drive his character constructions in The Quiet American. Greene employs these 
characters – and in particular Alden Pyle – to illustrate the devastation wrought upon 
humanity by the ignorance of those who attempt to reduce life to the constraints of 
political ideology. Depicted as a young idealistic CIA operative during the French Indo-
China war, Pyle is presented as the personification of ignorance, blindly following the 
vision of his political indoctrination. Much like the Lieutenant in The Power and Glory 
Pyle is continually disappointed by the incompatibility of his political worldview with the 
realities of human experience. The older and more ‘worldly’ English journalist Thomas 
Fowler reflects upon Pyle’s dented idealism: ‘I was to see many times that look of pain 
and disappointment touch his eyes and mouth when reality didn’t match the romantic 
ideas he cherished’ (Greene 2004b, p. 66). Although champions of antithetical political 
views, both Pyle and the Lieutenant are shown to judge life according to their 
convictions of the relative ‘good’ of their respective political ideologies.  
 
Greene employs simile and allegory to disrupt language conventions in order to 
expose the assumptions upon which these political ideologies are constructed. 
Throughout The Quiet American language is repeatedly shown to be unable to 
faithfully render the experience of complex local realities, all the more conspicuous 
when questionable utopian discourse functions as a surrogate for reality (Kerr 2006: 
2). The novel is self-critical of its narration of events as is evident in the French Sûreté 
Officer, Inspector Vigot’s admission that he is limiting his investigation into the death of 
Pyle to “just making a report” (Greene 2004b, p. 20). Vigot’s report is intended to bury 
the truth about Pyle’s murder, functioning as a substitute for any real attempt to 
determine the circumstances of the victim’s death. Douglas Kerr considers this self-
critical narration as a literary technique employed by Greene in The Quiet American to 
illuminate the distance between writing and the reality of human experience, 
regardless of whether such representation of life is the product of ‘ignorant theory or 
knowing lies’ (Kerr 2006: 3). Through his presentation of the war correspondent 
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Fowler, Greene demonstrates that despite our sincere intentions one cannot write from 
an unbiased or disinterested perspective.  
 
At the end of The Quiet American Fowler reflects, “I wished there existed someone to 
whom I could say that I was sorry” (Greene 2004b, p. 189). I concur with Kerr’s view 
that The Quiet American functions as a ‘confessional narrative’ that recounts truths 
that Fowler can only disclose to the reader given that all other genres of speech and 
writing are revealed to be compromised (Kerr 2006: 7).i Reflecting upon the 
destructive potential of language, Fowler acknowledges that although the innocent are 
inevitably involved in any conflict, the ‘other kind of war is more innocent … One does 
less damage with a mortar’ (Greene 2004b, p. 45). Bemoaning the futility of war a 
French Cornel decries those who unleash such suffering and destruction due to their 
political ideologies and careless use of language: “We have to go on fighting till the 
politicians tell us to stop. Probably they will get together and agree to the same peace 
that we could have had at the beginning, making nonsense of all these years” (Greene 
2004b, p. 144). Conscious of his own hypocrisy and the impossibility of being 
‘dégagé’, Fowler nonetheless exposes the pretence of Pyle’s ideological rhetoric and 
returns our focus to human experience.  
 
“They don’t want Communism.” 
“They want enough rice,” I said. “They don’t want to be shot at. They want 
one day to be much the same as another. They don’t want our white skins 
around telling them what they want” (Greene 2004b, p. 86). 
 
Throughout Greene’s works failure of imagination and an accompanying chronic 
incapacity to empathize is repeatedly associated with ignorance, whether such 
ignorance is contrived by institutional power or cultivated by the individual. In The 
Quiet American, Fowler admits to having failed to recognize the inherent danger in 
Pyle’s rhetoric earlier: ‘Perhaps I should have seen that fanatic gleam, the quick 
response to a phrase, the magic sound of figures: Fifth Column, Third Force, Seventh 
Day’ (Greene 2004b, p. 17). The danger of such ideological language is that it 
conceals the realities of actual human experience, blinding advocates such as Pyle to 
the sufferings of victims in the Indo-china war, their lives reduced to mere symbols 
 Chapter 7: From The Quiet American to The Road 
 
such as ‘Red menace’ or ‘Soldier of democracy’ (Greene 2004b, p. 24). Fowler 
observes: 
 
(Pyle) was as incapable of imagining pain or danger to himself as he was 
incapable of conceiving the pain he might cause others ... Yet he was 
sincere in his way: it was coincidence that the sacrifices were all paid by 
others (Greene 2004b, p. 53).   
 
Perhaps one of Greene’s greatest strengths is his ability to broach well-worn themes 
whose contentious history of debate, accusation and justification have created a 
seemingly impenetrable web. Greene’s creation of a disenfranchised Whisky Priest to 
redress the story of Christ and his portrayal of the cynical atheist Fowler to ‘insist on 
the authenticity’ of those sacrificed for a greater ideological struggle, are examples of 
Greene’s conviction that there is no idea worth killing for that has historically been 
sanctioned by the ‘lie of innocence’. Fowler recognizes the tragic reality that Pyle’s 
ideological fundamentalism kills through its ‘good’ intentions. Zadie Smith sums up the 
ideological deception that has taken hold of Pyle: 
 
To the end he remains determined that belief is more important than peace, 
ideas more vital than people. His worldly innocence is a kind of 
fundamentalism: he believes that there must be belief (Greene 2004b, p. ix). 
 
Greene demonstrates that political language such as that employed by Pyle 
empirically classifies people into workable units, easy to shuffle in an ideological 
mindscape. Fowler implicates tertiary institutions and government bureaucracies as 
culpable in the formation of Pyle’s ignorance: ‘He never saw anything he hadn’t heard 
in a lecture-hall and his writers and his lecturers made a fool of him’ (Greene 2004b, p. 
23). With his trademark cynicism, Fowler attributes Pyle’s ideological construction to 
the writings of ‘a superior sort of journalist – they call them diplomatic correspondents. 
He gets hold of an idea and then alters every situation to fit the idea’ (Greene 2004b, 
p. 160).ii 
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In order to elaborate upon the means by which such political ideology comes to 
impede our willingness or capacity to respond authentically to life, it is informative to 
consider Nietzsche’s views on knowledge. In Nietzsche’s view ‘innocence of 
becoming’ involved being freed from knowledge. Knowledge in Nietzsche’s conception 
is the ‘devil’ because it rationalizes our prejudices and justifies our dishonesty 
(Nietzsche 1990, p. 103). He argues that knowledge is not something we strive for but 
rather, becomes the means towards (a goal) justifying dishonest comfortable axioms 
of behaviour. In this sense the innocence of Pyle’s trust in the political ideology of his 
superiors may be likened to the naivety of the child rather than the intentional 
ignorance that underpins one’s dishonesty. Such rationalization employs knowledge 
as a tool in the service of our prejudices and thus functions as a moral cypher. The 
political observations Nietzsche made of late 19th century Europe can be seen to be 
characteristic of Greene’s representation of American political ideology during the 
Indo-China war some seventy years later (Nietzsche 1990, p. 125). The ‘slave’ 
morality that Nietzsche regarded as dominating Europe in his time can be discerned in 
The Quiet American, where Greene illustrates the corrosive effect of political language 
that reduces human experience to a mere linguistic category. Nietzsche identified the 
moral hypocrisy of those in command who justified their consciences by claiming they 
are merely serving the people (Nietzsche 1990, §199). This same rhetoric laced with 
‘herd’ maxims can be seen to be indicative of the language employed by American 
diplomatic correspondents to legitimize their political ideology.   
 
At first Pyle’s innocence appears to be a matter of harmless naivety, however as the 
novel unfolds it becomes increasingly apparent that such naivety is in fact a most 
dangerous ignorance: An innocence that kills. Concluding that Pyle was ‘young and 
ignorant and silly and he got involved’ Fowler suggests that ‘they killed him’ because 
‘he was too innocent to live’ (Greene 2004b, p. 23). Fowler elaborates upon this 
realization:  
 
Innocence always calls mutely for protection when we would be so much 
wiser to guard ourselves against it: innocence is like a dumb leper who has 
lost his, bell, wandering the world, meaning no harm (Greene 2004b, p. 29). 
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The evolution of the concept of innocence from its Christian roots to a modernist 
context can be identified in Fowler’s remarks whilst being questioned regarding Pyle’s 
death. During the interview Fowler intones: “God save us always … from the innocent 
and the good” (Greene 2004b, p. 16). The ‘good’ to which Fowler refers is 
unrecognizable to a Roman Catholic such as Vigot, a ‘good’ that Greene identifies as 
being that of a “damned Yankee” (Greene 2004b, p. 16). The political ideology that 
dictated American foreign policy in Indo-China during the 1950s proffered a notion of 
‘good’ that was ‘other’ than that prescribed by the Catholic Church.  
 
Greene identified ideological indoctrination and the call of patriotic duty as the means 
by which the United States cultivated and promoted the ignorance that obscured the 
vision of young men such as Alden Pyle to the sufferings of others.iii Greene writes not 
as one who has taken an anti-American stance, but rather as one who has much in 
common with Fowler’s sentiment that he had become ‘a bore on the subject of 
America… It was as if I had been betrayed, but one is not betrayed by an enemy’ 
(Greene 2004b, p. 132).iv In The Quiet American Greene demonstrates that 
colonization was only one measure by which nations such as Vietnam were adversely 
impacted by the West. Greene regarded American culture as being reflective of a 
world without values exhibiting “all the vacancy of drug-stores and cheap movies” 
(Greene 1982 p. 77). Gwen Boardman has argued that Greene’s view of America 
changed after Hiroshima and the start of the Cold War, during which he came to 
recognize American innocence as more harmful than he had originally thought 
(Boardman 1971, p. 102). She contends that through the eyes of Fowler we may 
observe Pyle as ‘the quintessential American abroad … bearing the whole burden of 
Anglo-Saxon failure, its muddled morality and irrational sentiment’ (Boardman 1971, p. 
102). Commenting on his experience of Americans abroad Greene reflects that they 
were “very innocent” however often “behind that pinkness and that goodness, eternal 
nothingness [was] working its way through to the brain” (Greene 1982, p. 37). Greene 
was not inherently prejudiced against Americans; his criticism was reserved for all who 
endangered lives due to their narrow-minded attitudes and unwavering conviction in 
the innocence of their actions.v That such behaviour is not limited to nationality 
suggests that Greene is concerned with something of which America was seen to be 
representative, a mind-set that Benz describes as exhibiting a ‘facile attitude that 
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insisted on seeing the world in narrow, black-and-white terms and that treated people 
as a means to an end, not as human beings’ (Benz 2003: 123). Greene regarded 
capitalism as manufacturing a thoughtlessness and spiritual myopia that he believed to 
be endemic to Western society, embodied in the ‘parties, commuter lifestyles, the love 
of novelty (and) the chatty banality of a radio continuously playing’ (Greene 1964, p. 
7).vi 
 
Revisionist Politics and The Modern Lie  
In her essay ‘Truth and Politics’ (1961), Hannah Arendt considers the nature and 
function of the ‘modern lie’ and its manipulation of facts that are ‘not secrets at all but 
are known to practically everybody’ (Arendt 1961, p. 255). While acknowledging that 
lies have always been employed by politicians and statesman as necessary and 
justifiable tools Arendt contends that modern techniques and mass media have 
enabled proponents of the ‘modern lie’ – such as governments and corporations – to 
go beyond altering reality to create images as substitutes (Derrida 1986, p. 71). The 
‘modern lie’ no longer dissimulates facts or hides truth but rather destroys it (Arendt 
1961, p. 255). It is ironic that governments readily employ the ‘modern lie’ yet 
hypocritically seek to control their citizens through appeals to truth: A concept 
elaborated upon by Michel Foucault who described this modern claim to legitimacy as 
‘government in the name of truth’ (Gordon 1991, p. 8). Governments seek to convince 
the public of the sanctity of truth but fail to support this principle with substance or the 
content of any particular truth. In the Post-modern era when all knowledge is relegated 
to a local context and dependent on relativism, notions of truth and innocence would 
appear to be equally provisional. Colebrook states that in our contemporary global 
market, Capitalism does not represent the imposition of law or value, but rather ‘a 
system that produces any and every value of one or more quantifiable item of 
exchange’ (Colebrook 2004, p. 150). Hence, truth can be viewed as merely another 
commodity exchanged according to political interpretation concerning values. Jacques 
Derrida contends that in principle truth or veracity is ‘subordinate’ to the competing 
values of ‘opportunity, necessity, correctness, or justice’ (Derrida 1986, p. 78). 
Likewise, any concept of innocence can be considered to be equally dependent upon 
political interpretation, expediency and appeals to truth.  
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Although this inquiry into the concept of innocence has focused upon its 
representation in literature, it is helpful at this point to consider two strikingly different 
film adaptations of The Quiet American that intentionally subvert the political 
environment portrayed by Greene. Applying Arendt’s notion of the ‘modern lie’ to of 
The Quiet American reveals how modern technology has been utilized to create 
images that substitute for Greene’s prophetic portrayal of the failure of American 
ideology in Vietnam. Joseph Mankiewicz’s 1958 film of the novel is overtly and 
unrepentantly patriotic in its portrayal of the United States and in keeping with 
accepted Cold War ideology of the time (The Quiet American 1958).vii Phillip Noyce’s 
2002 remake is more subtle than Mankiewicz rendition, but nevertheless represents 
the US in a more favourable light than Greene had intended (The Quiet American 
2002). William Bushell suggests that Mankiewicz represents Pyle’s ‘innocence’ as 
‘guiltlessness’ rather than ‘naïve’ (Bushnell 2006, p. 42). Pyle’s accusation that the 
older Fowler was “an adolescent boy … one of the most truly innocent men I’ll ever 
know” is ironic in the extreme when considered in light of Greene’s representation of 
Pyle in the novel. In Mankiewicz’s film the death of Pyle is apportioned to Fowler’s 
jealousy over Phuong and a moral susceptibility to the manipulations of the 
Communists. Pyle’s eagerness to take action is endorsed as a virtue in the 1958 film, 
a dismissive attitude to contemplation indicative of American Foreign Policy of the 
time. Greene’s response to Mankiewicz’s adaptation of his novel was predictably 
hostile, describing the film as ‘incoherent’ and ignorant of the political and human 
realities of the Indo-China war.viii 
 
Philip Noyce’s 2002 film version of The Quiet American represents Pyle as a deceitful 
spy myopically driven by idealism but shies away from Greene’s representation of Pyle 
as a fool who kills through ignorance (The Quiet American 2002). Noyce noted that it 
was “weird” how Greene’s “portrait of the American political evangelist of the early 50s 
contained the same zeal that has guided American foreign policy through to the 
present – a zeal born out of the best intentions” (Noyce cited in Blackwelder 2000: 1).ix 
In Greene’s novel Pyle must be stopped because he ‘comes blundering in and people 
have to die for his mistakes’ (Greene 2004b, p. 174). Noyce avoids contentious moral 
and political questions as to the naivety of US foreign policy in Indo-China, for as 
Bushnell suggests representing Pyle as a deceitful and sinister spy is a more palatable 
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proposition than ‘killing an indefatigable naïf’ (Bushnell 2006, p. 42). Pyle no longer 
blunders nor is he ignorant, variously justifying his actions according to US financial 
aid to France, the Domino Theory or mantra’s such as “today’s bombing will save 
lives” (Bushnell 2006, p. 43). In both film adaptations of The Quiet American, the ‘good 
intentions’ of American foreign policy in Indo-china are promoted.  
 
Derrida explains that the ‘modern lie’ entails a paradoxical perversion or ‘conspiracy in 
broad daylight’ where the truth is spoken with the ‘view of deceiving those who believe 
they ought not believe it’ (Derrida 1986, p. 92). Drawing on Alexandre Koyré’s essay 
‘The Political Function of the Modern Lie’ (1945), Derrida elaborates on the idea of a 
‘society with a secret’ whose structure permits a conspiracy in ‘broad daylight’ (Derrida 
1986, p. 93). Koyré writes that the function of the ‘modern lie’ (lie in ‘broad daylight’) is 
to deny the inherent value of thought, purporting that ‘myth is better than science, and 
rhetoric that works on the passions preferable to proof that appeals to the intellect’ 
(Koyré 1945: 291). An example of the function of the ‘modern lie’ maybe discerned in 
George W Bush’s reference to the innocence of Alden Pyle while commenting on the 
Iraq war. 
 
Addressing American War Veterans in August 2008, former President George W 
Bush’s reference to Alden Pyle was exceptional given that the then Republican 
administration actively sought to avoid any comparison between the war in Iraq and 
the Vietnam conflict. During his speech Bush cited Pyle in order to create a positive 
image of America’s involvement in the Indo-china conflict stating; “I never knew a man 
who had better motives for all the trouble he caused” (Buckley 2007, p. 97). The 
President’s representation of Pyle suggests either a failure to recognize the danger of 
promoting a concept of innocence constructed upon ignorance or an intentional 
revision of Greene’s representation. Fowler’s summation of Pyle provides an insight 
into Greene’s view on the danger of innocence and ‘good intentions’: 
 
What’s the good? He’ll always be innocent, you can’t blame the innocent, 
they are always guiltless. All you can do is control them, or eliminate them.  
Innocence is a kind of insanity... He was impregnably armoured by his good 
intentions and his ignorance (Greene 2004b, p. 163).   
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In seeking to justify America’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict – and by association 
their actions in the Iraq war – Bush’s admiration for Pyle’s ‘good intentions’ 
demonstrates the gulf that lay between political ideology and the reality of human 
suffering. Publically the US remained staunchly opposed to colonization during the 
Indo-China war, yet encouraged the French to absorb international condemnation for 
the violent conflict they waged in the twilight of colonialism. The hypocrisy of the 
American position is identified by Kevin Buckley who writes that during the time in 
which The Quiet American was set, the United States was already underwriting close 
to 80 per cent of the French cost of the war (Buckley 2007, p. 89). Financially 
underwriting the French in their nine year struggle to retain its colony the United 
States, by association, was complicit in the deaths of thousands of Indochinese 
civilians, estimated by Neil Sheehan as being anywhere between a quarter of a million 
to a million people (Sheehan cited in Buckley 2007, p. 89). Within a year of the peace 
agreement in Geneva that ended French claims to its former colony, the US acting on 
the ideological assumptions of their ‘good’ intentions, openly betrayed the agreement.x 
Commenting on American foreign policy Phil Melling notes that if like Alden Pyle the 
United States remained ‘determined to do good then military interventionism for any 
number of reasons’ – whether it be the war on drugs, immigration, trade or unstable 
government – ‘could well replace negotiation and law’ (Melling 1990, p. 10).xi  
 
Nietzsche identifies that throughout history intentions were regarded as irrelevant in 
determining the value of an action, rather he proposed that ‘the value or non-value of 
an action was derived from its consequences: the action itself came as little into 
consideration as did its origin’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 63). Only after the advent of 
Christian moral dominance did a priori moral judgments come to interpret one’s 
actions and ‘men became unanimous in the belief that the value of an action resided in 
the value of the intention behind it’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 63). Nietzsche regarded the 
‘morality of intentions’ as being a ‘prejudice … that must be overcome’ by the ‘secret 
labour’ of the ‘most honest and also most malicious consciences as living touchstones 
of the soul’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 64). The honesty of such an exacting conscience 
exposes the erstwhile ‘good intentions’ of Pyle and the US military intervention in 
Vietnam as being founded upon ignorance and error.xii Nietzsche could well have been 
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referring to the United States’ conviction in their ‘good’ intentions when he wrote that 
the ‘herd’ says ‘obstinately and stubbornly, “I am morality itself, and nothing is morality 
besides me!”’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 125).xiii  
  
At a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Singh during the 2006, G8 Summit, Bush 
declared: “I know you’ve been through difficult times, and America mourns the loss of 
innocent life as a result of the terrorist attacks… we condemn violence, we honour 
innocent life’.xiv Similarly, the President’s response to the 2002 bombing in Bali 
highlights the plight of the ‘innocent’ who have suffered at the hands of ‘terrorists’ who 
have: 
 
“once again targeted innocents… At least 182 innocent men and women 
have been murdered. We must together challenge and defeat the idea that 
the wanton killing of innocents advances any cause or supports any 
aspirations”.xv  
 
During a tribute at the Pentagon Memorial for the victims of the September 11th 2001 
terrorist attack, President Bush once again employed the term ‘innocent’ as he 
reflected on the tragedy:  
 
“We will never forget all the innocent people killed by the hatred of a few… a 
cult of evil which seeks to harm the innocent and thrive on human suffering. 
Theirs is the worst kind of violence, pure malice, while daring to claim the 
authority of God” 
 
Ironically Bush concluded his speech with a benediction: “May God bless you all, and 
may God bless America”.xvi President Bush does not define the meaning of innocence 
in any of these speeches. However, it is appears that the ‘innocent’ in these contexts 
are those who are victims of terrorism perpetrated against America and her allies. It is 
informative to consider that ‘terrorism’ has historically referred to a particular 
expression of State power. However as Badiou has observed, in contemporary times 
the word ‘terrorism’ has been appropriated by America to designate all violent political 
adversaries (Badiou 2003, p. 144). Terrorism today is employed as a propagandistic 
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term to refer to those who resist American imperialism, a generalized concept that fails 
to take into account the causes or consequences of political factors that comprise this 
identification (Badiou 2003, p. 153).  
 
In response to the latest evolution of the ‘lie’, Derrida would call for vigilance to ensure 
that the cause of truth is not perverted into dogmatism or orthodoxy (Derrida 1986, p. 
82). Such vigilance resists ‘performative’ truths that lay claim to innocence and go 
beyond the ‘determination of truth as objectivity’ (Derrida 1986, p. 90). Resistance to 
the ‘modern lie’ in all its patriarchal guises entails doing everything and thinking 
everything possible to remain free from its commandments, interventions and 
interference. This might be characterized as the ‘innocence of becoming’ – 
representing that state of unknowing that resists either intentional collaboration or 
passive collusion with the ‘lie’. ‘Innocence of becoming’ signifies a determination to 
remain consciousness of the provisional state of knowledge and a willingness to 
challenging claims to truth and legitimacy, for as Badiou notes ‘one single thought has 
immensity far beyond any judgment’ (Badiou 2003, p. 163). 
 
Although the Post-modern era can be seen as opening new possibilities to deconstruct 
and hence expose the lies that have sustained long held prejudices and concealed 
abuses of power, such deconstruction has inadvertently hobbled our capacity to 
respond to these lies with any sense of collective veracity. The Post-modern view that 
all values are relative has contributed to a contemporary political context in which all 
attempts to conceptualize ‘evil’, identify the manifestation of evil or indeed engage in 
action to resist evil, are relegated to a milieu of perspectives and histories that remain 
in a constant state of revision. In this context I use the term evil to denote the suffering, 
death and destruction wrought upon humanity and the environment by wilfully ignorant 
or intentionally malicious acts, rather than the notion of sinful or wicked trespasses 
against a transcendent moral standard. In his philosophical work Ethics: An Essay on 
the Understanding of Evil (2002) Badiou argues that if there is evil we must ‘conceive it 
from the starting point of the Good’ (Badiou 2002, p. 60).xvii He dismisses the notion of 
evil as ignorance of the Good due to the obvious difficultly of defining such ignorance 
asking the pertinent question, “For whom is a truth absent?” (Badiou 2002, p. 61). 
Although agreeing with Nietzsche that humanity in its vital power was ‘essentially 
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innocent, foreign in itself to both good and evil’, Badiou is emphatic in his assertion 
that ‘no life, no natural power, can be beyond good and evil… or rather every life… is 
beneath Good and Evil’ (Badiou 2002, p. 59). Badiou reasons that ‘it is only because 
there are truths, and only to the extent that there are subjects of these truths, that 
there is evil’ (Badiou 2002, p. 61). 
 
While I concur with Badiou’s view that truths grounded in actual subjects of those 
truths may reveal evil within a specific time/place continuum, his contention that all life 
is beneath good and evil is problematic. In our contemporary political context the 
capacity to evaluate the value or meaning of an action remains hindered by the 
methodology of deconstruction and obscured by the ‘performative’ truths of the 
‘modern lie’ – orchestrated to manipulate any concept of good for a particular end. 
Badiou contends that ‘truth and the truth alone, given as faithful trajectory’ constitutes 
the subject. While this subject may exhibit a laudable fidelity to constructing truth ‘bit 
by bit’ (Badiou 2002, p. 68) such discernment of truth as good – even as a product of 
“production” – remains a matter of ethical judgment made according to constructed 
hierarchies of knowledge.xviii Regardless of the veracity of one’s intention to act with 
fidelity to an event and how painstakingly thorough and meticulous the truth process 
may be, it nonetheless produces knowledge that even in its provisionality is subsumed 
by prior ethical interpretive models and theory. Hence both the individual and society 
can be seen to occupy an ethical vacuum in which evil remains a reality, yet our 
capacity to oppose prevent or avoid such evil is compromised. This ethical vacuum 
has proven to be a fertile environment for power brokers willing to employ political 
and/or religious ideology to justify and legitimate their own moral projections. The 
deceit of such ideology, its ‘lie of innocence’, is encrypted into the ideology itself. As 
the ‘lie’ never declares “I’m ideological”, it remains elusive, reproducing itself and in 
turn, hiding within a process that is self-authenticating and self-justifying.  
 
In today’s share market of ideas the ‘lie of innocence’ is at the service of the highest 
bidder. The ‘innocent’ in contemporary political dialogue are those who possess 
sufficient financial power to create images of themselves in which they are vicariously 
portray as patriots, faithful, or devout citizens. The plight of the vulnerable in society – 
such as children, the poor and ethnic minorities – reflects the same fate as their 
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erstwhile ‘innocent’ companions in biblical narratives. Yesterday’s lies of the powerful 
merely pre-empt the political narratives and rhetoric of today’s lies. It will be argued in 
the following analysis of The Road, that McCarthy’s portrayal of a dying world is a 
portent of the future of humanity unless our vision is renewed. Fixated upon the 
‘knowledge of good and evil’ humanity has rendered itself vulnerable to the 
machinations of the ‘modern lie’. Given that such knowledge is a construction of reality 
and hence a falsification of life, it obscures our vision of the ‘Tree of Life’ and thus 
inhibits our ability to respond adequately to those manifestations of evil that deny life.  
 
In an interview with Peter Hallward, Alain Badiou stated that the “essence of politics 
concerns thought and action, as connected through practical consequences of a 
prescription” (Badiou 2002, p. 115). Badiou’s reflection upon politics is of particular 
interest to this thesis in that he identifies the three areas of politics that, without 
redress, could conceivably hasten the advent of McCarthy’s nuclear wasteland. This 
connectivity of thought and action to a given prescription concerns practical matters of 
human and environmental import, rather than ideological issues which, as Greene 
demonstrates, so often obscures our vision and generates a political stasis. Badiou 
recognizes the importance of such vision in the rejuvenation of thought, perceiving that 
despite the deficiencies of our current political structures and praxis, the “space of the 
possible is larger than the one we are assigned – that something else is possible” 
(Badiou 2002, p. 115). It is in relation to this belief that there yet remains the ‘space’ to 
respond creatively to the challenges confronting us in this new millennium that The 
Road is of significance. Cormac McCarthy’s novel ventures into a rarefied literary 
‘space’ in that his portrayal of father and son inverts the relational dynamics typically 
represented in Western literature. In doing so he presents a perspective on the 
relationship between father and son that looks beyond the limitations and deceptions 
of political and religious ideology. As such The Road may be considered to be an 
example of what Badiou would call an event in that it can be seen to bring to ‘pass 
“something other” than the situation, opinions, [or] instituted knowledges… a 
hazardous, unpredictable supplement, which vanishes as soon as it appears’ (Badiou 
2002, p. 67). In the following analysis of The Road, it will be shown that within the 
microcosm of a father’s relationship with his son, McCarthy represents the conflict 
between knowledge and vision. It will be argued that the son’s fidelity to those he 
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encounters throughout the novel transfigures the vision of his father, an event that re-
invigorates the imagination to perceive possibilities for life, evocative of the ‘innocence 
of becoming’.  
 
The Road: The Son’s fidelity for life 
Examples in Western literature of positive relationships between fathers and sons are 
scarce. In a literary history where violence, alienation and betrayal have predominantly 
characterized relations between fathers and sons, the absence of positive fictional 
portrayals is confronting. Indeed this author has identified only two novels in which 
such a relationship is portrayed: Ivan Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons (1862) and Harper 
Lee’s To Kill a Mocking Bird (1960). Defining a ‘positive’ presentation of fathers and 
sons is problematic however; I propose that such a relationship would be non-violent 
and characterized by honesty and mutual respect.  Turgenev’s novel set in the rural 
Russian countryside in the mid-1850s portrays a small landholder lost in the financial 
and social turmoil that befell many following the emancipation of the Serfs during the 
reign of Tzar Alexander II. Enamoured with his university-educated son Arkady 
Kirsanov – a product of the newly enlightened Russia – the Father Nikolai is weak, 
confused and ultimately irrelevant to a society in which he had fast become archaic. 
The relationship inverses the power dynamic commonly presented in literature as the 
father willingly defers to the wisdom and guidance of his son. Turgenev removes the 
possibility of conflict between these characters by suppressing the father’s agency in 
diffidence to his son. Although Turgenev portrays an underlying affection between 
father and son there is no suggestion of mutual respect or a relationship of equality.   
 
In To Kill a Mocking Bird, Harper Lee presents a society in the southern states of 
America that is beset with racial prejudice and compromised by an ethically 
questionable judiciary. The main protagonist in the novel, the lawyer Atticus Finch, is 
depicted as morally astute in his endeavours to defend a poor African-American 
accused of raping a white woman. Atticus valiantly takes on the establishment 
confronting the deep-seated prejudice of his society and a flawed judiciary that 
repeatedly failed to deliver racial justice. To Kill a Mocking Bird is significant to this 
thesis in that Atticus employs the law to expose the prejudice of the Father intent upon 
procuring a sacrifice to maintain the established social order. It is of interest that Lee 
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neither refers to Atticus as “father” nor names his children. The boy referred to as 
“son” throughout the novel is essentially a non-entity, indiscernible from the will of 
Atticus and incidental in Lee’s depiction of racism in the South. Lee disrupts 
established views regarding relationships between the fathers and sons by distancing 
Atticus from the notion of the patriarchal Father and associated expressions of power. 
Rather than narrating the interpersonal dynamics of a father/son relationship, Lee 
presents the concept of Father through his depiction of Atticus as a compassionate 
and ethical man.  
 
In Cormac McCarthy’s novel The Road, the story focuses upon a father and son 
struggling for survival in a dying world. The novel is somewhat unique in that it 
presents a paternal relationship that – with one obvious exception – is characterized 
by an equality born from mutual love. Issues of power that typically characterize 
father/son relationships in Western literature are shown to be inconsequential. Taking 
into consideration his larger discussion of the ‘innocence of becoming’, Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s philosophical metaphors of the ‘Camel’, ‘Lion’ and ‘Child’ provides a lens 
through which McCarthy’s portrayal of this father/son relationship may be viewed.  
 
The Camel: The burden of Consciousness 
In Thus Spake Zarathustra the Übermensch declares that man must first become like 
a ‘camel … lumbered with a consciousness of humanity's false morality’ (Nietzsche 
1976, p. 55), if it is to learn the ‘meaning of the earth’ (Nietzsche 1976, p. 7). Nietzsche 
proposed that the ‘strength of a spirit could be measured by how much “truth” it could 
take, more clearly, to what degree it attenuated, veiled, sweetened, blunted and 
falsified’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 68). In his wake Albert Camus similarly argued that the 
only way humanity can live in a world that continually disappoints is to remain 
conscious of this very fact and resist the spurious solace of the lie. Reflecting on 
Camus’ premise that humanity yearns for a life of consciousness, Avi Sagi proposes 
the question, ‘when does consciousness awaken?’ (Sagi 2002, p. 74). In the sense 
that Kurtz mutters on his deathbed in Heart of Darkness “the horror, the horror” 
(Conrad 1995, p. 137) and Bartleby’s dying words “Ah Humanity” (Melville 1962, p. 
119) enact a sublime insight – apprehending the indifference of the universe and the 
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foolishness of our securities and constructed meanings – each of the writers 
considered in this thesis address this question. 
 
In the fictional works of Blake, Melville, Faulkner and Greene, a sublime moment 
pronounces the awakening of consciousness. In Blake’s poetry the imagination is 
presented as being of paramount importance to the renewal of a vision that can see 
beyond the oppressive chains of naivety, fear and ignorance. Blake employs irony to 
expose the Christian presentation of innocence as a lie and illustrate that 
consciousness is awoken in a sublime moment. In Herman Melville’s fiction the 
expanse of the sea and the ever present spectre of death serve to illuminate the 
foolishness of constructed truths, securities and value systems. His sea of 
consciousness lays bare ignorance and delusion whilst compelling the courageous to 
take action for life. The near death experience of Pip is the catalyst for a sublime vision 
of the indifference of the universe, emancipating the boy from the tyranny of 
rationalism and the omnipotence of a god. William Faulkner’s characters become 
conscious of the lies that have dictated their lives and a renewed sense of their own 
agency through the sublime experience of love and a transfiguring vision of nature. 
The absence of love and an apophatic theology characterize Greene’s fiction. His few 
depictions of compassion set amidst hopelessness and enduring suffering are shown 
to heighten the consciousness of his characters to the humanity of the other. These 
authors represent the sublime as the catalyst for change transfiguring the imagination, 
awakening consciousness of ‘humanity’s false morality’ and inspiring action. 
 
In McCarthy’s The Road, consciousness of ‘humanity’s false morality’ is neither the 
product of a re-invigorated imagination quickened by love nor the ‘affect’ of a sublime 
vision. Rather for those unfortunate enough to cling to life after the apocalypse, 
starvation, murder and death are shown to form consciousness, exposing the folly of 
humanity’s self-deceptive confidence in law and politics. Nietzsche may have 
envisaged McCarthy’s representation of a dying world when he wrote of the 
‘paradoxical mystery of the ultimate act of cruelty … reserved for the generation which 
is even now arising’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 81). The cruelty to which Nietzsche refers is 
the sacrifice of ‘God for nothingness’ – a self-destruction transformation of humanity’s 
worldview that removed all ‘healing, all hope, all faith in a concealed harmony, in a 
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future bliss and justice’ – ushering in the nihilism that he believed would ultimately 
consume the Earth unless checked (Nietzsche 1990, p. 81). The ‘nothingness’ 
produced by this nihilism can be discerned in The Road, where the very value of life is 
questioned during countless long and painful deliberations between the ‘man’ and his 
‘wife’ during the ‘hundred nights they’d sat up arguing the pros and cons of destruction 
with the earnestness of philosophers chain to a madhouse wall’ (McCarthy 2007, p. 
60). Claire Colebrook argues that Post-modernism has represented the idea of the 
individual as a mere construction of the social system and as ‘one with capitalism that 
reduces life to one undifferentiated plane of relative values’ (Colebrook 2004, p. 151). 
In The Road, McCarthy presents the death of such relative values as prior social and 
political systems are reduced to an equation of kill or be killed, rendering life itself as a 
mere commodity. Early in the novel the wife, having finally decided to end her life 
according to her own will, horrifically outlines the bleak prospects of her family: 
 
“No, I’m speaking the truth. Sooner or later they will catch us and they will kill 
us. They will rape me. They’ll rape him. They are going to rape us and kill us 
and eat US and you won’t face it. You’d rather wait for it to happen. But I 
can’t. I can’t” (McCarthy 2007, p. 58). 
 
The ‘man’ rejects his wife’s rational appraisal of their plight and entrusts his entire will 
to protect his son. In the absence of religious or legal mores the father’s commitment 
to his son can be seen as creating new meaning through action that defies death – 
justified with each new morning. The apparent absurdity of continuing to struggle for 
life is reflected in the mediated thoughts of the father: ‘Do you think that your fathers 
are watching? That they weigh you in their ledgerbook? Against what? There is no 
book and your fathers are dead in the ground’ (McCarthy 2007, p. 209). In McCarthy’s 
representation of love amidst sublime horror the possibility of communication between 
fathers and sons re-emerges, a mutual affection expressed in the boy’s greeting of the 
new day: “Hi papa” (McCarthy 2007, p. 3). 
 
Nietzsche’s contention that ‘physiologists should think again before postulating the 
drive to self-preservation as the cardinal drive in an organic being’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 
44) is supported by McCarthy’s representation of the father’s extraordinary 
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commitment to his son. Nietzsche argued that self-preservation is but one 
‘consequence’ of life desiring to ‘vent its strength’. If as Nietzsche proposes life is the 
‘will to power’ then relationships such as that depicted in The Road may be considered 
to be a ‘consequence’ of this same will (Nietzsche 1990, p. 44). In view of the 
vulnerability of the boy, trust in his father is of paramount importance. Although the 
father seeks to shelter his son from the horrors they encounter and provide what little 
comfort he can, even a ‘white’ lie is shown to generate a heightened state of anxiety 
(McCarthy 2007, pp. 34-35). McCarthy suggests that even when all external moral and 
legal codes have perished, honesty, fairness and integrity remain crucial within 
relationship.  
 
Integrity according to Camus is the mind not abdicating or retreating before ’what the 
mind itself has brought to light’ (Camus 2000, p. 50). Our refusal to seek comfort from 
our anguish in illusionary securities proffered by religious and/or political ideology is 
according to Nietzsche recognition of untruth as a ‘condition of life’. Nietzsche 
proposed that those who recognize untruth as a ‘condition of life’ are by ‘that act alone, 
beyond good and evil’ (Neitzsche 1990, p. 37). The ‘innocence of becoming’ speaks of 
an on-going process of resistance as one seeks to remain conscious of the provisional 
nature of truth and the continuing evolution of the ‘lie of innocence’.  The father in The 
Road is under no illusion as to the hopelessness of their struggle: a truth further 
crystallized by the knowledge that he will soon die from terminal illness. The father 
reflects: ‘Every day is a lie, But you are dying. That is not a lie’ (McCarthy 2007, p. 
254). In response to the overwhelming certainty of his imminent death, fantasy, stories 
and dreams – the things of childhood – are considered to be distractions from their all-
consuming priority: survival. Remaining focused upon the physical realities and 
challenges they must overcome is shown to be primarily an act of will. The father 
instructs his son: 
 
When your dreams are of some world that never was of some world that 
never will be and you are happy then you will have given up. Do you 
understand? And you cant give up. I wont let you … He looked at the boy out 
of his sunken haggard eyes. Some new distance between them. He could 
feel it (McCarthy 2007, p. 202).  
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The father’s insistence that the son abandon ‘childish’ dreams and illusions to focus 
solely upon survival creates a sense of alienation and distance between them, for 
while the father has memories of pre-apocalyptic happiness the son knows only the 
purgatory of the present. Throughout the course of the novel the boy is shown to 
evolve from a naïve ‘innocent’ seeking solace in stories of his father’s lost world, to 
one fully conscious of the harsh realities of the world of death he had inherited. Lisa 
Spurgeon’s discussion of the ethical implications of the man and the boy’s choices 
from the perspective of ‘survivalist consquentialism’ and ‘post-apocalyptic pragmatism’ 
emphasizes the significance of ‘knowing’ in the struggle to survive and define oneself 
in an environment in which the permeability of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is laid bare (Spurgeon 
2013). Coming in time to reject all that is not true to his experience, stories of a lost 
world find no place in the boy’s reality. It is argued by Julian Murphett that the father in 
The Road attempts to both preserve and develop a moral code in his son in a world 
devoid of morality. His assertion that McCarthy presents the boy as experiencing a 
‘metamorphosis of the human animal’ (Murphett 2012, p. 142) – a process of 
becoming human in this post-apocalyptic world – is at odds with McCarthy’s portrayal 
of the boy’s consciousness of his plight. The following dialogue between father and 
son expresses the weight of consciousness McCarthy bestows upon the boy:  
 
The man squatted and looked at him. I’m scared, he said. Do you 
understand? 
I’m scared. 
The boy didn’t answer. He just sat there with his head bowed, sobbing. 
You’re not the one who has to worry about everything. 
The boy said something but he couldn’t understand him. What? he said. 
He looked up, his wet and grimy face. Yes I am, he said, I am the one 
(McCarthy 2007, p. 277). 
 
Although unbeknown to his father, the boy is shown to bear a greater burden than 
death, the prospect of life beyond the looming death of his father: his only defence in 
the face of unimaginable cruelty is the prospect of shooting himself through the mouth 
(McCarthy 2007, p. 119). 
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Nietzsche argued that an unconscious resistance to truth lay in the heart of all people, 
regardless of the strength of their will. He believed that the ultimate strength of one’s 
character could be determined by how much truth they could bear to acknowledge. 
This strength of will is not defined by a capacity to accumulate knowledge, but rather 
reflects one’s courage to respond truthfully to ever changing events. Nietzsche 
regarded those who achieve greatness of spirit – the ‘noble man’ – as having 
demonstrated a willingness to bear truth beyond the self-deceit that characterizes the 
‘herd’. However he warns that such ‘over-coming of man’ came at the cost of much 
suffering and labour (Nietzsche 1990, p. 192). Nietzsche suggests that the ‘noble man’ 
will be known by four virtues, namely; courage, insight, sympathy and solitude. Much 
of what Nietzsche identified as being characteristic of the ‘noble man’ can be 
perceived in the characters of the son and father in The Road. The generosity of spirit 
reverence, devotion and enthusiasm of love with which the boy responds to his fellow 
refugees is foremost an expression of a ‘superfluity of free-will’. Despite the horrific 
circumstances of his existence, the boy is presented as grateful for life and the 
freedom to share this gift. Equally the father is shown to forgo the internalized 
expectations of his forefathers as he continues to care for his son despite all odds, 
demonstrating a love fuelled by his gratitude for the life of the boy. 
 
The Lion: Freedom for Creation  
Nietzsche proposed that once having become like a ‘camel … lumbered with a 
consciousness of humanity's false morality’, humanity must ‘create itself freedom for 
new creation: that the might of the lion can do’ (Nietzsche 1976, p. 55). The metaphor 
of the ‘Lion’ symbolizes a transition from the awakening of consciousness to action 
born from the courage and strength of will. Nietzsche argued that the synthetic 
concept ‘I’ had contributed to humanity’s failure to take action to free themselves from 
the strictures of false morality in order to create their own meaning of the earth. He 
contends that a ‘whole chain of erroneous conclusions and consequently of false 
evaluations of the will itself has become attached to the will as such’ (Nietzsche 1990, 
p. 49). The consequence of these errors is the belief that ‘willing suffices for action’ in 
which the ‘appearance has translated itself into the sensation’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 49).  
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 In The Road, the father whispers to the sleeping boy: “All things of grace and beauty 
such that one holds them to one’s heart have a common provenance in pain. Their 
birth in grief and ashes” (McCarthy 2007, p. 56). In the barren landscape of the father’s 
existence memories of love, joy and beauty were meaningless, their quality lost in 
translation amidst his living hell. The happiness of times past linger ever more like a 
phantom for the father, each memory inflicting pain upon a consciousness tortured by 
the damnation before him. The father sobs uncontrollably as he watches his son 
sleeping, however the narrator suggests that this grief ‘wasn’t about death’ but rather, 
‘beauty or about goodness. Things that he’d no longer any way to think about at all’ 
(McCarthy 2007, p. 137). The father is tormented by redundant moralities and 
although otherwise opposed to murder, kills without hesitation to protect his son. The 
father explains his actions to the boy: “You wanted to know what the bad guys looked 
like. Now you know. It may happen again. My job is to care of you. I was appointed to 
do that by God. I will kill anyone who touches you. Do you understand? (McCarthy 
2007, p. 80). In the aftermath of an attempt to murder his son, the gruesome reality of 
the father’s watch is evident as he reflects: ‘This is my child, he said. I wash a dead 
man’s brains out of hair. That is my job’ (McCarthy 2007, p. 77). Although the Father is 
shown to be willing to kill in order to protect his son, a consistent theme throughout the 
novel is the idea that the boy and his father are among the ‘good guys’, primarily due 
to their desire to preserve life and determination not to eat human flesh. 
 
The depth of love that moves the father to preserve the life of his son at all costs is 
accentuated by moments of soul wrenching grief, knowing to well that he will soon die 
from diseased lungs and leave his son to venture on into the darkness alone. At times 
the father is depicted as being overwhelmed by anger at the God he had previously 
looked to as the source of justice. Much like Sisyphus defying the gods, the father rails 
against the notion that ‘God is Love’ cursing the heartless, impotent and silent 
architect of creation to His own eternal damnation. Knelling in the ashes, his face 
raised to the ‘paling day’ the Father whispers:  
 
“Are you there ... Will I see you at the last? Have you a neck by which to 
throttle you? Have you a heart? Damn you eternally have you a soul? Oh 
God, he whispered. Oh God” (McCarthy 2007, p. 10). 
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The father rationalizes that in light of his imminent death, it would be better to kill his 
son than to let him fall into the clutches of post-apocalyptic humanity. McCarthy 
captures the agony of the father’s love as he nurses his ill boy: 
 
He held him all night, dozing off and waking in terror, feeling for the boy’s 
heart. In the morning he was no better. He tried to get him to drink some 
juice but he would not. He pressed his hand to his forehead, conjuring up a 
coolness that would not come. He wiped his white mouth while he slept. I will 
do what I promised, he whispered. No matter what. I will not send you into 
the darkness alone (McCarthy 2007, p. 265). 
 
The dark irony of the father’s conviction that he must kill his son in order to prevent 
him suffering an unbearable death brings into sharp focus the relationship between 
love and life. Nietzsche warned of the ethical dilemma confronting the father: 
 
He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not 
become a monster. And when you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also 
gazes into you (Nietzsche 1990, p. 102). 
 
The incongruity of the father’s love for his son and the belief that to kill his child was an 
authentic expression of that love haunts the father: his conviction all the more 
questionable in a world where all prior values, dogma and rationalization had ceased 
to exist. Faced with the immediate threat of discovery the father is torn by the reality of 
what he is contemplating: 
 
They lay listening. Can you do it? When the time comes. When the time 
comes there will be no time. Now is the time. Curse God and die. What if it 
doesn’t fire? It has fire. What if it doesn’t fire? Could you crush that beloved 
skull with a rock? Is there such a being within you, which you know nothing? 
Can there be? Hold him in your arms, Just so. The soul is quick. Pull him 
toward you. Kill him. Quickly (McCarthy 2007, p. 120). 
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Prior to this close encounter, the father decides to leave his son in order to search for 
food, leaving the boy with a pistol so that he can commit suicide if threatened with 
capture. This is the one occasion in The Road where the father imposes his authority 
on his son. The boy objects:  
 
Please, Papa.  
Stop it. I want you to do what I say. Take the gun. 
I dont want the gun.  
I didnt ask you if you wanted it. Take it (McCarthy 2007, p. 73).  
 
Despite the best of intentions within an impossible scenario the father’s will – a 
singular moment in the text – is presented as the harbinger of death. In Western 
literature violence has consistently been portrayed as obstructing our vision of life, as 
is represented in the aftermath of The Fall legend in which access to the ‘Tree of Life’ 
is waylaid by Seraphim bearing flaming swords.  
 
The Child: Innocence and a New Beginning 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra ‘becomes like a child: innocence and forgetfulness, a new 
beginning ... a sacred “Yes” (Nietzsche 1976, p. 55). Throughout The Road McCarthy 
associates the boy with the symbolism of a ‘fire’ that continues to glow despite the 
desolation. This inner ‘fire’ carried by the boy represents Hope for the future of 
humanity. The ‘fire’ is presented as a quality in and of itself and as the father reflects, it 
is no less beautiful for the context in which it is beheld: ‘not all dying words are true 
and this blessing is no less real for being shorn of its ground’ (McCarthy 2007, p. 31). 
Badiou’s theory on the representation of the subject in post-modern literature may 
provide a perspective from which to interpret McCarthy’s reference to the inner ‘fire’ of 
the boy. Badiou asks, “How can a modern doctrine of the subject be reconciled with an 
ontology?” considering Post-modernism’s ‘negative definitions’ that delimit the 
possibility of ontology (Badiou 2003, p. 3). He contends that as there are no stable 
objects there can be no ‘correlates of such objects’ (Badiou 2003, p. 3). Hence, if there 
is no definable ‘self’ that can be identified, how can subjects be differentiated amidst a 
general ontology? (Badiou 2003, p. 5). Badiou’s question is of particular relevance 
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when attempting to explain McCarthy’s presentation of the autonomous agency of the 
boy in The Road. 
 
Throughout the novel, McCarthy presents the boy as responding with fidelity to all he 
encounters, demonstrating a compassion and advocacy for the preservation of life. In 
her reading of The Road, Lydia Cooper’s contends that through connections with 
others the boy’s ethical development represents the evolution of a new human. Her 
summation that the disconnection of the boy from what the man ‘knows’ of humanity 
serves to emphasizes the continuing importance of values (Cooper 2011), a view 
supported by Andre Almacen who argues that despite McCarthy’s presentation of a 
moral void The Road suggests there yet remains innate values that can be restored 
(Almacen 2010). However, McCarthy’s depiction of the boy’s willingness to remain 
conscious of the horrific circumstances of his existence – refusing the comforts of 
fantasy or stories of a happier time – forms an immanent and continuing break with the 
prior values represented in the ‘knowing’ of the father. In the closing scenes of The 
Road, McCarthy alludes to a faint hope for humanity, a thread that has been shown to 
endure throughout the poetry and fiction examined in this thesis. During one of the few 
conversations in the novel that is not between father and son, the father discusses the 
motivation for the boy’s generous gift of a little food with an old vagabond. The father 
is convinced that the kindness of his son will endure beyond all the suffering and 
despicable cruelty he has and will encounter.  
 
The old man fitted the tins into his knapsack and fastened the straps. You 
should thank him you know, the man said. I wouldn’t have given you 
anything.  
Maybe I should and maybe I shouldn’t.  
Why wouldn’t you?  
I wouldn’t have given him mine.  
You don’t care if it hurts his feelings?  
Will it hurt his feelings?  
No. That’s not why he did it.  
Why did he do it?  
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He looked over at the boy and he looked at the old man You wouldn’t 
understand, he said. I’m not sure I do. 
Maybe he believes in God.  
I don’t know what he believes in.  
He’ll get over it.  
No he won’t (McCarthy 2007, pp. 184-185). 
 
The Child is christened by a grey snowflake that is soon lost upon his thin dirty hand. 
‘“It’s snowing”, the boy said. He looked at the sky. A single gray flake sifting down. He 
caught it in his hand and watched it expire there like the last host of Christendom’ 
(McCarthy 2007, p. 15). The last Host of Christ is blessed long after God is shown to 
have retreated from his offspring: Man had acted out his own damnation before the 
rapture had been summoned. In the complete absence of love the presence of the boy 
is an anomaly in which the very existence of God hangs by the most precarious of 
threads. Against a backdrop of carnage and death the boy is a counter point – a light 
in a darkness of epic proportions.  
 
In his discussion of how a ‘subject emerges through an autonomous chain of actions 
within a changing situation’, Badiou contends that the subject is always in a process of 
subjectivism. While not all are subjects, those who become subjects ‘act in fidelity to a 
chance encounter with an event which disrupts the situation they find themselves in’ 
(Badiou 2003, p. 6). Badiou describes fidelity as part of the truth ‘process’: ‘it amounts 
to a sustained investigation of the situation, under the imperative of the event itself; it 
is an immanent and continuing break’ (Badiou 2002, p. 68). In a world in which 
institutions of State and religion have been obliterated and any lingering remnant of 
morality is soon consumed in the quest to survive, the boy is shown to act in fidelity 
with each human he encounters and as such may be considered to be an incarnation 
of the ‘innocence of becoming’. Although aware that his fellow refugees will soon die 
the boy nonetheless pleas with his father to show compassion and share their meagre 
store of food to ease another’s suffering (McCarthy 2007, pp. 50, 53). Compassion or 
the willingness to ‘suffer with’ another characterizes the boy’s response to those he 
encounters. The desire to preserve life rather than charity compels the boy to beg his 
father to be merciful to a thief who had earlier abandoned them to exposure and 
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starvation (McCarthy 2007, p. 276). It is in this compassion that a faint hope remains 
for humanity, the ‘innocence of becoming’ expressed in the willingness to act for the 
‘other’. As the bearer of life in its most open spontaneous and creative incarnation, the 
boy is shown to transfiguring the father’s rationality. 
 
In the dimming candle light, the dying father looks upon his son for the last time and 
concedes that the boy shall wake to a new day and journey into the darkness alone. 
Having struggled with his rational decision to euthanize his son (McCarthy 2007, pp. 
28-29) the father acknowledges that he could not hold his dead child in his arms: He 
could not kill him (McCarthy 2007, p. 298). The narrator reflects on the father’s final 
moments: ‘In that cold corridor they had reached the point of no return which was 
measured from the first solely by the light they carried with them’ (McCarthy 2007, p. 
300). The Father’s final act is to exhort his Son to carry the ‘fire’:  
 
You have to carry the fire.  
I don’t know how to.  
Yes you do.  
Is it real? The fire?  
Yes it is.  
Where is it? I don’t know where it is.  
Yes you do. It’s inside you. It was always there. I can see it…  
You said you wouldn’t ever leave me.  
I know. I’m sorry. You have my whole heart. You always did (McCarthy 2007, 
p. 298).  
 
The ‘fire’ of compassion initially kindled by the father’s own love for his son must not 
be extinguished at the behest of the very bloody minded rationality that had destroyed 
humanity and taken the world with it. Although The Road is a bleak and despairing 
portrayal of humanity’s future, McCarthy’s novel is primarily concerned with the 
preciousness of life rather than being fixated with death, ensuring that at the last the 
father’s heart betrays his reason. The Father cannot act in violence against a life he 
had strived to preserve with all his will and strength of purpose. The foundation of 
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reason upon which the father had justified his intention to kill his child is dismantled by 
love for his son. 
 
Although wanting to die with his father in the hope of being united in an afterlife 
McCarthy affords the boy the good fortune of being taken in by one of the few 
remaining ‘good guys’. The orphan walks into clear view after the death of his father 
and is soon met by a man who invites the boy to come with him (McCarthy 2007, p. 
294). McCarthy closes the story with the slimmest of possibilities that joy may yet be 
born out of immense sorrow and loss, as the orphaned boy joins a family with children 
of his own age who, most importantly, do not eat people. The ‘fire’ from which 
humanity may yet salvage a meagre existence resides in the ‘spirit of man’ – a living 
response to life obscured by the reasoned and transcendent faith of the pre-
apocalyptic world. At the core of this spirit is the persistent hope of the ‘innocence of 
becoming’. Perhaps in McCarthy’s inversion of the relationship between father and 
son, a new perspective upon the Gospel story may be envisaged. Camus regarded 
Christianity as sanctifying violence in its representation of Jesus Christ as the 
redeeming sacrifice for the sins of the world. However, if Christ is perceived as dying 
purely because he had acted in ‘good faith’ to his convictions and in doing so 
challenged those in seats of power, the notion of a blood sacrifice to appease the will 
of the Father may be discounted. This inversion would see the authenticity and 
courage of the son (Christ) as transfiguring the law of violence and death that 
predominates in the Old Testament and has characterized God the Father throughout 
Christian history. As has been identified in the literature considered in this thesis, such 
a Christ would embody Nietzsche’s concept of the metaphorical ‘Child’, one who 
Zarathustra conceives as innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a 
self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes’ (Nietzsche 1976, p. 55).  
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i The confessional discourse alone redeems itself from the fall of language, seemingly removed from the 
scepticism it conveys and ‘further authenticated by the falsification of other forms and genres of writing’ 
(Kerr 2006: 7). 
 
ii Pyle is described as having an ‘enormous respect for what he called serious writers’ which excluded 
the literary works of ‘novelists, poets and dramatists unless they had what he called a contemporary 
theme’ (Greene 2004b, p. 16). It is perhaps ironic that in these ‘less serious’ works lay the possible 
catalyst to awaken Pyle’s imagination to the subtleties and complexities of human experience and 
evoke a previously dormant capacity for empathy. 
 
iii Greene loathed the blind sentimentality and obtuseness that he considered to be constituent of the 
wilful ignorance he perceived to have pervaded the United States. Responding to a question regarding 
his political stance Greene stated: “I would go to almost any length to put my feeble twig in the spoke of 
American foreign policy. I admit this may seem simplistic but that’s how it is. Some time ago there was 
an article in The Spectator about The Quiet American, which said that it made little difference whether I 
inclined to the Right or the Left, since what I truly detested was American liberalism. That wasn’t far 
wrong” (Greene cited in Allain 1991, p. 90). 
 
iv As an English citizen Greene was well aware of the terrible cost political idealism had exacted upon 
his own nation, reflected in his presentation of a WW1 veteran selling objects by the curb in Brighton 
Rock who having ‘lost the whole of one side of the body: leg and arm and shoulder’ hopelessly peddles 
“Shoelaces … matches” (Greene 2004a, p. 10). Drawing upon England’s own colonial history Fowler 
recounts the cost exacted upon her former allies by the King of Burma when abandoned in the name of 
peace: “to be crucified and sawn in two. They were innocent. They thought we’d stay. But we were 
liberals and we didn’t want a bad conscience” (Greene 2004b, p. 88). 
 
v Greene was critical of dangerous attitudes and actions no matter who committed them, criticizing the 
British government for many of the same reasons as the American government. Boardman contends 
that Greene’s ‘apparent indictment of America might with equal justice be applied to Europe’s failures’ 
(Boardman 1971, p. 102). 
 
vi In his prologue to Another Mexico, Greene wrote of this banal materialistic urban existence: ‘with 
visibility shut down to fifty yards you got no sense of a world, of simultaneous existences: each thing 
was self-contained like an image of private significance, standing for something else—the suburban, 
loneliness’ (Greene 1964, p. 7). Half a century earlier Nietzsche identified Christianity – with its 
emphasis upon ‘moderation and dignity and duty and love of one’s neighbour’ – as the source of this 
mediocrity (Nietzsche 1990, p. 202).  
 
vii Gerald Weales quotes from Mankiewicz’s interview with James O’Neill Jr. of the Washington Daily 
News, January 8, 1958. Mankiewicz describes Pyle’s character as “a cardboard, stupid, weak-kneed 
idiot. In fact, Greene’s book made me so mad I was determined to make a picture out of it. The book 
was insulting to America and Americans.” (Weales 2003, pp. 492-493). Bushnell notes the enthusiasm 
with which Major General Edward Lansdale – head of the Office of Strategic Services in Vietnam – 
recommends the film to the Vietnamese President (Bushnell 2006, p. 39). On October 28, 1957, 
Lansdale wrote to President Ngo Dinh Diem: ‘Just a little note to tell you that I have seen the motion 
picture, “The Quiet American,” and that I feel it will help win more friends for you and Vietnam in many 
places in the world where it is shown. When I first mentioned this motion picture to you last year, I had 
read Mr. Mankiewicz’ “treatment” of the story and had thought it an excellent change from Mr. Greene’s 
novel of despair. Mr. Mankiewicz had done much more with the picture itself, and I now feel that you will 
be very pleased with the reactions of those who see it’ (Greene 1996. p. 307). 
 
viii In response to Mankiewicz’s film Greene wrote: ‘one could almost believe that the film was made 
deliberately to attack the book and the author, but the book was based on a closer knowledge of the 
Indo-China war than the American director possessed, and I am vain enough to believe that the book 
will survive a few years longer than Mr. Mankiewicz’ incoherent picture’ (Greene cited in Geist 1978, p. 
278). 
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ix Bushnell notes that although the film was completed in 2001, due to the 9/11 attacks it was put on 
hold by Miramax for a year. The Quiet American (2002) finally premiered in September 2002 (Bushnell 
2006, p. 40) 
 
x At the peace conference in Paris a “provisional military demarcation line” was delimited and the French 
agreed to supervise an election in July 1956. However, Lansdale derailed the Geneva understanding, 
reshaping Vietnam below the seventeenth parallel as a permanent new country. President Diem 
recanted on his earlier election promises and formed the Republic of Vietnam in the knowledge that the 
Americans estimated that Ho Chi Minh was likely to obtain at least 80 per cent of the vote (Buckley 
2007, p. 92).  
 
xi Carlos Fuentes notes the particular vulnerability of Central American states, suggesting that the 
conclusions of Panama are seemingly inevitable for those who either economically or politically are at 
variance with the United States (Fuentes 1990, p. 23). 
 
xii When question as to whether the tactics the US might consider implementing in Iraq may replicate 
militia programs in Vietnam, Paul Bremer – Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq – 
was adamant: “Vietnam! I don’t want to talk about Vietnam. This is not Vietnam. This is Iraq” (Buckley 
2007, p. 97). President Bush’s speech failed to mention the failures of US policy in Vietnam from 1954 
to 1975, suggesting that the tragedy of the Vietnam War was primarily due to the “withdrawal” of 
American troops. The President’s pronouncement that Iraq would suffer a similar catastrophe to 
Vietnam if the US was to withdraw may be likened to Pyle, avoiding accountability for the sectarian 
violence, growing refugee crisis, and on-going political instability that his policy had visited upon Iraq.   
 
xiii Nietzsche goes on to observe that even in the 1880’s things had moved to the ‘point where we 
discover even in political and social institutions an increasingly evident expression of this morality: the 
democratic movement inherits the Christian’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 125). 
 
xiv Remarks by President George W Bush following his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Singh at 
Konstantinovsky Palace Complex during the 2006 G8 Summit. Released by the Office of the Press 
Secretary, The White House, Washington DC (July 17, 2006) 
www.whitehouse.gov//news/releases/2006/07/images/20060717-1_d-0119-515h.html. 
 
xv Statement by President George W Bush in response to the 2002 bombings in Bali. Released by the 
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington DC (October 13, 2002)   
www.whitehouse.gov//news/releases/2002/10/20021013-1.es.html. 
 
xvi Speech by President George W Bush during the Department of Defence Service of Remembrance, 
Arlington, Virginia. Released by the Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington DC 
(October 11, 2001) www.whitehouse.gov//news/releases/2001/10/20011011-1.es.html. 
 
xvii Badiou argues that ‘without consideration of the Good, and thus of truths, there remains only the 
cruel innocence of life, which is beneath Good and beneath Evil’ (Badiou 2002, p. 60). 
 
xviii Badiou elaborates in an interview with Peter Hallward: “Let’s not forget that I conceive of a truth not 
as a pre-given transcendent norm, in the name of which we are supposed to act, but as a production” 
(Badiou 2002, p. 116). 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis identifies that the biblical origins of innocence assumes varying functions 
across legal prophetic and narrative texts. It has been argued that the ambiguous 
nature of the concept is amplified by the proliferation in translations of ‘innocence’ 
seen in contemporary versions of the Bible. These changes in translation reflect a 
disassociation of the concept of innocence from prior language conducive to ethical or 
political critique, contributing to the enduring sacrosanct value of the concept in 
Christian and secular societies. Given that The Fall legend represents innocence as 
an unrealized state and the Bible’s own stories reveal its insignificance before the 
competing demands of power, it has been argued that the Christian presentation of 
innocence is a lie: employed to legitimize, sanctify and conceal the will of the 
patriarchal Father. The Christian tradition’s failure to recognize the symbolism of The 
Fall as a prophetic warning of the destructive potential of humanity’s fixation upon the 
knowledge of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ has been identified as obscuring a vision for life 
symbolized by the ‘Tree of Life’. This thesis has argued that innocence is a concept 
that carries with it the weight of history. Although embodying an idealized state this 
thesis demonstrates the extent to which it has been rendered as an actual state of 
being in the same sense as ‘goodness’ or ‘evil’. This study has identified innocence as 
a construction, an error of knowledge – a lie – employed to legitimize, sanctify and 
mask the will of the patriarchal Father. The literature examined portrays the 
dehumanizing cost of humanity’s need of constructed moral principles of ‘good’ and 
‘evil’, which has necessitated a belief in innocence and which has served to subjugate 
men and women to the demands of law and the necessity of sacrifice. The texts 
chosen to show an enactment of the ‘lie of innocence’ are ones that expose it. 
Throughout these texts, biblical stories, myths and symbols have been re-interpreted 
for philosophical and political ends, revealing that the ‘lie of innocence’ has been 
employed by institutionalized Christianity, the law and morality to uphold the will of the 
Father amidst changing socio-political contexts.  
 
William Blake’s poetry exposes the Romantic representation of the child as the 
embodiment of innocence as idealistic sentimentality, obscuring the stark realities of 
child abuse in late 18th century English society. Blake’s poetry is derisive of such 
  Conclusion 
 
idealism and is equally contemptuous of the Enlightenment view that the creativity, 
honesty and imagination of the naïve child necessitated a process of suppression 
through religious and ideological indoctrination. Blake’s poetry indicts institutionalized 
Christianity as being instrumental in legitimizing immanent suffering and endorsing 
social ills in return for the promise of eternal salvation.  
 
The purpose of this thesis in part was to show how the concept of innocence develops 
throughout time and it examines particular awareness of writers’ suspicious of its 
implementation. Melville employs biblical symbolism and imagery in order to reveal the 
contradictions of the presentation of innocence. His fiction demonstrates the 
irrelevance of innocence in a society in which Protestant Christianity had been 
rationalized in the service of Capitalism. William Faulkner’s modernist novel Light in 
August illustrates the destructive legacy of the Protestant Work Ethic, a legacy 
encapsulated in the dehumanizing Calvinist applied categories of the ‘elect’ and the 
‘damned’. In a secular age where prior hope of transcendent providence had waned, 
Light in August exposes the supposed ontological innocence of the ‘elect’ as being 
instrumental in the relegation of human beings to a perpetual state of guilt in which 
moral choice is denied, doubt silenced and the possibility for peace or forgiveness 
repudiated. The social ills of poverty, prejudice and violence represented in Faulkner’s 
novel are shown to be sustained and perpetuated by a form of Protestantism informed 
by the Puritan theology of predestination and an ultra-transcendent concept of God 
antagonistic to human emotion/sexuality. Whether presented as striving to be 
adjudged among the ‘innocent’ or acting in response to their self-conviction of 
innocence, Faulkner’s characters represent the intolerable loneliness exacted by the 
Protestant Work Ethic. While the doctrine of ‘original sin’ may be seen as underwriting 
the fatalism engendered by the Protestant notion of predestination, the ‘lie of 
innocence’ is shown to be a necessary self-deception for those who seek to suppress 
consciousness of their own sorrow or complicity in the social determinism responsible 
for the suffering of others. 
 
Graham Greene’s fiction represents the sufferings of humanity as being the 
manifestation of a world corrupted by sin. Illustrating that the Roman Catholic Church’s 
moral axioms are disconnected from the social, political and economic conditions that 
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combine to create such suffering, Greene’s novels demonstrate that the ‘lie of 
innocence’ both contributed to the fatalism he perceived to have pervaded the Catholic 
response to the poor and served to reinforce the moral authority of the Church. 
Possibly in response to this fatalism Greene’s fiction challenges the notion that 
suffering and sacrifice are an expression of God’s love. Catholic dogma such as its 
teachings on sexuality and guilt are signified as distractions that hinder meaningful 
dialogue on more pressing social, political and ethical questions. A consistent theme 
throughout Greene’s novels is that ‘evil’ emanates from the pursuit of power – either 
individually or collectively – at the expense of others. His works illustrate the 
destructive ramifications of personal revolt or political revolution that condemn the 
‘Son’ to a retributive cycle of violence. Ambivalence to suffering is shown to be 
characteristic of the internalization of the false actuality of an innocent state. When 
exhibited at the level of political ideology this same ambivalence to the realities of 
human experience is shown to take on a guise of innocence that is distinctive in its 
ignorance.  
 
Greene’s fiction illustrates that political revolution that disregards the cost of human 
suffering in the pursuit of ideological ends manifests in a nihilism characterized by 
spiritual vacancy and contempt for life. This spiritual vacancy is shown to be not only 
symptomatic of the revolutionary State, but conversely, also a defining feature of the 
cheap and empty materialism Greene perceived to be the hallmark of Capitalism. 
Greene’s criticism of the United States’ foreign policy during the Cold War had much to 
do with his concern for the corrosive influence of nihilism upon the nation’s willingness 
to engage in discussion of profound questions regarding human existence. In his 
political reflections Greene identifies the banality of Capitalist culture as producing a 
melancholy that pervaded both individual and national consciousness, creating a 
stasis of inaction impotent to address social and political evils. Narrow minded 
conviction of national innocence employed to justify political, economic and military 
interventions in sovereign nations is exposed in the Quiet American as mere self-
deception. The post-apocalyptic hell portrayed in Cormac McCarthy’s novel The Road 
depicts the fatal consequences of patriotism founded upon a conviction of government 
in the name of truth, legitimized by the ‘lie of innocence’.    
 
  Conclusion 
 
It has been argued that the literature examined in this thesis exposes the concept of 
innocence as being a lie, which in its innumerable guises functions to obscure an 
alternative vision of life. Each of the selected literary texts rupture this ‘lie’ and in doing 
so affirms another concept of innocence: an emerging ‘knowledge of life’ (the Tree of 
Life) that Friedrich Nietzsche termed ‘innocence of becoming’. Blake’s use of irony 
illustrates that innocence is inevitably eroded by experience. His Songs of Innocence 
and Experience reveal the author’s interest in a third state: one perceived only by the 
sublime insight of an imagination reinvigorated by a vision for life. It is in the 
transfigured vision of a renewed mind that Blake saw the possibility for humanity to 
see beyond the ‘lie of innocence’ and break free from the fear and dread he perceived 
to be propagated by institutionalized Christianity.   
 
In his novel Moby Dick, Melville employs the metaphor of the ‘White Whale’ to 
symbolize the unrepresentable – that which in its sublimity exposes the indifference of 
the universe to concepts such as innocence and the foolishness of humanity’s trust in 
supposed certainties and securities. Through his colloquy on ‘whiteness’ Melville 
illuminates the failure of language to conveying absolute meaning or represent that 
which is most profound in human experience, anticipating Nietzsche’s contention that 
all values of good and evil or notions of absolute truth are contrived by man and based 
on error. Nietzsche’s assertion that unfree will is a myth – that there is only strong and 
weak wills – has been shown to be of particular significance to this thesis in that it both 
refutes the Christian doctrine of ‘original sin’ and rejects the idea that humanity may 
strive to attain or actualize a state of innocence sanctified by a God or consecrated by 
some transcendent order. Ahab’s madness is show to be the inevitable product of 
man’s attempts to fashion life according to such illusions of power and the desire to 
define experience according to the projections of one’s will. In his novella Billy Budd, 
Melville’s allegorical representation of an ‘innocent’ man illuminates the vulnerability of 
innocence to the machinations of power, exemplified by the treachery of one willing to 
rationalize acts of malice at the expense of life. Just as Blake’s poetry portrays the 
inevitability that innocence is eroded by experience, Billy Budd demonstrates that 
innocence cannot survive when exposed to the deceits of power and demands of law. 
Nonetheless Melville’s fiction alludes to a knowledge of life that is neither subject to 
the naïve vulnerability of innocence nor the deceptive callousness of experience. This 
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‘knowledge of humanity’ is shown to be brought into consciousness through 
recognition of the nuances and intricacies of humanity.  
 
This thesis has identified similarities between Melville’s ‘knowledge of humanity’ and 
Faulkner’s portrayal of a vision of life that ruptures the ‘lie of innocence’: an insight 
born from the experience of suffering and the desire to prevent others experiencing 
such sufferings. It is a gaze that sees beyond the constraints and deceptions of 
language to dismantle the delusions and deceits of the ‘lie of innocence’. Within a 
context of alienation and condemnation Light in August portrays a hope for humanity, 
one contingent upon acts of compassion inspired by the transfiguring ‘affect’ of ‘new 
life’. The sublime experience of ‘new life’ is shown to manifest in veracity for truth that 
exposes previously held investments in the ‘lie of innocence’. Faulkner’s novel depicts 
love expressed through compassion, loyalty, and as Robert Solomon suggests, a 
concern for others and the world, as the catalyst that frees humanity from the life 
denying strictures of the Protestant Work Ethic. In Light in August the social 
construction of the ‘self’ is shown to be dismantled by the instinct and intuition that 
proceeds from a knowledge of life born from compassion and concealed from male 
codes such as language. Through his re-invention of biblical stories and parables, 
Faulkner portrays love as transfiguring characters such as JC and Byron Bunch who – 
drawing upon Christian terminology – could be said to be immanently ‘born again’.  
 
Greene like Melville before him illustrates – what the poststructuralists will make their 
mantra – that language can never represent the world from an unbiased or 
disinterested perspective. His fiction demonstrates the destructive consequences of 
substituting religious or political language for the realities of human experience. In 
seeking to elucidate a response to the actuality of human suffering, Greene looked to 
symbolism to depict the mystery of faith, which he perceived to be the source of 
inspiration that could create new paradigms of compassion. Through his apophatic 
representation of God, Greene asks questions about love and paradox without being 
subject to the language of the Church. In so doing he negates the authority of the 
Father and illustrates that love can only be known in a sublime moment of lived 
experience. Such love is shown to be aroused by consciousness of another’s 
humanity, the intimacy of sexuality and actualized in acts of solidarity with the 
marginalized that bring about new concepts of justice.  
  Conclusion 
 
 
Inklings of ‘becoming innocent’ appear in Melville and Faulkner but only to be 
represented in epiphanies of madness (Pip), out-sidedness (Queequeg), or at death in 
Faulkner when JC recognizes that you can’t fight violence with violence. It has been 
argued that the ruptures of the ‘lie of innocence’ identified in the literature examined 
are embodied in the political and metaphorical ‘Orphan’. Through strength of will and 
the authenticity and honesty to create their values the ‘Orphan’ may be seen as a 
literary representation of the ‘innocence of becoming’. Condemned as unbelievers, 
heretics and political subversives due to their rebellion for life, the ‘Orphan’ in taking a 
line of flight away from the will of the Father exemplifies Greene’s notion that a political 
revolution with a humane face is dependent upon the individual rebellion of those 
willing to be damned for their fidelity with the abused. This solidarity with those who 
suffer is epitomized in the character of the Boy in The Road, who McCarthy presents 
as acting with fidelity in the moment to preserve life. In this environment of violence 
and death the politics of the ‘lie of innocence’ is rendered meaningless, exposed as 
self-deception of fatal import akin to suicide. The slim possibility of humanity’s survival 
is portrayed as being dependent upon humanity’s willingness to act with veracity for 
the preservation of life.  
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Appendix A: Bible Comparison Table 
 
 
Today’s New 
International Version 
(2005) 
New International 
Version (1978) 
New American 
Standard Bible (1960) 
American Standard 
Version (1901) 
King James Version 
(1611) 
      
 
innocence (cy) 9 6 4 5 5 
innocent (ly) 76 70 50 35 38 
innocents - - - 1 2 
      
Genesis 20:5 
 
niqqayown 
clean hands clean hands 
 (NASB) 
"Did he not himself say to 
me, 'She is my sister'? And 
she herself said, 'He is my 
brother ' In the integrity of 
my heart and the innocence 
of my hands I have done 
this." 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Said he not himself unto me, 
She is my sister? And she, 
even she herself said, He is 
my brother. In the integrity 
of my heart and the 
innocency of my hands have 
I done this. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Said he not unto me, She is 
my sister? and she, even she 
herself said, He is my 
brother: in the integrity of 
my heart and innocency of 
my hands have I done this. 
 
 
Genesis 44:16 
 
tsadaq 
 (TNIV) 
"What can we say to my 
lord?" Judah replied. "What 
can we say? How can we 
prove our innocence? God 
has uncovered your servants' 
guilt. We are now my lord's 
slaves—we ourselves and the 
one who was found to have 
the cup." 
 
 
 (NIV) 
"What can we say to my 
lord?" Judah replied. "What 
can we say? How can we 
prove our innocence? God 
has uncovered your servants' 
guilt. We are now my lord's 
slaves—we ourselves and the 
one who was found to have 
the cup." 
 
 
we justify ourselves we clear ourselves we clear ourselves 
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1 Kings 8:32 
 
tsadeq 
 (TNIV) 
then hear from heaven and 
act. Judge between your 
servants, condemning the 
guilty by bringing down on 
their heads what they have 
done, and vindicating the 
innocent by treating them in 
accordance with their 
innocence. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
then hear from heaven and 
act. Judge between your 
servants, condemning the 
guilty and bringing down on 
his own head what he has 
done. Declare the innocent 
not guilty, and so establish 
his innocence. 
 
 
justify the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
2 Chronicles 
6:23 
 
tsadeq 
 (TNIV) 
then hear from heaven and 
act. Judge between your 
servants, condemning the 
guilty and bringing down on 
their heads what they have 
done, and vindicating the 
innocent by treating them in 
accordance with their 
innocence. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
then hear from heaven and 
act. Judge between your 
servants, repaying the guilty 
by bringing down on his own 
head what he has done. 
Declare the innocent not 
guilty and so establish his 
innocence. 
 
 
justify the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
Job 9:2 
 
tsadeq 
 (TNIV) 
"Indeed, I know that this is 
true. But how can mere 
mortals prove their 
innocence before God? 
 
 
be righteous before in the right be just with be just with 
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Job 23:7 
 
yasher 
 (TNIV) 
There the upright can 
establish their innocence 
before him, and there I 
would be delivered forever 
from my judge. 
 
 
  the righteous the righteous 
Job 27:6 
 
tsedaqah 
 (TNIV) 
I will maintain my 
innocence and never let go 
of it; my conscience will not 
reproach me as long as I live. 
 
 
my righteousness my righteousness my righteousness my righteousness 
Psalm 26:6 
 
niqqayown 
 (TNIV) 
I wash my hands in 
innocence, and go about 
your altar, LORD, 
 
 
 (NIV) 
I wash my hands in 
innocence, and go about 
your altar, O LORD, 
 
 
(NASB) 
I shall wash my hands in 
innocence, And I will go 
about Your altar, O LORD, 
 
 
 (ASV) 
I will wash my hands in 
innocency: So will I 
compass thine altar, O 
Jehovah; 
 
 
 (KJV) 
I will wash mine hands in 
innocency: so will I compass 
thine altar, O LORD: 
 
 
Psalm 73:13 
 
niqqayown 
 (TNIV) 
Surely in vain I have kept 
my heart pure and have 
washed my hands in 
innocence. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Surely in vain have I kept 
my heart pure; in vain have I 
washed my hands in 
innocence. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Surely in vain I have kept 
my heart pureAnd washed 
my hands in innocence; 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Surely in vain have I 
cleansed my heart, And 
washed my hands in 
innocency; 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Verily I have cleansed my 
heart in vain, and washed my 
hands in innocency. 
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Isaiah 43:26 
 
tsadeq 
 (TNIV) 
Review the past for me, let 
us argue the matter together; 
state the case for your 
innocence. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Review the past for me, let 
us argue the matter together; 
state the case for your 
innocence. 
 
 
be proved right be justified be justified 
Daniel 6:22 
 
zakuw 
found innocent in found innocent in found innocent before 
 (ASV) 
My God hath sent his angel, 
and hath shut the lions' 
mouths, and they have not 
hurt me; forasmuch as before 
him innocency was found in 
me; and also before thee, O 
king, have I done no hurt. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
My God hath sent his angel, 
and hath shut the lions' 
mouths, that they have not 
hurt me: forasmuch as before 
him innocency was found in 
me; and also before thee, O 
king, have I done no hurt. 
 
 
Hosea 8:5 
 
niqqayown 
be incapable of purity be incapable of purity 
 (NASB) 
He has rejected your calf, O 
Samaria, saying,"My anger 
burns against them!"How 
long will they be incapable 
of innocence? 
 
 
 (ASV) 
He hath cast off thy calf, O 
Samaria; mine anger is 
kindled against them: how 
long will it be ere they attain 
to innocency? 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Thy calf, O Samaria, hath 
cast thee off; mine anger is 
kindled against them: how 
long will it be ere they attain 
to innocency? 
 
 
      
Appendix A: Bible Comparison Table 
 
 
Innocent 
      
Genesis 20:4 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
Now Abimelek had not gone 
near her, so he said, "Lord, 
will you destroy an innocent 
nation? 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Now Abimelech had not 
gone near her, so he said, 
"Lord, will you destroy an 
innocent nation? 
 
 
even though blameless a righteous nation a righteous nation 
Genesis 44:10 
 
naqiy 
NA NA 
 (NASB) 
So he said, "Now let it also 
be according to your words; 
he with whom it is found 
shall be my slave, and the 
rest of you shall be 
innocent." 
 
 
shall be blameless shall be blameless 
Exodus 23:7 
 
naqiy 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
Have nothing to do with a 
false charge and do not put 
an innocent or honest person 
to death, for I will not acquit 
the guilty. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Have nothing to do with a 
false charge and do not put 
an innocent or honest person 
to death, for I will not acquit 
the guilty. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
" Keep far from a false 
charge, and do not kill the 
innocent or the righteous, 
for I will not acquit the 
guilty. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Keep thee far from a false 
matter; and the innocent and 
righteous slay thou not: for I 
will not justify the wicked. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Keep thee far from a false 
matter; and the innocent and 
righteous slay thou not: for I 
will not justify the wicked. 
 
 
Numbers 5:31 
 
naqah 
 (TNIV) 
The husband will be 
innocent of any wrongdoing, 
but the woman will bear the 
consequences of her sin.' " 
 
 
 (NIV) 
The husband will be 
innocent of any wrongdoing, 
but the woman will bear the 
consequences of her sin.' " 
 
 
free from guilt free from iniquity be guiltless 
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Deuteronomy 
19:10 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
Do this so that innocent 
blood will not be shed in 
your land, which the LORD 
your God is giving you as 
your inheritance, and so that 
you will not be guilty of 
bloodshed. 
 
 (NIV) 
Do this so that innocent 
blood will not be shed in 
your land, which the LORD 
your God is giving you as 
your inheritance, and so that 
you will not be guilty of 
bloodshed. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"So innocent blood will not 
be shed in the midst of your 
land which the LORD your 
God gives you as an 
inheritance, and 
bloodguiltiness be on you. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
that innocent blood be not 
shed in the midst of thy land, 
which Jehovah thy God 
giveth thee for an 
inheritance, and so blood be 
upon thee. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
That innocent blood be not 
shed in thy land, which the 
LORD thy God giveth thee 
for an inheritance, and so 
blood be upon thee. 
 
 
Deuteronomy 
19:13 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
Show no pity. You must 
purge from Israel the guilt of 
shedding innocent blood, so 
that it may go well with you. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Show him no pity. You must 
purge from Israel the guilt of 
shedding innocent blood, so 
that it may go well with you. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
" You shall not pity him, but 
you shall purge the blood of 
the innocent from Israel, that 
it may go well with you. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Thine eye shall not pity him, 
but thou shalt put away the 
innocent blood from Israel, 
that it may go well with thee. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Thine eye shall not pity him, 
but thou shalt put away the 
guilt of innocent blood from 
Israel, that it may go well 
with thee. 
 
 
Deuteronomy 
21:8 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
Accept this atonement for 
your people Israel, whom 
you have redeemed, LORD, 
and do not hold your people 
guilty of the blood of an 
innocent person." And the 
bloodshed will be atoned for. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Accept this atonement for 
your people Israel, whom 
you have redeemed, O 
LORD, and do not hold your 
people guilty of the blood of 
an innocent man." And the 
bloodshed will be atoned for. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
' Forgive Your people Israel 
whom You have redeemed, 
O LORD, and do not place 
the guilt of innocent blood 
in the midst of Your people 
Israel.' And the 
bloodguiltiness shall be 
forgiven them. 
 (ASV) 
Forgive, O Jehovah, thy 
people Israel, whom thou 
hast redeemed, and suffer not 
innocent blood to remain in 
the midst of thy people 
Israel. And the blood shall be 
forgiven them. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Be merciful, O LORD, unto 
thy people Israel, whom thou 
hast redeemed, and lay not 
innocent blood unto thy 
people of Israel's charge. 
And the blood shall be 
forgiven them. 
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Deuteronomy 
21:9 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
So you will purge from 
yourselves the guilt of 
shedding innocent blood, 
since you have done what is 
right in the eyes of the 
LORD. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
So you will purge from 
yourselves the guilt of 
shedding innocent blood, 
since you have done what is 
right in the eyes of the 
LORD. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
" So you shall remove the 
guilt of innocent blood from 
your midst, when you do 
what is right in the eyes of 
the LORD. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
So shalt thou put away the 
innocent blood from the 
midst of thee, when thou 
shalt do that which is right in 
the eyes of Jehovah. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
So shalt thou put away the 
guilt of innocent blood from 
among you, when thou shalt 
do that which is right in the 
sight of the LORD. 
 
 
Deuteronomy 
25:1 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
When people have a dispute, 
they are to take it to court 
and the judges will decide 
the case, acquitting the 
innocent and condemning 
the guilty. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
When men have a dispute, 
they are to take it to court 
and the judges will decide 
the case, acquitting the 
innocent and condemning 
the guilty. 
 
 
justify the righteous justify the righteous justify the righteous 
Deuteronomy 
27:25 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
"Cursed is anyone who 
accepts a bribe to kill an 
innocent person." Then all 
the people shall say, 
"Amen!" 
 
 
 (NIV) 
"Cursed is the man who 
accepts a bribe to kill an 
innocent person." Then all 
the people shall say, 
"Amen!" 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Cursed is he who accepts a 
bribe to strike down an 
innocent person.' And all the 
people shall say, 'Amen.' 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Cursed be he that taketh a 
bribe to slay an innocent 
person. And all the people 
shall say, Amen. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Cursed be he that taketh 
reward to slay an innocent 
person. And all the people 
shall say, Amen. 
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Judges 21:22 
 
‘asham 
 (TNIV) 
When their fathers or 
brothers complain to us, we 
will say to them, 'Do us a 
kindness by helping them, 
because we did not get wives 
for them during the war, and 
you are innocent, since you 
did not give your daughters 
to them.' " 
 
 
 (NIV) 
When their fathers or 
brothers complain to us, we 
will say to them, 'Do us a 
kindness by helping them, 
because we did not get wives 
for them during the war, and 
you are innocent, since you 
did not give your daughters 
to them.' " 
 
 
would now be guilty would  ye should be guilty that ye should be guilty 
1 Samuel 19:5 
 
chinnam 
 (TNIV) 
He took his life in his hands 
when he killed the Philistine. 
The LORD won a great 
victory for all Israel, and you 
saw it and were glad. Why 
then would you do wrong to 
an innocent man like David 
by killing him for no 
reason?" 
 
 
 (NIV) 
He took his life in his hands 
when he killed the Philistine. 
The LORD won a great 
victory for all Israel, and you 
saw it and were glad. Why 
then would you do wrong to 
an innocent man like David 
by killing him for no 
reason?" 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"For he took his life in his 
hand and struck the 
Philistine, and the LORD 
brought about a great 
deliverance for all Israel; you 
saw it and rejoiced Why then 
will you sin against innocent 
blood by putting David to 
death without a cause?" 
 
 
 (ASV) 
for he put his life in his hand, 
and smote the Philistine, and 
Jehovah wrought a great 
victory for all Israel: thou 
sawest it, and didst rejoice; 
wherefore then wilt thou sin 
against innocent blood, to 
slay David without a cause? 
 
 
 (KJV) 
For he did put his life in his 
hand, and slew the Philistine, 
and the LORD wrought a 
great salvation for all Israel: 
thou sawest it, and didst 
rejoice: wherefore then wilt 
thou sin against innocent 
blood, to slay David without 
a cause? 
 
 
2 Samuel 3:28 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
Later, when David heard 
about this, he said, "I and my 
kingdom are forever 
innocent before the LORD 
concerning the blood of 
Abner son of Ner. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Later, when David heard 
about this, he said, "I and my 
kingdom are forever 
innocent before the LORD 
concerning the blood of 
Abner son of Ner. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Afterward when David heard 
it, he said, "I and my 
kingdom are innocent before 
the LORD forever of the 
blood of Abner the son of 
Ner. 
 
 
guiltless guiltless 
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2 Samuel 4:11 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
How much more—when 
wicked men have killed an 
innocent man in his own 
house and on his own bed—
should I not now demand his 
blood from your hand and rid 
the earth of you!" 
 
 
 (NIV) 
How much more—when 
wicked men have killed an 
innocent man in his own 
house and on his own bed—
should I not now demand his 
blood from your hand and rid 
the earth of you!" 
 
 
righteous man a righteous person righteousness 
2 Samuel 
15:11 
 
tom 
 (TNIV) 
Two hundred men from 
Jerusalem had accompanied 
Absalom. They had been 
invited as guests and went 
quite innocently, knowing 
nothing about the matter. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Two hundred men from 
Jerusalem had accompanied 
Absalom. They had been 
invited as guests and went 
quite innocently, knowing 
nothing about the matter. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Then two hundred men went 
with Absalom from 
Jerusalem, who were invited 
and went innocently, and 
they did not know anything. 
 
 
went in their simplicity went in their simplicity 
1 Kings 2:9 
 
naqah 
 (TNIV) 
But now, do not consider 
him innocent. You are a 
man of wisdom; you will 
know what to do to him. 
Bring his gray head down to 
the grave in blood." 
 
 
 (NIV) 
But now, do not consider 
him innocent. You are a 
man of wisdom; you will 
know what to do to him. 
Bring his gray head down to 
the grave in blood." 
 
 
do not let him go 
unpunished not guiltless not guiltless 
1 Kings 2:31 
 
chinnam 
 (TNIV) 
Then the king commanded 
Benaiah, "Do as he says. 
Strike him down and bury 
him, and so clear me and my 
family line of the guilt of the 
innocent blood that Joab 
shed. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Then the king commanded 
Benaiah, "Do as he says. 
Strike him down and bury 
him, and so clear me and my 
father's house of the guilt of 
the innocent blood that Joab 
shed. 
 
 
blood…shed without 
cause 
blood…shed without 
cause 
 (KJV) 
And the king said unto him, 
Do as he hath said, and fall 
upon him, and bury him; that 
thou mayest take away the 
innocent blood, which Joab 
shed, from me, and from the 
house of my father. 
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1 Kings 8:32 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
then hear from heaven and 
act. Judge between your 
servants, condemning the 
guilty by bringing down on 
their heads what they have 
done, and vindicating the 
innocent by treating them in 
accordance with their 
innocence. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
then hear from heaven and 
act. Judge between your 
servants, condemning the 
guilty and bringing down on 
his own head what he has 
done. Declare the innocent 
not guilty, and so establish 
his innocence. 
 
 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
2 Kings 10:9 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
The next morning Jehu went 
out. He stood before all the 
people and said, "You are 
innocent. It was I who 
conspired against my master 
and killed him, but who 
killed all these? 
 
 
 (NIV) 
The next morning Jehu went 
out. He stood before all the 
people and said, "You are 
innocent. It was I who 
conspired against my master 
and killed him, but who 
killed all these? 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Now in the morning he went 
out and stood and said to all 
the people, "You are 
innocent; behold, I 
conspired against my master 
and killed him, but who 
killed all these? 
 
 
ye are righteous ye be righteous 
2 Kings 21:16 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
Moreover, Manasseh also 
shed so much innocent 
blood that he filled 
Jerusalem from end to end—
besides the sin that he had 
caused Judah to commit, so 
that they did evil in the eyes 
of the LORD. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Moreover, Manasseh also 
shed so much innocent 
blood that he filled 
Jerusalem from end to end—
besides the sin that he had 
caused Judah to commit, so 
that they did evil in the eyes 
of the LORD. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Moreover, Manasseh shed 
very much innocent blood 
until he had filled Jerusalem 
from one end to another; 
besides his sin with which he 
made Judah sin, in doing evil 
in the sight of the LORD. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Moreover Manasseh shed 
innocent blood very much, 
till he had filled Jerusalem 
from one end to another; 
besides his sin wherewith he 
made Judah to sin, in doing 
that which was evil in the 
sight of Jehovah. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Moreover Manasseh shed 
innocent blood very much, 
till he had filled Jerusalem 
from one end to another; 
beside his sin wherewith he 
made Judah to sin, in doing 
that which was evil in the 
sight of the LORD. 
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2 Kings 24:4 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
including the shedding of 
innocent blood. For he had 
filled Jerusalem with 
innocent blood, and the 
LORD was not willing to 
forgive. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
including the shedding of 
innocent blood. For he had 
filled Jerusalem with 
innocent blood, and the 
LORD was not willing to 
forgive. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
and also for the innocent 
blood which he shed, for he 
filled Jerusalem with 
innocent blood; and the 
LORD would not forgive. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
and also for the innocent 
blood that he shed; for he 
filled Jerusalem with 
innocent blood: and Jehovah 
would not pardon. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
And also for the innocent 
blood that he shed: for he 
filled Jerusalem with 
innocent blood; which the 
LORD would not pardon. 
 
 
2 Chronicles 
6:23 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
then hear from heaven and 
act. Judge between your 
servants, condemning the 
guilty and bringing down on 
their heads what they have 
done, and vindicating the 
innocent by treating them in 
accordance with their 
innocence. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
then hear from heaven and 
act. Judge between your 
servants, repaying the guilty 
by bringing down on his own 
head what he has done. 
Declare the innocent not 
guilty and so establish his 
innocence. 
 
 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
justifying the righteous 
 
according to his 
righteousness 
Job 4:7 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
"Consider now: Who, being 
innocent, has ever perished? 
Where were the upright ever 
destroyed? 
 
 
 (NIV) 
"Consider now: Who, being 
innocent, has ever perished? 
Where were the upright ever 
destroyed? 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"Remember now, who ever 
perished being innocent?Or 
where were the upright 
destroyed? 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Remember, I pray thee, who 
ever perished, being 
innocent? Or where were the 
upright cut off? 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Remember, I pray thee, who 
ever perished, being 
innocent? or where were the 
righteous cut off? 
 
 
Job 9:15 
 
tsadeq 
 (TNIV) 
Though I were innocent, I 
could not answer him; I 
could only plead with my 
Judge for mercy. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Though I were innocent, I 
could not answer him; I 
could only plead with my 
Judge for mercy. 
 
 
righteous righteous righteous 
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Job 9:20 
 
tsadeq 
 (TNIV) 
Even if I were innocent, my 
mouth would condemn me; 
if I were blameless, it would 
pronounce me guilty. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Even if I were innocent, my 
mouth would condemn me; 
if I were blameless, it would 
pronounce me guilty. 
 
 
  If I justify myself 
Job 9:23 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
When a scourge brings 
sudden death, he mocks the 
despair of the innocent. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
When a scourge brings 
sudden death, he mocks the 
despair of the innocent. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"If the scourge kills 
suddenly,He mocks the 
despair of the innocent. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
If the scourge slay suddenly, 
He will mock at the trial of 
the innocent. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
If the scourge slay suddenly, 
he will laugh at the trial of 
the innocent. 
 
 
Job 9:28 
 
naqah 
 (TNIV) 
I still dread all my 
sufferings, for I know you 
will not hold me innocent. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
I still dread all my 
sufferings, for I know you 
will not hold me innocent. 
 
 
you will not acquit me 
 (ASV) 
I am afraid of all my 
sorrows, I know that thou 
wilt not hold me innocent. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
I am afraid of all my 
sorrows, I know that thou 
wilt not hold me innocent. 
 
 
Job 10:15 
 
tsadeq 
 (TNIV) 
If I am guilty—woe to me! 
Even if I am innocent, I 
cannot lift my head, for I am 
full of shame and drowned in 
my affliction. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
If I am guilty—woe to me! 
Even if I am innocent, I 
cannot lift my head, for I am 
full of shame and drowned in 
my affliction. 
 
 
if I am righteous if I be righteous if I be righteous 
Job 11:4 
 
bar 
I am pure I am pure 
 (NASB) 
"For you have said, 'My 
teaching is pure,And I am 
innocent in your eyes.' 
 
 
I am clean I am pure 
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Job 17:8 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
The upright are appalled at 
this; the innocent are 
aroused against the ungodly. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Upright men are appalled at 
this; the innocent are 
aroused against the ungodly. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"The upright will be appalled 
at this,And the innocent will 
stir up himself against the 
godless. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Upright men shall be 
astonished at this, And the 
innocent shall stir up 
himself against the godless. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Upright men shall be 
astonied at this, and the 
innocent shall stir up 
himself against the 
hypocrite. 
 
 
Job 22:19 
 
naqiy 
 
tsaddiyq 
 
 (TNIV) 
The righteous see their ruin 
and rejoice; the innocent 
mock them, saying, 
 
 
 (NIV) 
"The righteous see their ruin 
and rejoice; the innocent 
mock them, saying, 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"The righteous see and are 
glad,And the innocent mock 
them, 
 
 
 (ASV) 
The righteous see it, and are 
glad; And the innocent 
laugh them to scorn, 
 
 
 (KJV) 
The righteous see it, and are 
glad: and the innocent laugh 
them to scorn. 
 
 
Job 22:30 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
He will deliver even one who 
is not innocent, who will be 
delivered through the 
cleanness of your hands." 
 
 
 (NIV) 
He will deliver even one who 
is not innocent, who will be 
delivered through the 
cleanness of your hands." 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"He will deliver one who is 
not innocent,And he will be 
delivered through the 
cleanness of your hands." 
 
 
 (ASV) 
He will deliver even him that 
is not innocent: Yea, he 
shall be delivered through 
the cleanness of thy hands. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
He shall deliver the island of 
the innocent: and it is 
delivered by the pureness of 
thine hands. 
 
 
Job 27:17 
 
naqiy 
 
tsaddiyq 
 
 (TNIV) 
what he lays up the righteous 
will wear, and the innocent 
will divide his silver. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
what he lays up the righteous 
will wear, and the innocent 
will divide his silver. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
He may prepare it, but the 
just will wear itAnd the 
innocent will divide the 
silver. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
He may prepare it, but the 
just shall put it on, And the 
innocent shall divide the 
silver. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
He may prepare it, but the 
just shall put it on, and the 
innocent shall divide the 
silver. 
 
 
Job 33:9 
 
chaph 
I am clean I am clean 
 (NASB) 
'I am pure, without 
transgression;I am innocent 
and there is no guilt in me. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
I am clean, without 
transgression; I am innocent, 
neither is there iniquity in 
me: 
 
 (KJV) 
I am clean without 
transgression, I am innocent; 
neither is there iniquity in 
me. 
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Job 34:5 
 
tsadeq 
 (TNIV) 
"Job says, 'I am innocent, 
but God denies me justice. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
"Job says, 'I am innocent, 
but God denies me justice. 
 
 
I am righteous I am pure I am righteous 
Psalm 10:8 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
They lie in wait near the 
villages; from ambush they 
murder the innocent. Their 
eyes watch in secret for their 
victims; 
 
 
 (NIV) 
He lies in wait near the 
villages; from ambush he 
murders the innocent, 
watching in secret for his 
victims. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
He sits in the lurking places 
of the villages;In the hiding 
places he kills the innocent; 
His eyes stealthily watch for 
the unfortunate. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
He sitteth in the lurking-
places of the villages; In the 
secret places doth he murder 
the innocent; His eyes are 
privily set against the 
helpless. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
He sitteth in the lurking 
places of the villages: in the 
secret places doth he murder 
the innocent: his eyes are 
privily set against the poor. 
 
 
Psalm 10:10 
 
cheleka 
 (TNIV) 
[The innocent] are crushed, 
they collapse; they fall 
victim to superior strength. 
 
 
his victims are crushed the unfortunate fall the helpless fall  the poor may fall  
Psalm 15:5 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
who lend money to the poor 
without interest and do not 
accept bribes against the 
innocent. Whoever does 
these things will never be 
shaken. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
who lends his money without 
usury and does not accept a 
bribe against the innocent. 
He who does these things 
will never be shaken. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
He does not put out his 
money at interest,Nor does 
he take a bribe against the 
innocent He who does these 
things will never be shaken. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
He that putteth not out his 
money to interest, Nor taketh 
reward against the innocent. 
He that doeth these things 
shall never be moved. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
He that putteth not out his 
money to usury, nor taketh 
reward against the innocent. 
He that doeth these things 
shall never be moved. 
 
 
Psalm 19:13 
 
naqah 
 (TNIV) 
Keep your servant also from 
willful sins; may they not 
rule over me. Then I will be 
blameless, innocent of great 
transgression. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Keep your servant also from 
willful sins; may they not 
rule over me. Then will I be 
blameless, innocent of great 
transgression. 
 
 
be acquitted of  be clear 
 (KJV) 
Keep back thy servant also 
from presumptuous sins; let 
them not have dominion over 
me: then shall I be upright, 
and I shall be innocent from 
the great transgression. 
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Psalm 64:4 
 
tam 
 (TNIV) 
They shoot from ambush at 
the innocent; they shoot 
suddenly, without fear. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
They shoot from ambush at 
the innocent man; they shoot 
at him suddenly, without 
fear. 
 
 
the blameless the perfect the perfect 
Psalm 94:21 
 
naqiy 
 
tsaddiyq 
 
 (TNIV) 
The wicked band together 
against the righteous and 
condemn the innocent to 
death. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
They band together against 
the righteous and condemn 
the innocent to death. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
They band themselves 
together against the life of 
the righteousAnd condemn 
the innocent to death. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
They gather themselves 
together against the soul of 
the righteous, And condemn 
the innocent blood. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
They gather themselves 
together against the soul of 
the righteous, and condemn 
the innocent blood. 
 
 
Psalm 106:38 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
They shed innocent blood, 
the blood of their sons and 
daughters, whom they 
sacrificed to the idols of 
Canaan, and the land was 
desecrated by their blood. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
They shed innocent blood, 
the blood of their sons and 
daughters, whom they 
sacrificed to the idols of 
Canaan, and the land was 
desecrated by their blood. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
And shed innocent 
blood,The blood of their sons 
and their daughters,Whom 
they sacrificed to the idols of 
Canaan;And the land was 
polluted with the blood. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
And shed innocent blood, 
Even the blood of their sons 
and of their daughters, 
Whom they sacrificed unto 
the idols of Canaan; And the 
land was polluted with 
blood. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
And shed innocent blood, 
even the blood of their sons 
and of their daughters, whom 
they sacrificed unto the idols 
of Canaan: and the land was 
polluted with blood. 
 
 
Proverbs 1:11 
 
naqiy 
 
chinnam 
 (TNIV) 
If they say, "Come along 
with us; let's lie in wait for 
innocent blood, let's ambush 
some harmless soul; 
 
 
for someones’s 
blood…some harmless 
soul 
 (NASB) 
If they say, "Come with 
us,Let us lie in wait for 
blood,Let us ambush the 
innocent without cause; 
 
 
 (ASV) 
If they say, Come with us, 
Let us lay wait for blood; Let 
us lurk privily for the 
innocent without cause; 
 
 
 (KJV) 
If they say, Come with us, let 
us lay wait for blood, let us 
lurk privily for the innocent 
without cause: 
 
 
Proverbs 6:17 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
haughty eyes, a lying tongue, 
hands that shed innocent 
blood, 
 
 
 (NIV) 
haughty eyes, a lying tongue, 
hands that shed innocent 
blood, 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Haughty eyes, a lying 
tongue,And hands that shed 
innocent blood, 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Haughty eyes, a lying 
tongue, And hands that shed 
innocent blood; 
 
 
 (KJV) 
A proud look, a lying tongue, 
and hands that shed innocent 
blood, 
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Proverbs 6:29 
 
naqah 
will go unpunished will go unpunished not go unpunished not be unpunished 
 (KJV) 
So he that goeth in to his 
neighbour's wife; whosoever 
toucheth her shall not be 
innocent. 
 
 
Proverbs 
12:13 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
Evildoers are trapped by 
their sinful talk, and so the 
innocent escape trouble. 
 
 
a righteous man the righteous will the righteous shall the just shall 
Proverbs 16:2 
 
zak 
ways are pure 
 (NIV) 
All a man's ways seem 
innocent to him, but motives 
are weighed by the LORD. 
 
 
are clean in his are clean in his are clean in his 
Proverbs 
17:15 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
Acquitting the guilty and 
condemning the innocent— 
the LORD detests them both. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Acquitting the guilty and 
condemning the innocent— 
the LORD detests them both. 
 
 
condemns the righteous condemneth the righteous condemneth the just 
Proverbs 
17:26 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
If imposing a fine on the 
innocent is not good, surely 
to flog honest officials is not 
right. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
It is not good to punish an 
innocent man, or to flog 
officials for their integrity. 
 
 
fine the righteous to punish the righteous to punish the just is not 
Proverbs 18:5 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
It is not good to be partial to 
the wicked and so deprive 
the innocent of justice. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
It is not good to be partial to 
the wicked or to deprive the 
innocent of justice. 
 
 
thrust aside the 
righteous turn aside the righteous overthrow the righteous 
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Proverbs 21:8 
 
zak 
 (TNIV) 
The way of the guilty is 
devious, but the conduct of 
the innocent is upright. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
The way of the guilty is 
devious, but the conduct of 
the innocent is upright. 
 
 
as for the pure as for the pure as for the pure 
Proverbs 
24:24 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
Whoever says to the guilty, 
"You are innocent," will be 
cursed by peoples and 
denounced by nations. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Whoever says to the guilty, 
"You are innocent"— 
peoples will curse him and 
nations denounce him. 
 
 
you are righteous thou are righteous thou are righteous 
Proverbs 
28:20 
 
naqah 
will not go unpunished will not go unpunished will not go unpunished will not be unpunished 
 (KJV) 
A faithful man shall abound 
with blessings: but he that 
maketh haste to be rich shall 
not be innocent. 
 
 
Isaiah 5:23 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
who acquit the guilty for a 
bribe, but deny justice to the 
innocent. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
who acquit the guilty for a 
bribe, but deny justice to the 
innocent. 
 
 
who are in the right the righteousness of the righteous from him 
the righteousness of the 
righteous from him 
Isaiah 29:21 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
those who with a word make 
someone out to be guilty, 
who ensnare the defender in 
court and with false 
testimony deprive the 
innocent of justice. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
those who with a word make 
a man out to be guilty, who 
ensnare the defender in court 
and with false testimony 
deprive the innocent of 
justice. 
 
 
the one in the right aside the just aside the just 
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Isaiah 59:7 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
Their feet rush into sin; they 
are swift to shed innocent 
blood. They pursue evil 
schemes; acts of violence 
mark their ways. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Their feet rush into sin; they 
are swift to shed innocent 
blood. Their thoughts are 
evil thoughts; ruin and 
destruction mark their ways. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Their feet run to evil,And 
they hasten to shed innocent 
blood; Their thoughts are 
thoughts of 
iniquity,Devastation and 
destruction are in their 
highways. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Their feet run to evil, and 
they make haste to shed 
innocent blood: their 
thoughts are thoughts of 
iniquity; desolation and 
destruction are in their paths. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Their feet run to evil, and 
they make haste to shed 
innocent blood: their 
thoughts are thoughts of 
iniquity; wasting and 
destruction are in their paths. 
 
 
Jeremiah 2:34 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
On your clothes is found the 
lifeblood of the innocent 
poor, though you did not 
catch them breaking in. Yet 
in spite of all this 
 
 
 (NIV) 
On your clothes men find the 
lifeblood of the innocent 
poor, though you did not 
catch them breaking in. Yet 
in spite of all this 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"Also on your skirts is 
foundThe lifeblood of the 
innocent poor;You did not 
find them breaking in.But in 
spite of all these things, 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Also in thy skirts is found 
the blood of the souls of the 
innocent poor: thou didst not 
find them breaking in; but it 
is because of all these things. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Also in thy skirts is found 
the blood of the souls of the 
poor innocents: I have not 
found it by secret search, but 
upon all these. 
 
 
Jeremiah 2:35 
 
naqah 
 (TNIV) 
you say, 'I am innocent; he 
is not angry with me.' But I 
will pass judgment on you 
because you say, 'I have not 
sinned.' 
 
 
 (NIV) 
you say, 'I am innocent; he 
is not angry with me.' But I 
will pass judgment on you 
because you say, 'I have not 
sinned.' 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Yet you said, 'I am 
innocent;Surely His anger is 
turned away from 
me.'Behold, I will enter into 
judgment with youBecause 
you say, 'I have not sinned.' 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Yet thou saidst, I am 
innocent; surely his anger is 
turned away from me. 
Behold, I will enter into 
judgment with thee, because 
thou sayest, I have not 
sinned. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Yet thou sayest, Because I 
am innocent, surely his 
anger shall turn from me. 
Behold, I will plead with 
thee, because thou sayest, I 
have not sinned. 
 
 
Jeremiah 7:6 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
if you do not oppress the 
foreigner, the fatherless or 
the widow and do not shed 
innocent blood in this place, 
and if you do not follow 
other gods to your own 
harm, 
 
 
 (NIV) 
if you do not oppress the 
alien, the fatherless or the 
widow and do not shed 
innocent blood in this place, 
and if you do not follow 
other gods to your own 
harm, 
 
 
 (NASB) 
if you do not oppress the 
alien, the orphan, or the 
widow, and do not shed 
innocent blood in this place, 
nor walk after other gods to 
your own ruin, 
 
 
 (ASV) 
if ye oppress not the 
sojourner, the fatherless, and 
the widow, and shed not 
innocent blood in this place, 
neither walk after other gods 
to your own hurt: 
 
 
 (KJV) 
If ye oppress not the 
stranger, the fatherless, and 
the widow, and shed not 
innocent blood in this place, 
neither walk after other gods 
to your hurt: 
 
 
Appendix A: Bible Comparison Table 
 
 
Jeremiah 19:4 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
For they have forsaken me 
and made this a place of 
foreign gods; they have 
burned incense in it to gods 
that neither they nor their 
ancestors nor the kings of 
Judah ever knew, and they 
have filled this place with the 
blood of the innocent. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
For they have forsaken me 
and made this a place of 
foreign gods; they have 
burned sacrifices in it to gods 
that neither they nor their 
fathers nor the kings of 
Judah ever knew, and they 
have filled this place with the 
blood of the innocent. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"Because they have forsaken 
Me and have made this an 
alien place and have burned 
sacrifices in it to other gods, 
that neither they nor their 
forefathers nor the kings of 
Judah had ever known, and 
because they have filled this 
place with the blood of the 
innocent 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Because they have forsaken 
me, and have estranged this 
place, and have burned 
incense in it unto other gods, 
that they knew not, they and 
their fathers and the kings of 
Judah; and have filled this 
place with the blood of 
innocents, 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Because they have forsaken 
me, and have estranged this 
place, and have burned 
incense in it unto other gods, 
whom neither they nor their 
fathers have known, nor the 
kings of Judah, and have 
filled this place with the 
blood of innocents; 
 
 
Jeremiah 22:3 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
This is what the LORD says: 
Do what is just and right. 
Rescue from the hands of 
their oppressors those who 
have been robbed. Do no 
wrong or violence to the 
foreigner, the fatherless or 
the widow, and do not shed 
innocent blood in this place. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
This is what the LORD says: 
Do what is just and right. 
Rescue from the hand of his 
oppressor the one who has 
been robbed. Do no wrong or 
violence to the alien, the 
fatherless or the widow, and 
do not shed innocent blood 
in this place. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
'Thus says the LORD, " Do 
justice and righteousness, 
and deliver the one who has 
been robbed from the power 
of his oppressor Also do not 
mistreat or do violence to the 
stranger, the orphan, or the 
widow; and do not shed 
innocent blood in this place. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Thus saith Jehovah: Execute 
ye justice and righteousness, 
and deliver him that is 
robbed out of the hand of the 
oppressor: and do no wrong, 
do no violence, to the 
sojourner, the fatherless, nor 
the widow; neither shed 
innocent blood in this place. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Thus saith the LORD; 
Execute ye judgment and 
righteousness, and deliver 
the spoiled out of the hand of 
the oppressor: and do no 
wrong, do no violence to the 
stranger, the fatherless, nor 
the widow, neither shed 
innocent blood in this place. 
 
 
Jeremiah 
22:17 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
"But your eyes and your 
heart are set only on 
dishonest gain, on shedding 
innocent blood and on 
oppression and extortion." 
 
 
 (NIV) 
"But your eyes and your 
heart are set only on 
dishonest gain, on shedding 
innocent blood and on 
oppression and extortion." 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"But your eyes and your 
heartAre intent only upon 
your own dishonest gain,And 
on shedding innocent 
bloodAnd on practicing 
oppression and extortion." 
 
 
 (ASV) 
But thine eyes and thy heart 
are not but for thy 
covetousness, and for 
shedding innocent blood, 
and for oppression, and for 
violence, to do it. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
But thine eyes and thine 
heart are not but for thy 
covetousness, and for to shed 
innocent blood, and for 
oppression, and for violence, 
to do it. 
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Jeremiah 
26:15 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
Be assured, however, that if 
you put me to death, you will 
bring the guilt of innocent 
blood on yourselves and on 
this city and on those who 
live in it, for in truth the 
LORD has sent me to you to 
speak all these words in your 
hearing." 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Be assured, however, that if 
you put me to death, you will 
bring the guilt of innocent 
blood on yourselves and on 
this city and on those who 
live in it, for in truth the 
LORD has sent me to you to 
speak all these words in your 
hearing." 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"Only know for certain that 
if you put me to death, you 
will bring innocent blood on 
yourselves, and on this city 
and on its inhabitants; for 
truly the LORD has sent me 
to you to speak all these 
words in your hearing." 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Only know ye for certain 
that, if ye put me to death, ye 
will bring innocent blood 
upon yourselves, and upon 
this city, and upon the 
inhabitants thereof; for of a 
truth Jehovah hath sent me 
unto you to speak all these 
words in your ears. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
But know ye for certain, that 
if ye put me to death, ye 
shall surely bring innocent 
blood upon yourselves, and 
upon this city, and upon the 
inhabitants thereof: for of a 
truth the LORD hath sent me 
unto you to speak all these 
words in your ears. 
 
 
Daniel 6:22 
 
zakuw 
 (TNIV) 
My God sent his angel, and 
he shut the mouths of the 
lions. They have not hurt me, 
because I was found 
innocent in his sight. Nor 
have I ever done any wrong 
before you, Your Majesty." 
 
 
 (NIV) 
My God sent his angel, and 
he shut the mouths of the 
lions. They have not hurt me, 
because I was found 
innocent in his sight. Nor 
have I ever done any wrong 
before you, O king." 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"My God sent His angel and 
shut the lions' mouths and 
they have not harmed me, 
inasmuch as I was found 
innocent before Him; and 
also toward you, O king, I 
have committed no crime." 
 
 
innocency innocency 
Joel 3:19 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
But Egypt will be desolate, 
Edom a desert waste, 
because of violence done to 
the people of Judah, in 
whose land they shed 
innocent blood. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
But Egypt will be desolate, 
Edom a desert waste, 
because of violence done to 
the people of Judah, in 
whose land they shed 
innocent blood. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Egypt will become a 
waste,And Edom will 
become a desolate 
wilderness,Because of the 
violence done to the sons of 
Judah,In whose land they 
have shed innocent blood. 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Egypt shall be a desolation, 
and Edom shall be a desolate 
wilderness, for the violence 
done to the children of 
Judah, because they have 
shed innocent blood in their 
land. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Egypt shall be a desolation, 
and Edom shall be a desolate 
wilderness, for the violence 
against the children of Judah, 
because they have shed 
innocent blood in their land. 
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Joel 3:21 
 
naqah 
 (TNIV) 
Shall I leave their innocent 
blood unpunished? No, I will 
not." The LORD dwells in 
Zion! 
 
 
their bloodguilt avenge their blood I will cleanse their blood 
I shall cleanse their 
blood 
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Amos 2:6 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
[ Judgment on Israel ] This 
is what the LORD says: "For 
three sins of Israel, even for 
four, I will not turn back [my 
wrath]. They sell the 
innocent for silver, and the 
needy for a pair of sandals. 
 
 
the righteous for silver the righteous for money the righteous for silver the righteous for silver 
Amos 5:12 
 
tsaddiyq 
 (TNIV) 
For I know how many are 
your offenses and how great 
your sins. There are those 
who oppress the innocent 
and take bribes and deprive 
the poor of justice in the 
courts. 
 
 
oppress the righteous distress the righteous afflict the just afflict the just 
Jonah 1:14 
 
naqiy 
 (TNIV) 
Then they cried out to the 
LORD, "Please, LORD, do 
not let us die for taking this 
man's life. Do not hold us 
accountable for killing an 
innocent man, for you, 
LORD, have done as you 
pleased." 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Then they cried to the 
LORD, "O LORD, please do 
not let us die for taking this 
man's life. Do not hold us 
accountable for killing an 
innocent man, for you, O 
LORD, have done as you 
pleased." 
 
 
 (NASB) 
Then they called on the 
LORD and said, "We 
earnestly pray, O LORD, do 
not let us perish on account 
of this man's life and do not 
put innocent blood on us; for 
You, O LORD, have done as 
You have pleased." 
 
 
 (ASV) 
Wherefore they cried unto 
Jehovah, and said, We 
beseech thee, O Jehovah, we 
beseech thee, let us not 
perish for this man's life, and 
lay not upon us innocent 
blood; for thou, O Jehovah, 
hast done as it pleased thee. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
Wherefore they cried unto 
the LORD, and said, We 
beseech thee, O LORD, we 
beseech thee, let us not 
perish for this man's life, and 
lay not upon us innocent 
blood: for thou, O LORD, 
hast done as it pleased thee. 
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New 
Testament 
  
 
  
      
Matthew 
10:16 
 
akeraios 
 (TNIV) 
"I am sending you out like 
sheep among wolves. 
Therefore be as shrewd as 
snakes and as innocent as 
doves. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
I am sending you out like 
sheep among wolves. 
Therefore be as shrewd as 
snakes and as innocent as 
doves. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
[ A Hard Road before Them ] 
" Behold, I send you out as 
sheep in the midst of wolves; 
so be shrewd as serpents and 
innocent as doves. 
 
 
and harmless as doves and harmless as doves 
Matthew 12:5 
 
anaitios 
 (TNIV) 
Or haven't you read in the 
Law that the priests on 
Sabbath duty in the temple 
desecrate the Sabbath and 
yet are innocent? 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Or haven't you read in the 
Law that on the Sabbath the 
priests in the temple 
desecrate the day and yet are 
innocent? 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"Or have you not read in the 
Law, that on the Sabbath the 
priests in the temple break 
the Sabbath and are 
innocent? 
 
 
and are guiltless? and are blameless? 
Matthew 12:7 
 
anaitios 
 (TNIV) 
If you had known what these 
words mean, 'I desire mercy, 
not sacrifice,' you would not 
have condemned the 
innocent. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
If you had known what these 
words mean, 'I desire mercy, 
not sacrifice,' you would not 
have condemned the 
innocent. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"But if you had known what 
this means, ' I DESIRE 
COMPASSION, AND NOT 
A SACRIFICE,' you would 
not have condemned the 
innocent. 
 
 
condemned the guiltless condemned the guiltless 
Matthew 27:4 
 
athoos 
 (TNIV) 
"I have sinned," he said, "for 
I have betrayed innocent 
blood." "What is that to us?" 
they replied. "That's your 
responsibility." 
 
 
 (NIV) 
"I have sinned," he said, "for 
I have betrayed innocent 
blood." "What is that to us?" 
they replied. "That's your 
responsibility." 
 
 
 (NASB) 
saying, "I have sinned by 
betraying innocent blood." 
But they said, "What is that 
to us? See to that yourself!" 
 
 
 (ASV) 
saying, I have sinned in that I 
betrayed innocent blood. 
But they said, What is that to 
us? see thou to it. 
 
 
(KJV) 
Saying, I have sinned in that 
I have betrayed the innocent 
blood. And they said, What 
is that to us? see thou to that. 
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Matthew 
27:19 
 
dikaios 
 (TNIV) 
While Pilate was sitting on 
the judge's seat, his wife sent 
him this message: "Don't 
have anything to do with that 
innocent man, for I have 
suffered a great deal today in 
a dream because of him." 
 
 
 (NIV) 
While Pilate was sitting on 
the judge's seat, his wife sent 
him this message: "Don't 
have anything to do with that 
innocent man, for I have 
suffered a great deal today in 
a dream because of him." 
 
 
that righteous Man that righteous man that just man 
Matthew 
27:24 
 
athoos 
 (TNIV) 
When Pilate saw that he was 
getting nowhere, but that 
instead an uproar was 
starting, he took water and 
washed his hands in front of 
the crowd. "I am innocent of 
this man's blood," he said. "It 
is your responsibility!" 
 
 
 (NIV) 
When Pilate saw that he was 
getting nowhere, but that 
instead an uproar was 
starting, he took water and 
washed his hands in front of 
the crowd. "I am innocent of 
this man's blood," he said. "It 
is your responsibility!" 
 
 
 (NASB) 
When Pilate saw that he was 
accomplishing nothing, but 
rather that a riot was starting, 
he took water and washed his 
hands in front of the crowd, 
saying, "I am innocent of 
this Man's blood; see to that 
yourselves." 
 
 
 (ASV) 
So when Pilate saw that he 
prevailed nothing, but rather 
that a tumult was arising, he 
took water, and washed his 
hands before the multitude, 
saying, I am innocent of the 
blood of this righteous man; 
see ye to it. 
 
 
 (KJV) 
When Pilate saw that he 
could prevail nothing, but 
that rather a tumult was 
made, he took water, and 
washed his hands before the 
multitude, saying, I am 
innocent of the blood of this 
just person: see ye to it. 
 
 
Luke 23:47 
 
dikaios 
was a righteous man was a righteous man 
 (NASB) 
Now when the centurion saw 
what had happened, he began 
praising God, saying, 
"Certainly this man was 
innocent." 
 
 
was a righteous man was a righteous man 
Acts 18:6 
 
katharos 
 (TNIV) 
But when they opposed Paul 
and became abusive, he 
shook out his clothes in 
protest and said to them, 
"Your blood be on your own 
heads! I am innocent of it. 
From now on I will go to the 
Gentiles." 
I am clear of  I am clean I am clean I am clean 
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Acts 20:26 
 
katharos 
 (TNIV) 
Therefore, I declare to you 
today that I am innocent of 
the blood of everyone. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Therefore, I declare to you 
today that I am innocent of 
the blood of all men. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
"Therefore, I testify to you 
this day that I am innocent 
of the blood of all men. 
 
 
I am pure from I am pure from 
Romans 16:18 
 
akakos 
minds of naïve people minds of naïve people the hearts of the unsuspecting 
 (ASV) 
For they that are such serve 
not our Lord Christ, but their 
own belly; and by their 
smooth and fair speech they 
beguile the hearts of the 
innocent. 
 
 
hearts of the simple 
Romans 16:19 
 
akeraios 
 (TNIV) 
Everyone has heard about 
your obedience, so I rejoice 
because of you; but I want 
you to be wise about what is 
good, and innocent about 
what is evil. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
Everyone has heard about 
your obedience, so I am full 
of joy over you; but I want 
you to be wise about what is 
good, and innocent about 
what is evil. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
For the report of your 
obedience has reached to all; 
therefore I am rejoicing over 
you, but I want you to be 
wise in what is good and 
innocent in what is evil. 
 
 
and simple unto that 
which is evil 
and simple concerning 
evil 
1 Corinthians 
4:4 
 
dikaioō 
 
 (TNIV) 
My conscience is clear, but 
that does not make me 
innocent. It is the Lord who 
judges me. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
My conscience is clear, but 
that does not make me 
innocent. It is the Lord who 
judges me. 
 
 
am not by this 
acquitted 
am I not hereby 
justified 
am I not hereby 
justified 
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2 Corinthians 
7:11 
 
hagnos 
 (TNIV) 
See what this godly sorrow 
has produced in you: what 
earnestness, what eagerness 
to clear yourselves, what 
indignation, what alarm, 
what longing, what concern, 
what readiness to see justice 
done. At every point you 
have proved yourselves to be 
innocent in this matter. 
 
 
 (NIV) 
See what this godly sorrow 
has produced in you: what 
earnestness, what eagerness 
to clear yourselves, what 
indignation, what alarm, 
what longing, what concern, 
what readiness to see justice 
done. At every point you 
have proved yourselves to be 
innocent in this matter. 
 
 
 (NASB) 
For behold what earnestness 
this very thing, this godly 
sorrow, has produced in you: 
what vindication of 
yourselves, what indignation, 
what fear, what longing, 
what zeal, what avenging of 
wrong! In everything you 
demonstrated yourselves to 
be innocent in the matter. 
 
 
to be pure in the matter to be clear in this matter 
Philippians 
2:15 
 
akeraios 
blameless and pure blameless and pure 
 (NASB) 
so that you will prove 
yourselves to be blameless 
and innocent, children of 
God above reproach in the 
midst of a crooked and 
perverse generation, among 
whom you appear as lights in 
the world, 
 
 
blameless and harmless blameless and harmless 
Hebrews 7:26 
 
akakos 
holy, blameless, pure holy, blameless, pure 
 (NASB) 
For it was fitting for us to 
have such a high priest, holy, 
innocent, undefiled, 
separated from sinners and 
exalted above the heavens; 
 
 
holy,  guileless 
undefiled 
holy,  harmless 
undefiled 
James 5:6 
 
dikaios 
(TNIV) 
You have condemned and 
murdered the innocent one, 
who was not opposing you. 
 
 
(NIV) 
You have condemned and 
murdered innocent men, 
who were not opposing you. 
 
 
put to death the 
righteous killed the righteous killed the just 
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